The "Iron Law of Oligarchy" and the Delusion of Democracy | Neema Parvini

One of the primary issues with democracy is the "Iron Law of Oligarchy," as described by Robert Michels. Although democracy promises equality and freedom, an elite class inevitably holds power. Whether Professor Peabody, Sally Strawberry, or Pedro Orange is in office, an elite class persists. Even when one elite group is replaced by another, such as a shift from peas to strawberries, the system remains fundamentally unchanged. 

 

 Chuan Jianguo (特朗同志), Comrade Build the Nation, a.k.a. 

MAGA Traitor (MAGA 叛徒) and Genocide Don (种族灭绝唐). 

 

Michels' "Iron Law of Oligarchy" argues that the egalitarianism democracy promises is an illusion. Elites always emerge; even if the masses overthrow one, they soon create another. James Burnham, in "The Machiavellians," expands on this, asserting that any realistic political analysis must accept elites' inevitable dominance. This elite dominance reflects the Pareto principle, suggesting a natural 80/20 split between elites and society. 

 

Plato ("The Republic," Book VI) and Aristotle ("Politics," Book IV) warned against direct majority rule, fearing tyranny of the majority and mob rule. In his "Discourses on Livy," Niccolò Machiavelli shared this view, citing the Gracchi brothers, Tiberius and Gaius, in 2nd-century BC Rome. Their land reforms to redistribute wealth from the aristocracy to the poor led to bloodshed and civil war. Machiavelli argued that the Gracchi erred in assuming the poor were less self-interested than the wealthy. By seeking the masses' approval, they fueled hatred between plebeians and the Senate, ultimately destroying the Roman Republic.

 

 

 Gaetano Mosca and Vilfredo Pareto:

The Intractable Problem of Democracy.

 

» The heirs began to degenerate from their ancestors, and, abandoning virtuous deeds, thought that princes had nothing to do but surpass others in luxury, lasciviousness, and every other kind of pleasure. Thus, the prince, becoming hated, and fearing because of this hatred, turned to tyranny, and many of those who helped establish it became its enemies.

These, conspiring together, brought about its ruin. And so the cycle continues. «
Discourses on Livy, Book I, Chapter 2, Niccolò Machiavelli, 1531. 

Machiavelli described a cyclical pattern where democracy transitions to tyranny. A wise and just ruler, the "prince," leads initially, but his successor often indulges in luxury, resulting in tyranny. An aristocratic class overthrows this tyranny, establishing a new government, but these aristocrats also become corrupt, ushering in anarchy and renewed tyranny. Machiavelli proposed a mixed government—a republic—where monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy are institutionally represented. This form is more stable and enduring than pure democracies or oligarchies, as exemplified by the Spartan Republic, which lasted 800 years compared to shorter cycles elsewhere.

 

 

» This system ensures special interest groups dominate. «

Despite this mixed government, challenges persist. In the 18th century, David Hume identified factionalism as a major democratic flaw. He argued that people naturally form factions based on personal interests, often undermining the common good. Even trivial differences, as seen in ancient Greek factions or recent civil wars, can spark factionalism. Modern democracies still face factions driven by religion, politics, or personal rivalries.

 

James Madison, in his "Federalist Paper No. 10," addressed factions, proposing two solutions: removing their causes or controlling their effects. Eliminating causes requires abolishing liberty, which is impractical and undesirable. Controlling effects is more feasible. Madison argued that large republics dilute factional harm through diverse interests, making domination by one faction harder and offering voters more choices, thus reducing corrupt candidates' influence. However, Madison's vision did not anticipate political parties, now central to modern politics, nor the impact of communication tools like radio, television, and the internet, which amplify factional organization and influence.

 

» Oligarchy always rests upon force and fraud. «
George Orwell, 1946.

 

Mancur Olson, in "The Logic of Collective Action," identified another issue: large groups with shared interests struggle to organize due to high costs, while smaller, organized special interest groups effectively influence policy, even against the majority's interests. These groups often secure their goals, disregarding the public’s benefit. 

 

» Sovereign is he who decides on the exception. «
Political Theology, Carl Schmitt, 1922.

 

For example, candidates Sunny Strawberry and Lucy Lemon, running for office, receive offers from special interest groups like the Peas, Aubergines, and Pears, seeking government funding or tax breaks. To win, Sunny might pledge favors to these groups, even if the broader population gains nothing. If she refuses, the groups may support Lucy, who offers similar deals. This system ensures special interest groups dominate policy, leaving the general population underrepresented.

 

» You great star! What would your happiness be had you not those for whom you shine! «
Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Friedrich Nietzsche, 1883.

 

The general public, lacking special interests, struggles to organize and advocate for their agenda. Consequently, their needs are often overlooked in favor of well-resourced lobbies. Madison's republic and modern democracies face significant challenges. Representatives often prioritize electoral success over the common good, and their policies may fail without consequence. These systemic issues pose serious problems for modern democracies, and while solutions are elusive, recognizing and addressing these flaws is crucial.

 

Reference:

Neema Parvini (2019)  - Elite Theory: Gaetano Mosca and Vilfredo Pareto. (video)
Neema Parvini (2018)  - The Intractable Problem of Democracy. (video)

 

See also:

Neema Parvini (2022) - The Populist Delusion. 

Neema Parvini (2022) - The Liberal Political Theology.  

Ernst Jünger (1977) - The Forest Passage. (Der Waldgang) 

Imam Khomeini (1970) - Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist. (ولایت فقیه) 

 Mancur Olson (1965) - The Logic of Collective Action.

George Orwell (1946) - James Burnham and the Managerial Revolution. 

 James Burnham (1943) - The Machiavellians: Defenders of Freedom.

 Carl Schmitt (1922) - Political Theology. Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty. (Politische Theologie)

 Robert Michels (1915) - Political parties; a sociological study of the oligarchical tendencies of modern democracy.

(Zur Soziologie des Parteiwesens in der modernen Demokratie) 

Vilfredo Pareto (1916) - The Mind and Society. (Trattato di sociologia generale)  

Gaetano Mosca (1896) - The Ruling Class. (Elementi di scienza política)

 Gaetano Mosca (1896) - The Rulers and the Ruled.

Juan Donoso Cortés (1851) - Essays on Catholicism, Liberalism, and Socialism.

(Ensayo sobre el catolicismo, el liberalismo y el socialismo)

James Madison (1787)  - The Federalist Papers : No. 10. 

David Hume (1741) - Essay XXII: Of the Parties of Great Britain.

Niccolò Machiavelli (1531) - Discourses on Livy. (Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio) 

Aristotle (350 BCE) - Politics.
Plato (375 BCE) - The Republic.

 

了解你的敌人
Know your Enemies.

The Rulers and the Ruled | Gaetano Mosca

Among the constant facts and tendencies that are to be found in all political organisms, one is so obvious that it is apparent to the most casual eye. In all societies — from all societies that are very meagerly developed and have barely attained the dawnings of civilization, down to the most advanced and powerful societies — two classes of people appear — a class that rules and a class that is ruled.

 

[...] In reality the dominion of an organized minority, obeying a single impulse, over the unorganized majority is inevitable. The power of any minority is irresistible as against each single individual in the majority, who stands alone before the totality of the organized minority. A hundred men acting uniformly in concert, with a common understanding, will triumph over a thousand men who are not in accord and can therefore be dealt with one by one. Meanwhile it will be easier for the former to act in concert and have a mutual understanding simply because they are a hundred and not a thousand. It follows that the larger the political community, the smaller will the proportion of the governing minority to the governed majority be, and the more difficult will it be for the majority to organize for reaction against the minority.

"I can certainly call myself an anti-democrat, but I am not an anti-liberal;
indeed I am opposed to pure democracy precisely because I am a liberal.
I believe that the ruling class ought not to be monolithic and homogeneous
but ought to consist of elements which are diverse in regard to origin and
interests; when, instead, political power originates from a single source,
even if this be elections with universal suffrage, I regard it as dangerous
and liable to become oppressive. Democratic Jacobinism is an illiberal
doctrine precisely because it subordinates everything to a single force,
that of the so-called majority, on which it does not set any limits."

[...] What happens in other forms of government — namely, that an organized minority imposes its will on the disorganized majority — happens also and to perfection, whatever the appearances to the contrary, under the representative system. When we say that the voters ‘choose’ their representative, we are using a language that is very inexact. The truth is that the representative has himself elected by the voters, and, if that phrase should seem too inflexible and too harsh to fit some cases, we might qualify it by saying that his friends have him elected. In elections, as in all other manifestations of social life, those who have the will and, especially, the moral, intellectual and material means to force their will upon others take the lead over the others and command them.

[...] From our point of view there can be no antagonism between state and society. The state is to be looked upon merely as that part of society which performs the political function. Considered in this light, all questions touching interference or noninterference by the state come to assume a new aspect. Instead of asking what the limits of state activity ought to be, we try to find out what the best type of political organization is, which type, in other words, enables all the elements that have a political significance in a given society to be best utilized and specialized, best subjected to reciprocal control and to the principle of individual responsibility for the things that are done in the respective domains.

"Who says organization, says oligarchy. [...] Historical evolution mocks all the
prophylactic measures that have been adopted for the prevention of oligarchy."
Robert Michels, 1911

[...] Any political organization is both voluntary and coercive at one and the same time — voluntary because it arises from the very nature of man, as was long ago noted by Aristotle, and coercive because it is a necessary fact, the human being finding himself unable to live otherwise. It is natural, therefore, and at the same time indispensable, that where there are men there should automatically be a society, and that when there is a society there should also be a state — that is to say, a minority that rules and a majority that is ruled by the ruling minority.

Quoted from:
Gaetano Mosca (1896) - The Ruling Class (Elementi di scienza política).

See also:

 Robert Michels (1915) - Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy (Zur Soziologie des Parteiwesens in der modernen Demokratie).
Vilfredo Pareto (1916) - The Mind and Society (Trattato di sociologia generale).