Showing posts with label Energy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Energy. Show all posts

Friday, August 21, 2026

Why Time Is on Iran, Russia and China's Side | Michael Hudson

Time is on the side of Iran, Russia, and China and increasingly works against the US and its allies. The longer the confrontation persists, the greater the pressure on highly indebted Western economies. As in Russia's past wars against Napoleon and Germany, the decisive advantage need not come from military strength alone, but from an external force that steadily erodes the enemy's capacity to sustain the conflict. Today, that force is the global financial and economic system.

Tsar Nicholas I famously boasted that Russia possessed two unbeatable generals—"General January and General February." However, while the severe winter of 1854–1855 did inflict catastrophic casualties on British and French forces during the Siege of Sevastopol, "General Winter" failed to save Russia from defeat in the Crimean War (1853–1856). World War I illustration of 'General Winter' on the Eastern Front, featured on the front page of the French periodical Le Petit Journal (1916).
"General Winter"—Russia's eternal ally against her enemies.

The US has contained the oil price shock by releasing oil from its strategic petroleum reserves and encouraging other countries to do the same, despite the major disruption to Persian Gulf exports. But this buys time, and only by depleting reserves and leaving less room for further intervention. The stakes are high because higher energy prices quickly feed into diesel, aviation fuel, fertilizer, transportation, and food costs. With the US midterm elections approaching, Washington is therefore racing the clock to contain prices as its economic buffers diminish.

Weaponizing Survival: Energy, Food, and Sovereign Debt Pressure
Iran's strategic advantage is to avoid escalation while letting economic pressure accumulate. A similar dynamic is developing around Russia and Ukraine, where disruptions to grain exports risk compounding the energy shock. About 27% of global grain trade moves through the Black Sea; Ukraine's harvest is coming in while warehouses are full, and Russian attacks on shipping and ports threaten both incoming supplies and outgoing grain. Much of Ukraine's grain normally goes to Europe, leaving Europe vulnerable to simultaneous fertilizer, food, and energy-price shocks.
 
Asymmetric warfare against Western full-spectrum aggression:
wrecking the enemy through food, energy, and debt.

The crisis need not involve major military escalation because the US and Europe are already too financially stretched to absorb a sustained increase in energy costs without wider economic damage. Higher fuel prices raise transportation, food distribution, and production costs; industries operating on thin margins can become unprofitable; and higher inflation puts upward pressure on interest rates. The resulting pressure spreads to agriculture, trucking, and the movement of crops, with particularly severe effects in the West, among US allies, and across developing economies in Asia and the Global South.

 
Higher inflation and interest rates also raise the cost of servicing already-heavy debt burdens. Rising bond yields compound the problem in the US, Japan, and other highly indebted economies, while vulnerabilities associated with Japan's currency and carry trade expose the limits of available policy responses. The fundamental vulnerability is therefore debt: governments must increasingly choose between supporting households and industry and servicing accumulated debt.

Sanctions Threaten America's Financial Power 
This pressure also threatens the financial system that has enabled the US to exercise global power for decades. Washington has relied not only on military force, but also on its control of the dollar, international payments, global banking, and the oil trade. By weaponizing sanctions against Iran and threatening Chinese, Asian, and other banks involved in Iranian oil transactions, the US is encouraging those same countries and institutions to reduce their dependence on the dollar. Financial coercion could therefore undermine one of America's principal instruments of power.

murder, slaughter, genocide: children, women, heads of state; weapon, drug, organ, child
trafficking; well poisoning; pedophilia; hijacking; torturing; counterfeiting; looting; piracy; bribery...
 
The oil trade is particularly important because Persian Gulf and OPEC oil have long been key channels of US financial influence. Oil revenues recycled through US banks, dollar assets, and the American financial system have reinforced the dollar's central position. Driving oil producers, buyers, and financial institutions away from that system therefore risks undermining the very mechanism Washington has used as a global economic choke point.  
 
Tru
mp offered billions to Iran's military

Iran: "Leave before it's too late!"

Iran's strategy exploits this contradiction. If its own oil exports are blocked by sanctions and trade restrictions, the implicit threat is that broader oil exports may also be disrupted, forcing other countries to choose between accepting higher energy costs and resisting the sanctions regime. Iran cannot defeat the US militarily, even though it can attack US bases in the Middle East; its leverage instead lies in imposing costs on the wider system and forcing other countries to decide how they will respond.

China and the Emerging Alternative
China is relatively well-positioned to withstand such pressure because of its large oil reserves, coal resources, and extensive investment in solar power and other energy alternatives. The broader question is how China, Russia, Iran, Asia, and the Global South will respond if continued US sanctions keep driving up energy and commodity prices. Their incentive will be to develop mechanisms that insulate their trade from unilateral US financial coercion. 

Zhou Xiaochuan, Governor of the People's Bank of China, presenting his
landmark 2009 proposal, "Reform the International Monetary System," 
to the Bank for International Settlements (BIS).

Gold provides one possible reserve asset outside the dollar system. Countries have increasingly added to their gold reserves while maintaining relatively stable dollar holdings; the European Union now holds more reserves in gold than in dollars. China and Russia have also developed alternatives to Western payment infrastructure. China's and Russia's independent clearing systems reduce their reliance on SWIFT, while Iran has experimented with cryptocurrency payments despite the US seizure of Iranian cryptocurrency assets.  
 
The issue therefore goes beyond creating a BRICS currency. What is required is an alternative international architecture for payments, reserves, and lending, capable of financing trade without depending on the dollar, SWIFT, the IMF, or other Western institutions. China, because of its enormous financial reserves, is uniquely positioned to provide the financial capacity that such a system would require. Russia and Iran could contribute oil, with Russia also contributing grain.

The Cost of Dedollarization
Such a system could fundamentally reshape the post-1945 financial order. Countries facing rising energy, food, fertilizer, and chemical costs would increasingly face a choice between supporting domestic industry and households and servicing dollar-denominated debt. As balance-of-payments pressures intensify, governments would have to decide whether scarce resources should go toward subsidizing industry, protecting families from higher heating and food costs, or continuing to pay foreign creditors. The incentive to prioritize domestic stability would accelerate dedollarization and weaken the financial mechanisms through which Washington has historically exercised global influence.

More sanctions, guns, butter, servicing debt, or collapse?
 
China, Russia, and Iran could therefore form the foundation of an alternative monetary system: Iran contributing oil, Russia oil and grain, and China financial reserves. Such a system could remove or weaken several of the instruments of influence established after World War II to structure global trade and finance in America's interest, including control over the dollar, oil, food, and seaborne trade. 

Keynes's Alternative to the Dollar System
The alternative need not be another dominant national currency at all. The argument instead returns to John Maynard Keynes's 1944 proposal for an international clearing institution based on a supranational unit of account called the bancor. Keynes proposed a system designed to manage persistent international surpluses and deficits rather than forcing debtor countries into destructive austerity. The institution would manage intergovernmental debts, allowing countries with temporary imbalances to obtain temporary liquidity while preserving their capacity to become economically self-sufficient.
 
Keynes maybe wasn't all wrong.

The critical difference is that surplus countries would also share responsibility for global imbalances. Keynes argued that the persistent accumulation of surpluses and claims by creditor countries necessarily creates corresponding deficits elsewhere. If debts become so large that repayment requires destroying a debtor’s economy, those debts should be written down—and the corresponding creditor claims written down as well. The US rejected this approach in 1944 because it was then the dominant creditor and had little incentive to accept a system that could reduce its accumulated claims.
 
Keynes's proposal was shaped by the German reparations and transfer debates of the 1920s. His central argument was that a debtor cannot repay indefinitely by suppressing wages, transferring resources abroad, and selling its assets without destroying its own productive economy. A loan made without regard to the borrower’s ability to repay ultimately becomes a bad loan. The same logic, he argued, applies internationally: forcing debtors into permanent austerity can produce depression rather than repayment.
 
The proposed international institution would create an accounting unit based on a combination of gold and member currencies rather than a conventional national currency. It would manage international surpluses and deficits and provide liquidity for temporary imbalances. When accumulated claims became impossible to service without undermining a country’s productive capacity, the system would permit debt reduction rather than compel economic destruction.

China's Potential Role
China could potentially build such an international payments system around productive investment rather than creditor extraction. Its investments in ports, railways, infrastructure, and the Belt and Road Initiative could increase borrowers' productive capacity and ability to earn foreign exchange, enabling them to repay principal and interest rather than forcing them into austerity and privatization. The argument is that, unlike Western financial systems, China has the capacity to structure such financing primarily on geopolitical and developmental grounds rather than purely for financial returns or capital gains.
 
The central question is whether China itself could avoid becoming another creditor power with the capacity to weaponize its currency. The historical lesson, however, is that other countries did not necessarily expect the US to weaponize the dollar in the 1950s and 1960s, yet it eventually did. The same concern could apply to the yuan. The proposed solution, however, is not simply to substitute one national currency for another, but to create an international clearing mechanism that limits any single country's ability to accumulate unlimited financial power.

The End of the Post-1945 Order
The broader conclusion is that the post-1945 financial order may be approaching a structural break. The present conflict is no longer simply a military conflict; it is increasingly a contest between competing economic systems: a creditor-driven and highly financialized model and an industrial, state-directed model represented by China and parts of Asia. The existing system may not contain mechanisms capable of managing this transition. Instead, the world could fracture into parallel financial and economic systems, with the struggle over the future economic order ultimately displacing the narrower conception of a military or civilizational conflict.

Reference:

Thursday, October 9, 2025

The Dow-to-Gold Ratio (DJI/XAU) Collapses: Get Ready for Tangible Assets

The Dow-to-Gold ratio (DJI/XAU) measures how many ounces of gold are needed to buy the Dow Jones Industrial Average. It is used as a long-term indicator of monetary confidence, where a falling ratio shows a shift in real value away from paper assets (cash, bonds, stocks) towards tangible assets like gold, silver, platinum, palladium, rhodium, copper (metals), oil, lumber (energy), and real estate.

Dow-to-Gold Ratio (DJI/XAU) from 1897 to 2025 (quarterly bars, log scale; chart credit: Francis Hunt.)
 Although the Dow has gained roughly 250% in dollar terms since 2000, by Q4 2025, 
its real value has declined by about two-thirds when measured in gold.
 
Over the last century, the Dow-to-Gold ratio has oscillated between periods of equity confidence and monetary stress. In 1929, the ratio peaked at roughly 18.63 before collapsing below 2 during the Great Depression. It reached about 28 in 1966, then fell below 1 in 1980 amid high inflation and currency instability. 
 
Dow-to-Gold Ratio (DJI/XAU) from 1800 to 2020 (quarterly values, log scale).
 
At the 1999–2000 peak, the Dow equaled approximately 45 ounces of gold—its highest in over a century. As of October 2025, the ratio is near 12, a decline of about 73% from that peak. The drop was steep from 2000 to 2011 (reaching a ratio near 6), followed by a rebound to about 20 by 2018, and renewed erosion thereafter. Over that period, gold has outperformed equities in real terms.
 
 

Monday, October 6, 2025

Mexico's Economic Rise Shifts Power from the US | Richard D. Wolff

Mexico, often viewed as dependent on the US, holds a significant edge in the global economy, with the US relying more on Mexico than most Americans realize. Beyond avocados and automobiles, Mexico is a vital hub for US supply chains in electronics, pharmaceuticals, automotive, aerospace, medical devices, textiles, consumer goods, and information/communications technology. As the US depends on Mexico, Mexico has strategically built leverage, shifting focus from politics to economics.
 

Mexico’s rise as an economic powerhouse challenges its subordinate image. Its leverage in trade, energy, and geopolitics makes it vital to the US. Rising labor and environmental demands could disrupt supply chains. The era of US dominance is fading, replaced by interdependence, and Mexico wields unprecedented influence. A fracture in this delicate relationship could swiftly impact the US. 
 
Mexico, once a trade partner, is now a force reshaping trade and energy policies, catching the US unprepared. The US has long focused on migration and border security, overlooking intricate economic ties. Mexico is a cornerstone of US production, driven by cost-effective labor and trade agreements like the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA, 2020).
 
 
This dependency stems from lower wages and proximity, but this corporate strategy has created vulnerabilities. US companies’ reliance on Mexico’s manufacturing gives Mexico significant leverage. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA,1994) boosted trade but moved US factories to Mexico for cheaper labor, eroding American jobs. USMCA preserved this structure. Mexico, no longer just a low-cost hub, has diversified into energy, consumer markets, and geopolitics, prioritizing labor rights and domestic growth, threatening the cheap labor model and US supply chains.
 
US policies, like subsidized agricultural exports, have displaced Mexican farmers, driving migration. US firms’ job relocation to Mexico exploits low-wage workers, creating an underclass on both sides of the border, with migration as a symptom of economic disparities.

Mexico, a key US oil supplier, is asserting control over its energy resources, nationalizing and tightening oversight, challenging US corporations. Its push into renewables diversifies its portfolio, enhancing global leverage. Prioritizing domestic energy could disrupt US imports, forcing a strategic shift.

 Mexico has surpassed China as the top US trade partner.
militarily occupy Mexico and use it as a substitute for China in its economic system. «  

Mexican labor movements demand better wages and conditions, undermining the cheap labor model, potentially raising US consumer prices. Environmental activists push for sustainable practices, challenging resource exploitation.
 
Amid the US-China trade war, Mexico is a nearshoring hub, benefiting from USMCA and proximity. China’s investments in Mexico create a trade triangulation, with Chinese components assembled in Mexico for US export, bypassing tariffs. Mexico negotiates favorable terms with both powers, gaining strategic autonomy.

 
 
Richard D. Wolff, American Marxist economist known for works like "Democracy at Work,"
is teaching at the University of Massachusetts Amherst and The New School.
 

Wednesday, September 3, 2025

China's Preparations for Reunification With Taiwan Around 2027 | Jin Canrong

The Chinese government has consistently avoided setting a timetable for resolving the Taiwan question, emphasizing instead President Xi’s call for peaceful reunification with patience, sincerity, and effort. Despite this, American analysts frequently forecast 2027 as the likely point of resolution. Their view is shaped by China’s large strategic reserves, new industrial measures, and visible military procurement, all of which they interpret as signs of preparation for decisive conflict.

Jin Canrong (金灿荣), leading scholar of China–US relations, American politics, and foreign policy;
CCP strategist; Professor and Associate Dean at the School of International Studies, Renmin University of China.

From a military perspective, China faces few obstacles. A Taiwan operation could be carried out through blockade or direct combat, and success would likely come quickly. US intervention is not considered probable, making the true challenges economic and political rather than military or diplomatic. China’s main vulnerabilities are its dependence on imported resources, its lack of a fully unified domestic market, and the influence of elites with assets or family ties abroad. By contrast, Russia’s economy, though smaller, is buffered by its abundant resources, allowing it to withstand sanctions more effectively.

Among many other heads of states, Putin, Kim Jong Un, 
Park Geun-hye, ex-President of South Korea, and Masoud
Pezeshkian, President of Iran, joined Beijing’s historic victory parade on September 3, marking 80 years since
Japan’s WWII surrender, where China showcased its hypersonic missiles and nuclear triad. 
 
The government is taking steps to address these weaknesses. Grain reserves now exceed two years thanks to improved storage and expanded farmland. By 2027, new oil and gas discoveries together with Central Asian pipelines are expected to reduce import dependence. Coal-to-oil conversion and the spread of new energy vehicles will further narrow the energy gap. The more difficult issue lies in market access, as domestic circulation remains weak due to provincial barriers. Efforts to expand the Belt and Road initiative continue, though China lacks the military and cultural instruments historically used by the West to protect overseas investments.

»
US intervention is not considered probable. «
Jin Canrong's complete discourse video.
 
Diplomatically, a resolution of the Taiwan issue would have far-reaching effects. ASEAN countries, seeing the United States as unreliable for security, would likely align with China, turning the South China Sea into an inland sea. Japan and South Korea, highly dependent on maritime trade and external resources, would also face strong pressure to yield. Once the Taiwan Strait and the South and East China Seas are secured, Shanghai and the eastern seaboard would be protected, creating what could be the safest period in Chinese history.

Welcome to the Eurasian Century.
 
Historically, China’s threats came from the north, but industrialization eliminated that danger. Today, the principal threats come from the sea, the heartland of Western industrial power. Once Taiwan is reclaimed and the maritime approaches are secure, China can focus entirely on internal development and raising living standards. The most serious obstacles to this outcome are economic fragility and political complications, not military or diplomatic resistance. The year 2027 therefore stands out as the most likely turning point, a moment that could bring short-term hardship but ultimately mark the beginning of a new and safer era for China.

 
See also:

Wednesday, May 8, 2024

How the US Destroyed the German Economy | Cyrus Janssen

"To be an enemy of the US is dangerous, but to be a friend is fatal." This famous quote from Henry Kissinger is now unfolding in real time: Germany, Europe's largest economy and its industrial powerhouse, is now collapsing. Last year, Germany posted the worst performance among all major global economies, with its economy being the only one to actually shrink by 0.3%. Just last month, Germany's economic minister, Robert Habeck, stated that the German economy is performing "dramatically badly." Yet, the Western media has concealed the true cause.
 
» NATO's purpose is: Keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down. «
Lord Hastings Lionel Ismay, NATO's first Secretary General, 1952.
 » Fuck the European Union! «
Victoria Nuland, US Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, 2014
 
Even worse, this bleak situation shows no signs of improving. There were high hopes that 2024 would turn things around and be a comeback year for Germany. Until recently, the German government projected a growth rate of 1.3%. However, shockingly, they have now been forced to slash this forecast to a mere 0.2%. The scariest part is that most economists and business leaders agree: this isn't just a temporary recession, but a deeper structural problem with the German economic model. If you think this is an exaggeration, consider that, by now, an astonishing two in three German companies have left Germany or at least partially relocated abroad, with most citing sky-high energy prices, inflation, over-regulation, and endless political debates as their reasons for leaving. What or who is causing this catastrophic collapse of Germany's long-standing economic and industrial prowess?
 
   » Halting Russian supplies can well create a systemic crisis that would be devastating
for the German economy and, indirectly, for the entire European Union. «
 
Germany has been played by the United States and continues to score own goals in tackling this economic crisis. The country's dire situation is caused by three main factors: first, the sky-high energy prices; second, reduced exports to Russia and China; and third, increased military expenditure.
 
   » China called the Nord Stream pipeline blast an act of international terrorism,
and an act of war against Germany and Russia. «

[...] As much as the US is to blame here, astonishingly, almost all of Germany's political elite, mainstream media, and general population have eagerly obeyed America's wishes to demonize and decouple from Russia and China. This is absolutely bizarre and frankly foolish, as numerous experts and German business leaders have repeatedly warned that decoupling would destroy the German economy. The sad truth is that much of Germany's political and media establishment has a long history of blindly accepting US-formed policy narratives at face value—even when they themselves are the ones getting harmed. The best recent example of this is the bombing of the Nord Stream pipeline, whose sole purpose was to transport natural gas from Russia to Germany and the rest of Western Europe.
 
 » Germany's establishment has been one of the biggest cheerleaders for severing its energy ties with Russia.
You seriously can't make this stuff up. «
Cyrus Janssen - March 12, 2024.

[...] After the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Germany and the EU introduced sanctions against Russia, while Russia responded by sharply decreasing its delivery of natural gas to Europe. This caused Germany's energy prices to skyrocket and severely damaged its economy. Before the invasion, Germany imported a staggering 55% of its gas from Russia, and it was precisely this cheap Russian gas that enabled Germany to become an economic and industrial powerhouse. Of course, sanctioning your main energy supplier was never the smartest choice to begin with. The fallout cannot be understated: in the same year the war started, the market price for natural gas increased more than tenfold.

 Biden vows that the US will 'bring an end' to the Nord Stream 2 pipeline if Russia invades Ukraine, and German vassal Chancellor Scholz simply agrees. - February 7, 2022.
 
But it's not just ordinary Germans who have suffered. An astonishing 70% of Germany's mechanical engineering, industrial goods, and automotive sectors have relocated abroad, making it clear why Germany's economic and industrial power has collapsed so rapidly. The US role in Germany's energy crisis is much larger than merely taking advantage of the Germans. Not only did the US openly wish to eliminate Germany's energy relationship with Russia, but it also shares significant blame for causing the war in Ukraine, which led to Germany's crisis in the first place. However, once again, Germany shares the blame: the country's establishment is in virtual lockstep with the United States and has been one of the biggest cheerleaders for severing its energy ties with Russia. You seriously can't make this stuff up.
 

 » Ukraine's victory: whatever it takes, as long as it takes. «
German vassal chancellor Scholz - May 7, 2024.

See also:

Friday, September 1, 2023

Crush Europe and Strengthen the US | RAND Corporation

January 25, 2022.
Confidential.
Distribution:
WHCS, ANSA, Dept. of State, CIA, NSA, DNC 
 
Executive Summary
[...] The current German economic model is based on two pillars. These are unlimited access to cheap Russian energy resources and to cheap French electric power, thanks to the operation of nuclear power plants. The importance of the first factor is considerably higher. Halting Russian supplies can well create a systemic crisis that would be devastating for the German economy and, indirectly, for the entire European Union. The French energy sector could also soon begin to experience heavy problems. The predictable stop of Russian-controlled nuclear fuel supplies, combined with the unstable situation in the Sahel region, would make French energy sector critically dependent on Australian and Canadian fuel.
 
"A reduction in Russian energy supplies - ideally, a complete halt of such supplies -
would lead to disastrous outcomes for German industry." - RAND Corporation, Jan 25, 2022.
 
[...] The only feasible way to guarantee Germany's rejection of Russian energy supplies is to involve both sides in the military conflict in Ukraine. Our further actions in this country will inevitably lead to a military response from Russia. Russians will obviously not be able to leave unanswered the massive Ukrainian army pressure on the unrecognized Donbas republics. That would make possible to declare Russia an aggressor and apply to it the entire package of sanctions prepared beforehand. Putin may in turn decide to impose limited counter-sanctions - primarily on Russian energy supplies to Europe. Thus, the damage to the EU countries will be quite comparable to the one to the Russians, and in some countries - primarily in Germany - it will be higher.
 
The prerequisite for Germany to fall into this trap is the leading role of green parties and ideology in Europe. The German Greens are a strongly dogmatic, if not zealous, movement, which makes it quite easy to make them ignore economic arguments. In this respect, the German Greens somewhat exceed their counterparts in the rest of Europe. Personal features and the lack of professionalism of their leaders - primarily Annalena Baerbock and Robert Habeck - permit to presume that it is next to impossible for them to admit their own mistakes in a timely manner.
 
Thus, it will be enough to quickly form the media image of Putin’s aggressive war to turn the Greens into ardent and hardline supporters of sanctions, a ‘party of war’. It will enable the sanctions regime to be introduced without any obstacles. The lack of professionalism of the current leaders will not allow a setback in the future, even when the negative impact of the chosen policy becomes obvious enough [...] This will ensure a sufficiently long gap in cooperation between Germany and Russia, which will make large German economic operators uncompetitive.

"The prerequisite for Germany to fall into this trap is the leading role of the German Greens."

[...] A reduction in Russian energy supplies - ideally, a complete halt of such supplies - would lead to disastrous outcomes for German industry. The need to divert significant amounts of Russian gas for winter heating of residential and public facilities will further exacerbate the shortages [...] A complete standstill at the largest in the chemical, metallurgical, and machine-building, plants is likely, while they have virtually no spare capacity to reduce energy consumption. It could lead to the shutting down of continuous-cycle enterprises, which would mean their destruction.

The cumulative losses of the German economy can be estimated only approximately. Even if the restriction of Russian supplies is limited to 2022, its consequences will last for several years, and the total losses could reach 200-300 billion euros. Not only will it deliver a devastating blow to the German economy, but the entire EU economy will inevitably collapse. We are talking not about a decline in economy growth pace, but about a sustained recession and a decline in GDP only in material production by 3-4% per year for the next 5-6 years. Such a fall will inevitably cause panic in the financial markets and may bring them to a collapse.


The euro will inevitably, and most likely irreversibly, fall below the dollar. A sharp fall of the euro will consequently cause its global sale. It will become a toxic currency, and all countries in the world will rapidly reduce its share in their forex reserves. This gap will be primarily filled with dollar and yuan.
 
"NATO's purpose is "keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down",
as Lord Hastings Lionel Ismay, NATO's first Secretary General, put it.

Another inevitable consequence of a prolonged economic recession will be a sharp drop in living standards and rising unemployment (up to 200,000-400,000 in Germany alone), which will entail the exodus of skilled labour and well-educated young people. There are literally no other destinations for such migration other than the United States today. A somewhat smaller, but also quite significant flow of migrants can be expected from other EU countries.
 
Since 1871 the prime U.S. geopolitical foreign policy doctrine for Europe is:
"Keep Germany and Russia separate and in conflict."
Or as Victoria Nuland put it in 2014: "Fuck the EU!"

The scenario under consideration will thus serve to strengthen the national financial condition both indirectly and most directly. In the short term, it will reverse the trend of the looming, economic recession and, in addition, consolidate American society by distracting it from immediate economic concerns. This, in turn, will reduce electoral risks.

In the medium term (4-5 years), the cumulative benefits of capital flight, re-oriented logistical flows and reduced competition in major industries may amount to USD 7-9 trillion. Unfortunately, China is also expected to benefit over the medium term from this emerging scenario. At the same time, Europe's deep political dependence on the U.S. allows us to effectively neutralise possible attempts by individual European states to draw closer to China [...]



See also: