China's Preparations for Reunification With Taiwan Around 2027 | Jin Canrong

The Chinese government has consistently avoided setting a timetable for resolving the Taiwan question, emphasizing instead President Xi’s call for peaceful reunification with patience, sincerity, and effort. Despite this, American analysts frequently forecast 2027 as the likely point of resolution. Their view is shaped by China’s large strategic reserves, new industrial measures, and visible military procurement, all of which they interpret as signs of preparation for decisive conflict.

Jin Canrong (金灿荣), leading scholar of China–US relations, American politics, and foreign policy;

CCP strategist; Professor and Associate Dean at the School of International Studies, Renmin University of China.

From a military perspective, China faces few obstacles. A Taiwan operation could be carried out through blockade or direct combat, and success would likely come quickly. US intervention is not considered probable, making the true challenges economic and political rather than military or diplomatic. China’s main vulnerabilities are its dependence on imported resources, its lack of a fully unified domestic market, and the influence of elites with assets or family ties abroad. By contrast, Russia’s economy, though smaller, is buffered by its abundant resources, allowing it to withstand sanctions more effectively.

Among many other heads of states, Putin, Kim Jong Un, Park Geun-hye, ex-President of South Korea, and Masoud

Pezeshkian, President of Iran, joined Beijing’s historic victory parade on September 3, marking 80 years since

Japan’s WWII surrender, where China showcased its hypersonic missiles and nuclear triad. 
 

The government is taking steps to address these weaknesses. Grain reserves now exceed two years thanks to improved storage and expanded farmland. By 2027, new oil and gas discoveries together with Central Asian pipelines are expected to reduce import dependence. Coal-to-oil conversion and the spread of new energy vehicles will further narrow the energy gap. The more difficult issue lies in market access, as domestic circulation remains weak due to provincial barriers. Efforts to expand the Belt and Road initiative continue, though China lacks the military and cultural instruments historically used by the West to protect overseas investments.

» US intervention is not considered probable. «

Jin Canrong's complete discourse video.

 

Diplomatically, a resolution of the Taiwan issue would have far-reaching effects. ASEAN countries, seeing the United States as unreliable for security, would likely align with China, turning the South China Sea into an inland sea. Japan and South Korea, highly dependent on maritime trade and external resources, would also face strong pressure to yield. Once the Taiwan Strait and the South and East China Seas are secured, Shanghai and the eastern seaboard would be protected, creating what could be the safest period in Chinese history.

Welcome to the Eurasian Century.

 

Historically, China’s threats came from the north, but industrialization eliminated that danger. Today, the principal threats come from the sea, the heartland of Western industrial power. Once Taiwan is reclaimed and the maritime approaches are secure, China can focus entirely on internal development and raising living standards. The most serious obstacles to this outcome are economic fragility and political complications, not military or diplomatic resistance. The year 2027 therefore stands out as the most likely turning point, a moment that could bring short-term hardship but ultimately mark the beginning of a new and safer era for China.

Reference:
Awakening Richard (September 3, 2025) - Famous Chinese Professor on China's progress regarding war preparation. (video)

 

See also:

Samim Aktar (March 4, 2025) - Trump 2.0 and the China Containment Strategy.

Hybrid Warfare & Strategic Stalemate in China–US Competition | Jin Canrong

Structurally speaking, China–US relations are certainly not good. The logic is quite simple: the world is changing significantly, and China is the variable, while the US is the leader of the original order. Naturally, the US is not pleased. [...] Whether it's Biden or Trump, both consider China their only opponent. This is very critical. America’s power is still greater than ours.

Jin Canrong (金灿荣), leading scholar of China-US relations, American politics, and foreign policy;

CCP strategist; Professor and Associate Dean, School of International Studies, Renmin University of China.

[...] China–US relations entered full competition in late 2017, when the US began to wage a hybrid war against China. It is called a hybrid war because multiple tactics are employed: trade war; industrial war (denying chips and pushing Chinese companies to relocate industries); financial war (aggressive interest rate hikes to extract Chinese capital); legal battles; media campaigns (such as accusations of genocide in Xinjiang); and biological warfare allegations, including SARS and COVID-19 claims.

» Siding with the EU to split the West. «
The China-US Competition, Jin Canrong, August 19, 2025.

[...] There are also sovereignty issues concerning Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the East and South China Seas, as well as opposition to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) through new alliances, like AUKUS (US, UK, Australia) and the Quad (US, India, Australia, Japan).

[...] The first phase involved US offensives and China’s strategic defense; now, we have entered a strategic stalemate. The key to strategic alignment is domestic management. The US faces high debt, declining manufacturing, and internal challenges, while China confronts economic performance issues, social conflicts, and a rapidly falling birth rate. Addressing domestic challenges strengthens both nations’ positions abroad.

[...] The US strategy toward China involves territorial ambitions (Canada, Greenland, Panama Canal), aligning Russia, reorganizing allies (Europe, Japan, Canada), and increasing defense spending to ensure allies can act independently. China, meanwhile, has abandoned its low-profile policy, focusing on active defense and strategic deterrence.

[...] Since last year, China’s defense policy has changed. China has moved from passive strategy to assertive action. Strategic stalemate depends on addressing domestic issues first, then external threats. For external alignment, China should coordinate with the EU to balance the West, manage neighboring relations, and continue Belt and Road and BRICS initiatives. This roughly represents the current positions of both parties.

 

Reference:
Jin Canrong (August 19, 2025) - The China-US Competition.

The US-China Competition in Southeast Asia | Jin Canrong

The US-China competition is going to be a long-term rivalry, and one shouldn't expect immediate outcomes. It consists of domestic competition, in which both countries will try to improve the competitiveness of their economies and the efficiency of their governance. It also consists of relationship-informed competition, where both countries will try to win favor with other nations during this process.

 Jin Canrong, Professor and Associate Dean of School of 

International Studies at Renmin University of China.

To me, the highlight of this competition will occur in Southeast Asia. The American strategy tends to create conflict and tension around China, fostering unrest and stirring up trouble, motivating countries like the Philippines and India to escalate tensions with China. Additionally, the US will use many NGOs to incite color revolutions in the area, including Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Central Asia. Even if these NGOs do not succeed in overthrowing governments, they can still create disturbances and interrupt China's rise. This is a favored geopolitical strategy of the US. In addition, the new $1.6 billion congressional bill passed to support the media demonization of China—what I would call "dog food for social media"—is a well-known tactic that the US has been continuously using against its geopolitical rivals.

 » Southeast Asian countries need industry to boost their growth, and China will be their biggest investor. 

These countries also require infrastructure development, which China can provide. China's financial capabilities 

are well above those of its Western counterparts when it comes to foreign investments. «

It's all part of the grand competition, and we are accustomed to it. The Chinese government cares greatly about Southeast Asia. We often express our desire to establish a community of shared future with Southeast Asian countries. The economic relationship with Southeast Asia has been quite positive in recent years, and the political relationship is also generally healthy, aside from the situation with the Philippines. Almost all Southeast Asian countries were originally colonies of the West, so the cultural and historical influence of Western powers over the region still exists today. There was an organization called the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), founded back in 1954. Its primary goal was to prevent the spread of communism during the Cold War. This can also be seen as part of a broader coalition against China led by the United States. Thus, the US has some advantages over Southeast Asian countries, at least due to recent history, particularly because China was too weak to project any significant power in the past.

Of course, I believe China's influence is catching up to that of the US in the region. To begin with, we are their neighbors, while the United States is far away. Secondly, our economic ties with the region are much stronger than those of the US. Finally, I think the majority of Southeast Asian countries agree with the Chinese style of non-interventionist foreign policy. In recent months, research and polls conducted by organizations in Singapore and Australia have shown that China's influence over the region is improving and has surpassed that of the United States in some countries. The magazine "Foreign Affairs" has also expressed concern that the US is losing its influence in the region. 

» The US economy is not prepared for global war. We are broke. «  

— Peter Schiff, October 2, 2024.

From my point of view, I believe the current situation is a deadlock—50-50. It's hard to say who is really leading in the region: China or the US. Again, the polls can sometimes be deceiving; they might not provide an accurate picture of what's really going on and can change quickly due to ongoing events. Nonetheless, I believe China is going to overtake the US in terms of influence over Southeast Asian countries in the near future. I believe this is a trend that is difficult to reverse. China has a large and expanding industrial sector, which often carries a spillover effect. Many Southeast Asian countries need industry to boost their growth, and China will be their biggest investor. These countries also require infrastructure development, which China can provide. Additionally, China's financial capabilities are well above those of its Western counterparts when it comes to foreign investments. 

I still see the US as the sole superpower on this planet, but what we are witnessing is that many regional powers are on the rise. In fact, I find it amusing that the majority of Chinese scholars today still consider the US to be the sole superpower. However, many of my foreign colleagues disagree with me. When I traveled to Africa recently, many people there told me that there are currently two superpowers in the world: China and the US. Within the Chinese intellectual community, we do not yet see China as a superpower. That being said, I believe we are entering a bipolar world, particularly in Asia and Southeast Asia, although it is important to note that there are also other strong regional powers. If I refer to it as merely bipolar, our friends in India might take issue with that description.

Quoted from:

Jin Canrong (October 1, 2024) - US-China Competition in Southeast Asia. (video)