Showing posts with label Balance of Power. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Balance of Power. Show all posts

Friday, September 12, 2025

Defeating the Enemy Without Fighting | Henry Kissinger

Rarely did Chinese statesmen risk the outcome of a conflict on a single all-or-nothing clash; elaborate multiyear maneuvers were closer to their style. Where the Western tradition prized the decisive clash of forces emphasizing feats of heroism, the Chinese ideal stressed subtlety, indirection, and the patient accumulation of relative advantage.

This contrast is reflected in the respective intellectual games favored by each civilization. China’s most enduring game is wei qi (圍棋, pronounced roughly “way chee,” and often known in the West by a variation of its Japanese name, go). Wei qi translates as “a game of surrounding pieces”; it implies a concept of strategic encirclement. 

The outcome of a Wei Qi game between two expert players.
Black has won by a slight margin.
David Lai (2004) - Learning from the Stones: A Go Approach to Mastering China’s Strategic Concept, Shi.
Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute.

The board, a grid of nineteen-by-nineteen lines, begins empty. Each player has 180 pieces, or stones, at his disposal, each of equal value with the others
. The players take turns placing stones at any point on the board, building up positions of strength while working to encircle and capture the opponent’s stones. Multiple contests take place simultaneously in different regions of the board. The balance of forces shifts incrementally with each move, as the players implement strategic plans and react to each other’s initiatives. At the end of a well-played game, the board is filled by partially interlocking areas of strength. The margin of advantage is often slim, and to the untrained eye, the identity of the winner is not always immediately obvious.

Chess, on the other hand, is about total victory. The purpose of the game is checkmate, to put the opposing king into a position where he cannot move without being destroyed. The vast majority of games end in total victory achieved by attrition or, more rarely, a dramatic, skillful maneuver. The only other possible outcome is a draw, meaning the abandonment of the hope for victory by both parties.

If chess is about the decisive battle, wei qi is about the protracted campaign. The chess player aims for total victory. The wei qi player seeks relative advantage. In chess, the player always has the capability of the adversary in front of him; all the pieces are always fully deployed.

» Ultimate excellence lies not in winning every battle but in defeating the enemy without ever fighting.
The highest form of warfare is to attack the enemy’s strategy itself. «
The Art of War, Sun Tzu.

The wei qi player needs to assess not only the pieces on the board but the reinforcements the adversary is in a position to deploy. Chess teaches the Clausewitzian concepts of “center of gravity” and the “decisive point”—the game usually beginning as a struggle for the center of the board. Wei qi teaches the art of strategic encirclement. Where the skillful chess player aims to eliminate his opponent’s pieces in a series of head-on clashes, a talented wei qi player moves into “empty” spaces on the board, gradually mitigating the strategic potential of his opponent’s pieces. Chess produces single-mindedness; wei qi generates strategic flexibility.

A similar contrast exists in the case of China’s distinctive military theory (中国军事思想). Its foundations were laid during a period of upheaval, when ruthless struggles between rival kingdoms decimated China’s population. Reacting to this slaughter (and seeking to emerge victorious from it), Chinese thinkers developed strategic thought that placed a premium on victory through psychological advantage and preached the avoidance of direct conflict.
 
» US imperialism is a paper tiger. «
 Mao Zedong, July 14, 1956.
 
On his secret mission to establish a US-China alliance against the Soviet Union, US National Security
 Advisor Henry Kissinger meets with Zhou Enlai (Premier of the PRC since 1949) in Beijing on July 9, 1971.
 
Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party Mao Zedong (founding leader of the PRC since 1949)
welcomes President of the United States Richard Nixon (1969-1974) in Beijing on February 21, 1972.
 
Xi Jinping, President of the People's Republic of China (since 2013), invites
94-year-old former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to Beijing on July 19, 2017. 
 
The seminal figure in this tradition is known to history as Sun Tzu (or “Master Sun”), author of the famed treatise The Art of War. Intriguingly, no one is sure exactly who he was. Since ancient times, scholars have debated the identity of The Art of War’s author and the date of its composition. The book presents itself as a collection of sayings by one Sun Wu, a general and wandering military advisor from the  Spring and Autumn period of Chinese history (770–476 B.C. ), as recorded by his disciples.

[…] Well over two thousand years after its composition, this volume of epigrammatic observations on strategy, diplomacy, and war—written in classical Chinese, halfway between poetry and prose—remains a central text of military thought. Its maxims found vivid expression in the twentieth-century Chinese civil war 
(人民战争) at the hands of Sun Tzu’s student Mao Zedong, and in the Vietnam wars, as Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap employed Sun Tzu’s principles of indirect attack and psychological combat (逸待劳) against France and then the United States.

 

Thursday, August 22, 2024

America's Final War | Andrei Martyanov

"Warfare is a geopolitical tool of the first order; only wars of scale can measure the real strength of nations." For decades, American claims of hegemony, and by extension, those of the West, have been based on what has now proved to be a carefully constructed mythology of economic and military supremacy.

 » Barack Obama allowed Russia to steal American hypersonic technology. This is why Russia
is two generations ahead of the US in hypersonic technology, while the United States still
cannot produce even 'slow' hypersonic weapons. «
 
This is Andrei Martyanov’s fourth book addressing this issue, now as it concerns the war in Ukraine. In America’s Final War, he lays out in detail the underpinning causes and extent of its self-deception. Washington’s eight years of preparing Ukraine and its armed forces for war with Russia was a mistake of historic proportions due to its misperception of American military power based on its 1991 Gulf War victory against a minor military player. Washington believed its own propaganda about crippling sanctions on Russia, the viability of its Ukrainian proxy army, and the economic and military weakness of Russia, spelling doom for the American empire and its “rules-based order.”

 The Sarmat II ICBM travels at Mach 20.7 (25,000 km/h) and has a range of up to 18,000 km.
In comparison, the United States is actively working on its own hypersonic
weapons, which aim to travel at speeds greater than Mach 5.

Martyanov lays out Washington’s utter incompetence and shocking military amateurism. But then, he claims, the US doesn’t do strategy; it does business plans. Through 2022-2023, Russia’s Special Military Operation (SMO) exposed US and NATO forces as legacy armies stuck in the 1990s, still viewing the world from that vantage point. The massive destruction of the West’s high-cost weaponry ensued, annulling their vaunted superiority. Western armaments, from anti-tank Javelins to APC Bradleys to air defense complexes such as the Patriot PAC3 or NASAMS, performed dismally and proved unready for what has become the largest military conflict in Europe since WWII. By 2023, the Kiev regime could no longer exist without the West’s support, both financial and in war materiel. By 2024, Russia will have not just exhausted Ukraine but also demilitarized NATO as a whole, exposing the industrial and military impotence of the US and its European vassals.
 
Defeated by "revolution", Mexico gets secured as booty by Woodrow Wilson (1915).

The finance and tech-based economy is not a real economy; expeditionary warfare and doctrine are not real war.
The global balance of power has shifted to Eurasia. Western Europe has become a collection of weak and fast-deindustrializing economies which will increasingly become irrelevant against the background of the explosive economic, technological, scientific, and military development in Eurasia. The world has noticed what has been exposed, and because of that, life as we knew it is no more. The rule of the West of the last half-millennium is over.
 
Reference:
 
See also:

Tuesday, March 5, 2024

On Realism and War with China | John Mearsheimer

Lex Fridman: The communication gap between China and the United States seems to be much greater than that of what was the former Soviet Union and the United States.
 
Mearchiavelli,
Machiavelli's revenant.
 
John Mearsheimer: It’s an interesting question. A lot of people describe the Cold War as an ideological competition above all else.
Communism versus liberal democracy or communism versus liberal capitalism, whatever. I actually don’t believe that. The Soviets were realists to the core. Stalin was a realist par excellence, and ideology did not matter much in Stalin’s foreign policy. And if you look at Soviet foreign policy after World War II, throughout the Cold War, they were realists to the core. And in those days the Americans were realists. Sure, a lot of liberal ideology floating around out there, but the Americans were realists. One of the reasons we avoided a shooting match between the United States and the Soviet Union from 1947 to 1989 was because both sides understood the basic balance of power logic.
 
The US-China competition is somewhat different. But first of all, the Chinese are realists to the core. I’ve spent a lot of time in China. I am basically a rock star in China. The Chinese are my kind of people. They are realists. They speak my language. It’s the United States that is no longer very realist. American leaders have a very powerful liberal bent and tend not to see the world in realist terms.
 
That’s fascinating. So the Chinese are pragmatic realists and think of the world as a competition of military powers?
 
Yeah, you are actually right. And I think we will avoid war. The problem with the Americans is, it’s not just their liberalism. It’s the possibility that we will pursue a rollback policy. During the Cold War the American grand strategy towards the Soviet Union was: containment, containment, containment. We now know from the historical record that the United States was not only pursuing containment. We were trying to rollback Soviet power to put it bluntly. We were trying to wreck the Soviet Union. And I would not be surprised moving forward with regard to China if the United States pursues a serious rollback policy.
 
So you’re saying throughout history the United States was always pursuing rollback policies? 

Look, you don’t respect the power of other nations. You fear the power of other nations.
 
Will there be a war with China in the 21st century?
 
I don’t know. But my argument is yes, there will be war with China