One of the primary issues with democracy
is the "Iron Law of Oligarchy," as described by Robert Michels.
Although democracy promises equality and freedom, an elite class inevitably
holds power. Whether Professor Peabody, Sally Strawberry, or Pedro Orange is in
office, an elite class persists. Even when one elite group is replaced by
another, such as a shift from peas to strawberries, the system remains
fundamentally unchanged.
Chuan Jianguo (特朗同志), Comrade Build the Nation, a.k.a.
MAGA Traitor (MAGA 叛徒) and Genocide Don (种族灭绝唐).
Michels' "Iron Law of Oligarchy" argues that
the egalitarianism democracy promises is an illusion. Elites always emerge;
even if the masses overthrow one, they soon create another. James Burnham, in "The Machiavellians," expands on this,
asserting that any realistic political analysis must accept elites' inevitable
dominance. This elite dominance reflects the
Pareto principle, suggesting a natural 80/20 split between elites and society.
Plato ("The Republic," Book VI) and Aristotle ("Politics," Book IV) warned against direct majority rule, fearing tyranny of the
majority and mob rule. In his "Discourses on Livy," Niccolò Machiavelli shared this view, citing the Gracchi brothers, Tiberius and Gaius, in 2nd-century BC Rome. Their land reforms to
redistribute wealth from the aristocracy to the poor led to bloodshed and civil
war. Machiavelli argued that the Gracchi erred in assuming the poor were less
self-interested than the wealthy. By seeking the masses' approval, they fueled
hatred between plebeians and the Senate, ultimately destroying the Roman
Republic.
Gaetano Mosca and Vilfredo Pareto:
The Intractable Problem of Democracy.
» The heirs began to degenerate from their ancestors, and, abandoning virtuous deeds, thought that princes had nothing to do but surpass others in luxury, lasciviousness, and every other kind of pleasure. Thus, the prince, becoming hated, and fearing because of this hatred, turned to tyranny, and many of those who helped establish it became its enemies.
Machiavelli described a cyclical
pattern where democracy transitions to tyranny. A wise and just ruler, the
"prince," leads initially, but his successor often indulges in
luxury, resulting in tyranny. An aristocratic class overthrows this tyranny,
establishing a new government, but these aristocrats also become corrupt,
ushering in anarchy and renewed tyranny. Machiavelli proposed a mixed
government—a republic—where monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy are
institutionally represented. This form is more stable and enduring than pure
democracies or oligarchies, as exemplified by the Spartan Republic, which
lasted 800 years compared to shorter cycles elsewhere.
» This system ensures special interest groups
dominate. «
Despite this mixed government,
challenges persist. In the 18th century, David Hume identified factionalism as
a major democratic flaw. He argued that people naturally form factions based on
personal interests, often undermining the common good. Even trivial
differences, as seen in ancient Greek factions or recent civil wars, can spark
factionalism. Modern democracies still face factions driven by religion,
politics, or personal rivalries.
James Madison, in his "Federalist Paper No. 10," addressed factions,
proposing two solutions: removing their causes or controlling their effects.
Eliminating causes requires abolishing liberty, which is impractical and
undesirable. Controlling effects is more feasible. Madison argued that large
republics dilute factional harm through diverse interests, making domination by
one faction harder and offering voters more choices, thus reducing corrupt
candidates' influence. However, Madison's vision did not
anticipate political parties, now central to modern politics, nor the impact of
communication tools like radio, television, and the internet, which amplify
factional organization and influence.
» Oligarchy always rests upon force and fraud. «
George Orwell, 1946.
Mancur Olson, in "The Logic of Collective Action," identified another issue: large groups with shared interests struggle to
organize due to high costs, while smaller, organized special interest groups
effectively influence policy, even against the majority's interests. These
groups often secure their goals, disregarding the public’s benefit.
» Sovereign is he who decides on the exception. «
Political Theology, Carl Schmitt, 1922.
For example, candidates Sunny
Strawberry and Lucy Lemon, running for office, receive offers from special
interest groups like the Peas, Aubergines, and Pears, seeking government
funding or tax breaks. To win, Sunny might pledge favors to these groups, even
if the broader population gains nothing. If she refuses, the groups may support
Lucy, who offers similar deals. This system ensures special interest groups
dominate policy, leaving the general population underrepresented.
» You great star! What would your happiness be had you not those for whom you shine! «
Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Friedrich Nietzsche, 1883.
The general public, lacking
special interests, struggles to organize and advocate for their agenda.
Consequently, their needs are often overlooked in favor of well-resourced
lobbies. Madison's republic and modern democracies face significant challenges.
Representatives often prioritize electoral success over the common good, and their
policies may fail without consequence. These systemic issues pose serious
problems for modern democracies, and while solutions are elusive, recognizing
and addressing these flaws is crucial.
See also:
(Zur Soziologie des Parteiwesens in der modernen Demokratie)
