Recognition of the possibility of civil war in the West exists in politics and related punditry and in a range of scholarship. Many people still deny or are reluctant to talk of it. Perhaps they fear a kind of ‘security dilemma’ that might occur; if people become convinced that civil war is coming because important people say so they might behave in ways that cause or hasten it. Equally, one might surmise, some know the truth but are factionally invested in the conflict and are simply positioning over who will be judged by history to have fired the first shot in it.
Henry Nowak, 18, was fatally stabbed in Southampton in April 2026 by Vickrum Digwa and controversially handcuffed by police as he lay dying, ignited nationwide riots.
Neither, in my view, are credible positions to hold when confronted with the unfortunate reality. Theory is generally clear and convincing about the conditions under which civil war is likely to occur. Walton concluded that in any year just under four per cent of the countries in which the conditions of civil war were present would experience it. Accepting this, even as something of a pessimistic baseline, would suggest over the coming decade the collective West is in deep trouble. Moreover, there is little reason to hope that should one kick off in one major country its consequences would not spread more widely to others.
Moreover, it is not simply that the conditions are present in the West; it is, rather, that the conditions are nearing the ideal. The relative wealth, social stability and related lack of demographic factionalism, plus the perception of the ability of normal politics to solve problems that once made the West seem immune to civil war are now no longer valid.
Organized and directed polarization: liberal 'Left', radical 'Islamism', and patriotic 'far-right', all infested with Zionist agents, fanning the flames.
In fact, in each of these categories the direction of pull is towards civil conflict. Increasingly, people perceive this to be the case and their levels of confidence in government would seem to be declining even more in the face of the apparent unwillingness or inability of leaders to confront the situation honestly. The result, society-wise, is a reinforcing spiral calling to mind the opening lines of Yeats’ famous ‘The Second Coming’.
Turning and turning in the widening gyre
The falcon cannot hear the falconer;
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold…
The fact of the matter is that the tools of revolt in the form of various appurtenances of modern life are just lying around, knowledge of how to employ them is widespread, targets are obvious and undefended, and more and more formerly regular citizens seem minded to take the shot.
Assume—based on recent statements by credible national political and academic figures—that at least ten European countries face the risk of violent civil conflict. The table above lists fifteen; discard any five you consider least plausible. Even then, the probability of such conflict occurring in at least one of the remaining countries within five years is 87%—rising to 95% if all fifteen are included.
‘Normalcy bias’ is a concept originating in disaster management that refers to the way in which people sometimes fail to react in a timely manner to warnings of imminent danger. The defense establishments of the West ought to guard against a tendency to disbelieve or to minimize the threat of internal conflict. The matter is that conditions which are generally agreed to be indicative of the potential for civil war are vividly present across a range of states which have for a long time been thought beyond such sort of conflict.
» Configured for civil war. «
Strategic studies may be quite caught off guard, moreover, for two other reasons. First, civil wars are little studied in the same manner as interstate wars. The literature on civil wars is extensive, including important works on its causation, resolution, social origins, outcomes, post-war rebuilding and so on; but it is rarely studied, as is ‘normal war’, from the perspective of military strategy—in other words, how it is or should be fought. The work of Stathis Kalyvas, the most astute contemporary observer of the ‘logic’ of civil wars, is a rare exception.
Quoted from:
David Betz (2023) - Civil War Comes to the West. Part 1 and Part 2. Military Strategy Magazine, Volume 9, Issue 1, summer 2023, pages 20-26.
Military Strategy Magazine, Volume 10, Issue 2, spring 2025, pages 6-16.
See also:
David J. Betz is
Professor of War in the Modern World in the Department of War Studies,
King's College London where he heads the MA War Studies program. He is
also a Senior Fellow of the Foreign Policy Research Institute.
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