Friday, October 2, 2026

The Great Harmony Society in Chinese Thought

The Great Harmony (大同, Datong) is an ideal social order envisioned by classical Chinese Confucianism in the 6th century BCE. Receiving its first systematic exposition in The Book of Rites (禮記, Liji), specifically within the chapter 'The Conveyance of Rites,' its core philosophical bedrock is the principle that 'The World Belongs to the Public' (天下爲公, Tianxia Wei Gong).
 
» When the World Belongs to the Public. « 
Central 天下為公 passage from The Book of Rites.

This concept advocates for the public ownership of power, rejects hereditary systems (世袭, Shixi), and promotes a strict meritocracy by selecting the "worthy and capable" (選賢與能, Xuǎn). Economically, it advocates the public ownership of goods and wealth, emphasizes that all members of society fulfill their respective duties, ensures that the elderly, the weak, orphans, and widows are cared for, and aims to construct a public order characterized by equality and mutual assistance for all.
 
Sun Yat-sen, Three Principles of the People.
 
Pre-Qin Confucians (before 221 BCE) regarded it as an institutional design opposing monarchical power and advocating that power be chosen by the people. Han Confucians (202 BCE to 220 CE) cited the Abdication of Yao and Shun as examples but still did not depart from the framework of monarchical designation. During the Sui and Tang dynasties (581 to 907 CE), the principle of "selecting the worthy and capable" gradually evolved into the Imperial Examination System, deviating from the initial concept of popular election. Neo-Confucianism elevated its ethical principles into the philosophical concept of "The Unity of All Things." 
 
In modern times, Kang Youwei reinterpreted the traditional Confucian ideal of datong—the "Great Harmony"—as a vision of an egalitarian future society in his Book of Great Harmony (Datong shu), which he began developing in the 1880s and revised over the following decades. In 1906, Sun Yat-sen integrated datong into his political thought and the Three Principles of the People, particularly his Principle of Livelihood, which he associated with socialism, communism, and the realization of a society based on social equality and common welfare. 
 
However, this intellectual journey did not proceed directly from Kang's Confucian reformism to Chinese socialism. Rather, elements of the Confucian and Neo-Confucian traditions were repeatedly reinterpreted by successive generations and reconciled with nationalism, Marxism, socialism, and the requirements of modernization. After the Mao era, this increasingly involved recovering traditional culture as a resource compatible with socialist modernization.

Deng Xiaoping's formulation of 
Socialism with Chinese Characteristics (SWCC) in the early 1980s established the basis for pursuing socialism according to China's particular conditions, preferences, and priorities. Under later leaders, especially Xi Jinping, this approach increasingly drew on historical and cultural traditions alongside Marxist principles, and Confucian ideals of social harmony, moral cultivation, collective responsibility, and datong became explicit components of the Communist Party's doctrine.
  
See also:

Thursday, October 1, 2026

My Forecast for the Rest of 2026 | Larry Williams

US equities face near-term downside pressure and range-bound volatility driven by poor market breadth. Deteriorating internal health—evident in the divergence between a strong Nasdaq, a moderate S&P 500, and a weak Dow Jones Industrial Average—reflects capital shifting from quality blue-chips into speculative assets, a dynamic that historically precedes broader sell-offs.


A major cyclical buying opportunity aligns with  late October, near the nineteenth trading day (Tuesday, October 27), ahead of the US presidential election. 
 
Reference:
Oct 27 (Tue) opens the midterm stretch that runs through Nov 10 (Tue), 2026, up in 22 of 24
midterm years (91.67%, avg. +2.6%, med. +3.2%). The misses were 1930, −12.6%, and 1994, −0.3%.  

See also:

Why the Best Part of the Presidential Cycle Starts Now | Jeff Hirsch

On the Full Signal podcast from October 1, 2026, Jeff Hirsch, editor of the Stock Trader’s Almanac, spoke with host Phil Rosen about historical market cycles, midterm positioning, structural AI drivers, and actionable portfolio strategies.

Presidential Cycle 2025–2028: Midterm Sweet Spot expected rally target window: 
September 30, 2026 – July 19, 2027.
 
Presidential Cycles & The Midterm Sweet Spot
Midterm election years historically rank as the presidential cycle's weakest due to early-term policy friction and political uncertainty that drive a Q2–Q3 soft patch. By early October, markets transition into the cycle's most bullish window: the "midterm sweet spot" running from Q4 through pre-election Q2. Since 1949, this three-quarter stretch averages gains of +19% for the Dow, +20% for the S&P 500, and +29–30% for the Nasdaq, with midterm Octobers frequently marking the exact pivot bottom.

The AI Super Boom & Market Fundamentals
This cyclical tailwind merges with a secular "AI super boom" comparable to post-war industrialization or the early internet era. Driven by massive hyperscaler capital expenditure and robust semiconductor earnings, this fundamental expansion supports high valuations into 2027 and overrides traditional cyclical drags. Historical super booms prove that staying invested through temporary volatility is essential when liquidity and structural drivers hold, despite short-term risks from extreme mega-cap tech concentration.
 
 
Macro Strategy: Yields, Politics & Small Caps
Near 5% bond yields increase equity opportunity costs, but strong AI earnings power and presidential cycle tailwinds dominate asset allocation. Hirsch is rotating from fixed income into lagging small caps, which offer relative value, broadening market participation into 2027, and seasonal drivers like the January Effect. Preferred sectors include transports, selective industrials, stabilizing financials, and core AI infrastructure, while post-midterm political gridlock adds market-friendly policy stability.

Technical Timing & Seasonality Execution
Rather than relying on strict calendar dates, seasonal strategies require technical filters. For the "Best Six Months" strategy (November–April for broad markets; extended through June for Nasdaq), a confirmed positive MACD crossover on major averages on or after early October triggers the buy signal, while negative April/June crossovers signal exits. Institutional tax cycles, calendar flows, and psychology maintain seasonal edges, but MACD confirmation prevents false starts.
Jeff Hirsch uses MACD crossovers as a technical filter to execute the "Best Six Months" strategy. By combining technical momentum with the calendar, he avoids buying into falling markets or exiting strong spring rallies prematurely.
►
Timing Windows: The "Best Six Months" run Nov 1–Apr 30 for the Dow/S&P 500, extending through June for Nasdaq. Daily monitoring begins October 1 for buys and April 1 (June 1 for Nasdaq) for exits.   
► Indicator Setup: Daily charts with 12-day fast EMA, 26-day slow EMA, and a 9-day signal line.Buy Signal: On/after Oct 1, a positive MACD crossover (12-day EMA crosses above 26-day EMA) triggers the Seasonal Buy Signal, confirming downside momentum has ended before entering equities.
► Sell Signal: On/after Apr 1 (or Jun 1 for Nasdaq), a negative MACD crossover triggers the Seasonal Sell Signal, shifting exposure to cash or defensive sectors.
► Why It Works: It eliminates buying into October market crashes, captures extended spring upside, and reduces drawdowns compared to strict calendar dates or buy-and-hold strategies. 
Bearish Risks & Defensive Rules
Key risks to the base case include policy missteps, re-accelerating inflation, labor deterioration, geopolitical shocks, or an AI earnings reset. Shifting bearish entails tactical risk management—tightening stops and trimming laggards—rather than full liquidation, maintaining flexibility if macro trends or technicals break down.
 

See also:

EU/NATO-Russia War Inevitable: But Is Russia Our Enemy? | Alex Krainer

An all-out war between European NATO member nations and Russia is increasingly regarded as inevitable by many analysts on both sides of the divide, as the former CIA analyst Larry Johnson conveyed in an interview on Prof. Glenn Diesen's podcast published just yesterday. Johnson spent a few days in Moscow and spoke with a number of Russian officials and military generals who now believe that, "the combination of European rhetoric and European actions is making it inevitable that there's going to be a war."

» Russia is not my enemy. «
According to Grok's estimate, there have been at least 20,000 original
"Russia is not my enemy" posts, seen and liked by millions. 
 
As the American analyst Chris Helali put it, 
"Neither Americans, nor Europeans, and especially Ukrainians, have made any effort to reach a peace agreement. They don't want peace. They want to continue operating in a military mode. Their goal is not even the strategic defeat of Russia. Their goal is the Balkanization of Russia." 
Bulgaria's MEP Peter Volgin noted that, 
"The main activities of the European Commission and the European Parliament are aimed at convincing EU citizens that their main enemy is Russia, and that they will eventually have to fight against that enemy."
Of course, the idea that war is inevitable could be an exaggeration—the officials' job is to be prepared for the worst—and this may shape their mindset. It is true, however that among the European leaders, the rhetoric has escalated to the point where it feels as though the decision to go to war has already been made and that now the actions are focused on engineering the population's consent for war and willingness to fight. In an attempt to stem the march to war, on 29 September, Embassy of Russia in Ireland issued an official statement:
"There has been an abundance of talk, recently, from the European political circles that Russia somehow is planning to launch a military invasion of Europe, escalate its alleged hybrid campaign against European countries, or both. The slogan of ‘Russian threat' is being recycled in the Western media on a daily basis. … The current governments in Europe would like everybody to believe that they are the victims of Russia's alleged hostility or objects of the imminent ‘Russian invasion'. There is nothing to support such a claim. … we have no plans, no reasons and, most importantly, no real motives for aggravating situation with Europe."

The "Gallant Boar"?

The Russian embassy's statement also enumerates some of European nations' actions that are exacerbating the risk of breakout of a military conflict:
"Only in recent months, from June to September 2026, there have been almost incessant NATO military exercises with the anti-Russian scenarios in Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Finland, as well as in the Baltic Sea. Finland and Baltic states, aside from being NATO members integrated into the Alliance's nuclear planning, either joined or are planning to join the initiative of President Macron of France of the so-called ‘forward deterrence', which provides for deployment of the French nuclear weapons on their territory (that is, on the Russia's doorstep).
Among all that, the joint Lithuanian, Polish, French military exercise ‘Gallant Boar 2026' stands out as specifically aimed at the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad at the coast of the Baltic Sea. There has been information that NATO is preparing air and naval blockade of Kaliningrad and Kaliningrad region. This is not fiction, but matter of grave concern to Russia. The irresponsible and shortsighted European political elite is playing a dangerous game.

As the Russia's Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said recently, if the West attacks us, we will respond and it would be completely different war and a very brief one. There should be no mistake – Russia would be ready to use all its arsenal, including nuclear weapons, to defend its territory if NATO countries try to isolate Kaliningrad region from the rest of the country.

Under such scenario the risk of armed confrontation is high with the likelihood of Russia using preemptive strikes against centers of decision-making in the Alliance countries already at the early stage of the conflict. It is a matter of utmost seriousness and should be treated by Europe as such."
 » All three war cycles show rising phase conditions. A convergence appears around 2027-2032. «
  
Where's Your Proof, Rutte?
Thus, it seems that the European military organizations are actively training for war, while their public officials and the media are warning that, the Russians are coming, the Russians are coming… At the same time, the Russians themselves say that, "there's nothing to support such a claim…" It would appear that someone's lying to the public, and according to the NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, it's the Europeans.

In a fairly spectacular exchange at a recent press conference, the Prime Minister of Lithuania, Mindaugas Sinkevičius spilled the beans in a fairly spectacular manner and revealed that there's no evidence that Russia was preparing an invasion of Europe: 
"I was addressing Secretary General, is there any proof—real proof—intelligence services providing something on the table that Russia is getting ready for something, and there's actually none…"
One might ask, if there's no evidence that Russia is preparing to invade Europe, then why is the hysteria being whipped up in the first place? This is quite an obvious question, but we're not supposed to ask questions—we're supposed to believe and go along with the program, whether the threat is real or invented.
 
Killer answer.
Putin's 2026 Valdai Q&A / plenary session, October 1, 2026.
 
Lock Up the Unbelievers!
This is why those who need us to believe—like UK Labour's adviser Paul Richards—recommend locking up those who question the narrative:
"…the British would rise to greatness against Russia. We would have to lock a few people up, by the way, some of the pro-Russian voices, people who say there isn't a threat, don't fight for your country, that don't go to war for Burnham—we'd have to lock them up!"
If you have no evidence, and your impulse is to lock up those who question your narrative, you have a very serious credibility issue and, as it turns out, a large proportion of European people—at least those who are paying attention to these developments—are more inclined to believe the Russians than their own, deeply unpopular leaders.


Russia Is Not My Enemy

One of the symptoms of this credibility deficit has been a viral appearance of anti-war memes in social media stating simply that, "Russia is not my enemy," or something to that effect. Above is a small sample of tens of thousands of posts that have appeared on X over the recent days: According to Grok's estimate, there have been at least 20,000 original "Russia is not my enemy" posts, seen and liked by millions. Many of them went a step further, stating that the EU, NATO, Ursula von der Leyen, Volodymyr Zelensky or other Western officials are the real enemy. The same sentiment has driven student protests against war and conscription across German cities, attended by hundreds of thousands of young people, firmly rejecting the idea that war is necessary. Thousands of them publicly burned or ripped up their draft notices.

If it were up to Paul Richards, they should all be locked up along with Lithuania's Prime Minister, but at the moment, at least, the public sentiment is bitterly opposed to war. For the first time in human history, we have the Internet and social media, which could change the social engineering formulas in ways that we can't account for. In the meantime, we all should take advantage of these outlets to make our voices heard and hope and pray that the war drive by Europe's degenerate elites can be stemmed. As Abraham Lincoln put it, the best way to destroy an enemy is to make them a friend. Wouldn't that be nice?
 
Reference:
 

Q4 2026 Geocentric and Heliocentric Bradley Indices


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Cosmic Cluster Days | October 2026

Heliocentric Cosmic Cluster Days (CCDs) do not exhibit a consistent polarity or directional bias in financial markets. The 'noise channel' functions as a signal filter, with its upper and lower bounds defined empirically. However, swing highs and lows that form within the noise channel may still correlate with short-term market trends and reversals.
 
   Cosmic Cluster Days  |   Composite Line  |  Noise Channel
   
Oct 04 (Sun) | Oct 06 (Tue) | Oct 11 (Sun) | Oct 12 (Mon) | Oct 18 (Sun) | Oct 19 (Mon)
 | Oct 24 (Sat)  | Oct 27 (Tue) | Oct 29 (Thu) | Nov 04 (Wed)

  For previous CCDs, click [HERE]. For background on the concept, click [HERE].

Tuesday, September 29, 2026

Europe: Multipolar Civilization & Diplomacy of Logoi | Lorenzo Maria Pacini

The Times We Live In
The Greeks told of a young woman named Europa, daughter of a king of Tyre, on the coast of present-day Lebanon. One morning, as she was playing by the sea, a white bull emerged from the waves. She climbed onto its back, and the bull carried her across the waters to Crete. From her, the poets said, an entire continent took its name. The myth says more than it seems. The name "Europe" comes from Asia and crossed the Mediterranean on the back of a god. Our continent bears the name of a foreigner, a traveler, a girl from the other shore. Europe was born of an encounter: before it was a territory, it was a crossing.
 
»
Europe has the ship and the plow in its blood. «

Europeans have forgotten this story. For eighty years, they have been told repeatedly that Europe is a collection of institutions, a common market, a security perimeter administered from across the ocean; that Europe is simply "the West." Many have come to believe it. The thesis of these pages is different. Europe is a civilization—or, more precisely, many civilizations under one roof. And in the multipolar world that is emerging, this home is neither a province nor a periphery. It stands at the center of the map, and the new order will not be complete without it.

Something has come to an end. The unipolar order that emerged after 1991—the one that Francis Fukuyama was quick to call "the end of history"—is unraveling before everyone's eyes. History had not ended. It was waiting. New centers of gravity have emerged in Eurasia, Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Capitals that others have spoken of for centuries now speak for themselves. Even in Washington, the tone has changed: the US National Security Strategy of 2025 speaks openly of interests, burdens, and transactions, and treats old multilateral commitments as costs to be renegotiated. The patron is presenting the bill. For Europe, therefore, the question is no longer whether the multipolar world will arrive. It is already here. The real question is whether Europe will enter it as a subject or as an object: whether it will write history or be the place where others write their own.


In The Theory of the Multipolar World, Aleksandr Dugin observes that most of those who speak of multipolarity have no theory of it whatsoever. They imagine a "core" of the world—the United States, Europe, and the Western bloc—surrounded by rising competitors. In that framework, Europe sits at the table of the old, declining center. That place must be rejected. Europe has never truly been the master of the unipolar world; it was its first protectorate. In his handbook on geopolitics, Dugin writes that after 1945, Western Europe was under American control to the same extent that Eastern Europe was under Soviet control. The methods of governance changed, but not the degree of dependence. Many Europeans, on both sides of the Iron Curtain, experienced that division as a tragedy, and some attempted to break it. When General de Gaulle's France left NATO's integrated military command in 1966, it did not commit a hostile act against anyone. It committed an act of remembrance: Europe remembered that it had a will of its own.

What is Europe
If you ask Brussels, the answer will involve competencies, directives, and procedures. If you ask a geographer, you'll get coordinates: a peninsula bounded by the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, and the Ural Mountains. The first answer is a bureaucracy; the second is a map without a legend. Neither explains why a Sicilian shepherd, a Bavarian carpenter, and a monk from Mount Athos belong, in a profound sense, to the same history. Russian Eurasianists—and Pyotr Savitsky more than anyone else—liked to say that Europe is nothing more than the "western promontory" of Eurasia. Many Western analysts say the same thing with less affection: a small cape attached to Asia.
 

The image is acceptable. But on capes, people have always built lighthouses. At Cape Sounion, the Athenians erected the Temple of Poseidon, white against the sea, so that sailors would know where Greece began. At the tip of Galicia, the Romans named a cape Finis Terrae, the end of the earth. The promontory is the point where a continent looks outward, where the land speaks to the sea and to the world beyond. Europe's small size on the map has always been the very condition of its significance. Within this promontory, there is not just a single civilization. There are at least four major axes, in constant and fruitful tension. 
► There is the Mediterranean axis: Athens and Rome, law and philosophy, Byzantium and Latin Christianity, Renaissance humanism born of the encounter between Christian theology and the science preserved and developed in the Islamic world.
► 
There is the continental axis: the Frankish and Germanic world, the Holy Roman Empire, the medieval university, the long line of thought stretching from Kant and Hegel to Heidegger, the old dream of a Mitteleuropa between the Atlantic and the steppe.
►
There is the Eastern axis: the Slavic peoples, Orthodox Christianity, the legacy of Byzantium transmitted through Kiev and Moscow—a Europe that is fully European and yet distinct from Western modernity. 
►
And there is the Northern axis: the Norse and Baltic worlds, with their assemblies, their sense of communal law, and their closeness to the rugged beauty of nature.
Dugin, following in Heidegger's footsteps, speaks of the Dasein of peoples—the particular way in which each people exists in the world—and of the Logos of each people, that which gives it life "not merely on the biological level, but on the ethnosociological and metaphysical levels." Europe does not have just one Logos: it has many. It has always been, in and of itself, a multipolar world in miniature. This is the first thesis of this essay. The plurality that the entire planet now calls for, Europe already carries within itself. It does not need to import multipolarity. It must remember it.

Land and Sea
To understand why Europe stands at the center, we must go back to the oldest opposition in geopolitics. Halford Mackinder saw it, Carl Schmitt reflected on it, and Dugin systematized it: the opposition between the civilization of the Sea and the civilization of the Land, between thalassocracy and tellurocracy. The Sea civilization is mobile, mercantile, and individualistic, and measures the world in terms of routes, ports, and prices. The Land civilization is rooted, communal, and hierarchical, and measures it in terms of duties, generations, and the sacred. 
 

These are not merely military categories. They shape law, religion, philosophy, and even the way a family sits down to dinner on Sundays. Mackinder traced the origin of this opposition to the Mediterranean, to the wars between Rome and Carthage. Dugin recalls that at that moment, Western civilization found itself at a crossroads: to found a civilization along the maritime path—that of Carthage—or along the terrestrial path—that of Rome. Chesterton noted that Carthage literally meant "the New City." It was a colony founded by merchants from Tyre and Sidon, and the English writer compared it—not innocently—to New York and New Zealand. Carthage fell, he wrote, because it remained faithful to its own philosophy until the very end, and its god ultimately devoured its children. In Mackinder's interpretation, the Punic Wars never truly end: they recur in every era under new names.

Where does Europe stand in this perpetual war? Here Dugin offers a key insight that I consider decisive. Europe belongs to what geopoliticians call the Rimland, the great coastal belt of Eurasia, and the Rimland has a dual identity: it can serve the Sea or serve the Land. For this reason, Dugin writes, European history is not the free play of sovereign states colliding like atoms, but "a single field made up of waves generated by two opposing geopolitical centers; a field crisscrossed by the golden threads of geopolitical destiny." Venice and Genoa have sailed all the seas; the plains of Poland and Bohemia and the forests of Germany have rooted our peoples in the soil. Europe has the ship and the plow in its blood. Precisely for this reason, anyone who has sought to dominate the world has first had to take control of Europe.
 

In an essay on the Mediterranean, I wrote that Rome is, in a certain sense, occupied by Carthage's emissaries. Carthage has moved. It no longer sits on the African shore: it sits across the Atlantic and governs our inland sea from the outside. I do not say this out of hatred for anyone. I say it because a people that does not know who governs its sea cannot govern its own future.

Why Europe Is at the Center
It remains to be shown why Europe is not merely one pole among others—one that the multipolar world could easily do without—but an indispensable protagonist. There are four reasons.
► The first is geographical, and the geopoliticians of the Sea understood it before anyone else. Mackinder's famous formula states: "Whoever rules Eastern Europe commands the Heartland; whoever controls the Heartland controls the World Island; whoever controls the World Island controls the world." The entire pyramid of world power rests on a European foundation. Nicholas Spykman, the strategist who laid the intellectual groundwork for NATO, insisted—as Dugin notes—on the importance of the intellectual factor in binding Western Europe to North America. They understood that Europe is held first in the minds and only later on the ground, and for this reason they have never let it go. A multipolar world in which Europe remained captive would preserve the old unipolar order embedded at its heart, right at the pivot between the Atlantic and Eurasia.
► The second reason is historical. Europe gave the world the grammar of the modern international order. The Westphalian system, born in 1648 at the end of the Thirty Years' War, originally concerned only the European powers; the colonies, as Dugin notes, were treated as mere appendages. From Europe came the sovereign state, the balance of power, and even a civilization's claim to universality. Schmitt called it Jus Publicum Europaeum, the European public law that for three centuries gave the entire world its Nomos, its fundamental order.
Those who wrote the framework can rewrite it. Criticism of Western universalism cannot stop at Europe's borders, because it is in Europe that this universalism was born. If Europe is not the first to overcome the idea that its own values are the measure of all humanity, the old claim will survive in its place of origin, and every other civilization will have to continue defending itself against it. Only a Europe that has rediscovered its own plurality can say to the world, with authority: we were wrong to believe that there was only one path, and we are the first to abandon that error.
 
 
Schmitt himself drew this conclusion and pointed out to the peoples of Europe and Eurasia what he called the imperative of vast spaces: the right of peoples to organize their own vast spaces against universalism and imperialism, no matter where they come from. Dugin observes that even the European Union is, at its core, a "great space" whose status remains uncertain. The Union is a draft. The question is who is holding the pen.
► The third reason is the one from which we began: Europe is already a multipolar world in miniature. For centuries, Catholics and Orthodox Christians, Latins and Slavs, Germanic peoples and Mediterraneans have learned—often through pain—to live side by side without becoming one another. Europe knows from within the cost and the benefits of coexistence with difference. No other civilization has had to learn this lesson so many times, through so many wars and so many reconciliations. It is precisely the experience that a multipolar world needs.
► The fourth reason is its position between the poles. Europe borders the Atlantic and the Eurasian Heartland; through the Mediterranean, it borders Africa and the Middle East; and through the Arctic—which opens up beneath a warmer sky—it will connect to the northern routes toward Asia. In the vision developed by Dugin, Europe and Russia-Eurasia remain two distinct poles, two entities bound by a common destiny within the vast continental space—contiguous in geography and culture, yet independent. The Austrian geopolitician Jordis von Lohausen, whom Dugin studied extensively, went even further: he considered a future for Europe without Russia unthinkable, and a Russia without Europe geopolitically incomplete.
I know how heavily these words weigh in years of war and mistrust, and I do not claim that the wounds of our continent are minor. But precisely because governments have stopped listening to one another, the peoples must not stop talking to one another.
 

The Suppressed Tradition
None of this is an invention. It is a matter of recovering a line of thought that official Europe has preferred to forget. After World War II, Dugin recalls, European geopolitical thought split into different currents. On the one hand, there was pure Euro-Atlanticism, which accepted American primacy as the natural order of things. On the other, there was what he calls Euro-Continentalism: the conviction that Europe should stand on its own, with its own culture, its own economic and energy interests, and its own security system. Charles de Gaulle spoke of a Europe stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals. Alain de Benoist distilled the sentiment of an entire generation into the phrase "neither West nor East, but Europe," later adding that it was preferable to align with the East rather than the West.


One may agree or disagree with each of these authors on many points; a living tradition is built on debate. Taken together, however, they clearly convey one thing. The Europe of Brussels and NATO is not the only Europe that has ever been imagined. There has always been another—a continental, sovereign Europe, rooted in its own history and open to its neighbors. It has never disappeared. It has been silenced.

The Sea-Heart
Let us return to the sea that gave Europe its name. In NATO documents, the Mediterranean is the "southern flank." A flank is something you guard—the edge of the body, not its heart. For three thousand years, however, the Mediterranean has been the heart of the Old World, the space where Egyptians and Phoenicians, Greeks and Romans, Arabs, Normans, Venetians, and Ottomans met, traded, fought, and learned from one another.


I have called it the "Sea-Heart," and I have proposed the idea of an expanded Mediterranean that stretches from continental Europe to the Middle East, to North and Sub-Saharan Africa, and beyond, toward the Far East. On this sea, I believe a Pax Mediterranea is possible: a harmony among the civilizations that have always inhabited its shores, a peace between North Africa and the Middle Eastern Crescent, between Southern Europe and the peoples of the Balkans. A peace open to the Atlantic Ocean that does not allow itself to be governed by its power.

In the Italian edition of The Theory of the Multipolar World, Giuseppe Marro writes that Italy, due to its natural projection into the Mediterranean, serves as a bridge between Western Europe, Asia, and Africa. That is indeed the case. Italy is—or should be—the natural holder of a strategic role in the Mediterranean basin. Not to dominate—a lesson our history has already taught us—but to mediate. A peninsula jutting out into the sea is a hand extended in friendship.
 
The Diplomacy of the Logoi
What is the diplomacy of peoples? It is what happens when peoples meet without waiting for permission from their bureaucracies. A diplomacy that comes from below, but also from deep within: from language, from memory, from faith, from the way a people understands life and death. In Dugin's thought, as his Italian interpreters have emphasized, dialogue among civilizations is the great challenge of our time. To address it, a new kind of elite is needed—men and women trained in cultural anthropology and the study of archaic and traditional societies, capable of understanding the codes of civilizations different from their own and of navigating a shared map of meanings. In this vision, diplomacy should focus on the circulation of ideas even more than on politics or trade. Marro sums up the idea with a fitting phrase: diplomacy should become "a sacred profession." How far we have strayed from that. Today, diplomacy is all too often about managing sanctions, drafting ultimatums, and the arithmetic of armaments. Yet the ambassador was once the one who carried the word of one people to another, and his person was inviolable because the word was sacred.

 
The diplomacy of peoples, as I understand it, is a diplomacy of the Logoi. It does not ask the other to become like us; it asks the other to be fully itself, so that a genuine dialogue may take place. In Noomachia, Dugin describes the future he envisions with words that could serve as a program: "many civilizations, many poles, many centers, many value systems on the same planet and within the same humanity. Many worlds." Many worlds. Not a single world governed by a single capital, speaking a single authorized language and believing in a single authorized truth, but many worlds—and among them, a European world that has rediscovered its own voice.
 
Thinking, Remembering, Encountering
Before building new institutions and signing new alliances, a new consciousness must exist. What a people cannot imagine, it cannot achieve. The first task is therefore an intellectual one: to make a multipolar Europe conceivable—and thus possible. This task has three dimensions. 
► The first is to think—that is, to construct a European theory of multipolarity that draws on the full depth of the continent's geopolitical thought, from Ratzel and the continental school to Schmitt and Dugin's geopolitics of civilizations, while remaining critical, open to every tradition, and aware of the limitations of each school.
► The second is to remember. We must recover the traditions that the Atlantic consensus has pushed to the margins: the continental and Mediterranean thinkers, the philosophers who resisted liberal universalism, and the voices of Eastern Europe silenced twice—first by Soviet rule and then by the liberal hegemony that succeeded it.
► The third is to come together. We need spaces where institutions, scholars, artists, and representatives of different civilizations can speak to one another as equals: Europeans with Russians and Chinese, with Africans and Latin Americans, with the peoples of the Islamic world, with India, and with the Global South. Not the polite multicultural "dialogue" in which everyone agrees in advance to say nothing, but a genuine encounter between different Logoi, from which each emerges transformed.
In this work, the Mediterranean occupies a special place. Our inland sea must once again be seen as a crossroads of civilizations and not as an area of external management, and the Pax Mediterranea is a concrete horizon for action: the regional laboratory of the multipolar world. Such a project takes the form neither of a political party nor of a lobby. It takes the form of a myth, that of a crossing: the journey of Europa across the sea repeated in our time, with Europe setting out to meet the other shore and the other shore coming to meet her. It is a task measured in decades, not years, and one that will be accomplished for a generation that will not live to see it. This is no reason to be discouraged. Europe's cathedrals were built by men who knew they would never see them completed. They built them anyway, because they knew what they were building for.
 

The Crossing
When the white bull carried her across the sea, Europa did not know where she was going. She did not know that her name would one day be given to a continent—to its empires and cathedrals, its crimes and saints, its philosophers and poets. Today, Europe stands once again at the water's edge. Behind her lies the old world she built and then lost—the one in which a single civilization believed it could speak on behalf of all humanity. That world is over, and there is no reason to mourn it. Before her lies a sea full of other shores, other peoples, other ways of being human.

Europe can remain on the shore, gazing out at the Atlantic, waiting for instructions. Or it can set out on the crossing once more. Not as a conqueror this time, nor as a missionary of a universal model, but as what it was in the beginning: a traveler, a guest in both senses that our language gives to the word, a civilization born of an encounter. If it makes this crossing, the multipolar world will have its missing center: the civilization that knows better than any other what it means to live with difference, because it has been doing so—with blood and genius—for three thousand years. Europe is not the world's past. It is one of its futures, and it is up to the peoples to decide which one.

Lorenzo Maria Pacini (b. 1994) is an Italian author, political theorist, and Associate Professor of Political Philosophy and Geopolitics at UniDolomiti in Belluno, who also acts as a strategic intelligence and international relations consultant. Founder and Director of Idee&Azione, his work spans multipolar statecraft, political metaphysics, and Eurasian geopolitical analysis. His principal publications include Dugin e Platone, Cantare amantis est: Bene, bellezza e musica in sant'Agostino da Ippona, Myanmar: Nella terra dorata, and contributions to Solstizio d'inverno alongside Alexander Dugin.
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