The new 33-page US National Security Strategy, strongly shaped by Elbridge Colby and personally prefaced by President Trump, represents a partial yet still incomplete departure from three decades of neoconservative pursuit of hegemony. Officially released on December 4, it explicitly
renounces any further quest for global domination, acknowledges that
post-1991 globalism hollowed out American industry while delivering few
benefits to ordinary citizens, and ultimately weakened the United States
itself. It faults an over-reliance on allies and proxies that
Washington could not fully control—pointedly implying Israel and
European-driven adventures in Ukraine—for repeatedly pulling America
into conflicts that did not serve its core interests.
» One of the first formal acknowledgments that American hegemony has irrevocably ended. «
In place of hegemony, the document calls for aggressive domestic reindustrialization, technological supremacy, and a return to traditional spheres-of-influence politics. It resurrects an explicitly imperial interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine, insisting that no external great power may have any presence whatsoever in the Western Hemisphere and that the United States must maintain absolute predominance there. At the same time, it insists that America must remain the world’s foremost military and economic power and must permanently prevent any rival from ever attaining the degree of primacy the United States itself enjoyed in recent decades.
China continues to be treated as the sole peer competitor capable of achieving parity or even supremacy; opposition to Taiwan’s reunification with the mainland remains a clear priority, revealing no substantive softening despite changed rhetoric. Russia, by contrast, is now a power with which the United States must seek accommodation and continental stability. The document is extraordinarily harsh toward European leadership and the European Union, accusing Brussels of delusional thinking on Russia and Ukraine, economic self-destruction, creeping authoritarianism, and the erosion of European civilization itself. Stabilizing Europe, it argues, requires ending the Ukraine war in partnership with the continent’s other great power—Russia.
Alexander Dugin, December 6, 2025.
The new operating model abandons the image of America as a "weary Titan" bearing the world’s burdens alone. Instead, Washington will concentrate on its own hemispheric backyard while outsourcing or franchising security responsibilities elsewhere: Europe is expected to provide for its own defense, Asia will be handled by regional proxies, Africa reduced to transactional resource partnerships, and the Middle East treated as a complicated but no longer central theater. These partners will still answer to the United States and pay their dues, yet day-to-day management becomes their problem.
Historically, this precise pattern—admitting overextension, rejecting free-trade globalism, demanding allied burden-sharing while assuming continued overall control, and invoking the "weary Titan" metaphor—appeared during the terminal phases of both the British Empire under Joseph Chamberlain in the 1890s–1900s and the Spanish Empire under Gaspar de Guzmán, Count-Duke of Olivares in the 17th century. In both cases the reforms were offered as salvation but in reality signaled irreversible imperial decline.
Historically, this precise pattern—admitting overextension, rejecting free-trade globalism, demanding allied burden-sharing while assuming continued overall control, and invoking the "weary Titan" metaphor—appeared during the terminal phases of both the British Empire under Joseph Chamberlain in the 1890s–1900s and the Spanish Empire under Gaspar de Guzmán, Count-Duke of Olivares in the 17th century. In both cases the reforms were offered as salvation but in reality signaled irreversible imperial decline.
» [The Trump administration] resurrects an explicitly imperial interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine. «
The strategy is riddled with contradictions. While calling for stabilization with Russia, Pentagon sources simultaneously press Europe to be combat-ready against Moscow by 2027; Europeans counter that 2030 is more realistic, and Viktor Orbán openly states that the official EU position is preparation for war with Russia by that later date. The unspoken American ultimatum to Europe is therefore: achieve full military self-sufficiency on Washington’s timeline or the United States will negotiate directly with Moscow over Europe’s head and end the Ukraine conflict on Russia’s terms. Given Europe’s incapacity to meet that deadline, the second path becomes the default—yet powerful entrenched forces in Washington, Brussels, and the broader transatlantic apparatus remain committed to perpetual confrontation with Russia and containment of Russia.
The document is ultimately a fragile compromise between a small restraint-oriented faction and the far larger interventionist bureaucracy. History suggests the bureaucracy will prevail, just as it defeated Chamberlain and Olivares. Moscow and Beijing instantly recognize the contradiction of a United States that urges its vassals to keep fighting while posing as the reasonable party seeking stability; they will not be deceived. Russia, in particular, reads the American declaration that peace in Ukraine and stabilized relations with Moscow are now core US interests as confirmation that time is on its side, that it can stand firm on all demands, and that Washington will eventually concede because it is the United States, not Russia, that now needs the war to end.
Thus, while the 2025 National Security Strategy marks the intellectual arrival of restraint-oriented thinking inside parts of the American national-security establishment and constitutes an official admission that the unipolar era is over, its internal contradictions and the entrenched power of the old order make it unlikely to survive in anything like its present form. Like its British and Spanish predecessors, it may ultimately be remembered less as the blueprint for managed retrenchment than as one of the first formal acknowledgments that American hegemony has irrevocably ended.
The document is ultimately a fragile compromise between a small restraint-oriented faction and the far larger interventionist bureaucracy. History suggests the bureaucracy will prevail, just as it defeated Chamberlain and Olivares. Moscow and Beijing instantly recognize the contradiction of a United States that urges its vassals to keep fighting while posing as the reasonable party seeking stability; they will not be deceived. Russia, in particular, reads the American declaration that peace in Ukraine and stabilized relations with Moscow are now core US interests as confirmation that time is on its side, that it can stand firm on all demands, and that Washington will eventually concede because it is the United States, not Russia, that now needs the war to end.
Thus, while the 2025 National Security Strategy marks the intellectual arrival of restraint-oriented thinking inside parts of the American national-security establishment and constitutes an official admission that the unipolar era is over, its internal contradictions and the entrenched power of the old order make it unlikely to survive in anything like its present form. Like its British and Spanish predecessors, it may ultimately be remembered less as the blueprint for managed retrenchment than as one of the first formal acknowledgments that American hegemony has irrevocably ended.
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