Mexico's Economic Rise Shifts Power from the US | Richard D. Wolff

Mexico, often viewed as dependent on the US, holds a significant edge in the global economy, with the US relying more on Mexico than most Americans realize. Beyond avocados and automobiles, Mexico is a vital hub for US supply chains in electronics, pharmaceuticals, automotive, aerospace, medical devices, textiles, consumer goods, and information/communications technology. As the US depends on Mexico, Mexico has strategically built leverage, shifting focus from politics to economics.

 

The Power Problem: Nearshoring and Mexico’s energy sector.

Mexico’s rise as an economic powerhouse challenges its subordinate image. Its leverage in trade, energy, and geopolitics makes it vital to the US. Rising labor and environmental demands could disrupt supply chains. The era of US dominance is fading, replaced by interdependence, and Mexico wields unprecedented influence. A fracture in this delicate relationship could swiftly impact the US. 

 

Mexico, once a trade partner, is now a force reshaping trade and energy policies, catching the US unprepared. The US has long focused on migration and border security, overlooking intricate economic ties. Mexico is a cornerstone of US production, driven by cost-effective labor and trade agreements like the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA, 2020).

 

Mexico’s Manufacturing Momentum: Many well-established industrial clusters.

 

This dependency stems from lower wages and proximity, but this corporate strategy has created vulnerabilities. US companies’ reliance on Mexico’s manufacturing gives Mexico significant leverage. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA,1994) boosted trade but moved US factories to Mexico for cheaper labor, eroding American jobs. USMCA preserved this structure. Mexico, no longer just a low-cost hub, has diversified into energy, consumer markets, and geopolitics, prioritizing labor rights and domestic growth, threatening the cheap labor model and US supply chains.

 

 Puerto Manzanillo, Mexico's new trade hub on the Pacific, bypassing the Panama Canal.

 

US policies, like subsidized agricultural exports, have displaced Mexican farmers, driving migration. US firms’ job relocation to Mexico exploits low-wage workers, creating an underclass on both sides of the border, with migration as a symptom of economic disparities.

Mexico, a key US oil supplier, is asserting control over its energy resources, nationalizing and tightening oversight, challenging US corporations. Its push into renewables diversifies its portfolio, enhancing global leverage. Prioritizing domestic energy could disrupt US imports, forcing a strategic shift.

 Mexico has surpassed China as the top US trade partner.

 » In fact, the most direct and simplest way for the US to reindustrialize would be to 

militarily occupy Mexico and use it as a substitute for China in its economic system. «  

Mexican labor movements demand better wages and conditions, undermining the cheap labor model, potentially raising US consumer prices. Environmental activists push for sustainable practices, challenging resource exploitation.

 

Amid the US-China trade war, Mexico is a nearshoring hub, benefiting from USMCA and proximity. China’s investments in Mexico create a trade triangulation, with Chinese components assembled in Mexico for US export, bypassing tariffs. Mexico negotiates favorable terms with both powers, gaining strategic autonomy.

Reference:
Richard D. Wolff (September 17, 2025) - Mexico Is About to Change Everything for the US. (video)

 

 

Richard D. Wolff, American Marxist economist known for works like "Democracy at Work,"

is teaching at the University of Massachusetts Amherst and The New School.

 

See also:
TPR (January 24, 2025) - Mexico's Strategic Position in China's Maritime Silk Road of the Americas.

TPR (September 12, 2024) - Failed US Regime Change Attempt in Mexico. 

TPR (August 18, 2024) - Mexico Pivoting Away From Washington’s Grip. 
Andrés Manuel López Obrador (May 8, 2024) - The US is in Decline and Desperate Need to Modernize.

Defeating the Enemy Without Fighting | Henry Kissinger

Rarely did Chinese statesmen risk the outcome of a conflict on a single all-or-nothing clash; elaborate multiyear maneuvers were closer to their style. Where the Western tradition prized the decisive clash of forces emphasizing feats of heroism, the Chinese ideal stressed subtlety, indirection, and the patient accumulation of relative advantage.

This contrast is reflected in the respective intellectual games favored by each civilization. China’s most enduring game is wei qi (圍棋, pronounced roughly “way chee,” and often known in the West by a variation of its Japanese name, go). Wei qi translates as “a game of surrounding pieces”; it implies a concept of strategic encirclement. 

The outcome of a Wei Qi game between two expert players.
Black has won by a slight margin.
David Lai (2004) - Learning from the Stones: A Go Approach to Mastering China’s Strategic Concept, Shi.

Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute.

The board, a grid of nineteen-by-nineteen lines, begins empty. Each player has 180 pieces, or stones, at his disposal, each of equal value with the others. The players take turns placing stones at any point on the board, building up positions of strength while working to encircle and capture the opponent’s stones. Multiple contests take place simultaneously in different regions of the board. The balance of forces shifts incrementally with each move, as the players implement strategic plans and react to each other’s initiatives. At the end of a well-played game, the board is filled by partially interlocking areas of strength. The margin of advantage is often slim, and to the untrained eye, the identity of the winner is not always immediately obvious.

Chess, on the other hand, is about total victory. The purpose of the game is checkmate, to put the opposing king into a position where he cannot move without being destroyed. The vast majority of games end in total victory achieved by attrition or, more rarely, a dramatic, skillful maneuver. The only other possible outcome is a draw, meaning the abandonment of the hope for victory by both parties.

If chess is about the decisive battle, wei qi is about the protracted campaign. The chess player aims for total victory. The wei qi player seeks relative advantage. In chess, the player always has the capability of the adversary in front of him; all the pieces are always fully deployed.

» Ultimate excellence lies not in winning every battle but in defeating the enemy without ever fighting.

The highest form of warfare is to attack the enemy’s strategy itself. «

The Art of War, Sun Tzu.

The wei qi player needs to assess not only the pieces on the board but the reinforcements the adversary is in a position to deploy. Chess teaches the Clausewitzian concepts of “center of gravity” and the “decisive point”—the game usually beginning as a struggle for the center of the board. Wei qi teaches the art of strategic encirclement. Where the skillful chess player aims to eliminate his opponent’s pieces in a series of head-on clashes, a talented wei qi player moves into “empty” spaces on the board, gradually mitigating the strategic potential of his opponent’s pieces. Chess produces single-mindedness; wei qi generates strategic flexibility.

A similar contrast exists in the case of China’s distinctive military theory (中国军事思想). Its foundations were laid during a period of upheaval, when ruthless struggles between rival kingdoms decimated China’s population. Reacting to this slaughter (and seeking to emerge victorious from it), Chinese thinkers developed strategic thought that placed a premium on victory through psychological advantage and preached the avoidance of direct conflict.

 

» US imperialism is a paper tiger. «
 Mao Zedong, July 14, 1956.

 

On his secret mission to establish a US-China alliance against the Soviet Union, US National Security

 Advisor Henry Kissinger meets with Zhou Enlai (Premier of the PRC since 1949) in Beijing on July 9, 1971.

 

Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party Mao Zedong (founding leader of the PRC since 1949)

welcomes President of the United States Richard Nixon (1969-1974) in Beijing on February 21, 1972.

 

Xi Jinping, President of the People's Republic of China (since 2013), invites

94-year-old former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to Beijing on July 19, 2017. 

 

The seminal figure in this tradition is known to history as Sun Tzu (or “Master Sun”), author of the famed treatise The Art of War. Intriguingly, no one is sure exactly who he was. Since ancient times, scholars have debated the identity of The Art of War’s author and the date of its composition. The book presents itself as a collection of sayings by one Sun Wu, a general and wandering military advisor from the  Spring and Autumn period of Chinese history (770–476 B.C. ), as recorded by his disciples.

[…] Well over two thousand years after its composition, this volume of epigrammatic observations on strategy, diplomacy, and war—written in classical Chinese, halfway between poetry and prose—remains a central text of military thought. Its maxims found vivid expression in the twentieth-century Chinese civil war (人民战争) at the hands of Sun Tzu’s student Mao Zedong, and in the Vietnam wars, as Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap employed Sun Tzu’s principles of indirect attack and psychological combat (以逸待劳) against France and then the United States.

Quoted from:
Henry Kissinger (2012) - On China.

 

» And this is something you never understood, you Americans. « 

State Central Banking vs Private Central Banking | Wen Tiejun

Let's delve into the core reasons underlying the strategic confrontation between the People's Republic of China and the United States of America, as this unveils a significant systemic discrepancy: [...] The issuance of the renminbi (RMB) is fundamentally based on the authority of the Chinese government, specifically through the People's Bank of China (PBC). The basis for the issuance of the renminbi is definitely not gold. The reason this money is valuable is because it is a sovereign currency issued by the state and backed by state authority. Empowering a sovereign currency establishes credit. The currency creates credit, and the sole resource available is political authority. Thus, political authority, governmental power, and the administration in control align with the currency system.

Wen Tiejun (温铁军) is a Chinese agricultural economist and a professor at the Renmin

University of China, best known for his studies on the Three Rural Issues in Mainland China.

 

On the other hand, the source of the US dollar's credit is an institution established by private bankers, not a country. Pay attention, this difference matters: The US dollar is actually issued by an institution called the Federal Reserve. The Federal Reserve is neither an official entity nor a government institution; instead, it is an organization operated by private bankers. This particular organization possesses the authority to issue the national currency and determines the financial policy of the United States, which the government then implements.

 

 

» The root cause of global chaos is financial capital globalization, which is

supported by military hegemony. « Wen Tiejun's complete discourse video.  

 

This occurrence is quite rare across the globe, both in terms of nations and systems. In the majority of countries, it is the political power of the state that grants authority to its national currency, forming a sovereign currency. In a select number of nations, such as the United States, institutions are established by private banking entities, and the government subsequently enacts the policies of these private banker collectives.

[...] Therefore, throughout the extensive history of the United States, numerous influential presidents have attempted to reclaim monetary authority. All of them ultimately failed. Almost every president who was resolute in their determination to reclaim monetary authority ended up deceased, including the widely recognized Kennedy assassination. These events all share similar demands to restore monetary rights back to the government, yet none of these plans have been fully realized.

[...] China continues to maintain its national control over financial capital. For what specific purpose? In recent years, when China faced global crises and a decline in exports, the Chinese government mainly relied on national finance, investing in infrastructure that may not yield immediate profits. A straightforward example is the allocation of funds for the construction of roads and railways in rural, mountainous, and even desert regions. All these investments cannot be recovered in the short term, and it's also difficult to recover them in the long term. So, should we invest? We should, because if we don't, businesses will have no market and workers will become unemployed. On the other hand, the government would have to use its finances to pay for unemployment benefits. Rather than doing that, it's better to invest. 

» The United States exploits the world's wealth with the help of "seigniorage." It costs only about 17 cents to produce a 100 dollar bill, but other countries had to pony up 100 dollar of actual goods in order to obtain one. It was pointed out more than half a century ago, that the United States enjoyed exorbitant privilege and deficit without tears created by its dollar, and used

the worthless paper note to plunder the resources and factories of other nations. The hegemony of the US dollar 

is the main source of instability and uncertainty in the world economy. «

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2023. 

[...] I perceive this as one of Trump's most proactive and forward-thinking policies—to focus on the advancement of infrastructure development. His most significant challenge is that the US lacks the so-called state-owned enterprises (SOEs) similar to those in China. Additionally, it doesn't have a state-owned banking system. China's system uses state banks to receive currency from the government, which is directly paid to state-owned enterprises. These enterprises then directly engage in infrastructure construction, maintaining China's economic growth and sustaining employment. The US uses private banks to issue more currency to buy government bonds, which then leads to a virtual capital expansion, with two hands shifting the crisis to the whole world.

[...] Analyzing this with American theory suggests China's state-owned banks and state-owned enterprises are inefficient. They don't provide tax revenue and occupy a large amount of capital. But just because financial resources are utilized doesn't mean nothing is produced. A significant amount of wealth is indeed generated, but this wealth manifests in the form of airports, seaports, train stations, highways, and high-speed railway systems. None of these investments can generate returns in the immediate short term. Consequently, a substantial amount of capital in China's state-owned banks is currently tied up. According to general free-market economic theory, those that can't be recovered soon should all go bankrupt. As long as you genuinely and sincerely execute what is purportedly stated in the media today, China's economy should have gone bankrupt long ago because its large investments can't be recovered quickly.

» I think he [US Fed chairman Jerome Powell] is a very stupid person, actually. «
Not-calling-the-shots POTUS, July 13, 2025.

 

[...] How Trump might approach the situation? He doesn't have China's methods. So, how will he do it? By relying on private bankers to reform America's railways? How long will it take to recoup the investment? Why would private individuals invest in rebuilding American roads and airports? Private investment is dropping. This is similar to what's happening in China: whenever there's an economic crisis, China's private investment decline is inevitable. So, how do you counter it? You have to rely on state investment to push it up. One goes down, the other goes up. That's how it is. 

 

» The US uses private banks to issue more currency to buy government bonds, which then 
leads to a virtual capital expansion, with two hands shifting the crisis to the whole world. «

 

A significant number of individuals are critical of China's system. I don't intend to imply anything else; I'm merely suggesting that you observe the actual impact. I also don't wish to defend this so-called closed system of China because I equally dislike this bureaucratic system, but it actually maintains the nation's foundational employment and crucial economic development.

  

Reference:
Wen Tiejun (2021) - Money, War, Supremacy: The Root Cause of Global Chaos. (video)

See also:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China (2023) - US Hegemony and Its Perils. 

Stephen Mitford Goodson (2019) - A History of Central Banking and the Enslavement of Mankind.
Murray N. Rothbard (1994) - The Case Against the Fed. (the legal monopoly of counterfeiting)

G. Edward Griffin (1994) - The Creature from Jekyll Island. 

Eustace Mullins (1952) - The Secrets of the Federal Reserve.

Ezra Pound (1939) - What is Money for?

The End of Western Dominance—US Lives in Mortal Fear | John Mearsheimer

Since 2017, when Trump entered the White House, the balance of power has shifted in China’s favor, though the United States remains the world’s most powerful state. China is rapidly closing the gap, particularly in cutting-edge technologies, which Washington fears could tilt global economic and military power. As China converts its economic strength into military might, it builds not just regional forces but also blue-water naval power and global projection capabilities linked to its Belt and Road Initiative. This imitation of US strategy alarms Washington and drives a bipartisan policy of containment.

John J. Mearsheimer, American political scientist and professor at the University of Chicago, best known for his work

on international relations theory, offensive realism, the US Zionist lobby, US–China rivalry and great power politics.

Initially, Chinese leaders argued that economic interdependence would prevent conflict, since prosperity required cooperation. However, survival—not prosperity—is the primary goal of states in an anarchic international system with no higher authority. As China’s economic rise translated into growing military capacity, American fear replaced optimism, triggering security competition in East Asia. Prosperity enriched both sides, but balance-of-power politics and survival imperatives outweighed economic interdependence theory.

» Great powers are ruthless, exploiting weaker rivals to secure survival and expand influence. «

John J. Mearsheimer's complete discourse video. 

Historical lessons reinforce this logic. Weak states like China during its “century of humiliation” (1840s–1940s) and Russia during NATO expansion in the 1990s suffered because they lacked power. Great powers are ruthless, exploiting weaker rivals to secure survival and expand influence. In this system, the optimal strategy is regional hegemony, dominating one’s neighborhood while preventing rivals from doing the same. The US has long acted this way, blocking Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union from achieving dominance in Europe or Asia, while securing its own supremacy in the Western Hemisphere.

China’s trajectory fits this pattern. As its power has grown since the 1990s, Beijing naturally seeks to dominate East Asia. Yet the US cannot tolerate another regional hegemon, making containment inevitable. From Washington’s perspective, preventing Chinese hegemony is about survival, not choice. From Beijing’s perspective, seeking hegemony is equally rational. The result is a structural clash: both sides are locked in an intensifying security competition driven by the anarchic nature of the international system.

» The United States lives in mortal fear that the Chinese are going to dominate. «

China’s path to hegemony is more difficult than America’s was because regional powers like Japan, Australia, South Korea, and the Philippines—backed by the US—resist Chinese dominance. India participates in the Quad but is geographically and strategically less central to East Asian balance. Russia, meanwhile, has been pushed into China’s camp by the Ukraine war, eliminating a potential counterweight. This complicates US strategy: instead of balancing China together, Washington and Moscow are now aligned against each other.

 

The Ukraine war creates two major problems for the US: it prevents a full pivot to Asia and deepens the Sino-Russian partnership. Trump recognized this dynamic and sought rapprochement with Moscow to peel Russia away from China, but his chances of success are slim. Russia deeply distrusts the US, and Trump underestimated the difficulty of ending the Ukraine conflict. His instincts—to improve ties with Russia and focus on China—align with realist logic, but his reliance on instincts over experts undermines effective execution.

» It's only recently that Putin has brought the Russians back 

from the dead and we now consider Russia to be a great power. «

Since 2017, US policy has shifted decisively from engagement to containment of China, first under Trump and then reinforced, even hardened, under Biden. Yet American forces remain tied down in Ukraine and the Middle East. Deployments against the Houthis in the Red Sea and the prospect of war with Iran divert vital resources away from East Asia, just as China grows militarily stronger. Past US experiments in social engineering—in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya—ended in failure, raising doubts about new entanglements that sap the capacity to counter China.

Facing escalating global uncertainties, Chinese President Xi Jinping said the SCO is increasingly

responsible for regional peace, stability, and member-state development, August 31, 2025.

 

Ultimately, the US–China rivalry reflects structural realities of power politics. Both states seek survival through maximizing power, and both see regional hegemony as the path to security. The United States, the sole global hegemon since 1900, refuses to share that status, while China, closing the gap, sees dominance in East Asia as essential. The result is an enduring, intensifying contest that economic interdependence or diplomatic optimism cannot erase.

Reference:
John J. Mearsheimer (September 2, 2025) - Lecture on the SCO Summit 2025: Why China is acting this way. (video)

 

See also:

Tecnología Futura (August 31, 2025) - China's new weapon that could destroy the US in seconds. (video)
 John J. Mearsheimer (2001) - The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.

Jin Canrong  (September 3, 2025) - China's Preparations for Reunification With Taiwan Around 2027.

Jin Canrong (September 1, 2025) - Hybrid Warfare & Strategic Stalemate in China–US Competition.

TPR (September 01, 2025) - SCO Summit Ushers in New Global Security Order and Development.

Ray Dalio (April 12, 2025) - Don't Think That What's Now Happening Is Mostly About Tariffs. 

Serge Bernard (2015)  - From Conquest to Affluence to Collapse: The 250 Year Empire Life Cycle. 

China's Preparations for Reunification With Taiwan Around 2027 | Jin Canrong

The Chinese government has consistently avoided setting a timetable for resolving the Taiwan question, emphasizing instead President Xi’s call for peaceful reunification with patience, sincerity, and effort. Despite this, American analysts frequently forecast 2027 as the likely point of resolution. Their view is shaped by China’s large strategic reserves, new industrial measures, and visible military procurement, all of which they interpret as signs of preparation for decisive conflict.

Jin Canrong (金灿荣), leading scholar of China–US relations, American politics, and foreign policy;

CCP strategist; Professor and Associate Dean at the School of International Studies, Renmin University of China.

From a military perspective, China faces few obstacles. A Taiwan operation could be carried out through blockade or direct combat, and success would likely come quickly. US intervention is not considered probable, making the true challenges economic and political rather than military or diplomatic. China’s main vulnerabilities are its dependence on imported resources, its lack of a fully unified domestic market, and the influence of elites with assets or family ties abroad. By contrast, Russia’s economy, though smaller, is buffered by its abundant resources, allowing it to withstand sanctions more effectively.

Among many other heads of states, Putin, Kim Jong Un, Park Geun-hye, ex-President of South Korea, and Masoud

Pezeshkian, President of Iran, joined Beijing’s historic victory parade on September 3, marking 80 years since

Japan’s WWII surrender, where China showcased its hypersonic missiles and nuclear triad. 
 

The government is taking steps to address these weaknesses. Grain reserves now exceed two years thanks to improved storage and expanded farmland. By 2027, new oil and gas discoveries together with Central Asian pipelines are expected to reduce import dependence. Coal-to-oil conversion and the spread of new energy vehicles will further narrow the energy gap. The more difficult issue lies in market access, as domestic circulation remains weak due to provincial barriers. Efforts to expand the Belt and Road initiative continue, though China lacks the military and cultural instruments historically used by the West to protect overseas investments.

» US intervention is not considered probable. «

Jin Canrong's complete discourse video.

 

Diplomatically, a resolution of the Taiwan issue would have far-reaching effects. ASEAN countries, seeing the United States as unreliable for security, would likely align with China, turning the South China Sea into an inland sea. Japan and South Korea, highly dependent on maritime trade and external resources, would also face strong pressure to yield. Once the Taiwan Strait and the South and East China Seas are secured, Shanghai and the eastern seaboard would be protected, creating what could be the safest period in Chinese history.

Welcome to the Eurasian Century.

 

Historically, China’s threats came from the north, but industrialization eliminated that danger. Today, the principal threats come from the sea, the heartland of Western industrial power. Once Taiwan is reclaimed and the maritime approaches are secure, China can focus entirely on internal development and raising living standards. The most serious obstacles to this outcome are economic fragility and political complications, not military or diplomatic resistance. The year 2027 therefore stands out as the most likely turning point, a moment that could bring short-term hardship but ultimately mark the beginning of a new and safer era for China.

Reference:
Awakening Richard (September 3, 2025) - Famous Chinese Professor on China's progress regarding war preparation. (video)

 

See also:

Samim Aktar (March 4, 2025) - Trump 2.0 and the China Containment Strategy.

Who Invented BRICS | Yuliana Titaeva

Many people believe that the idea of this strategic alliance was proposed in 2001 by Goldman Sachs analyst Jim O’Neill. In fact, he only came up with a successful name—BRIC (“brick”), formed from the first letters of the countries. The point was that these four economies would be the engines of global growth in the 21st century.

 

'Powerful Optics': China's Xi to welcome Putin and Modi in grand show of solidarity for the

Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit from August 31 to September 1 in Tianjin.

 

But in reality, the idea of an alliance between Russia, India, and China was first voiced by… Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. In 1920, Lenin wrote a “Letter to the Indian Revolutionary Association” in which he directly addressed the Indian people, called for liberation from British colonialism, and emphasized that India’s struggle was part of the world revolution. For Lenin, Russia had to be the natural ally of India and China in this struggle.

» The spiral of history. «  

Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1920. 

 

Of course, Lenin thought in terms of revolutions and class struggle, not trade blocs. But still, this was the first articulation of the "Russia–India–China" connection as a historical and political project. He was the first to see in these three civilizational giants natural allies against Western hegemony.

SCO Unites to Crush NATO’s Pressure, Pepe Escobar, August 29, 2025.

 

Seventy-eight years later, in 1998, the foreign minister of the new Russia, Yevgeny Maksimovich Primakov, formalized the idea of the strategic triangle RIC (Russia–India–China) as a foreign policy concept. In 2006, the tropical giant Brazil joined the "triangle," and the four countries turned the abbreviation into a real international club. Today, before our very eyes, BRICS is beginning to perceive itself as an alliance against Western hegemony. The spiral of history.

Quoted from:
Yuliana Titaeva (August 28, 2025) - Who Invented BRICS.

 

 

See also:

Pepe Escobar (November 28, 2024) - Trump’s Coming War on BRICS and the Global South.

Lu QiYuan (December 8, 2024) - Scott Bessent's Covert MAGA Strategy for Trump 2.0. 

Dmitry Skvortsov (November 25, 2024) - Trump's Plan to Ruin China.

Jin Canrong (October 3, 2024) - The US-China Competition in Southeast Asia.

Alexander Dugin (2022) - The Civilization-State.

China Already Won the Next Trade War with the US | Keyu Jin

Keyu Jin, a Harvard-educated professor from the London School of Economics, is one of the world’s leading insiders into the Chinese economy. She lays out the exact reasons why China is entering this next trade war with the US from a position of strength. China embraces strategic long-term planning, and when Donald Trump launched his first trade war against China back in 2018, the Chinese learned a valuable lesson: Never be too reliant on your main trading partner. China has long been preparing for reduced exposure to the US, diversifying in all aspects—not just in terms of trading partners and investment, but also in digital currencies and payment systems.  

 

 » Never be too reliant on your main trading partner. Diversify.

Don't be at the mercy of the dollar, nor the US financial system. «

 

Over the past seven years, China has strategically developed key industries that are set to dominate the future of our world: AI, quantum computing, blockchain, e-commerce, EVs, 5G networks, biotechnology and pharmaceuticals, materials science and nanotechnology, advanced manufacturing, 3D printing, robotics, space exploration, high-speed rail, advanced transportation and urban technologies, green technologies, agri-tech, and geoengineering—mirroring the complete technocratic Fourth Industrial Revolution agenda of the World Economic Forum. At Davos, Professor Jin explains how this shift has transformed the global economy:

 

"If you look at industries like electric vehicles (EVs) and solar panels—what they call new productive forces—very little of it is actually going to the US. This shift has pushed China to embrace new opportunities, sign new trade deals, and establish new trading partners. Global trade has actually expanded, and China's position in the world as a share of global exports has risen, while the US's has declined. So, while the US is retreating, China is opening up as much as possible. This is why Premier Li Keqiang (2013-2023) has repeatedly said China will unilaterally open up, offering zero tariffs to the least developed countries. We should not underestimate the degree and pace of fragmentation that is happening—multipolarity and the rise of economic blocs. We are already seeing the data, whether it's investment or trade, regarding the interaction between non-aligned blocs and aligned blocs. If you go around the world, asking the likes of Brazil or Asian countries, what are they saying? The same thing: Diversify. Don't be at the mercy of the dollar, nor the US financial system."

China halted exports of several rare minerals, including gallium, germanium, antimony, and superhard
materials to the US, citing their dual military and civilian uses. In response to a 10 percent levy
on Chinese goods, China also imposed a 15 percent tariff on US imports of coal and LNG.

 

This cannot be overstated. All of these new industries in which China is leading—electric vehicles, solar panels, and high-speed rail—are mostly not going to the United States. In the US you won’t see a single Chinese EV on the road. But in places like Thailand, Australia, and Brazil, Chinese automakers are dominating the market. Look at the top 20 fastest-growing economies on earth: Every single one of them is in the Global South—in the Middle East, North Africa, Asia Pacific, and Sub-Saharan Africa. Meanwhile, not a single American or European country is on that list. Many Western economies are stuck with zero to 3% growth, teetering on the edge of recession. And who is the number one trading partner for every single one of these rising economies? China. China hasn’t just dominated the fastest-growing regions; it has become the largest trading partner for the majority of the world. That’s why China can withstand this tariff war far better than the US.

» DeepSeek R1 is AI's Sputnik moment. «
Marc Andreessen, January 26, 2025.

Simply put: China has a plethora of options. But it doesn’t stop there. It’s not just about who is growing; it's also about who is declining. Western economies are not what they once were. The average American—and European, for that matter—simply doesn't have the same disposable income they did decades ago. And this trend is only worsening. This presents a massive problem for Trump, as his biggest leverage in this trade war is supposed to be the US consumer market. But what happens when that market isn't as powerful as it used to be? That only leaves the industrial sector, where the US is simply no match for China.

» This is China’s, not AI's, “Sputnik moment”. «

Deutsche Bank, February 05, 2025.

At the same time, the United States currently has sanctions on more than a third of the global economy, including 60% of all poor countries. As a Global South country, looking at who to trade with, it’s a no-brainer: China is clearly the better partner. While China has been building bridges and securing trade deals, Trump has been doing the exact opposite—taxing his closest allies. Under his administration, every country or region that has a trade surplus with the United States is now a target. The message is clear: If your country sells more goods to the US than the US sells to yours, you have two options: either relocate your industries to the US or face trade tariffs. Even Canada—one of the United States' closest allies and neighbor—was hit with 25% tariffs before Trump saw the stock market crash and quickly announced a 30-day pause to give time for Canada to negotiate. What Trump will do with the rest of the world has yet to be seen, but one thing is for certain: other countries aren't waiting around to find out. Every major economy is scrambling to diversify and find alternatives to US trade dependence.

» 2025 is the year when the investment community realizes that China is surpassing the rest of the world. «
Deutsche Bank, February 05, 2025.

 

While the US falters and the EU looks for an economic lifeline, Asia has firmly established itself as the center of global economic growth, with China at the helm as the undisputed economic superpower. China now accounts for more than 30% of the world’s total manufacturing output. China has completely leapfrogged the rest of the world in producing sophisticated industrial goods at a scale and cost that no Western country can compete with. 

 

Looking west, the Persian Gulf nations—Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and others—have also begun prioritizing their relationships with China and India. Why? Energy. Asia now accounts for over 70% of total oil and gas exports from the Gulf. This energy trade, combined with the region's critical position along the New Silk Road connecting China to Europe, has turned the Middle East into one of the biggest beneficiaries of this new global economic order. 

 

» I expect a sharp recovery in China’s economy in the latter half of 2025, boosting global performance. «
Simon Hunt, January 11, 2025.

 

The global landscape is quickly changing. One of the fastest-growing economic blocs is ASEAN—the Southeast Asian powerhouse economies of Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia. These countries are crucial for China’s future success. The biggest changes in trade can be seen in Asia. Nearly 60% of Asia's trade happens within the region, and half of the world’s fastest-growing trade corridors are there. In 2023, China's exports to ASEAN nations bypassed those from the United States. And with a majority of these countries either already in BRICS or set to join, these trade relationships will only deepen.

Reference:
Cyrus Jannsen (February 09, 2025) - Harvard Economist Reveals Shocking Secret About Trade War with China. (video)

 

 » The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting. « 

Sun Tzu, The Art of War, 5th century BC.

 

 » Americans are not known to like Chinese, nor are they known to like Muslims.
But somehow they like Chinese Muslims a lot. «
Former Foreign Minister of Singapore, George Yeo, on the Xinjiang Uyghur issue, May 23, 2023.

See also:

The China Academy (February 8, 2025) - Deutsche Bank Decides to Go Long on China.

Deutsche Bank (February 5, 2025) - China eats the World. 

 Simon Hunt (January 11, 2025) - Markets Amidst Trump 2.0: Geopolitics & Geoeconomics in 2025.

Lu QiYuan (December 8, 2024) - Scott Bessent's Covert MAGA Strategy for Trump 2.0.  

Pepe Escobar (November 28, 2024) - Trump’s Coming War on BRICS and the Global South.

Dmitry Skvortsov (November 25, 2024) - Trump's Plan to Ruin China.

 Francisco José Fernández-Cruz Sequera (October 30, 2024) - Global MAGA-nomics.

Jin Canrong (October 3, 2024) - The US-China Competition in Southeast Asia. 

MFA of the People's Republic of China (February 20, 2023) - US Technological Hegemony: Monopoly and Suppression.

Alexander Dugin (2022) - The Civilization-State.