Showing posts with label Realism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Realism. Show all posts

Tuesday, January 27, 2026

China, Russia Must Manage 'Orderly' US Decline | Huang J. and S. Karaganov

The year 2026 opened with a series of maneuvers by the United States that continue to unsettle the global landscape. Beneath the surface of international diplomacy, powerful undercurrents are surging. Even as the aftershocks of the military strike on Venezuela linger, Donald Trump has turned his sights toward Greenland, alternating between economic buyouts and martial threats.

» The Americans are withdrawing to the Western Hemisphere.  They are transitioning into a "normal" regional power. «               1941 political cartoon by Theodor Seuss Geisel (Dr. Seuss) satirizing "America First" isolationism. An elderly woman in an "America First" sweater reads "Adolf the Wolf" to two horrified children, remarking: "...and the Wolf chewed up the children and spit out their bones... but those were foreign children, and it didn't really matter."
 » The Americans are withdrawing to the Western Hemisphere. 
They are transitioning into a "normal" regional power. « 
1941 political cartoon by Theodor Seuss Geisel (Dr. Seuss) satirizing "America First" isolationism. An elderly woman in an "America First" sweater reads "Adolf the Wolf" to two horrified children, remarking: "...and the Wolf chewed up the children and spit out their bones... but those were foreign children, and it didn't really matter."
This predatory posture—where even allies are not spared—raises a fundamental question: Is this the brute assertion of a military hegemon, or the final, desperate thrashings of a superpower in decline? As the rift between the US and Europe widens over the Greenland dispute, and the very foundations of the NATO alliance tremble, what kind of shockwaves will the global order sustain?

Huang Jing: Regarding the abduction of Venezuelan President Maduro and the First Lady—an act of blatant violent aggression—how do you foresee its impact?

Sergey Karaganov: To be clear, we are still operating without full transparency regarding the facts; the abduction is peculiar, appearing almost like a choreographed performance. While clearly the work of US security apparatuses, their local facilitators remain in the shadowsHowever, the trend is undeniable: Trump and the US are attempting to pivot back to the Western Hemisphere as they retreat from global leadership. This process began 15 to 17 years ago, though it went largely unremarked by the masses. 

Huang: We only truly grasped it about 15 years ago.

Karaganov: Exactly. Circa 2006 or 2007. It was an internal discussion then, but the trajectory was visible. Notably, when Obama took office, his instinct was an "America First" strategy, but he was constrained by the globalist factions surrounding him. 
The kidnapping of Maduro and the "piracy" of seizing oil tankers are criminal acts. Yet, there is a "silver lining": the Americans are withdrawing to the Western Hemisphere. They are transitioning into a "normal" regional power rather than a global hegemon, shedding the pretense of world leadership. It is a double-edged sword. While we must condemn the incredible crime of abducting an elected leader, we are seeing a strategic retreat. For years, I have argued that we must create the conditions to help the US exit its global role—without triggering a world war.
 
» US decline isn't the problem; the "disorder" of that decline is the catastrophe. « Aggression as a symptom of decay: POTUS claiming US used classified "Disruptor"  weapon to paralyze Venezuelan defense systems in order to hijack Nicolás Maduro.
» US decline isn't the problem; the "disorder" of that decline is the catastrophe. «
Aggression as a symptom of decay: POTUS claiming US used classified "Disruptor" 
weapon to paralyze Venezuelan defense systems in order to hijack Nicolás Maduro.
 
Huang: Agreed. I recall your work on "Disorder," suggesting that a chaotic US decline is a threat to us all. This hegemonic fatigue began because the US simply could not sustain the post-1991 international system. You cite 2006; I would argue the definitive cracks appeared by 2008.

Karaganov: The decline of Western hegemony actually dates back to the 1960s. The signs were there, but ignored. When the USSR achieved nuclear parity, the foundation of a 500-year-old Western dominance began to crumble. After the Soviet collapse, the West—and the US specifically—fell into a state of "euphoria," believing they had reversed the tide of history. This lasted barely 15 years before Russia began to reconstitute its position and China emerged as a titan. Blinded by their "victory," the American elite made massive strategic blunders. They essentially subsidized China's rise, naively believing that capitalism would inevitably lead to a "democracy" that would act as a US satellite. When reality failed to meet their visions, they doubled down on failed invasions—Afghanistan, Iraq. By 2008, the internal decision to begin a long-term withdrawal had already taken root.
 
» Russia and China should work together to facilitate an orderly decline for the United States. This is in everyone's interest, including Washington's. «   August 2021, managing 'disordered' collapse: US troops at Kabul Airport use rifles to deter Afghan civilians attempting to flee during the withdrawal.
» Russia and China should work together to facilitate an orderly decline for
the United States. This is in everyone's interest, including Washington's. « 
 August 2021, managing 'disordered' collapse: US troops at Kabul Airport use
rifles to deter Afghan civilians attempting to flee during the withdrawal.
 
Huang: I agree, though I’d add a nuance: China’s rise wasn't merely a gift from the US. It was the result of correct internal policies and a desire to integrate into the global system to reform it from within. The US "vision" of a peaceful evolution into a Western-style state was indeed a profound miscalculation.

Karaganov: I don't disagree, but consider this: China’s development was facilitated by the Soviet/Russian security umbrella. Even when China was militarily weaker, the US never dared a direct strike. Furthermore, the US committed the ultimate strategic error. Through their actions, they pushed Russia and China—natural neighbors—into an unbreakable de facto alliance. Over the last 15 years, this "quasi-alliance" has effectively doubled the strategic weight of both nations. It is an monumental failure by Western competitors.
 
» The US will never come to the rescue of Europe. « 
 
Huang: From a historical perspective, we remember how the USSR helped build China’s industrial base. Yet the USSR also suffered from overexpansion—Afghanistan being the fatal error—which led to the fragile US-China cooperation of the 1980s to contain Moscow.

Karaganov: Indeed. But it wasn't just overexpansion; it was arrogance. Khrushchev’s arrogance toward Mao in the 50s and the refusal to aid China’s nuclear program were grave miscalculations.

Huang: Yet China succeeded regardless.

Karaganov: Yes, and that autonomous development secured China’s strategic autonomy for decades. Had we helped then, the rapprochement with Nixon might never have been necessary. History would be unrecognizable. But today, the US is committing the greatest error of the modern era. Post-1991, they mistook their moment for permanent "Globalist" dominion. They tried to export "universal values" through Color Revolutions and the Arab Spring—all of which failed. Now, they are retreating into the Western Hemisphere because they must, not because they want to. 
  
Huang: As you famously said: US decline isn't the problem; the "disorder" of that decline is the catastrophe. Does the invasion of Venezuela reflect a managed exit or a chaotic one?

Karaganov: Let’s put it this way: Russia and China should work together to facilitate an orderly decline for the United States. This is in everyone's interest, including Washington's. The US was an "accidental" global hegemon. Before WWII, they were an economic powerhouse but a geopolitical non-factor. They became the world leader with very little capital investment because Europe collapsed and the USSR was exhausted.

Now, as the "Global South" and China rise, the West realizes it can no longer control the very system of free trade and international law it created. So, they have begun to sabotage their own system—using sanctions and breaking trade rules—because they can no longer win by the old rules. In Ukraine, the Biden administration initially thought they could isolate Russia from Europe. They succeeded in creating a rift, but now that they see Russia is willing to escalate—even to the nuclear level—they are looking for the exit. Trump is vocal about withdrawal, but Biden started the process. I saw it myself: Biden's 2022 New York Times piece, where he set "red lines" for the US (no direct entry, no regime change), was the first signal of the American retreat.
 
» The source of all ills and evil in the history of humanity. «  Zelensky, Starmer, Macron, and Merz, December 8, 2025.
 » The source of all ills and evil in the history of humanity. «

 Zelensky, Starmer, Macron, and Merz, December 8, 2025.

Huang: You warned the Americans in 2012: "You are pushing us into a corner, and you will end up in one yourselves." In 2020, you argued that the goal wasn't just defeating Ukraine, but dismantling the Western international system itself—a system used as a tool for hypocritical hegemony. Do you still stand by that?

Karaganov: Absolutely. And we are succeeding. By raising the stakes, we have essentially pushed the US out of the war. We made them realize that Russia would risk nuclear conflict over Europe. Biden never explicitly promised to fight for Europe if it were attacked; he only spoke of "support." Now, Russia’s objective is to break the will of the European elites. Europe has historically been the source of the world's greatest troubles—colonialism, racism, world wars. They are currently drifting toward a Third World War. Our strategic long-term goal should be to push Europe to the periphery of the global stage, creating systemic conditions where their current "sinister" elites are rendered obsolete.

Huang: On that point, you and Trump seem to be in total agreement.

Karaganov: (Laughs) I said it first.
 
[Continue from 27:00 in the video above—highly insightful and well worth the watch.] 
 
[中俄应该携手合作,帮助美国实现“有序衰落.”]
 
"How can you discuss anything with Kaja Kallas? Neither we will ever discuss anything with her,  nor will the Americans, and this is obvious. We can only wait until she leaves," Peskov said.
"How can you discuss anything with Kaja Kallas? Neither we will ever discuss anything with her, 
nor will the Americans, and this is obvious. We can only wait until she leaves," Peskov said.

Huang Jing is a Distinguished Professor at Shanghai International Studies University and a globally recognized authority on Chinese politics and US-Asia relations. Formerly a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution and Director at the National University of Singapore, he specializes in the US-China-Russia strategic triangle. He is a prolific author and advisor known for his realist analysis of great power competition and global governance.
Sergey Karaganov is the Honorary Chairman of the Russian Council on Foreign and Defense Policy and a presidential advisor to both Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin. He currently serves as the Academic Supervisor of the Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs at Moscow’s Higher School of Economics. A primary architect of the "Greater Eurasia" concept, he is a leading realist thinker on Russian grand strategy and the transformation of the global order.

Monday, January 26, 2026

The Return of Great Spaces | Pierre-Antoine Plaquevent

One century ago, the continentalist school of geopolitics proposed a world-system organized into pan-regions (Haushofer): an international order divided into large, autonomous continental spaces (Carl Schmitt), each polarized around a core power. This third way—between the nation-state nationalism rendered obsolete after the First World War and the globalism of the League of Nations—is once again presenting itself today as an updated alternative to a declining globalism.

One's utopia is the other's dystopia: A world divided among five superstates.
Austro-Japanese aristocrat Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi's 1923 world map.
 
Regional imperialisms that restrain one another, rather than a hypocritical, monopolar planetary imperialism. Logically, if the United States were truly to accept a division of the world into autonomous great spaces, it would have to leave eastern Ukraine to Russia and Taiwan to China, in exchange for the abandonment of Sino-Russian influence in Latin America. Above all, it would have to restrain Israel in its posture towards Iran.

China, Russia, and Iran are the strategic powers that dominate the Eurasian heartland. A stabilized world order is possible only if the United States recognizes the respective spheres of influence of the Eurasian powers. This is the logical corollary of the updated Monroe Doctrine to which the Trump administration refers. Yet the history of the previous century shows that a thalassocracy of inherently globalist character does not accept a US retreat to the Western Hemisphere alone. The near future will tell us whether what is currently unfolding in Latin America marks a genuine US acceptance of a new post-globalist division of the world or the prologue to a broader conflagration.

» "Great North"—Russia, the United States, and Europe, forming a common sociocultural space. «
Vladislav Surkov, 2023.
 
The realistic scenario would thus be a division of the world into longitudinal corridors of influence among the powers of the “Global North” (Surkov), coupled with the construction of a multipolar world order of great powers that would definitively replace the faltering project of global governance. The pessimistic scenario, by contrast, would be that the move against Venezuela foreshadows an attack on Iran, after having seized control of the principal ally of political Eurasia in the southern part of the Western Hemisphere.

 
» The logic of great spaces does not have a universalist scope. The paradigm is no longer national, but spatial.  « Carl Schmitt, 1941.
 
See also:
Pierre-Antoine Plaquevent (born 1976) is a French geopolitical analyst, specializing on the intersection of infowarfare and the evolution of political philosophy. He is the founder of Strategika, a think tank and editorial platform that provides prospective analysis on international security and metapolitics.

Wednesday, January 7, 2026

After Maduro, Might Makes Right | Alexander Dugin

What does the kidnapping of the president of a sovereign country mean? Like in the era of barbarian kingdoms, Maduro was brought in and paraded through the streets of New York like a captive enemy for the amusement of the crowd. Many note that this is reminiscent of Rome in its twilight years.

 » "Reshuffling of the deck" and global conflict. The world will never be the same again. «
 
[...] And what does all this mean? [...] International law no longer exists. Appealing to the UN, asking the West to pay attention to violations of certain principles, agreements, or provisions that contradict the letter and spirit of the law — all of this is now completely futile. 
 
[...] The idea that there are certain norms and rules that can be negotiated should be left in the past once and for all. There is no international law. There is only the law of force. In a sense, it has always been this way — this is nothing new. It’s just that, at certain times, after each "reshuffling of the deck" and global conflict, when spheres of influence are redistributed, the great powers assert their right to sovereignty.  
 
» International law is always a balance of power between the victors. « 

This was the case in the First and Second World Wars. When fascist Europe became a separate entity in world politics, it demanded that the world submit to it. The world rebelled, and that power is no more. But any international law is always a balance of power between the victors. That’s the point. For more than a century, nation-states have not been sovereign actors establishing world order; world relations are shaped by ideological blocs.

[...] Trump said nothing conceptually new, but he de facto scrapped the Yalta peace, the bipolar system, the UN, and even the very idea of globalization hitherto. His position is simple: "My interests are the interests of the world hegemon. Obey me." 

À la fin, ces voleurs infâmes et perdus, Comme fruits malheureux à cet arbre pendus, Montrent bien que le crime (horrible et noire engeance) Est lui-même instrument de honte et de vengeance. Et que c’est le destin des hommes vicieux D’éprouver tôt ou tard la justice des Cieux.  In the end, these infamous and lost thieves, Like wretched fruit hanging from this tree, Show clearly that crime—horrible and black in its breed— Is itself an instrument of shame and vengeance. And that it is the destiny of vicious men To experience, sooner or later, the justice of Heaven. 
 » In the end, these infamous and lost thieves, like wretched fruit hanging from this tree... « 
The Miseries and Misfortunes of War by Jacques Callot, 1633.
 
In fact, humanity is now in a state of fundamental humiliation. Trump simply called a spade a spade. Globalists used to soften this humiliation by pretending to listen to your opinion and allowing you to participate in the process. Now that multilateralism is over, only the right of force remains, and this is an irreversible process. The world will never be the same again.

We are in the midst of a protracted, long-running Third World War, where international law simply does not exist. It will exist sometime in the future, based on the outcome of this conflict. [...] Trump is casting an arrogant challenge: "If you are winners, then win. Like me, for example. Where is your Zelensky?" 
 
 » If you are winners, then win. Where is your Zelensky? «
 
From this point of view, only when you parade Zelensky, the terrorist Malyuk, the terrorist Budanov, or Zaluzhny through Moscow in a cage, and the crowd of "Russian Romans," the inhabitants of the Third Rome, shout "shame, murderers" at them, only then will they talk to you. Perhaps on some holiday: Labor Day or Friendship of Peoples Day. Only then will we be accepted into the club of great powers. But for now, no. We are trying to convince Trump with documents that hundreds of Ukrainian drones wanted to destroy the Russian president, and the response we get is something like, "I don’t believe it. First, you set it up yourselves; second, it’s a pity it didn’t work out; and third, I know that we sent them so that your life wouldn’t be too sweet."

[...] We must defend ourselves in the war with the West, because that is where the initiative to revoke our right to sovereign policy comes from. It is time to abandon illusions about "Western partners" or "shared values." Trump is right to drop the mask of hypocrisy and nonsense about human rights: for him, America comes first. We are in a shootout: shoot or you will be killed. Trump did not even start World War III — he simply confirmed its existence.

» Then the very moment would come. ‌« RS-28 Sarmat [dubbed 'Satan II' by NATO] is Russia's most capable hypersonic thermonuclear intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). With a range of 18,000 km and traveling 27 times the speed of sound, Sarmat can extinguish any target/country/enemy anywhere on the planet within minutes with one single strike. Including the US.
»
 
In this game without rules, Russia must win by any means necessary. «
 
[...] Only war decides everything — that’s the issue. And here the question of resources arises. Apparently, we are much better off with them than we thought: over four years of war, the people have demonstrated an incredible will for sovereignty. But now, in Ukraine, the question is not about the use of sovereignty, but about its acquisition. So far, it is not enough. Sovereignty is when you draw red lines and punish those who cross them. And when we demonstrate the Burevestnik, Poseidon, or Oreshnik, but nothing happens, it ceases to count in this world of shows and short cycles.

We have put everything at stake — the existence of Russia and our people — to prove our sovereignty. [...] In this game without rules, Russia must win by any means necessary. There are no taboo topics: we can abolish the Constitution, declare a state of emergency, do away with all conventions, and do whatever is necessary to survive. If we observe propriety and lose, it will not count in our favor. But if we succeed, no matter what, the victors will not be judged. Only the defeated are judged: if we slip up, they will hold a new Nuremberg trial over us.

 
This is the seriousness of 2026: it is a year of war and extraordinary measures. Peaceful life is being completely erased, like a wet rag wiping outdated formulas off a blackboard. Everything we counted on no longer works. We are in a cowboy saloon where a shootout is taking place without rules or regulations.
 
 [...] Now, thanks to Trump and his new doctrines, the situation has changed. Trump says, "I will conquer you all, I will shoot without warning." And look what he’s doing: he really is shooting. [...] We must act just like the strongest players — the West or Trump. Do as Trump does, but with completely different content, goals, and objectives. 
 
Key Aspects of Schmitt's Großraum Theory      Critique of the Nation-State: Schmitt perceived the nation-state as increasingly incapable of representing concrete spatial reality and managing the challenges of modern international politics, particularly what he saw as the failings of liberal universalism.     Hierarchical Order: In a Großraum-based world, the principle of formal equality among sovereign states is replaced by a hierarchical structure. A predominant, hegemonic power (like the German Reich in his vision) would exist within a larger territorial space, asserting leadership over subordinate nations.     The Monroe Doctrine as a Model: Schmitt viewed the United States' Monroe Doctrine (declaring the Americas off-limits to European colonization and influence) as the classic example of a functioning Großraum: a regional power establishing a sphere of influence and excluding external interference.     Exclusion of External Powers: A core tenet of the Großraum order is the right of a hegemonic power to define the external orientation of its region and prevent "spatially alien powers" from intervening in its sphere.     Pluralistic World Order: Ultimately, Schmitt envisioned a multipolar world (a "pluriverse") characterized by several independent Großräume, which would achieve a new balance of power, contrasting with a unipolar, liberal, or Anglo-American dominated global order.
Key Aspects of Schmitt's Großraum Theory      Critique of the Nation-State: Schmitt perceived the nation-state as increasingly incapable of representing concrete spatial reality and managing the challenges of modern international politics, particularly what he saw as the failings of liberal universalism.     Hierarchical Order: In a Großraum-based world, the principle of formal equality among sovereign states is replaced by a hierarchical structure. A predominant, hegemonic power (like the German Reich in his vision) would exist within a larger territorial space, asserting leadership over subordinate nations.     The Monroe Doctrine as a Model: Schmitt viewed the United States' Monroe Doctrine (declaring the Americas off-limits to European colonization and influence) as the classic example of a functioning Großraum: a regional power establishing a sphere of influence and excluding external interference.     Exclusion of External Powers: A core tenet of the Großraum order is the right of a hegemonic power to define the external orientation of its region and prevent "spatially alien powers" from intervening in its sphere.     Pluralistic World Order: Ultimately, Schmitt envisioned a multipolar world (a "pluriverse") characterized by several independent Großräume, which would achieve a new balance of power, contrasting with a unipolar, liberal, or Anglo-American dominated global order.
»
 
There is no other way out. «
 
Methodologically, there is no other way out. China has achieved its goals through economics, but in a military confrontation, the question remains open: the Chinese are not the most warlike people, and there is a huge pro-Western elite there. We have not been able to compete economically, but our strengths are warrior bravery, courage, and faith. God is on our side: "Tremble, nations, and submit, for God is with us."
 
Went from scramble for Africa to scramble for Europe and Latin America real quick.
 
Neolib Zionist supremacist Jake Tapper (CNN host) and neocon Zionist supremacist Stephen Miller (Trump's
Deputy Chief of Staff for Policy), fighting over how to execute the takeover of Venezuela, January 5, 2026. 

Friday, September 12, 2025

Defeating the Enemy Without Fighting | Henry Kissinger

Rarely did Chinese statesmen risk the outcome of a conflict on a single all-or-nothing clash; elaborate multiyear maneuvers were closer to their style. Where the Western tradition prized the decisive clash of forces emphasizing feats of heroism, the Chinese ideal stressed subtlety, indirection, and the patient accumulation of relative advantage.

This contrast is reflected in the respective intellectual games favored by each civilization. China’s most enduring game is wei qi (圍棋, pronounced roughly “way chee,” and often known in the West by a variation of its Japanese name, go). Wei qi translates as “a game of surrounding pieces”; it implies a concept of strategic encirclement. 

The outcome of a Wei Qi game between two expert players.
Black has won by a slight margin.
David Lai (2004) - Learning from the Stones: A Go Approach to Mastering China’s Strategic Concept, Shi.
Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute.

The board, a grid of nineteen-by-nineteen lines, begins empty. Each player has 180 pieces, or stones, at his disposal, each of equal value with the others
. The players take turns placing stones at any point on the board, building up positions of strength while working to encircle and capture the opponent’s stones. Multiple contests take place simultaneously in different regions of the board. The balance of forces shifts incrementally with each move, as the players implement strategic plans and react to each other’s initiatives. At the end of a well-played game, the board is filled by partially interlocking areas of strength. The margin of advantage is often slim, and to the untrained eye, the identity of the winner is not always immediately obvious.

Chess, on the other hand, is about total victory. The purpose of the game is checkmate, to put the opposing king into a position where he cannot move without being destroyed. The vast majority of games end in total victory achieved by attrition or, more rarely, a dramatic, skillful maneuver. The only other possible outcome is a draw, meaning the abandonment of the hope for victory by both parties.

If chess is about the decisive battle, wei qi is about the protracted campaign. The chess player aims for total victory. The wei qi player seeks relative advantage. In chess, the player always has the capability of the adversary in front of him; all the pieces are always fully deployed.

» Ultimate excellence lies not in winning every battle but in defeating the enemy without ever fighting.
The highest form of warfare is to attack the enemy’s strategy itself. «
The Art of War, Sun Tzu.

The wei qi player needs to assess not only the pieces on the board but the reinforcements the adversary is in a position to deploy. Chess teaches the Clausewitzian concepts of “center of gravity” and the “decisive point”—the game usually beginning as a struggle for the center of the board. Wei qi teaches the art of strategic encirclement. Where the skillful chess player aims to eliminate his opponent’s pieces in a series of head-on clashes, a talented wei qi player moves into “empty” spaces on the board, gradually mitigating the strategic potential of his opponent’s pieces. Chess produces single-mindedness; wei qi generates strategic flexibility.

A similar contrast exists in the case of China’s distinctive military theory (中国军事思想). Its foundations were laid during a period of upheaval, when ruthless struggles between rival kingdoms decimated China’s population. Reacting to this slaughter (and seeking to emerge victorious from it), Chinese thinkers developed strategic thought that placed a premium on victory through psychological advantage and preached the avoidance of direct conflict.
 
» US imperialism is a paper tiger. «
 Mao Zedong, July 14, 1956.
 
On his secret mission to establish a US-China alliance against the Soviet Union, US National Security
 Advisor Henry Kissinger meets with Zhou Enlai (Premier of the PRC since 1949) in Beijing on July 9, 1971.
 
Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party Mao Zedong (founding leader of the PRC since 1949)
welcomes President of the United States Richard Nixon (1969-1974) in Beijing on February 21, 1972.
 
Xi Jinping, President of the People's Republic of China (since 2013), invites
94-year-old former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to Beijing on July 19, 2017. 
 
The seminal figure in this tradition is known to history as Sun Tzu (or “Master Sun”), author of the famed treatise The Art of War. Intriguingly, no one is sure exactly who he was. Since ancient times, scholars have debated the identity of The Art of War’s author and the date of its composition. The book presents itself as a collection of sayings by one Sun Wu, a general and wandering military advisor from the  Spring and Autumn period of Chinese history (770–476 B.C. ), as recorded by his disciples.

[…] Well over two thousand years after its composition, this volume of epigrammatic observations on strategy, diplomacy, and war—written in classical Chinese, halfway between poetry and prose—remains a central text of military thought. Its maxims found vivid expression in the twentieth-century Chinese civil war 
(人民战争) at the hands of Sun Tzu’s student Mao Zedong, and in the Vietnam wars, as Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap employed Sun Tzu’s principles of indirect attack and psychological combat (逸待劳) against France and then the United States.