On the Price of Russian Oil | Igor Sechin

The EU will no longer set prices for Russia’s flagship Urals oil blend, now that Asia is the largest consumer of western-sanctioned Russian crude, the head of the country’s oil major Rosneft, Igor Sechin, said on Monday.

An EU embargo on seaborne exports of crude accompanied by price caps on oil and petroleum products originating from Russia has triggered a reshuffle in global oil supply. In a matter of months, Moscow rerouted most of its oil flows that used to go to Europe, to Asian markets. The country has ramped up its seaborne oil shipments to China, India and Türkiye at the expense of Western nations.

 

Oil exports to India alone jumped 33 times in December, with Russia now the country’s largest supplier, replacing Iraq. About 70% of Urals cargoes loaded last month went to New Delhi, according to Reuters calculations.

“If Russian oil does not enter the European market, then there is no reference price. Reference prices will be formed where oil volumes actually go,” Sechin pointed out, speaking at the India Energy Week forum.

The Russian government is now discussing how to calculate Russia's taxable oil price following the import ban and price caps set by the EU and G7 countries. Currently, for tax purposes, the average price for Urals on the world market is used, in particular in the ports of Augusta (Italy) and Rotterdam (Netherlands). But due to sanctions, Russian oil is practically not supplied there. Sechin also suggested that “futures contracts, futures settlements” should be abandoned at the first stage in order to regulate market indicators. To stress his point, the head of Russia’s oil giant even quoted from the Bible. “As it is written in Ecclesiastes, "What is crooked cannot be made straight. And what is lacking cannot be counted.”

Meanwhile, Asian buyers have ramped up imports of a wide variety of Russian crude oil, including lesser-known Arctic grades. Two other popular blends, ESPO and Sokol, have been trading above the Western price ceiling of $60 a barrel, at $66 and $71 per barrel respectively, as of Tuesday.

 

Quoted from:

RT.com (Feb 07, 2023) - EU no longer dictates price for Russian oil – Rosneft CEO.

 

See also:

Rosneft.com (Feb 06, 2023) - Rosneft Board of Directors. 

Igor Sechin (2018) - Greater Eurasia: Russia’s New Energy Gamble.

 

Greater Eurasia | Russia’s New Energy Gamble

Bruno Maçães (Apr 2018) - In October 2017, Rosneft Chief Executive Officer Igor Sechin took the unusual step of presenting a geopolitical report on the “Ideals of Eurasian integration” to an audience in Verona, Italy. One of the maps projected on the screen during the presentation (HERE) showed the supercontinent—what Russian circles call “Greater Eurasia”—as divided between three main regions. For Sechin, the crucial division is not between Europe and Asia, but between regions of energy consumption and regions of energy production. The former are organized on the western and eastern edges of the supercontinent: Europe, including Turkey, and the Asia Pacific, including India. 

Between them we find three regions of energy production: Russia and the Arctic, the Caspian, and the Middle East. Interestingly, the map does not break these three regions apart, preferring to draw a delimitation line around all three. They are contiguous, thus forming a single bloc, at least from a purely geographic perspective. 

Sechin’s map has a number of other interesting elements. As noted already, Turkey is left on the European side of the line delimiting the energy production core in the west. The same is true for Ukraine, which although unavoidable in this context is still an unusual inclusion in a map sanctioned by the highest echelons of Russian state power. If one looks at the world through the prism of energy geopolitics, then Ukraine is a European country—a consumer, not a producer. 

[...] The map illustrates an important point about Russia’s new self-image. From the point of view of energy geopolitics, Europe and the Asia Pacific are perfectly equivalent, providing alternative sources of demand for energy resources. Russia has been struggling to abandon its traditional orientation toward Europe, hoping to benefit from the flexibility of being able to look both east and west to promote its interests. It seems that Sechin and Rosneft can place themselves in that position much more effortlessly. 

Sechin’s map subtly makes one final—and decisive—point. As you consider the three areas it delimits, it becomes apparent that two of them are already led and organized by a leading actor: Germany in the case of Europe and China for the Asia Pacific. Production chains within these highly industrial regions are increasingly managed by German or Chinese companies, which tend to reserve the higher value segments for themselves. Their spheres of influence extend to all important inputs, with one glaring exception: energy. In order to address this vulnerability, the two regions of energy consumption will be attracted to the core region, where they need to ensure ready and secure access to energy resources. And their efforts may well be made easier by the fact that the core region of energy production lacks a hegemon capable of ensuring its survival as an autonomous unit in the Eurasian system.

The very same day he delivered his speech on Eurasian geopolitics, Sechin announced that Rosneft would take control of Iraqi Kurdistan’s main oil pipeline, boosting its investment in the autonomous region to $3.5 billion, despite Baghdad’s military action sparked by a Kurdish vote for independence. The move helped shield Kurdistan from increasing pressure from Baghdad. Two weeks later, Sechin went on to sign a preliminary pact with the National Iranian Oil Company, the first step before a binding deal to participate in Iran’s oil and gas projects over the next few years, with investments totaling up to $30 billion and a production plateau of 55 million tons of oil per year.

Four Russian oil companies have even begun negotiating for opportunities in Syria, a venture driven as much by politics as by commercial interest. The aim is not to explore and extract Syria’s modest petroleum reserves, of course. By actively participating in rebuilding and operating Syrian oil and gas infrastructure, Russian energy companies will be in control of a critical transit route for Iranian and Qatari oil and gas heading to Europe, bringing two rival producers closer to its orbit and tightening its stranglehold on the European gas supply. In 2009, Qatar proposed to run a natural gas pipeline through Syria and Turkey to Europe. Instead, Al-Assad forged a pact with Iran to build a pipeline from the Persian Gulf and then through Iraq and Syria and under the Mediterranean. This project had to be postponed because of the war. When it is resumed, Russia will be in control.

It is in the very nature of the Eurasian system described by Sechin that the core energy production region—provided it is sufficiently united and organized—will benefit from its central position, being able to pick and choose between east and west in order to obtain the most favorable terms. Russia and the Middle East are now part of the same geopolitical unit. It took the Russian military intervention in Syria for the world to start to come to terms with this reality.