Showing posts with label Realism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Realism. Show all posts

Wednesday, January 7, 2026

After Maduro, Might Makes Right | Alexander Dugin

What does the kidnapping of the president of a sovereign country mean? Like in the era of barbarian kingdoms, Maduro was brought in and paraded through the streets of New York like a captive enemy for the amusement of the crowd. Many note that this is reminiscent of Rome in its twilight years.

 » "Reshuffling of the deck" and global conflict. The world will never be the same again. «
 
[...] And what does all this mean? [...] International law no longer exists. Appealing to the UN, asking the West to pay attention to violations of certain principles, agreements, or provisions that contradict the letter and spirit of the law — all of this is now completely futile. 
 
[...] The idea that there are certain norms and rules that can be negotiated should be left in the past once and for all. There is no international law. There is only the law of force. In a sense, it has always been this way — this is nothing new. It’s just that, at certain times, after each "reshuffling of the deck" and global conflict, when spheres of influence are redistributed, the great powers assert their right to sovereignty.  
 
» International law is always a balance of power between the victors. « 

This was the case in the First and Second World Wars. When fascist Europe became a separate entity in world politics, it demanded that the world submit to it. The world rebelled, and that power is no more. But any international law is always a balance of power between the victors. That’s the point. For more than a century, nation-states have not been sovereign actors establishing world order; world relations are shaped by ideological blocs.

[...] Trump said nothing conceptually new, but he de facto scrapped the Yalta peace, the bipolar system, the UN, and even the very idea of globalization hitherto. His position is simple: "My interests are the interests of the world hegemon. Obey me." 

À la fin, ces voleurs infâmes et perdus, Comme fruits malheureux à cet arbre pendus, Montrent bien que le crime (horrible et noire engeance) Est lui-même instrument de honte et de vengeance. Et que c’est le destin des hommes vicieux D’éprouver tôt ou tard la justice des Cieux.  In the end, these infamous and lost thieves, Like wretched fruit hanging from this tree, Show clearly that crime—horrible and black in its breed— Is itself an instrument of shame and vengeance. And that it is the destiny of vicious men To experience, sooner or later, the justice of Heaven. 
 » In the end, these infamous and lost thieves, like wretched fruit hanging from this tree... « 
The Miseries and Misfortunes of War by Jacques Callot, 1633.
 
In fact, humanity is now in a state of fundamental humiliation. Trump simply called a spade a spade. Globalists used to soften this humiliation by pretending to listen to your opinion and allowing you to participate in the process. Now that multilateralism is over, only the right of force remains, and this is an irreversible process. The world will never be the same again.

We are in the midst of a protracted, long-running Third World War, where international law simply does not exist. It will exist sometime in the future, based on the outcome of this conflict. [...] Trump is casting an arrogant challenge: "If you are winners, then win. Like me, for example. Where is your Zelensky?" 
 
 » If you are winners, then win. Where is your Zelensky? «
 
From this point of view, only when you parade Zelensky, the terrorist Malyuk, the terrorist Budanov, or Zaluzhny through Moscow in a cage, and the crowd of "Russian Romans," the inhabitants of the Third Rome, shout "shame, murderers" at them, only then will they talk to you. Perhaps on some holiday: Labor Day or Friendship of Peoples Day. Only then will we be accepted into the club of great powers. But for now, no. We are trying to convince Trump with documents that hundreds of Ukrainian drones wanted to destroy the Russian president, and the response we get is something like, "I don’t believe it. First, you set it up yourselves; second, it’s a pity it didn’t work out; and third, I know that we sent them so that your life wouldn’t be too sweet."

[...] We must defend ourselves in the war with the West, because that is where the initiative to revoke our right to sovereign policy comes from. It is time to abandon illusions about "Western partners" or "shared values." Trump is right to drop the mask of hypocrisy and nonsense about human rights: for him, America comes first. We are in a shootout: shoot or you will be killed. Trump did not even start World War III — he simply confirmed its existence.

» Then the very moment would come. ‌« RS-28 Sarmat [dubbed 'Satan II' by NATO] is Russia's most capable hypersonic thermonuclear intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). With a range of 18,000 km and traveling 27 times the speed of sound, Sarmat can extinguish any target/country/enemy anywhere on the planet within minutes with one single strike. Including the US.
»
 
In this game without rules, Russia must win by any means necessary. «
 
[...] Only war decides everything — that’s the issue. And here the question of resources arises. Apparently, we are much better off with them than we thought: over four years of war, the people have demonstrated an incredible will for sovereignty. But now, in Ukraine, the question is not about the use of sovereignty, but about its acquisition. So far, it is not enough. Sovereignty is when you draw red lines and punish those who cross them. And when we demonstrate the Burevestnik, Poseidon, or Oreshnik, but nothing happens, it ceases to count in this world of shows and short cycles.

We have put everything at stake — the existence of Russia and our people — to prove our sovereignty. [...] In this game without rules, Russia must win by any means necessary. There are no taboo topics: we can abolish the Constitution, declare a state of emergency, do away with all conventions, and do whatever is necessary to survive. If we observe propriety and lose, it will not count in our favor. But if we succeed, no matter what, the victors will not be judged. Only the defeated are judged: if we slip up, they will hold a new Nuremberg trial over us.

 
This is the seriousness of 2026: it is a year of war and extraordinary measures. Peaceful life is being completely erased, like a wet rag wiping outdated formulas off a blackboard. Everything we counted on no longer works. We are in a cowboy saloon where a shootout is taking place without rules or regulations.
 
 [...] Now, thanks to Trump and his new doctrines, the situation has changed. Trump says, "I will conquer you all, I will shoot without warning." And look what he’s doing: he really is shooting. [...] We must act just like the strongest players — the West or Trump. Do as Trump does, but with completely different content, goals, and objectives. 
 
Key Aspects of Schmitt's Großraum Theory      Critique of the Nation-State: Schmitt perceived the nation-state as increasingly incapable of representing concrete spatial reality and managing the challenges of modern international politics, particularly what he saw as the failings of liberal universalism.     Hierarchical Order: In a Großraum-based world, the principle of formal equality among sovereign states is replaced by a hierarchical structure. A predominant, hegemonic power (like the German Reich in his vision) would exist within a larger territorial space, asserting leadership over subordinate nations.     The Monroe Doctrine as a Model: Schmitt viewed the United States' Monroe Doctrine (declaring the Americas off-limits to European colonization and influence) as the classic example of a functioning Großraum: a regional power establishing a sphere of influence and excluding external interference.     Exclusion of External Powers: A core tenet of the Großraum order is the right of a hegemonic power to define the external orientation of its region and prevent "spatially alien powers" from intervening in its sphere.     Pluralistic World Order: Ultimately, Schmitt envisioned a multipolar world (a "pluriverse") characterized by several independent Großräume, which would achieve a new balance of power, contrasting with a unipolar, liberal, or Anglo-American dominated global order.
Key Aspects of Schmitt's Großraum Theory      Critique of the Nation-State: Schmitt perceived the nation-state as increasingly incapable of representing concrete spatial reality and managing the challenges of modern international politics, particularly what he saw as the failings of liberal universalism.     Hierarchical Order: In a Großraum-based world, the principle of formal equality among sovereign states is replaced by a hierarchical structure. A predominant, hegemonic power (like the German Reich in his vision) would exist within a larger territorial space, asserting leadership over subordinate nations.     The Monroe Doctrine as a Model: Schmitt viewed the United States' Monroe Doctrine (declaring the Americas off-limits to European colonization and influence) as the classic example of a functioning Großraum: a regional power establishing a sphere of influence and excluding external interference.     Exclusion of External Powers: A core tenet of the Großraum order is the right of a hegemonic power to define the external orientation of its region and prevent "spatially alien powers" from intervening in its sphere.     Pluralistic World Order: Ultimately, Schmitt envisioned a multipolar world (a "pluriverse") characterized by several independent Großräume, which would achieve a new balance of power, contrasting with a unipolar, liberal, or Anglo-American dominated global order.
»
 
There is no other way out. «
 
Methodologically, there is no other way out. China has achieved its goals through economics, but in a military confrontation, the question remains open: the Chinese are not the most warlike people, and there is a huge pro-Western elite there. We have not been able to compete economically, but our strengths are warrior bravery, courage, and faith. God is on our side: "Tremble, nations, and submit, for God is with us."
 
Went from scramble for Africa to scramble for Europe and Latin America real quick.
 
Neolib Zionist supremacist Jake Tapper (CNN host) and neocon Zionist supremacist Stephen Miller (Trump's
Deputy Chief of Staff for Policy), fighting over how to execute the takeover of Venezuela, January 5, 2026. 

Friday, September 12, 2025

Defeating the Enemy Without Fighting | Henry Kissinger

Rarely did Chinese statesmen risk the outcome of a conflict on a single all-or-nothing clash; elaborate multiyear maneuvers were closer to their style. Where the Western tradition prized the decisive clash of forces emphasizing feats of heroism, the Chinese ideal stressed subtlety, indirection, and the patient accumulation of relative advantage.

This contrast is reflected in the respective intellectual games favored by each civilization. China’s most enduring game is wei qi (圍棋, pronounced roughly “way chee,” and often known in the West by a variation of its Japanese name, go). Wei qi translates as “a game of surrounding pieces”; it implies a concept of strategic encirclement. 

The outcome of a Wei Qi game between two expert players.
Black has won by a slight margin.
David Lai (2004) - Learning from the Stones: A Go Approach to Mastering China’s Strategic Concept, Shi.
Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute.

The board, a grid of nineteen-by-nineteen lines, begins empty. Each player has 180 pieces, or stones, at his disposal, each of equal value with the others
. The players take turns placing stones at any point on the board, building up positions of strength while working to encircle and capture the opponent’s stones. Multiple contests take place simultaneously in different regions of the board. The balance of forces shifts incrementally with each move, as the players implement strategic plans and react to each other’s initiatives. At the end of a well-played game, the board is filled by partially interlocking areas of strength. The margin of advantage is often slim, and to the untrained eye, the identity of the winner is not always immediately obvious.

Chess, on the other hand, is about total victory. The purpose of the game is checkmate, to put the opposing king into a position where he cannot move without being destroyed. The vast majority of games end in total victory achieved by attrition or, more rarely, a dramatic, skillful maneuver. The only other possible outcome is a draw, meaning the abandonment of the hope for victory by both parties.

If chess is about the decisive battle, wei qi is about the protracted campaign. The chess player aims for total victory. The wei qi player seeks relative advantage. In chess, the player always has the capability of the adversary in front of him; all the pieces are always fully deployed.

» Ultimate excellence lies not in winning every battle but in defeating the enemy without ever fighting.
The highest form of warfare is to attack the enemy’s strategy itself. «
The Art of War, Sun Tzu.

The wei qi player needs to assess not only the pieces on the board but the reinforcements the adversary is in a position to deploy. Chess teaches the Clausewitzian concepts of “center of gravity” and the “decisive point”—the game usually beginning as a struggle for the center of the board. Wei qi teaches the art of strategic encirclement. Where the skillful chess player aims to eliminate his opponent’s pieces in a series of head-on clashes, a talented wei qi player moves into “empty” spaces on the board, gradually mitigating the strategic potential of his opponent’s pieces. Chess produces single-mindedness; wei qi generates strategic flexibility.

A similar contrast exists in the case of China’s distinctive military theory (中国军事思想). Its foundations were laid during a period of upheaval, when ruthless struggles between rival kingdoms decimated China’s population. Reacting to this slaughter (and seeking to emerge victorious from it), Chinese thinkers developed strategic thought that placed a premium on victory through psychological advantage and preached the avoidance of direct conflict.
 
» US imperialism is a paper tiger. «
 Mao Zedong, July 14, 1956.
 
On his secret mission to establish a US-China alliance against the Soviet Union, US National Security
 Advisor Henry Kissinger meets with Zhou Enlai (Premier of the PRC since 1949) in Beijing on July 9, 1971.
 
Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party Mao Zedong (founding leader of the PRC since 1949)
welcomes President of the United States Richard Nixon (1969-1974) in Beijing on February 21, 1972.
 
Xi Jinping, President of the People's Republic of China (since 2013), invites
94-year-old former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to Beijing on July 19, 2017. 
 
The seminal figure in this tradition is known to history as Sun Tzu (or “Master Sun”), author of the famed treatise The Art of War. Intriguingly, no one is sure exactly who he was. Since ancient times, scholars have debated the identity of The Art of War’s author and the date of its composition. The book presents itself as a collection of sayings by one Sun Wu, a general and wandering military advisor from the  Spring and Autumn period of Chinese history (770–476 B.C. ), as recorded by his disciples.

[…] Well over two thousand years after its composition, this volume of epigrammatic observations on strategy, diplomacy, and war—written in classical Chinese, halfway between poetry and prose—remains a central text of military thought. Its maxims found vivid expression in the twentieth-century Chinese civil war 
(人民战争) at the hands of Sun Tzu’s student Mao Zedong, and in the Vietnam wars, as Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap employed Sun Tzu’s principles of indirect attack and psychological combat (逸待劳) against France and then the United States.

 

Wednesday, September 3, 2025

China's Preparations for Reunification With Taiwan Around 2027 | Jin Canrong

The Chinese government has consistently avoided setting a timetable for resolving the Taiwan question, emphasizing instead President Xi’s call for peaceful reunification with patience, sincerity, and effort. Despite this, American analysts frequently forecast 2027 as the likely point of resolution. Their view is shaped by China’s large strategic reserves, new industrial measures, and visible military procurement, all of which they interpret as signs of preparation for decisive conflict.

Jin Canrong (金灿荣), leading scholar of China–US relations, American politics, and foreign policy;
CCP strategist; Professor and Associate Dean at the School of International Studies, Renmin University of China.

From a military perspective, China faces few obstacles. A Taiwan operation could be carried out through blockade or direct combat, and success would likely come quickly. US intervention is not considered probable, making the true challenges economic and political rather than military or diplomatic. China’s main vulnerabilities are its dependence on imported resources, its lack of a fully unified domestic market, and the influence of elites with assets or family ties abroad. By contrast, Russia’s economy, though smaller, is buffered by its abundant resources, allowing it to withstand sanctions more effectively.

Among many other heads of states, Putin, Kim Jong Un, 
Park Geun-hye, ex-President of South Korea, and Masoud
Pezeshkian, President of Iran, joined Beijing’s historic victory parade on September 3, marking 80 years since
Japan’s WWII surrender, where China showcased its hypersonic missiles and nuclear triad. 
 
The government is taking steps to address these weaknesses. Grain reserves now exceed two years thanks to improved storage and expanded farmland. By 2027, new oil and gas discoveries together with Central Asian pipelines are expected to reduce import dependence. Coal-to-oil conversion and the spread of new energy vehicles will further narrow the energy gap. The more difficult issue lies in market access, as domestic circulation remains weak due to provincial barriers. Efforts to expand the Belt and Road initiative continue, though China lacks the military and cultural instruments historically used by the West to protect overseas investments.

»
US intervention is not considered probable. «
Jin Canrong's complete discourse video.
 
Diplomatically, a resolution of the Taiwan issue would have far-reaching effects. ASEAN countries, seeing the United States as unreliable for security, would likely align with China, turning the South China Sea into an inland sea. Japan and South Korea, highly dependent on maritime trade and external resources, would also face strong pressure to yield. Once the Taiwan Strait and the South and East China Seas are secured, Shanghai and the eastern seaboard would be protected, creating what could be the safest period in Chinese history.

Welcome to the Eurasian Century.
 
Historically, China’s threats came from the north, but industrialization eliminated that danger. Today, the principal threats come from the sea, the heartland of Western industrial power. Once Taiwan is reclaimed and the maritime approaches are secure, China can focus entirely on internal development and raising living standards. The most serious obstacles to this outcome are economic fragility and political complications, not military or diplomatic resistance. The year 2027 therefore stands out as the most likely turning point, a moment that could bring short-term hardship but ultimately mark the beginning of a new and safer era for China.

 
See also:

Monday, September 1, 2025

Hybrid Warfare & Strategic Stalemate in China–US Competition | Jin Canrong

Structurally speaking, China–US relations are certainly not good. The logic is quite simple: the world is changing significantly, and China is the variable, while the US is the leader of the original order. Naturally, the US is not pleased. [...] Whether it's Biden or Trump, both consider China their only opponent. This is very critical. America’s power is still greater than ours.

Jin Canrong (金灿荣), leading scholar of China-US relations, American politics, and foreign policy;
CCP strategist; Professor and Associate Dean, School of International Studies, Renmin University of China.

[...] China–US relations entered full competition in late 2017, when the US began to wage a hybrid war against China. It is called a hybrid war because multiple tactics are employed: trade war; industrial war (denying chips and pushing Chinese companies to relocate industries); financial war (aggressive interest rate hikes to extract Chinese capital); legal battles; media campaigns (such as accusations of genocide in Xinjiang); and biological warfare allegations, including SARS and COVID-19 claims.

» Siding with the EU to split the West. «
The China-US Competition, Jin Canrong, August 19, 2025.

[...] There are also sovereignty issues concerning Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the East and South China Seas, as well as opposition to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) through new alliances, like AUKUS (US, UK, Australia) and the Quad (US, India, Australia, Japan).

[...] The first phase involved US offensives and China’s strategic defense; now, we have entered a strategic stalemate. The key to strategic alignment is domestic management. The US faces high debt, declining manufacturing, and internal challenges, while China confronts economic performance issues, social conflicts, and a rapidly falling birth rate. Addressing domestic challenges strengthens both nations’ positions abroad.

[...] The US strategy toward China involves territorial ambitions (Canada, Greenland, Panama Canal), aligning Russia, reorganizing allies (Europe, Japan, Canada), and increasing defense spending to ensure allies can act independently. China, meanwhile, has abandoned its low-profile policy, focusing on active defense and strategic deterrence.

[...] Since last year, China’s defense policy has changed. China has moved from passive strategy to assertive action. Strategic stalemate depends on addressing domestic issues first, then external threats. For external alignment, China should coordinate with the EU to balance the West, manage neighboring relations, and continue Belt and Road and BRICS initiatives. This roughly represents the current positions of both parties.
 

Saturday, August 23, 2025

The Game of Chess, and the Masters of the Board | The Honorable One

Chess can show you how the world is run, who is really in power, and how to break it. There are six types of people who run the modern world. First you need to understand who is at the bottom.
 
 » Someday, someone will return and flip the board. « 
 
Number one, the pawns—the masses. They follow orders, pay taxes, are predictable, and get sacrificed in each game. Without them, there is no game, no power, no state, no Suki system. They are the majority in every game, the foundation of all power, and yet they are too weak to realize it. 

Number two, the rooks—the 20% who do 80% of the work: long hours, efficient, diligent, straight shooters. They are like machines. But they get stuck when routines change, they are not flexible enough, and they are useless on their own. They need number three:

 
» Everyone is afraid of the queen. «  

The knights. For a long time they just sit. Then they leap over walls, surprising everyone. Their paths and creativity are unpredictable. They connect dots no one else connects. They are ahead of the curve and unplug first. They walk into uncharted terrain. But one wrong step, and they fall. 
 
Knights need number four by their side: A good bishop to protect them. He is a quiet planner, the one who can wait. He is patient and prepared with a plan to strike months or years from now. But bishops are nothing compared to number five:

» It's their game. « 
 
The queen can strike anytime, anywhere, in all directions. Everyone is afraid of the queen. Who are the queens of this world? Central Bankers, those who run the Suki agencies, the military—those who can take out anyone anytime anywhere. The rules and laws of pawns, knights, and bishops do not apply to them. 
 
» Families that cannot be named. « 

So why is number six, the king, in power, and not the queen? The king takes small steps in the back rows, unnoticed. Nobody fears him. He holds power through legacy. Queens wield power for decades; kings and their families hold it for centuries. Who are the kings of today's world? The families that cannot be named. They have trillions but don’t appear on Forbes lists. Money does not matter to them—they print it. Everyone plays chess, but they are the ones who provide the board. They decide how many fields the board has and how long the game will be played. 
 
» We are the oil in your dressing, the flour in your bread, the meat on your dinner table. «  
A largely unknown American family dynasty of 14 billionaires traces its fortune to William Wallace Cargill in 1865. The Cargill-MacMillan family business, Cargill Inc., became one of the world's largest private companies. With revenues of $177 billion, it controls 22% of US beef production, and its low public visibility stems from its dominance in the food supply chain, where it and three other firms handle 70–90% of the global grain trade.
 
It's their game, and it is hard to exit. But there is a way: You only win if you don't play. You stop paying, you stop playing. All the game is run by money—consumption, production, access, bureaucracy, taxes. If you stop the money flow, the game stops. Someday, someone who has stopped playing and walked away from the game will return and flip the board: Game over for all the kings and all their Suki helpers. Honor will come.
 
 

 “Suki,” Russian prison slang for traitors and bitches (сука/суки), denotes globalist elites, corporations, and establishment figures—who embody hypocrisy, manipulation, and betrayal. They uphold the “Suki system,” the oppressive order of financial dependency, surveillance, digital control, censorship, and cultural erosion. “The Grim” is the The Honorable One, and the adversary of the Suki. He stands  for growth, reliability, integrity, independence, incorruptibility. He rejects victimhood, consumerism, culture of comfort, indulgence, entitlement, materialism, and resists the Suki system mentally, emotionally, financially and spiritually.
 

See also:
 
了解你的敌人
Know your Enemies.