Thursday, September 24, 2026

Seasonality vs. Cycles: October Is the Midterm Sweet Spot—If the Switch Holds

October's reputation as a crash month misinterprets the midterm sweet spot playbook. Since 1950, the S&P 500 has averaged a +3.0% gain in midterm Octobers, closing higher 74% of the time. November extends that momentum, adding +2.8% with a 79% win rate. From September 30 through year-end, the midterm path averages +6.6% and yields positive returns in 16 of 19 instances. Jeffrey Hirsch's  Stock Trader's Almanac signal isn't "beware October"—it's that the four-year cycle stops leaking in October.

Seasonality Midterm October Map for the S&P 500: Midterm years leave September weaker than the all-year path—then pull away from October 1 through mid-November. S&P 500 calendar-day path from the September 14 close: crimson is midterms 1950–2022 (+3.0% in October, 74% up); navy dashed is all years 1928–2025. Late September is still the washout (window trough ~Sep 30). 2026 has already rallied +21% off the March low, so this is a Q4-bid midterm, not a crash-then-rally analog, unless 7,550 breaks.
However, the leak precedes the rally. Both the all-year seasonal map and the midterm composite sag from the autumn equinox through month-end. September 27 falls directly within that washout zone, with the midterm path averaging a trough near September 30 (−1.3% from mid-September levels). Because September 27, 2026, falls on a Sunday, the active trading window shifts to Friday the 25th and Monday the 28th. That cluster represents a dip-buying opportunity, not an immediate breakout zone.

2026 Is Already Off-Script
This market has diverged significantly from the historical midterm template. Jeffrey Hirsch's traditional model calls for a ~17% peak-to-trough drawdown—typically extending from late spring into mid-August—before launching into a Q4 rally. Instead, the 2026 tape printed its low early on March 30 at 6,344, rallied to 7,799 by August 13, and closed Thursday at 7,704—up +12.5% year-to-date and +21.4% off its lows. October arrives following an extended recovery rather than into a fresh, deeply discounted cyclical low.

Cycle vs. Seasonality
Running parallel to seasonality is the Hurst cycle model, which presents a more cautious picture. Across the Dow, S&P 500, and Nasdaq-100, the primary 40-week nominal trough starts at the March 30, 2026 major low, and is projected for January 9, 2027. Intermediate shared cycle troughs ahead of that window map to September 26 (40-day cycle) and October 30–31 (80-day cycle). Under this framework, the August highs are treated as the macro top for this wave segment. Until the major January trough arrives, counter-trend crests remain rallies to sell—unless a key pivot level fails, forcing an early-October alternate cycle low.

Primary Forward Projection and Confluence Calendar (Sep 2026 to Jan 2027).  

The Switch Levels Are the Entire Trade
These key switch levels dictate the structural bias: Dow Jones 51,172, S&P 500 7,550, and Nasdaq-100 30,125. On Thursday, September 24 the Dow undercut 51,172 intraday before reclaiming it by the close. The S&P and Nasdaq switch levels continue to hold. As long as 30,125 holds on the Nasdaq, a tactical bounce toward October 16 remains valid.


If the switches hold, the expected window of October 4–7 represents a sell zone to exit long positions taken off the September 26 low. If a switch breaks, a trough accelerates forward into October 4–5 as a primary buy window—the exact inflection point where seasonality and cycle analysis converge.
 
Execution Stance
Tactical discipline remains essential. Maintain light exposure heading into the Friday–Monday window, avoid initiating long positions on the Dow at current levels, do not hold the S&P 500 in anticipation of immediate new highs, and avoid over-allocating to the Nasdaq.
 
S&P 500 80-day cycle (primary): Starts at the Aug 20 trough. Wavelength 71 days. High already in on Aug 28, at 11% of the wave — left, not in the middle. Sep 21 did not beat it. Printed highs and lows as of Sep 21. "Expected" repeats that cycle’s last translation. Oct 31 is the 80-day low only — the 20-day low before it is Oct 17. 80-day FLD 7,790 is still lost. The 20-week from this same Aug 20 trough does not bottom until Jan 9, 2027 (timing schematic, not a price forecast).
S&P 500 80-day cycle (alternate): Same Aug 20 start. On this count the low is Oct 5, not Oct 31, and Oct 5 is not a high. Sep 21 did not beat Aug 28.No crest between Sep 21 and Oct 5. The Nov 10 bounce is drawn smaller because this alternate cycle count does not expect it a new high (timing schematic, not a price forecast). 
 
DJIA 80-day cycle — alternate: On this count the low is Oct 4, not Oct 30, and Oct 4 is not a high. The Sep 22 bounce already failed. Next week is a bounce only if Sep 26 holds above 51,172. The high of that bounce is Oct 4, and it is a sell. It is a short, left-translated 40-day high, about a week, and it does not repair 52,364. If 51,172 breaks, next week is down into Oct 4. Then Oct 4 is the low near 50,000, not the high (timing schematic, not a price forecast).
If the switch levels hold, treat the late-September dip strictly as a tactical trade—take profits into early October, look to cover risk around the October 30–31 trough, and save major position sizing for the January 9 40-week/18-month cycle low. If a switch level fails, step aside during the bounce and buy the index at its early-October reset instead. Midterm seasonality provides a strong tailwind once a low is established—it is not a license to ignore the cycle trough. 

Dow: Oct 4 is a sell only above 51,172. Under 51,172 it is the buy.
S&P: Oct 4–7 is a sell only above 7,550. Under 7,550, Oct 5 is the buy.
Nasdaq: Oct 16 is a sell only above 30,125. Under 30,125, Oct 5 is the buy.
 
See also:

The Collapse of America's Constitutional Order | Jeffrey Sachs

A president stood at the UN and claimed the right to annihilate a civilization. Congress said nothing. That is the constitutional order collapsing in public. I shuddered then, and I shudder now that a president of the United States can stand at the podium of the UN General Assembly, speaking to world leaders in a language of annihilation of other countries and of sending them to hell. It was ghastly, unprecedented, totally disgusting, disgraceful for the United States. But I would also say it is a measure of how broken the constitutional order of the United States is.


Annihilation as Presidential Language
Trump basically said, like a madman—which I think, arguably, he is—that he and he alone will decide the survival of Iran. He said that he has a big, big choice to make. Maybe Iran will be a great country. Maybe Iran will be annihilated. Maybe Trump will send it to hell. And not only was the language vulgar in a way that I certainly could never, in my lifetime, have imagined coming from a president of the United States or anybody standing at the UN podium—because what Trump said was odious and completely in violation of every religious, moral, ethical, and legal standard that we have in this world—it was also a measure of the brazen collapse of our Constitution.

Who Has the Power to Declare War?
Is there a political system where one man decides the fate of another civilization? Is that how the American system works? Of course, the answer is no. The Founding Fathers, who rebelled against a mad King George III, were very explicit in the Declaration of Independence, celebrated this year, 250 years after its issuance. We're in the 250th anniversary, one that Trump says is about our freedom. It was explicit that King George took on the authority to put the military above civil rule.

And when the Founding Fathers wrote the US Constitution, they specifically assigned the power to declare war not to the commander in chief, but solely and exclusively to the United States Congress—not by choice, not if they care about it or want to, not if they want to delegate it or not, but solely to Congress. Trump said yesterday he doesn't care what the public thinks. He doesn't care what the vote is. He says, 'It doesn't even cross my mind.' And earlier this year, when he was asked, 'Well, are there any limits on your power?' he thought about it and said, 'Yes, my morality, but it's my will. It's what I want to do. Otherwise, no, there are no other limits.'

When Congress Fails to Act
What did our Congress do? The majority party in both houses simply remained silent. Trump said he was going to have the difficult choice of whether to annihilate one of the most ancient civilizations in the world, 5,000 years old, twenty times older than the United States of America.

What did our Speaker of the House say? Nothing. What did our Senate majority leader say? Nothing. What did the members of the president's party in Congress say? Nothing. That is the institutional failure. Congress has the constitutional authority over war and the power of the purse. Yet when the president claims the unilateral authority to determine whether another country lives or dies, the institutions constitutionally empowered to check that authority remain silent.

The tens or hundreds of billions of dollars that Trump has wasted of American income in this flagrant war of whim—where is Congress to say, 'You have no authority whatsoever to spend that because only we can decide on the spending and only we can declare war'? This is worse than the Roman Empire. There was a Senate that actually still said something. Our Senate says nothing.

Beyond Partisanship
I am not partisan. And a Democratic president who dared to be as absolutely mad and deranged as this president would probably find subservience in that party too. So I'm not even making a partisan point. I'm making a point about the collapse of our constitutional order.

We are so broken that not only do we have a madman in power, but there is no respect for the constitutional limits on presidential power. The president can make statements, as he made yesterday, unprecedented in the chamber of the General Assembly in front of world leaders, speaking like the worst tyrant or gangster imaginable, and not a murmur from the Republican Party, which dominates the House and the Senate.

The Absence of Institutional Restraint
Have we come to a point where one man, who I happen to think is utterly incompetent, utterly sociopathic, actually—when people are killed under his order, not a moment of reflection or remorse when 150 schoolgirls are murdered, and he knows the truth. He says, ‘Yeah, the Iranians probably did it. We'll find out.' No, not any control at all in our system of government.

So, for me, you asked how I feel. I shudder at the last 24 hours, both at what the president said. It made my skin crawl. I was sitting there in the chamber listening to this madness. I mean, it really was psychopathic madness, speaking in this way, with a vulgarity that is unimaginable. But then I've shuddered since then at the lack of response by the leaders—the majority leader of the US Senate, the Speaker of the House, Supreme Court justices, anybody—to say no. In our system of government, it's not one person who decides on the fate of another civilization.

The Grim Constitutional Question
We are a country, we say, first of all, of representation, and the American people are aghast at this. They oppose it overwhelmingly. They do not support this war of Netanyahu and Trump, which is a two-person war of murder and destruction and assassination of leaders of another country. They do not support it.

So this is the grim fact. It wasn't just the awful statements. That was my first reaction. But then I thought, what have we come to when one person can make a statement like this and then remain essentially unchallenged in the United States system of government? Annihilation is not diplomacy. Congressional silence is not restraint. A constitutional republic cannot survive if one man claims the power to decide whether another civilization lives or dies.
 
Quoted from:
Jeffrey D. Sachs (b. 1954) is an American economist, professor, and author specializing in sustainable development, global economics, and international policy. He is Director of the Center for Sustainable Development at Columbia University, has advised governments and international organizations, and served as a special advisor to UN Secretaries-General. A 2011 Economist survey named Sachs, Bernanke, and Minsky among the decade's most influential economists.

US Finalizes De Facto Theft of Venezuela's Gold Reserve

Some 31 tons of Venezuelan gold worth about $4 billion is set to be transferred from the Bank of England to the US, where it will be stored at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
 
Delcy Rodríguez, the Orange Ape's new bitch.
 
The bullion remained frozen in London since 2018–2019, when British authorities refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of Nicolás Maduro's government. The legal stalemate was broken in early 2026, when US military forces  kidnapped the Venezuelan president in a raid on Caracas.

 
She begged King Charles for help. Now, Venezuela's stolen
gold moves from a vault in London to a vault in New York. 
 
While the gold nominally remains the property of Venezuela, Caracas will still be unable to access or repatriate it. Instead, the bullion will serve solely as collateral for US-vetted international loans, leaving the physical control of Venezuela’s sovereign wealth firmly in Washington's grip. 
 

Reference:

Sunday, September 20, 2026

Judgment Day for the Middle of the Barrel | Larry C. Johnson

Karl Miller's latest private assessment, dated September 16 and titled "Judgment Day Has Arrived," makes a single governing claim about diesel, jet fuel, and kerosene: physical demand is now outrunning promptly deliverable supply. Not the price of the barrel—the delivery of it. In Miller's framing the market has crossed from a pricing problem, which money solves, to a deliverability problem, which money alone does not. The next phase, he argues, forces buyers to compete not just for fuel but for delivery capacity and for the cash to fund both at once.

 » US pumps are going dark. They started a war over oil and now they can't fill a truck. « 

He is describing something the market has already begun to confirm… US retail diesel crossed $6.00 a gallon on September 11, the first time on record, ten days after setting its prior all-time high. The ULSD crack spread
—the margin between diesel and crude—hit an intraday record above $108 a barrel on September 3, a level never before sustained, which tells you the scarcity is in the product, not the barrel. Distillate inventories fell to roughly 103 million barrels in late August, the lowest for that point in the calendar since 1951, and the EIA expects them to stay below 100 million through much of 2027. Miller wrote his brief into a market that is already validating its premise.
 
The Governing Condition
The spine of the assessment is deliberately simple. Take a recurring shortfall between what a market consumes and what can actually be delivered to it. Inventory and diverted cargoes can bridge that gap for a while. They cannot sustain it indefinitely. Once usable stocks are drawn down, the adjustment arrives as some combination of higher replacement cost, tighter allocation, and reduced activity—and it lands first on whichever buyer, terminal, or airport cannot secure its next delivery on time. Miller's phrase for the resolution is stark: supply must recover, or consumption must fall. There is no third option once the buffers are gone.

How a Diesel Shortage Becomes an Economic Crisis. 

To size the thing, he runs a central diesel stress case
—and here it is essential to be precise about what kind of number this is, because Miller himself is. He assumes a 1.6 million-barrel-a-day export disruption met by 50 percent replacement, leaving a residual gap of 0.8 mb/d. Held constant, that residual would demand about 72 million barrels of stock draw or demand destruction over 90 days, and 144 million over 180. These are explicitly illustrative sensitivities, not a measured global deficit—he flags repeatedly that product-level deficit magnitudes remain uncertain and that the figures are scenario mechanics rather than forecasts. The value is in the method, not the decimal.

And the method maps onto the real shocks cleanly enough. The IEA has identified three disruptions compounding at once: the Hormuz conflict removing on the order of an eighth of global supply, Russian diesel-export bans after drone strikes disabled roughly a quarter of its refining capacity, and winter distillate demand arriving into depleted tanks. Russia
—historically the world’s second-largest diesel exporter—banned exports outright on July 9 to keep fuel for its military. Miller's 1.6 mb/d is an assumption; the machinery pulling barrels off the water is not.

Inventory as a Countdown, not a Cushion
The sharpest operational move in the brief is to demote the national inventory number that dominates the headlines. A country-level buffer, Miller argues, tells you almost nothing about whether a specific business keeps running. What matters is site-level endurance: usable stock—excluding tank bottoms, unqualified material, and volumes already committed to other buyers—divided by the net daily draw. A terminal with a fixed usable volume and a widening deficit is on a clock, and a replacement cargo that arrives four days after the clock runs out may as well not have sailed. The same logic scales down to a hospital’s or data center’s backup generators, where a tank that reads "full" is really a countdown measured in days against a known burn rate.

This is why his diagnosis is that the shortage will be local and uneven long before it is general. A national statistic can look adequate while individual nodes fail, because fuel that exists in the wrong place, in the wrong grade, or under someone else's contract does not cover a missed delivery. This broader point is illustrated in the photos at the top of this article.

Credit Decides Who Gets the Cargo
Miller’s second key insight is financial. In a market where prices are high and delivery cycles are long, the buyer has to fund both simultaneously—pay up for the barrel and carry it for the extra days it spends in transit. He illustrates with a delivered-cost stack that runs, in his tight-to-acute range, from roughly $200 to nearly $300 a barrel once location premium, ocean freight, terminal handling, inland delivery, and financing are added on top of the benchmark—the equivalent of something like $4.80 to $6.90 a gallon before tax. Again, these are illustrative route economics, not quotes. But note that the market has already printed the middle of that range: $6 diesel is here, and California retail has been reported above $9.

Food and energy are two of the most immediate and visible inflation channels

The consequence he draws is the one worth keeping: credit becomes a supply constraint. A buyer can be perfectly solvent on annual earnings and still lack the working capital to prepay a larger cargo, meet collateral calls, and carry slower-moving inventory all at the same time. When that happens, the fuel goes to whoever can fund it, not whoever needs it most. Financially weaker importers can lose access before larger economies feel the squeeze at all.

Aviation and the Airport Problem
Jet A and Jet A-1 get their own treatment, because aviation has the least room to improvise. Qualified fuel has to be at the airport, in the hydrant, before the aircraft departs; a refinery barrel somewhere else is worthless to a delayed flight. Airlines are left to choose among buying costlier replacement fuel, tankering extra where it is operationally feasible, reworking schedules, or cancelling. Miller’s illustrative math — a $20-a-barrel step adding $60 million over 30 days for a 100,000-barrel-a-day buyer — is less important than the structural point: hedging can change what a carrier pays, but it cannot conjure a delivery that the airport cannot physically make. He is also careful to note that jet fuel and kerosene are the same cut of the barrel, so the aviation volume must not be double-counted as additional kerosene demand — a discipline that a lot of looser analysis ignores.

Where It Bites First, and How It Ends
The geography of risk, in his ranking, runs through the weakest local links: import-dependent Northwest Europe and inland markets facing winter demand on top of freight fuel; the US Gulf Coast, whose refining and export weight makes any local outage a global event; import-dependent emerging markets where foreign exchange and cargo finance can fail before physical stocks do; and airports with concentrated, hard-to-substitute supply. The common thread is that substitution is hardest exactly where the stakes are highest.

On duration, Miller offers no normalization date, and insists none can be honestly given. His planning horizon is 90 to 180 days with contingency held into 2027. The recovery point he stresses is one that calendar-watchers routinely miss: ending the shortage requires not a daily balance but a sustained surplus, because supply first has to stop the draw and then rebuild the usable buffer while still covering consumption. At a half-million-barrel-a-day surplus, rebuilding 30 million barrels of cover takes two months — and that clock only starts after supply overtakes demand. A market that merely returns to breakeven stays fragile.

The Verdict
Strip the brief to its load-bearing claim and it does not merely hold up against the tape—the tape is racing to catch up to it. This is, by every current metric, a middle-distillate physical-supply crisis: record crack spreads above $108 confirm a refining and yield failure rather than a crude shortage, inventories sit at their lowest level in seven decades heading into heating season, refineries are already running at 98 percent and still cannot make enough of the middle of the barrel, and traders and the IEA alike are warning the tightness runs clear through winter and into 2027. Miller called the nature of the danger correctly and early: this is about deliverability—the next cargo, the qualified grade, the funded position—not headline price, and that lens is sharper than nearly all of the commentary still treating a structural break as a passing spike. He wrote "Judgment Day Has Arrived" into a market that promptly broke $6 diesel for the first time in history, printed the highest distillate margins ever recorded, and watched a quarter of Russia's refining capacity and an eighth of global supply go offline at once. The banner is not hyperbole. It is a description.

One distinction has to be kept, and it is the one that makes the brief stronger rather than weaker: the quantified apparatus is a scenario toolkit, not a set of measured deficits. The 1.6 mb/d disruption, the cost ladders, the barrel counts are illustrative sensitivities—Miller says so himself—and their power is in the method, not the decimal: the residual-gap arithmetic, the site-level endurance countdown, the credit gate. Insist on that and the framework is unassailable, because you are handing a reader a way to run the numbers rather than a number to argue with. And the one development that could ease the price—softening freight and contracting manufacturing—is no refutation at all. It is the second of the two exits Miller named. Either supply recovers or consumption falls, and consumption falling is not the crisis being escaped. It is the crisis arriving.
 
Reference:
Larry C. Johnson (b. 1954) is a former CIA analyst, State Department counter-terrorism advisor, and 24-year Special Operations trainer who has served as managing partner of BERG Associates LLC since 1998, specializing in financial analysis and anti-money laundering investigations. Sidelined from mainstream media for offering candid assessments against foreign interventionism, he now provides independent geopolitical analysis to businesses, non-partisan commentary outlets, and international platforms, including the UN Security Council and channels like Judging Freedom, The Duran, and Redacted.

Karl W. Miller (b. 1965) is an energy veteran with over 35 years of experience in commodities trading, risk management, and market strategy, having held senior executive roles at firms like JPMorgan Chase, Enron, El Paso Energy, and PG&E. Typically operating behind the scenes, he strictly reserves his proprietary insights for private clients, making his recent public warnings regarding unprecedented middle-distillate shortages a rare, high-stakes departure from standard practice. 
See also:

Spectrum Cycle Composites: S&P 500, Nasdaq & Dow Jones | Sergey Ivanov

S&P 500
(daily bars through Sep 18, 2026; blue solid line = forecast).
 
Nasdaq 
(daily bars through Sep 18, 2026; blue solid line = forecast).
 
DJIA (daily bars through Sep 18, 2026
; red solid line = forecast). 
 
Gold (XAU/USD, daily bars through Sep 18, 2026
; red solid line = forecast). 
 
Crude Oil (WTI/USD, daily bars through Sep 18, 2026
; red solid line = forecast). 
 
Bitcoin (BTC/USD, daily bars through Sep 18, 2026; red solid line = forecast). 
  
Reference:
 
See also:

Friday, September 18, 2026

Solar Activity Forecaster: September 18, 2026

According to Scafetta, Stefani, Hung, and Jose,  the ~11-year solar activity cycle—known as the Schwabe band—results from the interference of three tidal clocks: the Jupiter–Saturn spring period (9.93 yr), a central dynamo near 10.87 yr, and Jupiter's orbital period (11.86 yr). Meanwhile, Venus–Earth–Jupiter alignments supply an 11.07-year synchronizer, with the Hale polar reversal—the Sun's complete magnetic pole flip every 22 years—operating as that clock at half frequency.

Solar Activity Forecaster: Active planetary orbital geometry on September 18, 2026.
 
Because tidal forces scale with mass over distance cubed, Venus, Earth, and Jupiter—rather than Saturn—dominate photospheric tidal forcing. However, Jupiter and Saturn still govern the Sun's wobble around the barycenter (the inertial axis and its counter-pole). The Sun's velocity along this orbital path generates a dynamic ram effect: the Earth intersects a compressed, denser plasma sheet when positioned ahead of this directional vector, but passes through a thinner, rarefied sheet when in its trailing wake. When this local orbital vector aligns with the Sun's broader motion toward the galactic apex (Hercules, λ ≈ 280°), the two ram pressures stack constructively. At 1 AU, this accounts for a variation of a few tens of percent in the model, though actual observations are dominated by coronal holes rather than the apex. The solar plasma forms a thin ecliptic sheet—which is denser at sunspot maximum—that is steered along the active tidal axis. Consequently, sunspots emerge at butterfly latitudes and preferentially form at longitudes facing Jupiter.
 
Solar Activity Snapshot on September 18, 2026: Comparing Sunspot distribution on the Earth-facing and far sides of the Sun. From above the Sun's north pole, its rotation is counterclockwise, carrying sunspots from left to right. Because the Sun rotates differentially—faster at the equator (~25 days sidereal, or ~27 days synodic as seen from Earth) and progressively slower at higher latitudes (reaching ~30–35 days near the poles)—the time required for a given region to reappear depends on its heliographic latitude. The standard Carrington frame uses a compromise rotation period of 27.2753 days (synodic), which roughly corresponds to the typical 10–20° latitudes of sunspots. Regions at higher latitudes therefore take longer to rotate back into view, while those near the equator return sooner.  
  
Magnetic centers align only when three or more planets participate, and exclusively at critical angles such as conjunction, opposition, or quadrature (a 90-degree right-angle alignment). The pattern decouples between these alignments and snaps back into place when they re-form. If an alignment edge or magnetic knot intersects the photosphere, the Sun reacts with localized sunspots, an output burst, or a coronal mass ejection (CME) along the lock axis. The solar wind reflects the state of the ecliptic sheet: it is faint and cool when the sheet is quiet, but becomes brighter and warmer during a ram event or when a lock snaps through the photosphere. These outbursts radiate outward, leaving a wake on the trailing side.
 
The outlook for US stock indices is decidedly cautious, shaped by fading sentiment buffers and macroeconomic pressure. Near-term vulnerability builds into early October 2026, marking a naturally occurring gap between the second and third AFPs as micro-sentiment trends downward despite the Micro Driver line pointing upward into early October. A more severe market downturn is projected for early December 2026, driven by the conclusion of the final AFP cluster and the Macro Driver's shift into a negative stance. Resurfacing inflation fears, oil supply shocks, hawkish Federal Reserve expectations, and rising bond yields reinforce this negative trajectory. 
 

Wednesday, September 16, 2026

Facing the Great Satan Next Door, Mexico Draws Closer to Iran and Palestine

For the first time, Iran illuminated Tehran's iconic Azadi Tower in the green, white, and red of the Mexican flag on Tuesday night, creating a striking tribute to Mexican Independence Day.

Tehran's Azadi Tower illuminated in the colors of the
Mexican flag, featuring the national coat of arms.
 
The September 15 display marked the 216th anniversary of the Grito de Dolores—priest Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla's 1810 call to arms that launched Mexico's war for independence from Spain. "Today, Mexico is not in Mexico. It is in the heart of Iran," the Iranian Embassy in Mexico posted alongside a video of the glowing monument.
 
» Today, Mexico is not in Mexico. It is in the heart of Iran. «
The enemy of my enemy is my friend. Shared Realpolitik.
 
According to El Universal, this was the first time Iran lit a monument to honor Mexico. While green, white, and red are shared national colors—frequently lit on the landmark, such as for the 45th anniversary of the 1979 Islamic Revolution on February 10, 2024—Mexican Ambassador to Iran Guillermo Puente Ordorica praised the tribute to HispanTV as "a great gesture of friendship" that Mexicans will cherish. Indeed.
 
This symbolic alignment reflects broader geopolitical shifts. During the same holiday in 2025, hundreds
of thousands of Mexicans took to the streets chanting "Free Palestine" (Palestina vive) to condemn the
US-Israeli genocide in Gaza and express solidarity with Palestinians. According to the 2026 Pew
Spring Poll, Mexican public favorability dropped to just 40% for the US and 23% for Israel.
 
Nobody is illegal on his own turf.
 
¡Viva México libre, independiente y soberano!
 
Iranian Ambassador to Mexico Abolfazl Pasandideh emphasized this alignment in a message to the Mexican people: "For us Iranians, this celebration holds a very special meaning. Although Mexico and Iran are thousands of kilometers apart, our peoples share something profoundly important: a deep love for their history and identity, as well as a shared commitment to the right to freely decide their own destiny. From Iran, a fraternal greeting to the Mexican people. Long live Mexico! Long live the friendship between Iran and Mexico!"