Suicide by a Thousand Cuts: EU Migrant Population Hits Record 64.2 Million

Immigration to the European Union has surged to historically high levels, reaching a total of 64.2 million foreign-born residents in 2025. According to the Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration, which utilizes Eurostat and UNHCR data, this represents a dramatic climb from the 40 million recorded in 2010 and a year-over-year increase of 2.1 million people. 

 

"Agents of Deveolpment," preparing for a crossing from the French coast toward the UK. 

To put this in perspective, approximately one in seven people residing in the European Union was born in a country other than the one where they currently live. The growth trend over the last 15 years highlights a significant shift in the bloc's composition.

 

 

Number of individuals born outside their country of residence
(including those with unknown birth country) in the EU, 2010-2025

 (excluding Portugal due to missing data).

 Number of immigrants in EU countries with the largest immigrant populations, 2010-2025.

 

Number of individuals born outside their country of residence in the EU, 2010-2025.

 

In 2010, the foreign-born population represented approximately 9% of the total EU population; by 2025, that share has risen to 14.25%. This presence is characterized by heavy geographic concentration, particularly in nations like Germany, where nearly 18 million foreign-born residents out of a total population of 83.6 million bring the local percentage to approximately 21.5%. 

"Replacement Migration: Is it A Solution to Declining and Ageing Populations?"

Population Division, UN DESA, New York, March 21, 2000.

 

Resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly on the "Global Compact for Safe, 

Orderly and Regular Migration," A/RES/73/195, Marrakesh, Morocco, December 19, 2018. 

 

» The 2030 Agenda recognizes... migrant women, men and children... as agents of development. « 

"Migration and the 2030 Agenda. A Guide for Practitioners." IOM, 2018.

 

This shift also carries a distinct demographic impact. While the median age of the broader EU population reached 44.9 years in early 2025, 72% of the foreign-born group in Germany is of working age, contrasting sharply with the aging domestic profile of the bloc. These figures demonstrate that migration is not just increasing in volume, but is fundamentally reshaping the labor and age structures of the Union's largest economies.

Immigrant Population in 2025 by EU country (% of total population).

 

The Geography of Concentration

A small number of countries handle the vast majority of arrivals and residency stocks. Germany continues to be the primary destination, hosting nearly 18 million foreign-born residents, of whom 72% are of working age. Meanwhile, Spain has emerged as the leader in recent growth, adding 700,000 residents in a single year—roughly one-third of the entire EU’s annual increase—bringing its total foreign-born population to 9.5 million (20%). While Germany and Spain account for nearly half of the total increase, smaller states like Luxembourg, Malta, and Cyprus are experiencing the most significant pressure relative to their population size.

 

Ranking of EU27 countries by total migrant inflows, 2024.

 

Ranking of EU27 countries by total migrant inflows per 1,000 inhabitants, 2024. 

 

Asylum applications follow a similarly concentrated pattern, with four nations receiving nearly three-quarters of all claims. Spain leads the applications with 141,000, drawing heavily from Latin America, followed by Italy with 127,000 and France with 116,000, both of which exhibit diverse source-country patterns. Germany received 113,000 applications, primarily from conflict-driven regions such as Syria and Afghanistan. While larger nations take the most applications in absolute terms, smaller countries often bear a greater burden relative to their population.

 

Countries of Origin of First-Instance Asylum Applicants, 2025.

 

Socio-Economic Strain and the Housing Crisis

As migration reaches these new peaks, official data points to a severe mounting strain on living conditions across the bloc. In 2024, 8.2% of EU residents were considered overburdened by housing costs, spending at least 40% of their disposable income on rent or mortgages. The crisis is particularly acute for the youth, with nearly one in ten people aged 15 to 29 facing a similar housing cost burden. Furthermore, 16.9% of the population now lives in overcrowded households, and 9.2% are unable to adequately heat their homes.

Refugees as a Share of Total Population, 2025: Germany hosts the most (≈2.7 million), more than double Poland (≈1 million), followed by France (≈751,000), Spain (≈471,000), and Czechia (≈381,000). Italy (≈314,000), Austria (≈281,000), and the Netherlands (≈263,000), while most others have fewer than 200,000. Totals include refugees, people in refugee-like situations, and displaced persons from Ukraine under temporary protection.

Recently, European Council President Antonio Costa has emphasized that housing affordability is now "at the core of people's disillusionment with democratic institutions." Spot on, Mr. Costa... these economic pressures, combined with concerns over public security, services, and the cost of living, have fueled the rise in anti-immigration sentiment across EU member states and the UK. While the EU allocates approximately 2% of its seven-year budget to migration and "border management," the bulk of the financial and social costs are currently borne by individual national governments. 

 

In 2014, the cost to support 2 million 'refugees' over the next three years was at €900

billion—more than twice the German federal government's total annual budget.

 

Now just imagine—due to a prolonged general economic crisis and decline—what will happen once national administrations are no longer able to milk their native populations for hundreds of billions of euros and can no longer redistribute enough protection money to millions of formerly pampered, predominantly male, military-age "refugees" and "migrants" from dozens of Muslim countries destroyed by U$raHell, UK, NATO, and the very EU… they may suddenly start helping themselves otherwise.

 

Most urgent EU priority instead: Drone production and another €90 billion "loan" for Ukraine.

Geopolitical Tensions and 'Defense' Realities

The official EU migration narrative is now inextricably linked to "Russia, Russia, Russia"... Russia's support of Syrian "dictator" Assad, the Libyan "Gaddafi regime," and "Putin's unprovoked aggression" against Ukraine. The EU currently hosts approximately 4.35 million Ukrainian nationals, with Germany serving as the largest host at over one million people. However, the political climate is shifting as domestic hospitality begins to wane. Berlin and Kyiv are now coordinating efforts to facilitate the return of military-age Ukrainian men to their home country's meat grinder as losses mount at the front.

 

Though this be madness, yet there is method in’t.

Simultaneously, the EU—getting ready for "war with Russia by 2030"—is pivoting toward a more aggressive "defense" posture. Through the recently launched €800 billion EU “ReArm Europe / Readiness 2030” plan, member states are significantly increasing "defense spending" to counter perceived Russian aggression. 

 

 Militarism, war, deindustrialization, mass-migration, inflation, debt, impoverishment,

corruption, energy and food shortages: All ingredients in place for a perfect storm in the EU.

 

Moscow has dismissed these security concerns as "nonsense," suggesting that EU governments are using the "threat narrative" to distract their citizens from internal domestic failures and the growing complexities of their deliberately self-fabricated "Agenda 2030" replacement migration crisis. 

Reference:
Tommaso Frattini and Camilla Piovesan (April 20, 2026) - The Immigrant Population in the European Union:
Growth, Concentration and Dispersion. 

  

 See also:

Anthony Rubin (2026) - Replacing Europe: An Undercover Look at Mass Migration.

TPR (2016) - The US Weapon of Mass Migration and the Coerced Suicide of Europe.

TPR (March 30, 2026) - JPMorgan Maps and Times the Global Oil Supply Shockwave. Really? 
Stanislav Krapivnik (March 27, 2026) - No Energy, No Food: Global System Breakdown Begins.

Alexander L. Chizhevsky (2025) - Mass Excitability during Solar Cycle 25 (2019–2030).

David Betz (2025) - United Kingdom Configured for Civil War Within the Next 5 Years.

Markku Siira (2025) - The Sidonius Apollinaris Syndrome.

Entering the First Global Total War | Alex Krainer

In their conversation, Lena Petrova (IR, MBA, CPA, and political economy analyst) and commodities trader, former hedge fund manager, and geopolitical analyst Alex Krainer examine the dimensions of what he terms the "First Global Total War," driven by major energy and trade disruptions and broader global market stress stemming from the US war against Iran.

 

» This is not the Third World War. This is the First Global Total War. « 

 

Krainer frames the present moment as a systemic confrontation between two competing models of governance: the Western-led, British-derived system of free trade (globalism)—criticized as fostering a regulatory and labor "race to the bottom"—and the emerging multipolar framework rooted in Alexander Hamilton’s American System of political economy (economic nationalism). The latter is a protectionist, nationally oriented, and genuinely wealth-creating model that was applied with notable success by the United States, Germany, and Japan in the 19th century, and later as sovereigntist derivatives by Korea, Mexico, Brazil, Iran, China, and numerous other nations throughout the 20th and early 21st centuries. 

 

"The Monkey System:" 1831 cartoon attacking Henry Clay's "American System" from a
Jacksonian Democratic perspective favoring limited federal economic intervention.

 

Krainer forecasts a prolonged systemic confrontation with significant implications for global energy production, industrial output, trade, and food markets, arguing that tensions and worldwide wars will persist until the foundations of the current Western neocolonial financial architecture (including private central banking) are fundamentally challenged, ultimately defeated, and replaced.

 

Exhaustive List of Hydrocarbon and Major
 Energy Incidents (Non-Middle East).

 

Since April 3, ten oil refineries, power plants, and energy facilities across

 seven countries have been destroyed by "fires," "explosions," and "accidents."   

 

Escalation of Conflict

Krainer interprets the wars in Ukraine and West Asia as interconnected theaters within a broader strategic struggle. He argues that Western powers seek to open additional fronts—potentially in the Baltics, the Balkans, and around the Strait of Malacca—to prevent de-escalation in Ukraine and sustain strategic pressure.

Energy as a Strategic Lever

Control over energy flows, particularly through chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca, is presented as the central axis of conflict. Krainer characterizes this dynamic as part of a long-standing effort by Western neocolonial financial interests to preserve influence over the Eurasian landmass.

 »  A worldwide naval confrontation centered on energy and trade access. «

 

Commodities Markets and Inflation

On the economic front, Krainer contends that elevated equity valuations are being sustained by central bank liquidity, masking underlying structural fragility. This, he argues, has produced a growing divergence between financial markets and the real economy. He anticipates upward pressure on oil and other commodities, describing current price behavior as slow-moving and lagged in its response to geopolitical developments.

US Air Force General Dan Caine refused President Donald Trump's attempt to access
nuclear codes during an emergency White House meeting on Saturday, April 18.

 

Rise of a Parallel System

Krainer highlights the gradual emergence of alternative financial and commodity networks operating beyond Western institutional control. He notes that many countries in the Global South are exploring paths outside IMF-aligned frameworks, despite the political and economic risks involved.

Reference:
Lena Petrova (April 21, 2026) - Alex Krainer: Global War Expands as Energy and Economic Crises Accelerate. (video)

  

See also:
Jiang Xueqin (April 17, 2026) - US War Against the World, and the Future International Order.
TPR (March 30, 2026) - JPMorgan Maps and Times the Global Oil Supply Shockwave. Really? 
Stanislav Krapivnik (March 27, 2026) - No Energy, No Food: Global System Breakdown Begins.

DJIA 2026 vs Top Three Midterm Correlated Years Since 1886 | @Fiorente2

Plotting all 35 midterm-election years for the DJIA since 1886, the spread of outcomes is enormous: In difficult midterm years, the DJIA has fallen by as much as 25% (1966), while in stronger years it has gained up to 45%. The average of ±2% is likely the most realistic expectation right now, given the current environment.

 

Chart 1: DJIA 2026 versus the Top Three Midterm Correlated Years:

1898 = approx. +20% (correlation 0.764); 1926 = ended the year flat (0.716); 1966 = approx. -20% (0.826). 

However, to get a sharper view, the three midterm years with the highest correlation to 2026 DJIA performance (from January through last week) were selected and charted: 1966, 1926, and 1898 (Chart 1).  

• 1966 has the strongest correlation (0.826).  
• 1898 (0.764) is the bullish outlier: if 2026 follows that path, the market could go bazooka from here.  
• 1926 (0.716) sits in the middle, and curiously, its path aligns with the average of the top three.

 

Chart 2: DJIA 2026 vs 1966 and Top Three Composites. In 1966, the DJIA printed its yearly low in early October.

  

Each of these years carries its own resonance: 

• In 1898, the US was just emerging as a global power through victory in the Spanish-American War. 
• In 1926, an industrial revolution was reshaping the economy. 
• In 1966, tariffs, war, inflation, and a punishing midterm election defined the landscape.  

The bias points toward 1966 (Chart 2): The correlation is the strongest, and the themes are too close to ignore: tariffs, a costly overseas conflict with no clear exit, inflation concerns, and a midterm election that may punish the incumbent party. 

 

Reference:
@Fiorente2 (April 20, 2026) - A US Midterm forecast on the DJIA.

 

Berkshire Hathaway's cash position has risen to a record above $370B, underscoring a scarcity of attractive valuations and ongoing reductions in holdings such as Apple. Warren Buffett has described recent market pullbacks as modest relative to historical downturns, drawing parallels to the elevated cash levels he maintained ahead of the 1999 dot-com crash and the 2007 financial crisis—periods when major equities ultimately fell by 80–90%.

See also:

@Fiorente2 (April 20, 2026) - An Update on the DJIA and the Jupiter-Saturn Cycle.

@Fiorente2 (March 16, 2026) - The 60-Year Cycle in US Stock Indexes Revisited.

Jeffrey A. Hirsch (March 23, 2026) - Trump Presidency Seasonal Cycle Pattern: Q1 Shock. Q2-Q4 Awe.

Jeffrey A. Hirsch (December 29, 2025) - 2026 Midterm Election Year Seasonal Patterns of US Indices.

Namzes (April 19, 2026) - S&P 500 Bear Outlook Intact: Q3 3.5-Year Hurst Cycle Low.

S&P 500 Bear Outlook Intact: Q3 3.5-Year Hurst Cycle Low | Namzes

The big picture remains unchanged: I still expect a bear market, with a buyable 3.5-year Hurst cycle low in Q3 2026. The 20-week cycle low arrived on schedule—just one day after the ideal March 27 (Fri) window outlined in my 2026 forecast.

 Chart 1: The new 20-week cycle could run higher into late May. The current 40-day cycle is now about halfway through.

I didn’t expect new all-time highs—my plan was for a rejection at the golden pocket retracement. Instead, a mix of CTA driven mechanical buying and Trump playing the market like a violin produced the blow-off top I’d anticipated back in February. The market always finds a way to humble you. 

 

The current 40-day cycle is roughly halfway complete (Chart 1). Next week should clarify whether the rally has further upside or is topping out. In my base bear case, April 17 was flagged as a potential turning point, but so far there are no signs of buying pressure slowing. Options expiration (OPEX) often serves as a pivot—either on the day itself or shortly after.

 
From a Hurst cycle perspective, the S&P 500 may still have several percent of upside left. That said, I’m not chasing it. As in February, I’ve stepped aside—risk/reward isn’t compelling for my multi-month holding framework, especially with weekend headline risk in play.

Timing-wise, the next 40-day low is due around May 7 (Thu). That should provide clearer insight into structure—namely the depth of the pullback and the strength of the rebound into late May (Chart 2). This sequence would then feed into a larger decline toward a higher-degree summer low. Leading indicators continue to point to a more meaningful downside move in the weeks ahead, so I remain heavily in cash.

  

 Chart 2: Options expiration (OPEX) often acts as a pivot, either on the day itself or a few days after. 

Next 40-day low due around May 7 (Thu), followed by a rebound into late May.

 

Short-term models have triggered a buy signal. If you’re leaning bullish, the new 20-week cycle could extend into late May, including a typical retest of the May 40-day low. However, given the negative pressure from the dominant 3.5-year cycle, my base case is that this rally is a false breakout—likely forming another divergent top and unlikely to persist beyond April.

It’s extremely rare for a 40-week cycle (top panel, Chart 3) to undercut its prior low and still go on to make new highs. In S&P 500 history, I could identify only one comparable instance. The usual structure in such cases is an M-shaped pattern with a clear bearish bias, as highlighted by the arrows.

 

Chart 3: It’s rare for a 40-week cycle to undercut its low and still go on to make a new high.

Bottom panel shows 20-week cycle, expected to synchronize with the 40-week cycle around July. 

That’s exactly how I expected the current 20-week cycle to unfold. That said, we now need price action to confirm emerging bearish signals. A bullishly configured cycle could still extend into June. While models have triggered a buy signal, participation remains narrow and volume is light. In my view, a downside resolution over the next few weeks remains the highest-probability outcome—but it still requires confirmation. Cycles define the setup; price action and models provide the trigger. The bottom panel shows the 20-week cycle, which I expect to synchronize with the 40-week cycle around July.

To illustrate what typically happens after a 20-week cycle low when the 40-week cycle has already failed, we can look back at Q1 2022 (Chart 4). In January of that year, the price made a lower low, confirming that the 40-week cycle had failed and signaling the start of a larger-degree correction.

 

Chart 4: Typical outcome after a 20-week low when the 40-week cycle has already failed.

 

This was followed by a series of bounces that retraced some of the decline but failed to make new highs. The market then rolled over and established new lows. This pattern is typical behavior roughly 99% of the time.That’s why I’ll be watching closely to see whether the current breakout turns out to be a deviation that ultimately resolves to the downside over the next few weeks, especially with the longer 3.5-year cycle exerting downward pressure.

I'm watching for a potential Wyckoff upthrust after distribution (UTAD) to play out over the next few weeks (Chart 5). For the bulls, it's critical to keep any pullbacks shallow and hold above the 2026 opening price at SPY 685.71, as well as above the overall consolidation range. 

 

Chart 5: Watching for a potential Wyckoff UTAD to unfold in the coming weeks.

Doing so will help avoid the setup looking like a classic false breakout. I've also overlaid the 2022 bear market in yellow for reference, in case the bearish thesis unfolds and we see a similar structure develop.

Reference:
Namzes (April 17, 2025) - S&P 500 Bear Outlook Intact – Q3 3.5-Year Cycle Low.

See also:
Namzes (January 10, 2026) - 2026 Hurst Cycles Playbook for the S&P 500. 
Namzes (January 1, 2026) - 2026 US Stock Market Forecast: 25% Bear Market and Recovery.

Krasi (April 19, 2026) - This is a 4-year cycle high—don’t get too excited.

David Hickson (April 7, 2026) - Twenty-Week Cycle Trough Or Greater? (video)

US War Against the World, and the Future International Order | Jiang Xueqin

The US war on Iran has entered a temporary pause, with no major events reported in the days following the Islamabad negotiations. This lull suggests the 'ceasefire' functions as a strategic reset rather than a resolution. 

"O Owner of Time, the time is at hand." 

 

Ceasefire Functions as Strategic Reset and Preparation for Prolonged Global War of Attrition

The US, having been placed on the defensive during the active phase, is using the cease fire to reposition forces, reassess tactics, and prepare for the next phase of operations. Behind-the-scenes movements include the Indonesian Defense Minister's visit to Washington, and the signing of an agreement granting US access to Indonesian airspace. This cooperation advances US influence over the Strait of Malacca, the world's largest maritime chokepoint and the route for roughly 80 percent of China's oil imports. 

» Do you think Scott Bessent wants oil prices to fall? To crash? Maybe down to $20 a barrel? Do you think the energy giants would be happy with that? No, they would be furious because the cost of production in the US is around $30 a barrel. Do you think Bessent hasn’t thought about this? Of course, he has. He likely predicts, just as I do, that oil prices could rise to $150 a barrel. That’s why I said Bessent shouldn’t have made these statements public—they act as a warning signal about a potential US military operation. It suggests that the US might be preparing to take action against Iran and, in doing so, potentially shut down the entire Persian Gulf. « Lu QiYuan, 2024.

Such control would counter Iranian dominance in the Strait of Hormuz and could disrupt East Asian economies if access were restricted. Further reinforcement comes from the deployment of the aircraft carrier George H.W. Bush, accompanied by approximately 10,000 Marines, raising total US troop strength in the theater to 60,000 and signaling readiness for potential ground operations. Domestically, President Trump has requested a $1.5 trillion Pentagon budget for the coming fiscal year, automatic draft registration for young men begins in December, and major US automakers have been directed to initiate war-munitions production. 

»  A worldwide naval confrontation centered on energy and trade access. «

 

These steps indicate preparation for a prolonged war of attrition. Complementing this posture, the announced naval blockade focuses on the Indian Ocean, avoiding direct exposure to Iranian missiles near the Strait of Hormuz while effectively enforcing a global embargo on vessels deemed to support Iran, including Russian 'shadow-fleet tankers' and Chinese shipping. The conflict is thereby expanding into a worldwide naval confrontation centered on energy and trade access.

Three Competing Models for the Future International Order

The unfolding events point toward three distinct and competing models for the future international order: (1) The Technate: Focused on North America; (2) Pax Judaica: Focused on the Levant and Israel; and (3) The Third Rome: Alexander Dugin's model, where Moscow unites the Eurasian continent to create a new era of world peace.

» The US will treat the Western Hemisphere as its own territory. «

The trajectory suggests the end of the current era of relative global stability. A sustained global conflict would compel US re-industrialization to support overseas operations, positioning the US as the central supplier of resources and manufactured goods while other regions confront disruption and scarcity. Trump's long-standing mercantilist stance—evident since the 1980s in calls to seize Iranian assets—underpins this shift from a finance-oriented economy to one rooted in resources and production. Observers note that over 127 vessels are now rerouting toward the Gulf of Mexico, consistent with a deliberate strategy to redirect trade flows. President Trump has consistently advocated monetizing US naval power by imposing tariffs on maritime trade instead of providing unrestricted protection.

Russia is positioned within the expanding naval confrontation through its shadow-fleet tankers, which fall under the scope of the US global blockade. The broader context of energy-access competition places additional pressure on European and Eurasian supply lines, though specific Russian responses remain tied to the ongoing US commitments in the Iran theater.

The Technate of America

The broader US strategy aligns with the Technate of America concept, a 1930s proposal for transforming the US into a self-sufficient continental fortress governed by technocratic principles. This model envisioned a unified territory incorporating Canada, Mexico, Greenland, Colombia, and Venezuela, managed through data-driven decision-making by engineers and scientists rather than traditional democratic or financial systems. 

 

1940 Technate of America Map: From the Arctic to the Amazon — Nazi-scale Lebensraum,
master-race ideology, and still active on the US empire's agenda today. Next stop: Cuba.

  

Recent US actions reflect elements of this vision. Venezuela has been positioned as a primary US proxy in South America, with the Trump administration's National Security Strategy treating the entire Western Hemisphere as US territory—a modern corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. 

» There's an additional strategy: The US could swiftly vassalize Mexico, rapidly industrialize it, and use it to complete a North American internal economic circulation. [...] In fact, the most direct and simplest way for the US to reindustrialize would be to militarily occupy Mexico and use it as a substitute for China in its economic system. « 

Lu QiYuan, 2024.

This framework prioritizes access to Venezuelan oil and the Argentina-Bolivia-Chile Lithium Triangle, critical for advanced technologies. Related initiatives include annexing Greenland, pressure on Canada, special-forces operations against Mexican cartels, and indications of military action against Cuba in the coming month.

» Venezuela remains a major obsession for the US. The US is expected to escalate sanctions and covert actions to oust the Maduro government in order to gain access to the world's largest reserves of hydrocarbons, as well as to gold, bauxite, iron ore, uranium, diamonds, and rare-earth elements [...]. Bolivia, which has the world's largest lithium reserves, will be treated in a similar fashion. Washington think tanks still consider Brazil a "swing state," and controlling Brazil's policies remains central to US efforts to limit and sabotage BRICS in the region. « Pepe Escobar, 2024.

These policies echo the Technate's emphasis on resource security, onshoring manufacturing, and continental self-sufficiency. The nations involved in recent US disputes—Canada, Greenland, Nicaragua, Honduras, Cuba, Venezuela, Colombia, and Mexico—correspond precisely to the geographic scope outlined in the original Technate map. Elon Musk has expressed support for aspects of this framework; his grandfather was an early proponent of the movement.

Elite Civil War and Internal Tensions

The current global instability stems from an intensifying internal contest within the US between nationalist and globalist factions. Opposition to Trump's strategy is anticipated from entrenched globalist elements, including the City of London and Wall Street, which continue to influence the European Union, NATO, and segments of the US deep state. These actors may respond with economic sabotage, engineered recessions, and organized anti-war protests directed at the national draft. 

Historian Peter Turchin's analysis of elite overproduction provides context: empires decline when excess elites act as societal parasites, and the US now confronts precisely such dynamics. Emerging technology and artificial-intelligence leaders from Silicon Valley are challenging the traditional financial elite amid unprecedented levels of debt and political polarization. This domestic clash of political factions underscores the risk of extended internal conflict within the US. Comparable nationalist-globalist divides are also evident in China, Russia, Iran, and Europe. 

Reference:
Danny El-Ayoubi (April 16, 2026) - Jiang Xueqin Warns: The End of The World Has Begun. Here's Why. (video)

  

Alongside universities, libraries, museums, mosques, synagogues, churches, hospitals and schools,
more than 100 major Iranian historical and cultural sites were destroyed in recent U$raHell attacks.

 

World War Trump.
[ Jiang Xueqin, April 21, 2026 ]

See also:

 Jiang Xueqin and Alexander Dugin (April 13, 2026) - Eschatology and Geopolitics. (video)