Showing posts with label Diplomacy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Diplomacy. Show all posts

Friday, September 12, 2025

Defeating the Enemy Without Fighting | Henry Kissinger

Rarely did Chinese statesmen risk the outcome of a conflict on a single all-or-nothing clash; elaborate multiyear maneuvers were closer to their style. Where the Western tradition prized the decisive clash of forces emphasizing feats of heroism, the Chinese ideal stressed subtlety, indirection, and the patient accumulation of relative advantage.

This contrast is reflected in the respective intellectual games favored by each civilization. China’s most enduring game is wei qi (圍棋, pronounced roughly “way chee,” and often known in the West by a variation of its Japanese name, go). Wei qi translates as “a game of surrounding pieces”; it implies a concept of strategic encirclement. 

The outcome of a Wei Qi game between two expert players.
Black has won by a slight margin.
David Lai (2004) - Learning from the Stones: A Go Approach to Mastering China’s Strategic Concept, Shi.
Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute.

The board, a grid of nineteen-by-nineteen lines, begins empty. Each player has 180 pieces, or stones, at his disposal, each of equal value with the others
. The players take turns placing stones at any point on the board, building up positions of strength while working to encircle and capture the opponent’s stones. Multiple contests take place simultaneously in different regions of the board. The balance of forces shifts incrementally with each move, as the players implement strategic plans and react to each other’s initiatives. At the end of a well-played game, the board is filled by partially interlocking areas of strength. The margin of advantage is often slim, and to the untrained eye, the identity of the winner is not always immediately obvious.

Chess, on the other hand, is about total victory. The purpose of the game is checkmate, to put the opposing king into a position where he cannot move without being destroyed. The vast majority of games end in total victory achieved by attrition or, more rarely, a dramatic, skillful maneuver. The only other possible outcome is a draw, meaning the abandonment of the hope for victory by both parties.

If chess is about the decisive battle, wei qi is about the protracted campaign. The chess player aims for total victory. The wei qi player seeks relative advantage. In chess, the player always has the capability of the adversary in front of him; all the pieces are always fully deployed.

» Ultimate excellence lies not in winning every battle but in defeating the enemy without ever fighting.
The highest form of warfare is to attack the enemy’s strategy itself. «
The Art of War, Sun Tzu.

The wei qi player needs to assess not only the pieces on the board but the reinforcements the adversary is in a position to deploy. Chess teaches the Clausewitzian concepts of “center of gravity” and the “decisive point”—the game usually beginning as a struggle for the center of the board. Wei qi teaches the art of strategic encirclement. Where the skillful chess player aims to eliminate his opponent’s pieces in a series of head-on clashes, a talented wei qi player moves into “empty” spaces on the board, gradually mitigating the strategic potential of his opponent’s pieces. Chess produces single-mindedness; wei qi generates strategic flexibility.

A similar contrast exists in the case of China’s distinctive military theory (中国军事思想). Its foundations were laid during a period of upheaval, when ruthless struggles between rival kingdoms decimated China’s population. Reacting to this slaughter (and seeking to emerge victorious from it), Chinese thinkers developed strategic thought that placed a premium on victory through psychological advantage and preached the avoidance of direct conflict.
 
» US imperialism is a paper tiger. «
 Mao Zedong, July 14, 1956.
 
On his secret mission to establish a US-China alliance against the Soviet Union, US National Security
 Advisor Henry Kissinger meets with Zhou Enlai (Premier of the PRC since 1949) in Beijing on July 9, 1971.
 
Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party Mao Zedong (founding leader of the PRC since 1949)
welcomes President of the United States Richard Nixon (1969-1974) in Beijing on February 21, 1972.
 
Xi Jinping, President of the People's Republic of China (since 2013), invites
94-year-old former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to Beijing on July 19, 2017. 
 
The seminal figure in this tradition is known to history as Sun Tzu (or “Master Sun”), author of the famed treatise The Art of War. Intriguingly, no one is sure exactly who he was. Since ancient times, scholars have debated the identity of The Art of War’s author and the date of its composition. The book presents itself as a collection of sayings by one Sun Wu, a general and wandering military advisor from the  Spring and Autumn period of Chinese history (770–476 B.C. ), as recorded by his disciples.

[…] Well over two thousand years after its composition, this volume of epigrammatic observations on strategy, diplomacy, and war—written in classical Chinese, halfway between poetry and prose—remains a central text of military thought. Its maxims found vivid expression in the twentieth-century Chinese civil war 
(人民战争) at the hands of Sun Tzu’s student Mao Zedong, and in the Vietnam wars, as Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap employed Sun Tzu’s principles of indirect attack and psychological combat (逸待劳) against France and then the United States.

 

Wednesday, September 3, 2025

The End of Western Dominance—US Lives in Mortal Fear | John Mearsheimer

Since 2017, when Trump entered the White House, the balance of power has shifted in China’s favor, though the United States remains the world’s most powerful state. China is rapidly closing the gap, particularly in cutting-edge technologies, which Washington fears could tilt global economic and military power. As China converts its economic strength into military might, it builds not just regional forces but also blue-water naval power and global projection capabilities linked to its Belt and Road Initiative. This imitation of US strategy alarms Washington and drives a bipartisan policy of containment.

John J. Mearsheimer, American political scientist and professor at the University of Chicago, best known for his work
on international relations theory, offensive realism, the US Zionist lobby, US–China rivalry and great power politics.

Initially, Chinese leaders argued that economic interdependence would prevent conflict, since prosperity required cooperation. However, survival—not prosperity—is the primary goal of states in an anarchic international system with no higher authority. As China’s economic rise translated into growing military capacity, American fear replaced optimism, triggering security competition in East Asia. Prosperity enriched both sides, but balance-of-power politics and survival imperatives outweighed economic interdependence theory.

» Great powers are ruthless, exploiting weaker rivals to secure survival and expand influence. «
John J. Mearsheimer's complete discourse video. 

Historical lessons reinforce this logic. Weak states like China during its “century of humiliation” (1840s–1940s) and Russia during NATO expansion in the 1990s suffered because they lacked power. Great powers are ruthless, exploiting weaker rivals to secure survival and expand influence. In this system, the optimal strategy is regional hegemony, dominating one’s neighborhood while preventing rivals from doing the same. The US has long acted this way, blocking Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union from achieving dominance in Europe or Asia, while securing its own supremacy in the Western Hemisphere.

China’s trajectory fits this pattern. As its power has grown since the 1990s, Beijing naturally seeks to dominate East Asia. Yet the US cannot tolerate another regional hegemon, making containment inevitable. From Washington’s perspective, preventing Chinese hegemony is about survival, not choice. From Beijing’s perspective, seeking hegemony is equally rational. The result is a structural clash: both sides are locked in an intensifying security competition driven by the anarchic nature of the international system.

» The United States lives in mortal fear that the Chinese are going to dominate. «

China’s path to hegemony is more difficult than America’s was because regional powers like Japan, Australia, South Korea, and the Philippines—backed by the US—resist Chinese dominance. India participates in the Quad but is geographically and strategically less central to East Asian balance. Russia, meanwhile, has been pushed into China’s camp by the Ukraine war, eliminating a potential counterweight. This complicates US strategy: instead of balancing China together, Washington and Moscow are now aligned against each other.
 
The Ukraine war creates two major problems for the US: it prevents a full pivot to Asia and deepens the Sino-Russian partnership. Trump recognized this dynamic and sought rapprochement with Moscow to peel Russia away from China, but his chances of success are slim. Russia deeply distrusts the US, and Trump underestimated the difficulty of ending the Ukraine conflict. His instincts—to improve ties with Russia and focus on China—align with realist logic, but his reliance on instincts over experts undermines effective execution.

» It's only recently that Putin has brought the Russians back 
from the dead and we now consider Russia to be a great power. «

Since 2017, US policy has shifted decisively from engagement to containment of China, first under Trump and then reinforced, even hardened, under Biden. Yet American forces remain tied down in Ukraine and the Middle East. Deployments against the Houthis in the Red Sea and the prospect of war with Iran divert vital resources away from East Asia, just as China grows militarily stronger. Past US experiments in social engineering—in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya—ended in failure, raising doubts about new entanglements that sap the capacity to counter China.

Facing escalating global uncertainties, Chinese President Xi Jinping said the SCO is increasingly
responsible for regional peace, stability, and member-state development, August 31, 2025.
 
Ultimately, the US–China rivalry reflects structural realities of power politics. Both states seek survival through maximizing power, and both see regional hegemony as the path to security. The United States, the sole global hegemon since 1900, refuses to share that status, while China, closing the gap, sees dominance in East Asia as essential. The result is an enduring, intensifying contest that economic interdependence or diplomatic optimism cannot erase.

 

See also:

China's Preparations for Reunification With Taiwan Around 2027 | Jin Canrong

The Chinese government has consistently avoided setting a timetable for resolving the Taiwan question, emphasizing instead President Xi’s call for peaceful reunification with patience, sincerity, and effort. Despite this, American analysts frequently forecast 2027 as the likely point of resolution. Their view is shaped by China’s large strategic reserves, new industrial measures, and visible military procurement, all of which they interpret as signs of preparation for decisive conflict.

Jin Canrong (金灿荣), leading scholar of China–US relations, American politics, and foreign policy;
CCP strategist; Professor and Associate Dean at the School of International Studies, Renmin University of China.

From a military perspective, China faces few obstacles. A Taiwan operation could be carried out through blockade or direct combat, and success would likely come quickly. US intervention is not considered probable, making the true challenges economic and political rather than military or diplomatic. China’s main vulnerabilities are its dependence on imported resources, its lack of a fully unified domestic market, and the influence of elites with assets or family ties abroad. By contrast, Russia’s economy, though smaller, is buffered by its abundant resources, allowing it to withstand sanctions more effectively.

Among many other heads of states, Putin, Kim Jong Un, 
Park Geun-hye, ex-President of South Korea, and Masoud
Pezeshkian, President of Iran, joined Beijing’s historic victory parade on September 3, marking 80 years since
Japan’s WWII surrender, where China showcased its hypersonic missiles and nuclear triad. 
 
The government is taking steps to address these weaknesses. Grain reserves now exceed two years thanks to improved storage and expanded farmland. By 2027, new oil and gas discoveries together with Central Asian pipelines are expected to reduce import dependence. Coal-to-oil conversion and the spread of new energy vehicles will further narrow the energy gap. The more difficult issue lies in market access, as domestic circulation remains weak due to provincial barriers. Efforts to expand the Belt and Road initiative continue, though China lacks the military and cultural instruments historically used by the West to protect overseas investments.

»
US intervention is not considered probable. «
Jin Canrong's complete discourse video.
 
Diplomatically, a resolution of the Taiwan issue would have far-reaching effects. ASEAN countries, seeing the United States as unreliable for security, would likely align with China, turning the South China Sea into an inland sea. Japan and South Korea, highly dependent on maritime trade and external resources, would also face strong pressure to yield. Once the Taiwan Strait and the South and East China Seas are secured, Shanghai and the eastern seaboard would be protected, creating what could be the safest period in Chinese history.

Welcome to the Eurasian Century.
 
Historically, China’s threats came from the north, but industrialization eliminated that danger. Today, the principal threats come from the sea, the heartland of Western industrial power. Once Taiwan is reclaimed and the maritime approaches are secure, China can focus entirely on internal development and raising living standards. The most serious obstacles to this outcome are economic fragility and political complications, not military or diplomatic resistance. The year 2027 therefore stands out as the most likely turning point, a moment that could bring short-term hardship but ultimately mark the beginning of a new and safer era for China.

 
See also:

Monday, September 1, 2025

SCO Summit Ushers in New Global Security Order and Development Strategy

The Tianjin SCO Summit (August 31–September 1, 2025) brought together leaders from more than 20 nations and delegations from over 30 countries, representing half of humanity. Founded in 2001 from the “Shanghai Five” bloc, the SCO has since evolved into a platform of global significance, no longer limited to Eurasian security but increasingly positioned as a central force in world affairs.

Eurasia’s great powers 
align.
 
The summit adopted the "Tianjin Declaration" and updated the "SCO Development Strategy to 2035", mapping out collective approaches to global security, economic stability, technology gaps, and humanitarian issues. Around 20 agreements were signed covering regional security, economic cooperation, and cultural ties—showing the SCO’s increasingly comprehensive agenda.

The most striking diplomatic development was the warming of "China–India relations". Xi Jinping and Narendra Modi affirmed that their countries should act as partners, not rivals—“the dragon and the elephant dancing together.” China also declared readiness to cooperate with Belarus, strengthening its support for Russia. Azerbaijan’s potential membership was floated, adding complexity to regional dynamics.

Unlike Western alliances, the SCO emphasizes "non-interference, equality, and mutual respect", principles that resonate strongly with the Global South. Many members are also part of BRICS, reinforcing the alignment of emerging economies seeking independence from Western dominance. The summit thus showcased an alternative model of governance appealing to nations dissatisfied with US-led structures.

Indian Business Today depicts Trump's futile attempts
to stop the out-of-control Indian elephant.

The presence of leaders from Mongolia, Turkey, Egypt, and Indonesia underscored the SCO’s expanding gravitational pull. Ceremonies marking the 80th anniversary of the victory over Japan reminded participants of the historical depth of Russia–China ties and their shared resistance to Western hegemony. Symbolic gestures, such as Putin and Modi walking hand in hand, highlighted the summit’s theatrical but strategic diplomacy.
 
» The Dragon and the Elephant should dance together. «
Following Donald Trump's "unwise tariffs," former Global Times reporter
Yang Sheng says the policies pushed China and India to set aside differences. 
 
The summit signaled the "rise of a multipolar world order". By uniting Asia’s largest powers and fostering ties across the Global South, the SCO has moved closer to becoming a true counterweight to Western institutions. 
 
The West relegated to the rank of frustrated spectator.

Together with BRICS, it now represents a complementary pole of power. If China and India consolidate cooperation, analysts see the potential for a profound realignment of global governance away from Western dominance.
 
See also:

Monday, July 28, 2025

The Art of the $1.3 Trillion 'Screw You' Deal: EU Pays Up, US Gives Nothing

The $1.3 trillion US–EU trade agreement, reached after a tense 40-minute meeting held between US President Trump and President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen at Trump’s Scottish golf course on July 27, avoids a full-blown trade war. 
 
Trump celebrates his "biggest trade deal" yet.
 
As expected, Brussels, the tribute-bound US vassal, folded under pressure, and the circus ringmaster turned European diplomacy into an intergalactic howler: The EU accepted a 15% US tariff on its exports—while the US kept zero tariffs in return. Europe agreed to invest $600 billion into the US economy, pledged to buy hundreds of billions' worth of overpriced American weapons, and committed to $750 billion in US LNG purchases—$250 billion over the next three years alone—because apparently that's better than cheap gas through Nord Stream. In exchange, the US gave... absolutely nothing.
 
Von der Leyen, "You're known as a tough negotiator and dealmaker." Trump, "But fair." 
Von der Leyen, "And fair." Trump adds, "That's less important." Room erupts in laughter.
 
This 'screw you' deal and EU bailout for the US is seen as an absolute geopolitical and geoeconomic win for Trump, reinforcing his strategy of tariff threats and pressure, echoed in recent deals with Japan, Vietnam, and others.  
 
Brussels' Barbie—Trump’s total contempt: incompetent, corrupt, compromised.
 
Marine Le Pen, a veteran right-wing politician from France, calls the deal a political, economic, and moral "fiasco", and "an outright surrender for French industry and for our energy and military sovereignty"; Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov predicts "it will accelerate Europe’s deindustrialization".
 
Reference:
 
It is difficult, indeed.
 
了解你的敌人
Know your Enemies.
 

Monday, June 23, 2025

We Have Completed Our Very Successful Attack | Donald J. Trump

June 22, 2025 01:53 AM 
 
@realOsama
September 11, 2001 12:00 PM 
 
@RealHirohito
December 7, 1941 12:00 PM 
 
Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Friday, March 7, 2025

Make Chimerica Great Again | Mitchell Presnick

Forget about the G7 and G20. The truly important focus is the US and China, and what we do together. First of all, we are moving into a multipolar world. This means that the US and China will be peer competitors, but there will also be other important countries rising and becoming more influential over time, such as India, Brazil, Indonesia, and Russia. 
 
»
Donald Trump is probably the most pro-China President in US History. 
President Trump said that the US and China could solve all the world’s problems, and he is right. «
Mitchell Presnick.
 
We have this multipolar world, and within this context, we are going to see the formation of the G2. Forget about the G7 and G20. The real focus is the US and China and what we do together. President Trump said that “the US and China could solve all the world’s problems, and he is right. He specifically said the US and China; not the US, China, BRICS, and the developing world. If China and the US are working together, everyone else—over 200 countries—will be aligned with one or the other, or both in some cases.

This, I believe, is the world order that is coming. I think it is going to be net positive for the world because it will provide more opportunities for countries that have been ignored. Africa did not get much attention until China entered and began developing business and resource opportunities there. Now, Africa is receiving a lot more attention from everyone. The same is true for Latin America. The US has been dominant in this hemisphere since the early 1800s, and yet Latin America and South America have struggled to develop. Objectively, it is clearly in the interest of South America for China to get more involved and help develop infrastructure there.

This might even encourage the US to do the same, which would be a net positive for South America. It would also create business opportunities, because one thing people don’t understand about the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is that every time China builds a railway, road, port, or airport in a developing country, it is also creating the foundation for a middle class who will later buy other goods from China. In other words, it's like brand building for Chinese industry. China, as a brand, is being built in these countries. People there will become familiar with Chinese cars, well-built roads, and high-quality products. As these consumers develop, they will naturally be more inclined to buy Chinese goods, which are well-priced and of good quality. This is something I think the US also needs to be doing.

Globalism is Dead, What Comes Next | Alexander Dugin

The order of great powers is something harsher than multipolarity. It is essentially a form of multipolarity, since it is neither unipolar nor bipolar, but something greater. However, in this case, only the state civilizations that currently exist are considered, not those that might emerge in the future based on deep-rooted identities. 
 

We are living in a new age of great power politics, and Europe is the big loser. The order of great powers, outlined by Trump's bold reforms, represents a redistribution of the spheres of influence in the world among the tetrarchy of the US, Russia, China and India. 
 
 » Trump's bold reforms, represents a redistribution of the spheres of influence. «

Everything else falls into the realm of the periphery. In theory, Europe could have joined, but not under the liberal lunatics who are currently in power. Europe is desperately clinging to the unipolar world, from which, however, the structural foundation, the US, has been removed. The EU now hardly has any chance of surviving. So, for now, it's the tetrarchy and the prospects of Yalta 2.0.

 

Wednesday, August 28, 2024

Facing Global System Change | Prime Minister Viktor Orbán of Hungary

It is a cliché that war is the continuation of policy with other means. It is important to add that war is the continuation of policy from a different perspective. So war, in its relentlessness, takes us to a new position from which to see things, to a high vantage point. And from there it gives us a completely different – hitherto unknown – perspective. We find ourselves in new surroundings and in a new, rarefied force field. In this pure reality, ideologies lose their power; statistical sleights of hand lose their power; media distortions and politicians’ tactical dissimulation loses its power. There is no longer any relevance to widespread delusions – or even to conspiracy theories. What remains is the stark, brutal reality. 
 
 » The war in Ukraine is our red pill. And now we must talk about reality. « 
Viktor Orbán - July 27, 2024.

[...] A change is coming, that has not been seen for five hundred years. This has not been apparent to us because in the last 150 years there have been great changes in and around us, but in these changes the dominant world power has always been in the West. And our starting point is that the changes we are seeing now are likely to follow this Western logic. By contrast, this is a new situation. In the past, change was Western: the Habsburgs rose and then fell; Spain was up, and it became the centre of power; it fell, and the English rose; the First World War finished off the monarchies; the British were replaced by the Americans as world leaders; then the Russo–American Cold War was won by the Americans. But all these developments remained within our Western logic. 
 

This is not the case now, however, and this is what we must face up to; because the Western world is not challenged from within the Western world, and so the logic of change has been disrupted. What I am talking about, and what we are facing, is actually a global system change. And this is a process that is coming from Asia. To put it succinctly and primitively, for the next many decades – or perhaps centuries, because the previous world system was in place for five hundred years – the dominant centre of the world will be in Asia: China, India, Pakistan, Indonesia, and I could go on. They have already created their platforms, there is this BRICS formation in which they are already present. And there is the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, in which these countries are building the new world economy.


I think that this is an inevitable process, because Asia has the demographic advantage, it has the technological advantage in ever more areas, it has the capital advantage, and it is bringing its military power up to equilibrium with that of the West. Asia will have – or perhaps already has – the most money, the largest financial funds, the largest companies in the world, the best universities, the best research institutes, and the largest stock exchanges. It will have – or already has – the most advanced space research and the most advanced medical science. In addition, we in the West – even the Russians – have been well shepherded into this new entity that is taking shape. The question is whether or not the process is reversible – and if not, when it became irreversible. I think it happened in 2001, when we in the West decided to invite China to join the World Trade Organisation. Since then this process has been almost unstoppable and irreversible.
 
[...] What is the European response to global system change? We have two options. The first is what we call “the open-air museum”. This is what we have now. We are moving towards it. Europe, absorbed by the US, will be left in an underdeveloped role. It will be a continent that the world marvels at, but one which no longer has within it the dynamic for development. The second option is strategic autonomy. In other words, we must enter the competition of global system change. After all, this is what the USA does, according to its own logic. And we are indeed talking about 400 million people. It is possible to recreate Europe’s capacity to attract capital, and it is possible to bring capital back from America.

Friday, May 24, 2024

Putin wants Ukraine Ceasefire on Current Frontlines | Reuters

MOSCOW / LONDON, May 24, 2024 (Reuters) - Russian President Vladimir Putin is ready to halt the war in Ukraine with a negotiated ceasefire that recognises the current battlefield lines, four Russian sources told Reuters, saying he is prepared to fight on if Kyiv and the West do not respond.

 PUTIN READY TO STOP WAR FOR NEGOTIATED CEASEFIRE RECOGNIZING CURRENT FRONTLINES - 
two presstitutes at Reuters are claiming. They are citing "four anonymous Russian sources", 
and are warning Putin is ready to fight as long as it takes if West refuses.
MOSCOW, May 24, 2024

Three of the sources, familiar with discussions in Putin's entourage, said the veteran Russian leader had expressed frustration to a small group of advisers about what he views as Western-backed attempts to stymie negotiations and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy's decision to rule out talks. 
 
War is diplomacy by other means. 
And it is the winner on all battlefields dictating the terms of 'peace'.
» Russia is ready if the West wants to fight for Ukraine. «
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov
MOSCOW, May 13, 2024
 
"Putin can fight for as long as it takes, but Putin is also ready for a ceasefire – to freeze the war," said another of the four, a senior Russian source who has worked with Putin and has knowledge of top  level conversations in the Kremlin.
 
♫  He, like the others cited in this story, spoke on condition of anonymity given the matter's sensitivity. ♫ 
 
Under Hibatullah Akhundzada's leadership, the Islamic Republic 
was dissolved and the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan was re-established.
KABUL, August 15, 2021
 
Under General Abdourahamane Tchiani's leadership, the Republic of the Niger
resisted ECOWAS' invasion threats, kicked out all French and American
military, and called in Russian troops.
NIAMEY, May 3, 2024
 
Under Abdul-Malik Badruldeen al-Houthi's leadership, Ansar Allah overthrew
the previous regime in 2015, and took full control over the Republic of Yemen. 
SANA'A, May 24, 2024