Wednesday, September 3, 2025

J.M. Hurst's Future Lines of Demarcation (FLDs) | Christopher Grafton

A Future Line of Demarcation (FLD) is a replica cycle plotted half a wavelength forward in time from the original cycle. If you can picture a semicircle representing a cycle, the FLD is a copy of that semicircle overlaid on the original, but offset forward. In effect, there are now two overlapping semicircles. 
 
The job of Hurst cycle analysis is to back-engineer the composite cycle (i.e., the price action we observe over time on the chart) and resolve it into its constituent cycles. The goal is to find their troughs and peaks, then determine our position within the cyclic scheme at the lower right edge of the Bitcoin chart below. An FLD can be generated for any cycle in the nominal model. Among other things, the interaction between price and FLDs allows us to estimate the future time and price of peaks and troughs, and to gauge future trend direction. The following examples should clarify this.
 
In the Bitcoin chart, a 20-week FLD has been generated by offsetting a line to the right of price at each date by half the wavelength of the 20-week cycle (the wavelength is 22.7 weeks, as shown at the bottom right of the chart, so the offset is 11.3 weeks). The FLD is an exact duplicate of the original price line. 
 
Bitcoin's 20-Week Cycle and FLD (from June 2021 to January 2022).

The horizontal arrows stacked down the left-hand side of the chart show the offset in action. You might notice a slight difference between the FLD inflections and the original price; this is because FLDs use the median price (high + low)/2. Notice also that as the FLD falls in future time, for example in August, the price is rising at that time; and as the FLD rises in future time, for example in December, the price is falling.

The primary use of the FLD in the Hurst Cycle notes service will be as a target measurement tool and to confirm the magnitudes of recent peaks or troughs. Let's start at the 22 June diamond stack marking the time location of the 40-week cycle trough. The 40-week cycle is represented by a light green diamond, and our cycle of interest, the 20-week cycle, is the dark green diamond just below it in the stack. The arc of the entire cycle has been plotted, and the next trough is estimated to occur in the last week of January 2022.

The origin price is the 22 June low of 23,894. Price rallies with the new 20-week cycle and meets the falling 20-week FLD on 7 August at 43,546 X(1). With these two pieces of information, we can now estimate an initial target for the 20-week cycle peak. We do this by subtracting the origin price from the FLD cross price and then adding the difference to the cross price. This generates an upside target of 63,198, which turns out to be 92% of the actual peak price, which came in at 68,789 on 10 November. The reason the FLD projection fell a bit short is covered in the next section.

Now, let's consider the downside target. Using the 10 November peak as the new origin price (68,789), price falls and meets the rising 20-week FLD on 24 December at 50,918 X(2). Subtracting the FLD cross price from the origin price and then subtracting the difference from the cross price generates a downside target of 33,047 (the actual low was 33,184, i.e., a little lower).
 
Next, we are looking at the 20-day cycle and 20-day FLD in the E-minis chart below. The start of the 20-day cycle is the low of 20 May (3,807.5).  
 
E-minis 20-Day Cycles and FLD (from 20 May to 21 June 2022).

Price rises to meet the FLD on 26 May at 4,012.8 X(1), generating an upside target estimate of 4,218.2 (as a reminder, we subtract the origin price from the cross price and add the difference to the cross price). The actual peak came in somewhat lower at 4,202.2. Why it undershot should become clearer when we examine the downside leg, but basically, it's because the 20-day cycle was under downward pressure from longer, falling cycles. When FLDs either exceed or miss their targets, it tells us something about the bigger picture.

It gets interesting on the downside leg now because price is actually falling into a major low, that of the 40-week cycle trough. In real time, this would have appeared on the chart as a nest of lows shown by circles and whiskers. We would have known the magnitude of the upcoming trough and been prepared for a sharp sell-off into it.

The origin price for the downside leg is the 4,202.2 top, and prices fall to meet the rising 20-day FLD at 4,053.95 X(2). However, this only generates a downside target estimate of 4,053.9, which is clearly too short. In real time, you would have expected a price overshoot to the downside because of the looming big trough and not just randomly closed out at X(2). You would have needed to step up to the next longer cycle, the 40-day FLD. So, let's look at that now.
 
For the downside leg, the origin remains the same as for the 20-day cycle at 4,202.2, and price declines to meet the rising 40-day FLD at 3,913.0 X(2), providing a downside target estimate of 3,623.7. The actual 40-week cycle trough came in at 3,661.5.
 
The origin price of the 40-day cycle is the same as that of the first 20-day cycle at 3,807.5. Price rallies and crosses the falling 40-day FLD at 4,031.5 X(1), generating an upside target estimate of 4,254.7. This is undershot by 52 points, again because longer cycles are pressing price down into an upcoming 40-week cycle trough.

Summary: FLDs are replica cycles that help the analyst estimate targets and work out the magnitude of recent peaks and troughs. Theoretically, when prices cross up through a falling FLD, we are halfway to the peak. When prices cross down through a rising FLD, we are halfway to the trough. The influence of longer cycles on a cycle of interest can cause price to either undershoot or overshoot the theoretical target, providing us with useful information about underlying trend strength and direction.

The End of Western Dominance—US Lives in Mortal Fear | John Mearsheimer

Since 2017, when Trump entered the White House, the balance of power has shifted in China’s favor, though the United States remains the world’s most powerful state. China is rapidly closing the gap, particularly in cutting-edge technologies, which Washington fears could tilt global economic and military power. As China converts its economic strength into military might, it builds not just regional forces but also blue-water naval power and global projection capabilities linked to its Belt and Road Initiative. This imitation of US strategy alarms Washington and drives a bipartisan policy of containment.

John J. Mearsheimer, American political scientist and professor at the University of Chicago, best known for his work
on international relations theory, offensive realism, the US Zionist lobby, US–China rivalry and great power politics.

Initially, Chinese leaders argued that economic interdependence would prevent conflict, since prosperity required cooperation. However, survival—not prosperity—is the primary goal of states in an anarchic international system with no higher authority. As China’s economic rise translated into growing military capacity, American fear replaced optimism, triggering security competition in East Asia. Prosperity enriched both sides, but balance-of-power politics and survival imperatives outweighed economic interdependence theory.

» Great powers are ruthless, exploiting weaker rivals to secure survival and expand influence. «
John J. Mearsheimer's complete discourse video. 

Historical lessons reinforce this logic. Weak states like China during its “century of humiliation” (1840s–1940s) and Russia during NATO expansion in the 1990s suffered because they lacked power. Great powers are ruthless, exploiting weaker rivals to secure survival and expand influence. In this system, the optimal strategy is regional hegemony, dominating one’s neighborhood while preventing rivals from doing the same. The US has long acted this way, blocking Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union from achieving dominance in Europe or Asia, while securing its own supremacy in the Western Hemisphere.

China’s trajectory fits this pattern. As its power has grown since the 1990s, Beijing naturally seeks to dominate East Asia. Yet the US cannot tolerate another regional hegemon, making containment inevitable. From Washington’s perspective, preventing Chinese hegemony is about survival, not choice. From Beijing’s perspective, seeking hegemony is equally rational. The result is a structural clash: both sides are locked in an intensifying security competition driven by the anarchic nature of the international system.

» The United States lives in mortal fear that the Chinese are going to dominate. «

China’s path to hegemony is more difficult than America’s was because regional powers like Japan, Australia, South Korea, and the Philippines—backed by the US—resist Chinese dominance. India participates in the Quad but is geographically and strategically less central to East Asian balance. Russia, meanwhile, has been pushed into China’s camp by the Ukraine war, eliminating a potential counterweight. This complicates US strategy: instead of balancing China together, Washington and Moscow are now aligned against each other.
 
The Ukraine war creates two major problems for the US: it prevents a full pivot to Asia and deepens the Sino-Russian partnership. Trump recognized this dynamic and sought rapprochement with Moscow to peel Russia away from China, but his chances of success are slim. Russia deeply distrusts the US, and Trump underestimated the difficulty of ending the Ukraine conflict. His instincts—to improve ties with Russia and focus on China—align with realist logic, but his reliance on instincts over experts undermines effective execution.

» It's only recently that Putin has brought the Russians back 
from the dead and we now consider Russia to be a great power. «

Since 2017, US policy has shifted decisively from engagement to containment of China, first under Trump and then reinforced, even hardened, under Biden. Yet American forces remain tied down in Ukraine and the Middle East. Deployments against the Houthis in the Red Sea and the prospect of war with Iran divert vital resources away from East Asia, just as China grows militarily stronger. Past US experiments in social engineering—in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya—ended in failure, raising doubts about new entanglements that sap the capacity to counter China.

Facing escalating global uncertainties, Chinese President Xi Jinping said the SCO is increasingly
responsible for regional peace, stability, and member-state development, August 31, 2025.
 
Ultimately, the US–China rivalry reflects structural realities of power politics. Both states seek survival through maximizing power, and both see regional hegemony as the path to security. The United States, the sole global hegemon since 1900, refuses to share that status, while China, closing the gap, sees dominance in East Asia as essential. The result is an enduring, intensifying contest that economic interdependence or diplomatic optimism cannot erase.

 

See also:

China's Preparations for Reunification With Taiwan Around 2027 | Jin Canrong

The Chinese government has consistently avoided setting a timetable for resolving the Taiwan question, emphasizing instead President Xi’s call for peaceful reunification with patience, sincerity, and effort. Despite this, American analysts frequently forecast 2027 as the likely point of resolution. Their view is shaped by China’s large strategic reserves, new industrial measures, and visible military procurement, all of which they interpret as signs of preparation for decisive conflict.

Jin Canrong (金灿荣), leading scholar of China–US relations, American politics, and foreign policy;
CCP strategist; Professor and Associate Dean at the School of International Studies, Renmin University of China.

From a military perspective, China faces few obstacles. A Taiwan operation could be carried out through blockade or direct combat, and success would likely come quickly. US intervention is not considered probable, making the true challenges economic and political rather than military or diplomatic. China’s main vulnerabilities are its dependence on imported resources, its lack of a fully unified domestic market, and the influence of elites with assets or family ties abroad. By contrast, Russia’s economy, though smaller, is buffered by its abundant resources, allowing it to withstand sanctions more effectively.

Among many other heads of states, Putin, Kim Jong Un, 
Park Geun-hye, ex-President of South Korea, and Masoud
Pezeshkian, President of Iran, joined Beijing’s historic victory parade on September 3, marking 80 years since
Japan’s WWII surrender, where China showcased its hypersonic missiles and nuclear triad. 
 
The government is taking steps to address these weaknesses. Grain reserves now exceed two years thanks to improved storage and expanded farmland. By 2027, new oil and gas discoveries together with Central Asian pipelines are expected to reduce import dependence. Coal-to-oil conversion and the spread of new energy vehicles will further narrow the energy gap. The more difficult issue lies in market access, as domestic circulation remains weak due to provincial barriers. Efforts to expand the Belt and Road initiative continue, though China lacks the military and cultural instruments historically used by the West to protect overseas investments.

»
US intervention is not considered probable. «
Jin Canrong's complete discourse video.
 
Diplomatically, a resolution of the Taiwan issue would have far-reaching effects. ASEAN countries, seeing the United States as unreliable for security, would likely align with China, turning the South China Sea into an inland sea. Japan and South Korea, highly dependent on maritime trade and external resources, would also face strong pressure to yield. Once the Taiwan Strait and the South and East China Seas are secured, Shanghai and the eastern seaboard would be protected, creating what could be the safest period in Chinese history.

Welcome to the Eurasian Century.
 
Historically, China’s threats came from the north, but industrialization eliminated that danger. Today, the principal threats come from the sea, the heartland of Western industrial power. Once Taiwan is reclaimed and the maritime approaches are secure, China can focus entirely on internal development and raising living standards. The most serious obstacles to this outcome are economic fragility and political complications, not military or diplomatic resistance. The year 2027 therefore stands out as the most likely turning point, a moment that could bring short-term hardship but ultimately mark the beginning of a new and safer era for China.

 
See also:

Tuesday, September 2, 2025

Cosmic Cluster Days | September 2025

Heliocentric Cosmic Cluster Days (CCDs) and financial markets do not display a consistent polarity or directional bias. The 'noise channel' serves as a signal filter, with the upper and lower limits of the channel being empirically defined. That said, swing directions, along with swing highs and lows also within the 'noise channel,' may correlate with or coincide with short-term market trends and reversals.
 
 Cosmic Cluster Days  |   Composite Line  |  Noise Channel 
  = Full Moon | = New Moon |   = Lunar Declination max North and  = max South立春Solar Terms
 
Cosmic Cluster Days in September 2025: 
Aug 24 (Sun) | Sep 08 (Mon) | Sep 12 (Fri) | Sep 15 (Mon) | Sep 21 (Sun) | Sep 23 (Tue) | Sep 24 (Wed) | Oct 02 (Thu)
   
For previous CCDs, click [HERE]. For background on the author, the concept, and the calculation method, click [HERE].
 
 

Geocentric and Heliocentric Bradley Turning Points, click [HERE]. 
Sensitive Degrees of the Sun, click [HERE].
Planet Speed (Retrogradity), click [HERE].   
Planetary Declinations, click [HERE].
Lunation Cycle, click [HERE].  

The SoLunar Rhythm in September 2025.

Monday, September 1, 2025

Hybrid Warfare & Strategic Stalemate in China–US Competition | Jin Canrong

Structurally speaking, China–US relations are certainly not good. The logic is quite simple: the world is changing significantly, and China is the variable, while the US is the leader of the original order. Naturally, the US is not pleased. [...] Whether it's Biden or Trump, both consider China their only opponent. This is very critical. America’s power is still greater than ours.

Jin Canrong (金灿荣), leading scholar of China-US relations, American politics, and foreign policy;
CCP strategist; Professor and Associate Dean, School of International Studies, Renmin University of China.

[...] China–US relations entered full competition in late 2017, when the US began to wage a hybrid war against China. It is called a hybrid war because multiple tactics are employed: trade war; industrial war (denying chips and pushing Chinese companies to relocate industries); financial war (aggressive interest rate hikes to extract Chinese capital); legal battles; media campaigns (such as accusations of genocide in Xinjiang); and biological warfare allegations, including SARS and COVID-19 claims.

» Siding with the EU to split the West. «
The China-US Competition, Jin Canrong, August 19, 2025.

[...] There are also sovereignty issues concerning Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the East and South China Seas, as well as opposition to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) through new alliances, like AUKUS (US, UK, Australia) and the Quad (US, India, Australia, Japan).

[...] The first phase involved US offensives and China’s strategic defense; now, we have entered a strategic stalemate. The key to strategic alignment is domestic management. The US faces high debt, declining manufacturing, and internal challenges, while China confronts economic performance issues, social conflicts, and a rapidly falling birth rate. Addressing domestic challenges strengthens both nations’ positions abroad.

[...] The US strategy toward China involves territorial ambitions (Canada, Greenland, Panama Canal), aligning Russia, reorganizing allies (Europe, Japan, Canada), and increasing defense spending to ensure allies can act independently. China, meanwhile, has abandoned its low-profile policy, focusing on active defense and strategic deterrence.

[...] Since last year, China’s defense policy has changed. China has moved from passive strategy to assertive action. Strategic stalemate depends on addressing domestic issues first, then external threats. For external alignment, China should coordinate with the EU to balance the West, manage neighboring relations, and continue Belt and Road and BRICS initiatives. This roughly represents the current positions of both parties.
 

SCO Summit Ushers in New Global Security Order and Development Strategy

The Tianjin SCO Summit (August 31–September 1, 2025) brought together leaders from more than 20 nations and delegations from over 30 countries, representing half of humanity. Founded in 2001 from the “Shanghai Five” bloc, the SCO has since evolved into a platform of global significance, no longer limited to Eurasian security but increasingly positioned as a central force in world affairs.

Eurasia’s great powers 
align.
 
The summit adopted the "Tianjin Declaration" and updated the "SCO Development Strategy to 2035", mapping out collective approaches to global security, economic stability, technology gaps, and humanitarian issues. Around 20 agreements were signed covering regional security, economic cooperation, and cultural ties—showing the SCO’s increasingly comprehensive agenda.

The most striking diplomatic development was the warming of "China–India relations". Xi Jinping and Narendra Modi affirmed that their countries should act as partners, not rivals—“the dragon and the elephant dancing together.” China also declared readiness to cooperate with Belarus, strengthening its support for Russia. Azerbaijan’s potential membership was floated, adding complexity to regional dynamics.

Unlike Western alliances, the SCO emphasizes "non-interference, equality, and mutual respect", principles that resonate strongly with the Global South. Many members are also part of BRICS, reinforcing the alignment of emerging economies seeking independence from Western dominance. The summit thus showcased an alternative model of governance appealing to nations dissatisfied with US-led structures.

Indian Business Today depicts Trump's futile attempts
to stop the out-of-control Indian elephant.

The presence of leaders from Mongolia, Turkey, Egypt, and Indonesia underscored the SCO’s expanding gravitational pull. Ceremonies marking the 80th anniversary of the victory over Japan reminded participants of the historical depth of Russia–China ties and their shared resistance to Western hegemony. Symbolic gestures, such as Putin and Modi walking hand in hand, highlighted the summit’s theatrical but strategic diplomacy.
 
» The Dragon and the Elephant should dance together. «
Following Donald Trump's "unwise tariffs," former Global Times reporter
Yang Sheng says the policies pushed China and India to set aside differences. 
 
The summit signaled the "rise of a multipolar world order". By uniting Asia’s largest powers and fostering ties across the Global South, the SCO has moved closer to becoming a true counterweight to Western institutions. 
 
The West relegated to the rank of frustrated spectator.

Together with BRICS, it now represents a complementary pole of power. If China and India consolidate cooperation, analysts see the potential for a profound realignment of global governance away from Western dominance.
 
See also:

DJIA Squares Out in Price and Time for the First Time in History | @Fiorente2

For the first time in history, the DJIA has squared out in both price and time from its bear market low of September 24th, 1900, in 45,631 calendar days at a price level of $45,631. Considering the span of 125 years, this point marks a highly significant market hotspot.

In Gann terminology, "squaring price and time" refers to a balanced or harmonious relationship between 
the price and time dimensions, often indicating significant market reversals. Price and Time are interchangeable.

Last week, the DJIA reached the 45,631 level, which occurred two days before the expected square-out date on August 30, 2025, after 45,631 calendar days had elapsed. The square-out at 45,631 is significant because it is a prime number, emphasizing its importance on the 1x1 line, as it cannot be divided into smaller cycles that also “square” both price and time.

This does not necessarily mean that the bull market is over, as the 1x1 line continues on its path; however, this 1x1 line can represent significant resistance for some time to come. When broken, other past highs and lows may become more relevant, and we may see an even higher 1x1 timing line. On the chart above, I have included some relevant prices and future time dates, referencing past market highs and lows, as well as future dates.

 
» I do not expect a market shock to occur, similar to the one in March and April this year, 
which has been an echo of the 1987 decline, based on this 45-year Saturn-Uranus Cycle. « 
@Fiorente2, July 20, 2025.

The Mystery of the Maya Calendar | Martin Armstrong

Of all the calendars devised by man, there is truly nothing like the Maya investigation. They seem to be an ancient people who understood time. How, I am not sure. But their calculations are astonishing, and are not based upon the planets, but upon the cyclical forces of nature that they perceived. They certainly thought dynamically, rather than linearly, suggesting a more Asian foundation compared to European.

The Bearer of the Burden of Time: The Haab' calendar consists of 18 uinals (20-day periods) followed by
a 5-day period called wayeb, deemed unlucky as it disrupts the cycle, totaling 365.2422 solar days. 

The number 26 also shows up in the Maya calendar, which is quite remarkable. The calendar consists of a ritual cycle of 260 named days, and a 365-day year. Both are running in a complex, concurrent relationship. These components combine, creating a cycle of 18,980 days, constituting 52 years of 365 days, known as the "Calendar Round," where, at the end, a specific day designated in the 260-day cycle returns to the start, insofar as it recurs in the same position in the year. The 260-day cycle is formed by the combination of numerals 1 through 13, which mesh with a rotating wheel of 20 names in an ordered sequence. If we take 260 days and divide by 5, we end back at 52.

 
 
The Maya calendar is complex, shows dynamic thinking, and is far more intriguing from a mathematical perspective. The 365-year cycle was divided by 18 named months of 20 named days, with 5 days of mystic evil omen. The Maya named years based upon the first name of the day that appeared. However, the 365 days could be divided by 5, yielding 73 days (close to the 72-intensity cycle), and the number of named days being 20 was also divisible by 5, resulting in only 4 names combined with 13 numbers that could ever begin a year. These seem to be called "Year Bearers," and were assigned according to the 4 quarters of the world, and were given 4 specific colors. This becomes akin to the saying involving the 4 corners of the world and the 4 winds.

Measuring time since the day of the creation of the universe,
4 Ahau 8 Cumku (August 11, 3114 BCE), is known as the Maya Long Count.
 
The manner in which the Maya recorded dates shows a highly tuned style of dynamic thinking rather than linear. To specify a date in the "Calendar Round," they used the designated day by its numeral and name distinction, and added the current month by prefixing the number of days that had passed with the corresponding number for that month, using 0–19 rather than 1–20. A date written in this curious manner would occur only once in every Calendar Round, resulting in intervals of 52 years.

Yet the Maya were still concerned about reflecting time in a much longer space dimension. They showed a dynamic thinking process for time, and a keen sense of history that they needed to be able to reflect. The Maya devised the "Long Count," which was based upon a system of a count of 20; they strangely used 18 as the multiplier (18 × 4 = 72). Therefore, the dates were written as: kin (day); uinal (20 days); tun (18 uinals or 360 days); katun (20 tuns or 7,200 days); baktun (20 katuns or 144,000 days). Why the Maya used 18 as the multiplier is unknown. Perhaps they noticed the volatility of history, perhaps instigated by nature. 
 
Temple of Kukulkán, the feathered serpent, at Chichén Itzá, Mexico.

The "Long Count" was a means of anchoring time in a continuous time-space dimension, which they could see unfold as such: 1 kin = 1 day, 20 kin = 1 uinal, 18 uinals = 1 tun, 20 tuns = 1 katun, 20 katuns = 1 baktun. The Long Count was not just a calendar alone; the Maya conceived time as a dimension through which history is formed, but also as a cyclical event of self-organizing structure. The basic elements of the Mayan calendar have little to do with astronomy. The Maya seem to have placed great significance on cycles. There is the curious 819-day cycle (13 × 9 × 7 = 819), which also shockingly produces 2.24 years! The hidden order exists—it is not chaos!
 
 
 
The interesting aspect of the Maya calendar is its concurrent and dynamic structure of time, which is closer to what I have described from independent observations, having nothing to do with planetary movements. The use of both the 72 and 26 units of time is striking. The Aztec calendar followed the Maya in many respects, but incorporated a 584-day cycle from the planet Venus, and two 52-year cycles were considered "One Old Age," when the day cycle, the year, and the period of Venus all came together. These were also noted by the Maya, but were more important to the Aztec. All Meso-Americans believed in the cyclical destruction and re-creation of the world in these great sweeping periods of time.

The core of the Maya calendar is that the world is destroyed and reborn time and time again. While they saw the end of this world on December 21st, 2012, that would erupt from earthquakes, that is a separate issue. Lacking the data of the previous cycle from which the Maya started their calendar, there is no way to project forward to even test the theory. Like most religion, this falls into the area of faith, not math.

Calendars based upon the moon cycle of 19 years, known as the Metonic Cycle (named after Meton of Athens in 432 BC), or the solar cycle of 365.25 days, or the 28-year cycle when the same day repeats with the same number under the Julian Calendar, have created interesting math calculations. The Julian calendar cycle = 7,980 years, produced by 19 × 28 × 15. The last 15-year cycle is the Roman tax and census cycle of Indiction. There are calendars based upon Jupiter and its 12-year cycle. But all are cyclical-based.


 
See also:

The 8.6-Month or 37.33-Week Cycle | Martin Armstrong

There are 37.33 weeks within an 8.6-month cycle. Looking at the 8.6-month turning points within the 8.6-year wave structure, we have the following dates:
 

Note, we have 6 waves within each half of the 8.6-year wave. This is caused by the parallel wave that groups 12 waves of 6 into the 72-interval wave. We can see that the difference between 2008.57 and 2009.29 is again 0.72% of a year. Once more, we see the interjection of the number 72.

 
The interaction between this 8.6-month cycle within the 8.6-year cycle is critical to comprehending how the natural cyclical forces function in all aspects of our physical world. On the 8.6-year wave, the first reaction low after the major high at 2007.15 is 2008.225, corresponding to March 23, 2008. 
 
You will notice that this date does not appear on the list of dates above. This turning point was the low for the AMEX Oil Index, from which a rally moved into May 21, 2008, just afterwards. Many commodities reached turning points ±1 week from that March 23rd target, such as cattle, sugar, coffee, cotton, wheat, and soybean oil, just to mention a few. 
 
When we compare the 8.6-month cycle (37.33 weeks), we see the target of July 27, 2008. Here, we find again turning points generally ±1 week or so. The Australian dollar reached a high on July 15, 2008, for the year. The Mexican peso peaked August 4. The Euro peaked on July 15. Now, if we look at the Swiss franc, the high was March 17, 2008; the high in the Japanese yen was also March 17, 2008. Let us now turn to the British pound; here, the high is November 9, 2007, and the Canadian dollar peaked November 7, 2007. Looking at the above list of 8.6-month dates, we see November 10, 2007.

See also:

Friday, August 29, 2025

Who Invented BRICS | Yuliana Titaeva

Many people believe that the idea of this strategic alliance was proposed in 2001 by Goldman Sachs analyst Jim O’Neill. In fact, he only came up with a successful name—BRIC (“brick”), formed from the first letters of the countries. The point was that these four economies would be the engines of global growth in the 21st century.
 
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit from August 31 to September 1 in Tianjin.
 
But in reality, the idea of an alliance between Russia, India, and China was first voiced by… Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. In 1920, Lenin wrote a “Letter to the Indian Revolutionary Association in which he directly addressed the Indian people, called for liberation from British colonialism, and emphasized that India’s struggle was part of the world revolution. For Lenin, Russia had to be the natural ally of India and China in this struggle.

» The spiral of history. «  
Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1920. 
 
Of course, Lenin thought in terms of revolutions and class struggle, not trade blocs. But still, this was the first articulation of the "Russia–India–China" connection as a historical and political project. He was the first to see in these three civilizational giants natural allies against Western hegemony.

SCO Unites to Crush NATO’s Pressure, Pepe Escobar, August 29, 2025.
 
Seventy-eight years later, in 1998, the foreign minister of the new Russia, Yevgeny Maksimovich Primakov, formalized the idea of the strategic triangle RIC (Russia–India–China) as a foreign policy concept. In 2006, the tropical giant Brazil joined the "triangle," and the four countries turned the abbreviation into a real international club. Today, before our very eyes, BRICS is beginning to perceive itself as an alliance against Western hegemony. The spiral of history.

 
 
See also: