Western Europe could become the new Ukraine | Timofey Bordachev

The real causes of major armed conflicts such as world wars are always linked to socio-economic factors. For the naturally cautious German nation to become a bunch of cannibals, it first had to sink into the economic misery and moral oppression of the 1920s. Before that, demographic growth and the unresolved social problems of industrialization created the necessary mass of people willing to kill and die on the fields of the First World War.

 

 » Both the Minister for Economic Affairs and the Minister of Finance have come to the conclusion

that Germany is no longer sufficiently competitive. It is inconceivable that this will not lead to political changes. «
Christian Lindner, German Minister of Finance, Feb 12, 2024.

In any case, any great aggression against neighbors has required a very large number of poor and morally degenerate people. This is roughly what happened to Ukraine during the 30 years of its failed statehood. In other words, the ability of the Western Europeans to unleash armed aggression against us depends on how their own affairs are going.

This is why, from the Russian point of view, it is now of the utmost importance to observe what is happening in the Western European economies. The irrational policy of sanctions against Russia and the partial breakdown of trade and economic relations between us have already led to serious losses for their business sectors. Added to this are the accumulated domestic problems, competition from American and Chinese companies, and the general recession in the global economy.

 

» Ukraine must win this war. If Putin had his way, this would only be the beginning. « 

 Boris Pistorius, German Defence Minister, Feb 18, 2023.

 

For example, one of the Western news agencies recently published a story about how large manufacturing companies, industry leaders, are leaving Germany in search of more favorable locations and investment conditions. Other major Western European states are going through their own worrying processes. If these economic difficulties begin to erode the established model, the mood of the citizenry may change.

We do not know exactly how Western Europeans will react to the deterioration of their material situation and how long it will take. It is quite likely that the world will not see the practical consequences of this economic decline for another 20-30 years. What is more, we cannot say with certainty that the behavioral algorithms of its inhabitants will be exactly the same as in the first half of the 20th century. History does not repeat itself, which makes thinking about events by analogy a rather dead-end way of understanding what is happening.

Quoted from:
Timofey Bordachev (Feb 15, 2024) - Could Europe become the new Ukraine?

Crush Europe and Strengthen the US | RAND Corporation

January 25, 2022 

Confidential

Distribution: WHCS, ANSA, Dept. of State, CIA, NSA, DNC 

 

Executive Summary

[...] The current German economic model is based on two pillars. These are unlimited access to cheap Russian energy resources and to cheap French electric power, thanks to the operation of nuclear power plants. The importance of the first factor is considerably higher. Halting Russian supplies can well create a systemic crisis that would be devastating for the German economy and, indirectly, for the entire European Union. The French energy sector could also soon begin to experience heavy problems. The predictable stop of Russian-controlled nuclear fuel supplies, combined with the unstable situation in the Sahel region, would make French energy sector critically dependent on Australian and Canadian fuel.

 

"A reduction in Russian energy supplies - ideally, a complete halt of such supplies -
would lead to disastrous outcomes for German industry." - RAND Corporation, Jan 25, 2022.

 

[...] The only feasible way to guarantee Germany's rejection of Russian energy supplies is to involve both sides in the military conflict in Ukraine. Our further actions in this country will inevitably lead to a military response from Russia. Russians will obviously not be able to leave unanswered the massive Ukrainian army pressure on the unrecognized Donbas republics. That would make possible to declare Russia an aggressor and apply to it the entire package of sanctions prepared beforehand. Putin may in turn decide to impose limited counter-sanctions - primarily on Russian energy supplies to Europe. Thus, the damage to the EU countries will be quite comparable to the one to the Russians, and in some countries - primarily in Germany - it will be higher.

 

The prerequisite for Germany to fall into this trap is the leading role of green parties and ideology in Europe. The German Greens are a strongly dogmatic, if not zealous, movement, which makes it quite easy to make them ignore economic arguments. In this respect, the German Greens somewhat exceed their counterparts in the rest of Europe. Personal features and the lack of professionalism of their leaders - primarily Annalena Baerbock and Robert Habeck - permit to presume that it is next to impossible for them to admit their own mistakes in a timely manner.

 

Thus, it will be enough to quickly form the media image of Putin’s aggressive war to turn the Greens into ardent and hardline supporters of sanctions, a ‘party of war’. It will enable the sanctions regime to be introduced without any obstacles. The lack of professionalism of the current leaders will not allow a setback in the future, even when the negative impact of the chosen policy becomes obvious enough [...] This will ensure a sufficiently long gap in cooperation between Germany and Russia, which will make large German economic operators uncompetitive.

"The prerequisite for Germany to fall into this trap is the leading role of the German Greens."

[...] A reduction in Russian energy supplies - ideally, a complete halt of such supplies - would lead to disastrous outcomes for German industry. The need to divert significant amounts of Russian gas for winter heating of residential and public facilities will further exacerbate the shortages [...] A complete standstill at the largest in the chemical, metallurgical, and machine-building, plants is likely, while they have virtually no spare capacity to reduce energy consumption. It could lead to the shutting down of continuous-cycle enterprises, which would mean their destruction.

The cumulative losses of the German economy can be estimated only approximately. Even if the restriction of Russian supplies is limited to 2022, its consequences will last for several years, and the total losses could reach 200-300 billion euros. Not only will it deliver a devastating blow to the German economy, but the entire EU economy will inevitably collapse. We are talking not about a decline in economy growth pace, but about a sustained recession and a decline in GDP only in material production by 3-4% per year for the next 5-6 years. Such a fall will inevitably cause panic in the financial markets and may bring them to a collapse.

The euro will inevitably, and most likely irreversibly, fall below the dollar. A sharp fall of the euro will consequently cause its global sale. It will become a toxic currency, and all countries in the world will rapidly reduce its share in their forex reserves. This gap will be primarily filled with dollar and yuan.

 

NATO's purpose is "keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down",
as Lord Hastings Lionel Ismay, NATO's first Secretary General, put it.

Another inevitable consequence of a prolonged economic recession will be a sharp drop in living standards and rising unemployment (up to 200,000-400,000 in Germany alone), which will entail the exodus of skilled labour and well-educated young people. There are literally no other destinations for such migration other than the United States today. A somewhat smaller, but also quite significant flow of migrants can be expected from other EU countries.

 

Since 1871 the prime U.S. geopolitical foreign policy doctrine for Europe is:
"Keep Germany and Russia separate and in conflict."
Or as Victoria Nuland put it in 2014: "Fuck the EU!"

The scenario under consideration will thus serve to strengthen the national financial condition both indirectly and most directly. In the short term, it will reverse the trend of the looming, economic recession and, in addition, consolidate American society by distracting it from immediate economic concerns. This, in turn, will reduce electoral risks.

In the medium term (4-5 years), the cumulative benefits of capital flight, re-oriented logistical flows and reduced competition in major industries may amount to USD 7-9 trillion. Unfortunately, China is also expected to benefit over the medium term from this emerging scenario. At the same time, Europe's deep political dependence on the U.S. allows us to effectively neutralise possible attempts by individual European states to draw closer to China [...]

Quoted from:
RAND Corporation (Jan 25, 2022) - Executive Summary: Weakening Germany, Strengthening the U.S.

See also:

Hans-Benjamin Braun (Apr 07, 2023) - Nord Stream Pipeline Blast by US-Nuke. 

Michel Chossudovsky (Aug 30, 2023) - Niger’s Military Junta is Supported by the Pentagon.

Washington’s Unspoken Objective: “Remove France from Africa”.

Max Blumenthal & Aaron Maté (2023) - German Greens, the world's most hypocritical party? (video)

 Bruno Maçães (2018) - Greater Eurasia: Russia’s New Energy Gamble.

Greater Eurasia | Russia’s New Energy Gamble

Bruno Maçães (Apr 2018) - In October 2017, Rosneft Chief Executive Officer Igor Sechin took the unusual step of presenting a geopolitical report on the “Ideals of Eurasian integration” to an audience in Verona, Italy. One of the maps projected on the screen during the presentation (HERE) showed the supercontinent—what Russian circles call “Greater Eurasia”—as divided between three main regions. For Sechin, the crucial division is not between Europe and Asia, but between regions of energy consumption and regions of energy production. The former are organized on the western and eastern edges of the supercontinent: Europe, including Turkey, and the Asia Pacific, including India. 

Between them we find three regions of energy production: Russia and the Arctic, the Caspian, and the Middle East. Interestingly, the map does not break these three regions apart, preferring to draw a delimitation line around all three. They are contiguous, thus forming a single bloc, at least from a purely geographic perspective. 

Sechin’s map has a number of other interesting elements. As noted already, Turkey is left on the European side of the line delimiting the energy production core in the west. The same is true for Ukraine, which although unavoidable in this context is still an unusual inclusion in a map sanctioned by the highest echelons of Russian state power. If one looks at the world through the prism of energy geopolitics, then Ukraine is a European country—a consumer, not a producer. 

[...] The map illustrates an important point about Russia’s new self-image. From the point of view of energy geopolitics, Europe and the Asia Pacific are perfectly equivalent, providing alternative sources of demand for energy resources. Russia has been struggling to abandon its traditional orientation toward Europe, hoping to benefit from the flexibility of being able to look both east and west to promote its interests. It seems that Sechin and Rosneft can place themselves in that position much more effortlessly. 

Sechin’s map subtly makes one final—and decisive—point. As you consider the three areas it delimits, it becomes apparent that two of them are already led and organized by a leading actor: Germany in the case of Europe and China for the Asia Pacific. Production chains within these highly industrial regions are increasingly managed by German or Chinese companies, which tend to reserve the higher value segments for themselves. Their spheres of influence extend to all important inputs, with one glaring exception: energy. In order to address this vulnerability, the two regions of energy consumption will be attracted to the core region, where they need to ensure ready and secure access to energy resources. And their efforts may well be made easier by the fact that the core region of energy production lacks a hegemon capable of ensuring its survival as an autonomous unit in the Eurasian system.

The very same day he delivered his speech on Eurasian geopolitics, Sechin announced that Rosneft would take control of Iraqi Kurdistan’s main oil pipeline, boosting its investment in the autonomous region to $3.5 billion, despite Baghdad’s military action sparked by a Kurdish vote for independence. The move helped shield Kurdistan from increasing pressure from Baghdad. Two weeks later, Sechin went on to sign a preliminary pact with the National Iranian Oil Company, the first step before a binding deal to participate in Iran’s oil and gas projects over the next few years, with investments totaling up to $30 billion and a production plateau of 55 million tons of oil per year.

Four Russian oil companies have even begun negotiating for opportunities in Syria, a venture driven as much by politics as by commercial interest. The aim is not to explore and extract Syria’s modest petroleum reserves, of course. By actively participating in rebuilding and operating Syrian oil and gas infrastructure, Russian energy companies will be in control of a critical transit route for Iranian and Qatari oil and gas heading to Europe, bringing two rival producers closer to its orbit and tightening its stranglehold on the European gas supply. In 2009, Qatar proposed to run a natural gas pipeline through Syria and Turkey to Europe. Instead, Al-Assad forged a pact with Iran to build a pipeline from the Persian Gulf and then through Iraq and Syria and under the Mediterranean. This project had to be postponed because of the war. When it is resumed, Russia will be in control.

It is in the very nature of the Eurasian system described by Sechin that the core energy production region—provided it is sufficiently united and organized—will benefit from its central position, being able to pick and choose between east and west in order to obtain the most favorable terms. Russia and the Middle East are now part of the same geopolitical unit. It took the Russian military intervention in Syria for the world to start to come to terms with this reality.

Energy War over Syria │ The Geopolitics of Oil and Gas Pipelines

Major Planned Pipelines - Enlarge

The war on Syria is only unclear at first sight. On closer inspection, it becomes clear that fighting between mercenaries and government forces takes place only where important pipelines are running or planned. 

Russia, the Western powers and the Gulf States are fighting for the best starting position for gas and oil supplies for the European market. France, the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia and the United States, in particular, are interfering in the distribution struggle without any reference to international law, while Russia's support to the legal Syrian government is fully in line with international law.  

Two of the most important oil markets are located in the Syrian cities of Manbij and al-Bab, both of which are located in the Aleppo province. These two cities are also the most important pipeline, the oil from Iraq - from Mosul and al-Qaim - transported to Syria as far as the province of Idlib. 

Territorial Control - Enlarge

The same Pipeline runs through the city of Aleppo to the oil market in Idlib. Whoever controls Manbid, has a great influence on the oil transport in Syria. The same applies to Aleppo, Idlib and al-Bab in the west of the country. In the east of the country the same oil transport line runs through Raqqa and Deir Ezzor. The oil that flows through this transport line comes from Mosul, via Sinjar to Deir Ezzor and a second strand from al-Qaim to Deir Ezzor. So far, Turkey has had no influence on the oil transport lines in the Syrian conflict. Through the capture of Manbidz, Turkey could assert its influence on the transport system in Syria. The current battle for Aleppo is called only from a basic decision-making battle: Aleppo is the last big city through which flows the country's most important transport line. Anyone who controls Aleppo controls the "key" of the pipeline. It is striking that the conflicts between the conflict parties take place, in particular, on the most important points of the transport lines: Raqqa, Deir Ezzor, Aleppo, Idlib, Manbidsch, Hasaka, al-Bukamal, Ain Issa and al-Bab. In Homs and Hama also violent battles take place. Previously, Palmyra was fiercely fought. These, in turn, are the areas through which the Qatar-Turkey pipeline is planned. The Iran-Iraq-Syria pipeline supported and planned by the Russians should also be run by Homs. That is why Homs from the Russian point of view cannot be controlled by the Islamic mercenaries. 

The fog of war and the realm of uncertainty:
Russian and US Airstrikes - Enlarge

From the map of the air strikes, it is clear that the US airspace mainly focuses on the East and the Russian air strikes, especially on the west of Syria. While the control of West Syria is important to the Russians to prevent pro-Western pipelines, it is important from the US point of view that the prospect of pro-Russian pipelines - like the Iran-Iraq-Syria pipeline - to prevent.

Another planned pipeline was originally to go from the Israeli Golan Heights via Damascus to Turkey. This pipeline would allow Israel to emerge as a gas supplier, provided the government is overthrown in Damascus. But Russia does not want any competitors in the gas market.

In connection with the pipeline routes, the planned "Kurdish corridor" is also critical. The Caucasus Strategic Research Center (KAFKASSAM) in Ankara reports: "The real objective of this corridor is to transport the Kurdish oil and gas from the Northern Iraq over Northern Syria to the Mediterranean by pipeline there. In addition, the US had planned to build another pipeline from the Persian Gulf to the Northern Iraq and from there via Northern Syria. Thus, both Iraq and Turkey should be brought to the West and especially to Europe on the energy market through both Turkey and Northern Syria. But the plan to found a Kurdish corridor fell into the water because the Russians intervened in Syria. Russia is opposed to this corridor because Europe is to be maintained as a customer of Russian energy carriers. Russia will under no circumstances give up its position on the European market." See also HERE + HERE + HERE + HERE

War as the continuation of politics and economic interest by other means.

The Qatar - Turkey Pipeline Conspiracy | Hillary Clinton's Axis of Evil

Is the fight over a gas pipeline fuelling
the world’s bloodiest conflict? HERE + HERE

Global Oil and Gas Exploration and Development | US + CAN in Free Fall

Enlarge

The Baker Hughes International Rotary Rig Count is a monthly census of active drilling rigs exploring for or developing oil or natural gas outside North America (U.S. and Canada). The count does not include rigs drilling in Russia, the Caspian region, Iran, Sudan, Cuba, North Korea or onshore China. Iraq was excluded from the International Rotary Rig Count for the period September 1990 to May 2012. Syria is currently excluded from the International Rotary Rig Count as of February 2012 due to difficulty obtaining data as a result of continued civil unrest.

The international rig count for April 2016 was 946, down 39 from the 985 counted in March 2016 , and down 256 from the 1,202 counted in April 2015 . The international offshore rig count for April 2016 was 220, up 9 from the 211 counted in March 2016 , and down 80 from the 300 counted in April 2015 .

The average U.S. rig count for April 2016 was 437, down 41 from the 478 counted in March 2016 , and down 539 from the 976 counted in April 2015. In late May only 404 rigs were left in operation in the U.S.. The average Canadian rig count for April 2016 was 41, down 47 from the 88 counted in March 2016 , and down 49 from the 90 counted in April 2015 . The worldwide rig count for April 2016 was 1,424, down 127 from the 1,551 counted in March 2016 , and down 844 from the 2,268 counted in April 2015 .

The Origin And Natural Abundance Of Hydrocarbons

“The suggestion that petroleum might have arisen
from some transformation of squashed fish or
biological detritus is surely the silliest notion
to have been entertained by substantial numbers
of persons over an extended period of time.”
Sir Fred Hoyle, 1982

Since 150 years modern industrial civilization entirely rests upon the permanent and sufficient availability of hydrocarbons for fuel, power generation and the chemical transformation into an endless array of indispensable synthetical products. Yet, amazingly, there still coexist two opposing and politically very controversial theories on the origin of hydrocarbons such as petroleum, natural gas or black coal: the biogenic theory (Western School) and the abiogenic theory (Russian-Ukrainian School). The biogenic theory suggests that remnants of buried plants and animals somehow converted into hydrocarbons, and therefore crude oil, coal and natural gas were to be considered scarce, finite and hence expensive 'fossil fuels'. This view of course was always dear to Big Oil and in line with M. King Hubbert's malthusian-quack “peak oil” theory, forecasting the nearby exhaust and collapse of crude supplies ever since the 1950s. Meanwhile the abiogenic theory explains that deep deposits of primordial hydrocarbons were trapped during the formation of our planet, and hydrocarbon molecules (mostly methane) constantly migrate from the mantle to the crust. The element carbon is the fourth in order of abundance in the universe, preceded only by hydrogen, helium and oxygen. Therefore methane and other hydrocarbons are found not only on Earth but basically everywhere in our solar system and beyond: on Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus, Neptune, Pluto and their moons as well as on Comet Halley, Comet Hyakutake, on cosmic dust, in nebulae and interstellar gas.

Prof. Nikolai Alexandrovitch Kudryavtsev (1893 - 1971)

The Russian geologist Nikolai Alexandrovitch Kudryavtsev was the first proponent of the modern theory of abiotic oil. In 1951 he argued that no petroleum resembling the chemical composition of natural crudes has ever been made from plant material in the laboratory under conditions resembling those in nature. He analyzed the geology of the Athabasca bituminous sands in Alberta, Canada, and concluded that no organic débris could have formed that huge volume of oil. The most plausible explanation was that oil is abiogenic, inorganic and it comes through faults from deep inside the Earth. Kudryavtsev's Rule states that "any region in which hydrocarbons are found at one level will also have hydrocarbons in large or small quantities at all levels down to and into the basement rock. Thus, where oil and gas deposits are found, there will often be coal seams above them. Gas is usually the deepest in the pattern, and can alternate with oil. All petroleum deposits have a capstone [or permafrost soils and ice], which is generally impermeable to the upward migration of hydrocarbons. This capstone leads to the accumulation of the hydrocarbon." He gave many examples of substantial quantities of petroleum being found in crystalline or metamorphic basements, or in sediments directly overlying those. Developing this approach, exploration companies like Rosneft, Exxonmobil and Tullow Oil are quite successful.

Mud volcano on Malan Island, emerged in 2011 in Balochistan,
Pakistan, producing methane, ethane, propane and butane.

Outside the Soviet Union the Austrian-American astrophysicist Thomas Gold (1920 - 2004) was the most prominent proponent of the abiogenic theory. His Deep Hot Biosphere Theory and the Deep-Earth Gas Theory propose that crude oil and natural gas are primordial materials, formed deep inside the Earth as well as in other planets. The rise of methane, sometimes along with helium and nitrogen, act as carrier gases, bring together heavier hydrocarbons and reach shallower areas in the crust, where deep microbial life interact with the hydrocarbons and contaminates the primordial oil. Natural oil and gas seeps are found worldwide, e.g. in the Black Sea, the Caspian Sea, and in the Gulf of Mexico, where more than 600 natural seeps leak one to five million barrels of oil per year. Ships and aircrafts disappear in the Bermuda Triangle due to the presence of large fields of methane hydrates, underwater gas seeps and gas eruptions. Refilling is a common phenomenon in oil and gas fields throughout the Middle East, Indonesia, on Eugene Island (Alaska), in the Gulf of Mexico, the Prudhoe Basin, Russia's Romashkinokoye supergiant oilfield, and many others. Enormous amounts of methane hydrate have been found beneath Arctic permafrost, beneath Antarctic ice and in sedimentary deposits along continental margins worldwide. In some parts they are much closer to high-population areas than any natural gas field, and might allow countries currently importing natural gas to become self-sufficient. The United States, Canada, Germany, Japan and India all have vigorous research programs working to discover viable technologies for producing gas hydrates.

From the analysis of a ketchup stain on a tie can not
be concluded that the tie would be made ​​from tomatoes. 
(HERE)

Natural Gas

In December 2005 Natural Gas traded at USD 15.78, and is now at its 17-year low at USD 1.79.
Natural Gas has been in a downtrend over the last two years and lost 73% of its value.
The average seasonal low should print in the first week of January January 2016.
The 4 Lunar Month cycle projects lows for Dec 20 (Sun), Dec 29 (Fri), and Jan 5 (Tue).

U.S. Energy Consumption since 1776

Credits: EIA