Why a US War with Venezuela Would Benefit Russia | Dmitry Seleznyov

As cynical and crude as it may sound, a US war with Venezuela would benefit Russia. Venezuela could become America's "Ukraine," diverting US attention and resources away from our own conflict in Ukraine. The United States risks getting bogged down in a war it starts—especially if it launches a ground operation. In that case, Venezuela could turn into a second Vietnam for the US. Either way, South American countries would likely rally in solidarity to support it, uniting the continent in a fight against the "gringos." 

 

 » Uniting the continent in a fight against the "gringos." «

It won't be possible to tear the country apart with impunity; there won't be an easy walkover, and the US could face unacceptable losses. On the international stage, Russia and China would provide support—both politically and through hybrid means. On one hand, we'd be whispering sweet nothings to those Witkoffs or whoever's in charge in that administration, while on the other, quietly fueling Maduro's fire. Why not? If others can do it, why can't we? Of course, we'd offer help with the constraint that we're still tied down in Ukraine, but we'd do what we can.  

 

» Why not? If others can do it, why can't we? «

 

If things in Venezuela escalate to a hot phase and body bags start flowing back to Trump's "Great America," the MAGA electorate won't like it. Trump was elected to do the opposite. Fighting a war in Venezuela isn't just getting involved for Israel's sake or bombing Iran on the other side of the world—this one's right in America's backyard, with short supply lines. Not to mention that Trump would permanently lose his carefully cultivated image as a "peacemaker," the one he wants to be remembered for in history. A war in Venezuela would brand him forever as the man who tied a bloody ribbon of a second Vietnam around America's neck. Does Trump want that? Doubtful.

 

But Trump is pushing hard—he always plays the bluff game. Recently, Mr. Twitter declared a no-fly zone, and just the other day, he went even further with a full blockade. In effect, that's already a declaration of war. Will Maduro escalate? Sure, a direct conflict could end in different ways, but if Trump has already sentenced the Venezuelan president, what does he have to lose? Escalation often leads to de-escalation. Remember how young Kim Jong-un told Trump to get lost on surrendering nuclear weapons—and nothing happened; he ended up as a "good guy."
 

But for now, our friend Maduro is acting unconvincingly. Chanting "peace, peace, peace" won't stop an inevitable war. "You're only guilty of making me hungry," as the fable goes—red-haired Donnie's intentions are clear. So why wait? Look at the "barefoot" Houthis—they drove off American ships from clustering near their coast. And they're still standing strong. 

Or what—surrender?

Quoted from:
Dmitry Seleznyov (December 18, 2025) - Why a US War with Venezuela Would Benefit Russia.

(Чем выгодна России война США с Венесуэлой.) 

 

» The Pathetic Empire. «

Caracas, December 18, 2025: Venezuelan naval forces have begun escorting non-sanctioned oil tankers carrying petroleum derivatives, reportedly destined for China, in direct response to US President Donald Trump's December 16 announcement of a "total and complete blockade" targeting sanctioned vessels entering or leaving Venezuela. The escalation follows the US seizure on December 10 of the tanker Skipper, carrying approximately 1.9 million barrels of Venezuelan crude, which Trump indicated the US would retain. 

 

Venezuela has condemned these actions as aggression, requesting an urgent United Nations Security Council meeting to address perceived violations of international law. Domestically, PDVSA workers staged protests across multiple states in defense of national sovereignty, while Vice President Delcy Rodríguez reaffirmed the uninterrupted operation of the hydrocarbons sector. Amid the tensions, President Nicolás Maduro reported that Venezuela achieved 9 percent GDP growth in 2025 despite sanctions, with projections of at least 7 percent for 2026.

Preventing Empire Collapse | Alexander Mercouris and Alex Christoforou

The new 33-page US National Security Strategy, strongly shaped by Elbridge Colby and personally prefaced by President Trump, represents a partial yet still incomplete departure from three decades of neoconservative pursuit of hegemony. Officially released on December 4, it explicitly renounces any further quest for global domination, acknowledges that post-1991 globalism hollowed out American industry while delivering few benefits to ordinary citizens, and ultimately weakened the United States itself. It faults an over-reliance on allies and proxies that Washington could not fully control—pointedly implying Israel and European-driven adventures in Ukraine—for repeatedly pulling America into conflicts that did not serve its core interests.

 

» The unipolar era is over. « 

 

In place of hegemony, the document calls for aggressive domestic reindustrialization, technological supremacy, and a return to traditional spheres-of-influence politics. It resurrects an explicitly imperial interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine, insisting that no external great power may have any presence whatsoever in the Western Hemisphere and that the United States must maintain absolute predominance there. At the same time, it insists that America must remain the world’s foremost military and economic power and must permanently prevent any rival from ever attaining the degree of primacy the United States itself enjoyed in recent decades.

» Extraordinarily harsh toward European leadership and the EU. «

 

China continues to be treated as the sole peer competitor capable of achieving parity or even supremacy; opposition to Taiwan’s reunification with the mainland remains a clear priority, revealing no substantive softening despite changed rhetoric. Russia, by contrast, is now a power with which the United States must seek accommodation and continental stability. The document is extraordinarily harsh toward European leadership and the European Union, accusing Brussels of delusional thinking on Russia and Ukraine, economic self-destruction, creeping authoritarianism, and the erosion of European civilization itself. Stabilizing Europe, it argues, requires ending the Ukraine war in partnership with the continent’s other great power—Russia.

 

The new operating model abandons the image of America as a "weary Titan" bearing the world’s burdens alone. Instead, Washington will concentrate on its own hemispheric backyard while outsourcing or franchising security responsibilities elsewhere: Europe is expected to provide for its own defense, Asia will be handled by regional proxies, Africa reduced to transactional resource partnerships, and the Middle East treated as a complicated but no longer central theater. These partners will still answer to the United States and pay their dues, yet day-to-day management becomes their problem.

Historically, this precise pattern—admitting overextension, rejecting free-trade globalism, demanding allied burden-sharing while assuming continued overall control, and invoking the "weary Titan" metaphor—appeared during the terminal phases of both the British Empire under Joseph Chamberlain in the 1890s–1900s and the Spanish Empire under Gaspar de Guzmán, Count-Duke of Olivares in the 17th century. In both cases the reforms were offered as salvation but in reality signaled irreversible imperial decline.

» Explicitly imperial interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine. «

 

The strategy is riddled with contradictions. While calling for stabilization with Russia, Pentagon sources simultaneously press Europe to be combat-ready against Moscow by 2027; Europeans counter that 2030 is more realistic, and Viktor Orbán openly states that the official EU position is preparation for war with Russia by that later date. The unspoken American ultimatum to Europe is therefore: achieve full military self-sufficiency on Washington’s timeline or the United States will negotiate directly with Moscow over Europe’s head and end the Ukraine conflict on Russia’s terms. Given Europe’s incapacity to meet that deadline, the second path becomes the default—yet powerful entrenched forces in Washington, Brussels, and the broader transatlantic apparatus remain committed to perpetual confrontation with Russia and containment of Russia.

» Franchising security responsibilities elsewhere. «

 

The document is ultimately a fragile compromise between a small restraint-oriented faction and the far larger interventionist bureaucracy. History suggests the bureaucracy will prevail, just as it defeated Chamberlain and Olivares. Moscow and Beijing instantly recognize the contradiction of a United States that urges its vassals to keep fighting while posing as the reasonable party seeking stability; they will not be deceived. Russia, in particular, reads the American declaration that peace in Ukraine and stabilized relations with Moscow are now core US interests as confirmation that time is on its side, that it can stand firm on all demands, and that Washington will eventually concede because it is the United States, not Russia, that now needs the war to end.

Thus, while the 2025 National Security Strategy marks the intellectual arrival of restraint-oriented thinking inside parts of the American national-security establishment and constitutes an official admission that the unipolar era is over, its internal contradictions and the entrenched power of the old order make it unlikely to survive in anything like its present form. Like its British and Spanish predecessors, it may ultimately be remembered less as the blueprint for managed retrenchment than as one of the first formal acknowledgments that American hegemony has irrevocably ended.

 

Reference:

Alexander Mercouris and Alex Christoforou (December 8, 2025) - Preventing Empire Collapse. (video)

  

Professor Shen Yi, Director of the Center for BRICS Studies and Professor at the School of 

International Relations and Public Affairs at Fudan University, evaluating the 2025 US NSS.

 

See also:

 Serge Bernard (2016) - From Conquest to Affluence to Collapse: The 250 Year Empire Life Cycle.

William Strauss and Neil Howe (1997) - The Fourth Turning: An American Prophecy.  

Lieutenant-General Sir John Bagot Glubb (1978)  - The Age of Decadence.

The End of Western Dominance—US Lives in Mortal Fear | John Mearsheimer

Since 2017, when Trump entered the White House, the balance of power has shifted in China’s favor, though the United States remains the world’s most powerful state. China is rapidly closing the gap, particularly in cutting-edge technologies, which Washington fears could tilt global economic and military power. As China converts its economic strength into military might, it builds not just regional forces but also blue-water naval power and global projection capabilities linked to its Belt and Road Initiative. This imitation of US strategy alarms Washington and drives a bipartisan policy of containment.

John J. Mearsheimer, American political scientist and professor at the University of Chicago, best known for his work

on international relations theory, offensive realism, the US Zionist lobby, US–China rivalry and great power politics.

Initially, Chinese leaders argued that economic interdependence would prevent conflict, since prosperity required cooperation. However, survival—not prosperity—is the primary goal of states in an anarchic international system with no higher authority. As China’s economic rise translated into growing military capacity, American fear replaced optimism, triggering security competition in East Asia. Prosperity enriched both sides, but balance-of-power politics and survival imperatives outweighed economic interdependence theory.

» Great powers are ruthless, exploiting weaker rivals to secure survival and expand influence. «

John J. Mearsheimer's complete discourse video. 

Historical lessons reinforce this logic. Weak states like China during its “century of humiliation” (1840s–1940s) and Russia during NATO expansion in the 1990s suffered because they lacked power. Great powers are ruthless, exploiting weaker rivals to secure survival and expand influence. In this system, the optimal strategy is regional hegemony, dominating one’s neighborhood while preventing rivals from doing the same. The US has long acted this way, blocking Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union from achieving dominance in Europe or Asia, while securing its own supremacy in the Western Hemisphere.

China’s trajectory fits this pattern. As its power has grown since the 1990s, Beijing naturally seeks to dominate East Asia. Yet the US cannot tolerate another regional hegemon, making containment inevitable. From Washington’s perspective, preventing Chinese hegemony is about survival, not choice. From Beijing’s perspective, seeking hegemony is equally rational. The result is a structural clash: both sides are locked in an intensifying security competition driven by the anarchic nature of the international system.

» The United States lives in mortal fear that the Chinese are going to dominate. «

China’s path to hegemony is more difficult than America’s was because regional powers like Japan, Australia, South Korea, and the Philippines—backed by the US—resist Chinese dominance. India participates in the Quad but is geographically and strategically less central to East Asian balance. Russia, meanwhile, has been pushed into China’s camp by the Ukraine war, eliminating a potential counterweight. This complicates US strategy: instead of balancing China together, Washington and Moscow are now aligned against each other.

 

The Ukraine war creates two major problems for the US: it prevents a full pivot to Asia and deepens the Sino-Russian partnership. Trump recognized this dynamic and sought rapprochement with Moscow to peel Russia away from China, but his chances of success are slim. Russia deeply distrusts the US, and Trump underestimated the difficulty of ending the Ukraine conflict. His instincts—to improve ties with Russia and focus on China—align with realist logic, but his reliance on instincts over experts undermines effective execution.

» It's only recently that Putin has brought the Russians back 

from the dead and we now consider Russia to be a great power. «

Since 2017, US policy has shifted decisively from engagement to containment of China, first under Trump and then reinforced, even hardened, under Biden. Yet American forces remain tied down in Ukraine and the Middle East. Deployments against the Houthis in the Red Sea and the prospect of war with Iran divert vital resources away from East Asia, just as China grows militarily stronger. Past US experiments in social engineering—in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya—ended in failure, raising doubts about new entanglements that sap the capacity to counter China.

Facing escalating global uncertainties, Chinese President Xi Jinping said the SCO is increasingly

responsible for regional peace, stability, and member-state development, August 31, 2025.

 

Ultimately, the US–China rivalry reflects structural realities of power politics. Both states seek survival through maximizing power, and both see regional hegemony as the path to security. The United States, the sole global hegemon since 1900, refuses to share that status, while China, closing the gap, sees dominance in East Asia as essential. The result is an enduring, intensifying contest that economic interdependence or diplomatic optimism cannot erase.

Reference:
John J. Mearsheimer (September 2, 2025) - Lecture on the SCO Summit 2025: Why China is acting this way. (video)

 

See also:

Tecnología Futura (August 31, 2025) - China's new weapon that could destroy the US in seconds. (video)
 John J. Mearsheimer (2001) - The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.

Jin Canrong  (September 3, 2025) - China's Preparations for Reunification With Taiwan Around 2027.

Jin Canrong (September 1, 2025) - Hybrid Warfare & Strategic Stalemate in China–US Competition.

TPR (September 01, 2025) - SCO Summit Ushers in New Global Security Order and Development.

Ray Dalio (April 12, 2025) - Don't Think That What's Now Happening Is Mostly About Tariffs. 

Serge Bernard (2015)  - From Conquest to Affluence to Collapse: The 250 Year Empire Life Cycle. 

China's Preparations for Reunification With Taiwan Around 2027 | Jin Canrong

The Chinese government has consistently avoided setting a timetable for resolving the Taiwan question, emphasizing instead President Xi’s call for peaceful reunification with patience, sincerity, and effort. Despite this, American analysts frequently forecast 2027 as the likely point of resolution. Their view is shaped by China’s large strategic reserves, new industrial measures, and visible military procurement, all of which they interpret as signs of preparation for decisive conflict.

Jin Canrong (金灿荣), leading scholar of China–US relations, American politics, and foreign policy;

CCP strategist; Professor and Associate Dean at the School of International Studies, Renmin University of China.

From a military perspective, China faces few obstacles. A Taiwan operation could be carried out through blockade or direct combat, and success would likely come quickly. US intervention is not considered probable, making the true challenges economic and political rather than military or diplomatic. China’s main vulnerabilities are its dependence on imported resources, its lack of a fully unified domestic market, and the influence of elites with assets or family ties abroad. By contrast, Russia’s economy, though smaller, is buffered by its abundant resources, allowing it to withstand sanctions more effectively.

Among many other heads of states, Putin, Kim Jong Un, Park Geun-hye, ex-President of South Korea, and Masoud

Pezeshkian, President of Iran, joined Beijing’s historic victory parade on September 3, marking 80 years since

Japan’s WWII surrender, where China showcased its hypersonic missiles and nuclear triad. 
 

The government is taking steps to address these weaknesses. Grain reserves now exceed two years thanks to improved storage and expanded farmland. By 2027, new oil and gas discoveries together with Central Asian pipelines are expected to reduce import dependence. Coal-to-oil conversion and the spread of new energy vehicles will further narrow the energy gap. The more difficult issue lies in market access, as domestic circulation remains weak due to provincial barriers. Efforts to expand the Belt and Road initiative continue, though China lacks the military and cultural instruments historically used by the West to protect overseas investments.

» US intervention is not considered probable. «

Jin Canrong's complete discourse video.

 

Diplomatically, a resolution of the Taiwan issue would have far-reaching effects. ASEAN countries, seeing the United States as unreliable for security, would likely align with China, turning the South China Sea into an inland sea. Japan and South Korea, highly dependent on maritime trade and external resources, would also face strong pressure to yield. Once the Taiwan Strait and the South and East China Seas are secured, Shanghai and the eastern seaboard would be protected, creating what could be the safest period in Chinese history.

Welcome to the Eurasian Century.

 

Historically, China’s threats came from the north, but industrialization eliminated that danger. Today, the principal threats come from the sea, the heartland of Western industrial power. Once Taiwan is reclaimed and the maritime approaches are secure, China can focus entirely on internal development and raising living standards. The most serious obstacles to this outcome are economic fragility and political complications, not military or diplomatic resistance. The year 2027 therefore stands out as the most likely turning point, a moment that could bring short-term hardship but ultimately mark the beginning of a new and safer era for China.

Reference:
Awakening Richard (September 3, 2025) - Famous Chinese Professor on China's progress regarding war preparation. (video)

 

See also:

Samim Aktar (March 4, 2025) - Trump 2.0 and the China Containment Strategy.

Hybrid Warfare & Strategic Stalemate in China–US Competition | Jin Canrong

Structurally speaking, China–US relations are certainly not good. The logic is quite simple: the world is changing significantly, and China is the variable, while the US is the leader of the original order. Naturally, the US is not pleased. [...] Whether it's Biden or Trump, both consider China their only opponent. This is very critical. America’s power is still greater than ours.

Jin Canrong (金灿荣), leading scholar of China-US relations, American politics, and foreign policy;

CCP strategist; Professor and Associate Dean, School of International Studies, Renmin University of China.

[...] China–US relations entered full competition in late 2017, when the US began to wage a hybrid war against China. It is called a hybrid war because multiple tactics are employed: trade war; industrial war (denying chips and pushing Chinese companies to relocate industries); financial war (aggressive interest rate hikes to extract Chinese capital); legal battles; media campaigns (such as accusations of genocide in Xinjiang); and biological warfare allegations, including SARS and COVID-19 claims.

» Siding with the EU to split the West. «
The China-US Competition, Jin Canrong, August 19, 2025.

[...] There are also sovereignty issues concerning Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the East and South China Seas, as well as opposition to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) through new alliances, like AUKUS (US, UK, Australia) and the Quad (US, India, Australia, Japan).

[...] The first phase involved US offensives and China’s strategic defense; now, we have entered a strategic stalemate. The key to strategic alignment is domestic management. The US faces high debt, declining manufacturing, and internal challenges, while China confronts economic performance issues, social conflicts, and a rapidly falling birth rate. Addressing domestic challenges strengthens both nations’ positions abroad.

[...] The US strategy toward China involves territorial ambitions (Canada, Greenland, Panama Canal), aligning Russia, reorganizing allies (Europe, Japan, Canada), and increasing defense spending to ensure allies can act independently. China, meanwhile, has abandoned its low-profile policy, focusing on active defense and strategic deterrence.

[...] Since last year, China’s defense policy has changed. China has moved from passive strategy to assertive action. Strategic stalemate depends on addressing domestic issues first, then external threats. For external alignment, China should coordinate with the EU to balance the West, manage neighboring relations, and continue Belt and Road and BRICS initiatives. This roughly represents the current positions of both parties.

 

Reference:
Jin Canrong (August 19, 2025) - The China-US Competition.

In 2025 Cuba May Just Collapse Like Syria │ Mikhail Zvinchuk

Since the 1959 revolution, Cuba has relied on foreign aid. Right now, people appreciate help from other countries, but they don’t want to work. They are unwilling to take action. We are talking about a new Cuba—one that is lazy and has no interest in developing itself.

 » It looks like Gaza. «

To illustrate, Cuba now imports almost everything, even sugar. In the last century, Cuba was a major exporter of sugar, but now it depends on imports. The country is unable to maintain or rebuild its electricity system on its own. In 2021, they began a foolish economic reform that failed. Economic conditions are dire. Russia and other countries provide some aid, but the main problem is Cuba itself. The situation there reminds me of Syria right before the fall of Bashar al-Assad. 

 

It is clear that communism in Cuba is not working. When you go to a shop, the shelves are empty. You can find things on the black market for dollars, but in regular shops, there is nothing. While Cuba may have a relatively low crime rate and some degree of safety, it is a poor country, struggling with unreliable electricity and lacking opportunities for social mobility. As a result, many Cubans are still fleeing to Florida. In fact, the flow of migrants to the United States has been steadily increasing over the past decade. If the situation continues, Cuba will eventually end up like Puerto Rico.

 

» Nothing but disgust for the offspring of the Guevara and Castro families. «

If you stand on a high building and look across Havana or any of the major cities, you’ll see decaying, dilapidated buildings falling apart. It’s an insane sight. It looks like Gaza. People often blame the US blockade for this, but at some point, leadership has to come into question. How much of this is due to the blockade, and how much is a result of failed leadership? The problem is poor leadership—they lack the education and skills to properly govern the country.

The country is falling deeper into crisis, and no one seems to know how to fix it. I’ve spoken with many Russian diplomats, and Russia provides humanitarian aid, including oil and gas. However, even our diplomats can’t fill their tanks because the Cuban people expect everything to be handed to them without any effort in return. 

 

» The economic situation will likely cause Cuba to collapse on its own. «

 

If the country were to open its borders and allow for a more open market, there might be hope for improvement. Currently, only the hotel and tourism sectors are allowed some access. But if the country lifted restrictions on the private sector and started working with other countries, there could be a chance to improve the situation. Right now, however, it's a failed social state. The country is clearly collapsing. 

 

Yet, the ruling party elite still posts meme tweets about Trump being a fascist and display LGBT flags at their hotels in Havana. The priorities are completely misaligned. You know who is the main LGBT activist in Cuba? It’s Mariela Castro Espín, the daughter of Raúl Castro. When I spoke to average Cubans, they expressed nothing but disgust and disdain for the offspring of the Guevara and Castro families. They had nothing good to say about them.

Latter-day mission: babble on about feminism, LGBTQ+ rights, trans identities, and—of course—revolution. Priorities.

 

Cuba may fall in 2025. If the US wanted to take Cuba—liberate it from the communist regime, as they might call it—they could do it easily, and quickly. The Cuban people are not like their ancestors from the 1950s—they have changed a lot. It would take significant effort to rebuild the nation.

 

Russian Navy about to lose the haven of another friendly power.

 

Cuba was the last American colony, and now it could become a new American colony. However, Trump is currently focusing on Greenland and Panama, and hasn’t given Cuba much attention. The economic situation, though, will likely cause Cuba to collapse on its own, regardless of Trump’s decisions. Once the humanitarian crisis deepens, the US might intervene as a savior.
 

Quoted from:

Mikhail S. Zvinchuk (January 31, 2025) - The Collapse of Cuba. (video)

 

See also:

Martin Armstrong (April 1, 2025) - Cuba Lost a Quarter of its Population in the Last 4 Years.

The Panama Canal, Greenland, and Trump 2.0 | Andrew Korybko

Trump threatened that the US might retake control of the Panama Canal if it remains under indirect partial Chinese management and continues to charge the US what he described as exorbitant rates for passage. He then posted shortly after that, "For purposes of National Security and Freedom throughout the World, the United States of America feels that the ownership and control of Greenland is an absolute necessity." Both are his for the taking if he really wants them, but it’s unclear whether he does.

 » Available for Trump to claim if he truly desires. «

As regards the Panama Canal, Trump's immediate imperative appears to be rolling back Chinese influence over this crucial waterway, which he seemingly fears could be leveraged by the People's Republic to cut the US off from transoceanic shipment in the event of a crisis over Taiwan. He might also want to coerce Panama into shutting down illegal migrant routes to the US via the Darien Gap. Both are sensible from the perspective of his MAGA worldview that aims to restore the US' unipolar hegemony.

His objectives in Greenland might be similar in the sense of ensuring that Chinese companies don't obtain a monopoly over that island's critical mineral reserves as well as preventing the construction of "dual-use infrastructure" that might one day give Beijing military and intelligence advantages. Direct control over sparsely populated and practically undefended Greenland, which formally remains part of Denmark, is seen as the most effective means to that end.

 

  » A monopoly over the island's critical mineral reserves. «

Trump's threat to the Panama Canal and his claim to Greenland are also likely meant to appeal to his supporters' expectations that he'll "Make America Great Again" in a visible geopolitical way. Even if he doesn't impose formal US control over them, expelling Chinese influence from both and replacing it with US economic influence could be enough to satiate them. This could also solidify his legacy and lay the basis for his successor, who'd probably be JD Vance, to establish formal control sometime later.

 

» Turn Mexico into an economic vassal to replace China in the supply chain. «

Both are Trump's for the taking if he really wants them since neither could meaningfully oppose the US military if he authorizes an invasion. They'd be low-cost operations with high economic and political returns even though they'd occur at the expense of the US' international reputation. The global community would predictably decry them as imperialist invasions, but nobody would stand in the US' way nor sanction it afterwards. The most that might follow is harsh rhetoric, nothing more substantive.

 

Quoted from:

Andrew Korybko (December 23, 2024) - The Panama Canal and Greenland available for Trump to claim if he truly desires them. 

See also:

Lu QiYuan (December 8, 2024) - Scott Bessent's Covert MAGA Strategy for Trump 2.0. 

 Pepe Escobar (November 28, 2024) - Trump’s Coming War on BRICS and the Global South.

TPR (November 15, 2024) - US Greenland 2029: Congressman Collins' Map Rekindles Trump's Dream.

Israel’s Reckless Pager Operation: Who Can We Trust And Rely On? | Shen Yi

I've been studying international relations and politics for decades, and I'm shocked by this pager attack in Lebanon. This is not something a normal country would do; it's way past the moral red line of international norms. What we're looking at is a commercial electronic device, the pager, being modified into a military-style mini-grenade. Even though the operation targets Hezbollah members, the action is equivalent to igniting several cluster bombs in a market populated with Hezbollah members, their families, and other innocent civilians.

 » This is truly evil and shocking ... they've proven themselves willing to do outrageous, immoral things. «

Shen Yi, Director at Research Center for the Governance of Global Cyberspace, Fudan University.

 

The psychological effect of this operation is similar to the earliest Batman movie, where the Joker randomly poisoned hygiene products to create chaos in Gotham City. This isn't even using the pager to collect intel and destroy evidence. This can be considered a mass terrorist operation. It's like putting poison in bottled water and exporting it to your enemy city, expecting enemy soldiers to drink it, and disregarding innocent victims, oh well, sucks to be them.

 » Children lost their eyes while playing in the street. Mothers lost their limbs while shopping in a mall.
Doctors suffered severe injuries while driving to a hospital. This is horror and cruelty beyond imagination. «
China representative to the UN.

Assuming Israel's involvement, considering their current strike against Lebanon, there are two possibilities for this mass bombing. Either the bomb was installed during manufacturing in Taiwan, possibly through a joint operation between Taiwan and Israel, or the middleman modified the device. In China, Jewish people are considered the smartest and most cunning of all the peoples on this planet. Modifying this device into a bomb and activating it in mass volume is truly evil and shocking. However, I also consider this operation stupid and reckless, ignoring consequences and hiding behind the United States. The operation against Iran's nuclear enrichment facility might be within the rules of engagement, but this pager bombing is unacceptable. The United States swapped out hospital devices before the operation, showing awareness. The United States, Israel, and Taiwan governments remain quiet. 

 

How can we trust products from these regions in the future? This has impacted global supply chain trust. China now understands why the US considers Huawei cell phones and network devices national security issues - because they think China is as evil and immoral as they are. The problem isn't technical feasibility; today's technology makes it easy. The problem is who crosses the moral red line. Israel, backed by the United States, has shown willingness to cross it. This is a dangerous psychological barrier. 

 

How will China assure consumers of safety when buying US and Israel products? Shouldn't these products be inspected for tampering, with the US and Israel paying additional costs? This isn't unfair competition; they've proven themselves willing to do outrageous, immoral things. China can't wait until 5,000 Apple cell phones blow up to set up security. Considering the US views China as its biggest rival, China needs its own products, supply chain, communication, and banking systems. It's no longer about Chinese or US-made CPU preferences; it's about foreign entities willing to weaponize devices against you. It's not about faster cell phones; it's about safety. Maybe the quality of some Chinese products still lag behind, but we can tell the world we won't make products that explode intentionally. That should be a new standard. 

 

This chain of events shows that peace, safety, stability, and prosperity - elements of a great society - are rare globally. Many Chinese took these for granted. I believe China should lead promoting peace, growth, and stability around the world.

Quoted from:
Shen Yi (September 21, 2024) - Chinese response to Lebanon Pager Attack. (video)