Showing posts with label Commodity Supercycle. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Commodity Supercycle. Show all posts

Wednesday, October 15, 2025

Gold Production Mirrors the Long Wave, It Doesn’t Drive It | Nikolai Kondratieff

As regards the opening-up of new countries for the world economy, it seems to be quite obvious that this cannot be considered an outside factor which will satisfactorily explain the origin of long waves. The United States have been known for a relatively very long time; for some reason or other they begin to be entangled in the world economy on a major scale only from the middle of the nineteenth century. Likewise, the Argentine and Canada, Australia and New Zealand, were discovered long before the end of the nineteenth century, although they begin to be entwined in the world economy to a significant extent only with the coming of the 1890’s. 
 
Second Transvaal Gold Rush: Miners of the Republic Gold Mining Company, De Kaap Valley, Eastern Transvaal gold fields, South Africa, 1888.
» We know that commodity prices reach their lowest level toward the end of a long wave. This means
that at this time gold has its highest purchasing power, and gold production becomes most favorable. «
Second Transvaal Gold Rush: Miners of the Republic Gold Mining Company,
De Kaap Valley, Eastern Transvaal gold fields, South Africa, 1888.
 
It is perfectly clear historically that, in the capitalistic economic system, new regions are opened for commerce during those periods in which the desire of old countries for new markets and new sources of raw materials becomes more urgent than theretofore. It is equally apparent that the limits of this expansion of the world economy are determined by the degree of this urgency. If this be true, then the opening of new countries does not provoke the upswing of a long wave. On the contrary, a new upswing makes the exploitation of new countries, new markets, and new sources of raw materials necessary and possible, in that it accelerates the pace of capitalistic economic development.

There remains the question whether the discovery of new gold mines, the increase in gold production, and a consequent increase in the gold stock can be regarded as a casual, outside factor causing the long waves. An increase in gold production leads ultimately to a rise in prices and to a quickening in the tempo of economic life. But this does not mean that the changes in gold production are of a casual, outside character and that the waves in prices and in economic life are likewise caused by chance. We consider this to be not only unproved but positively wrong. 
 
California Gold Rush (1848–1855): Over 300,000 settlers flooded newly conquered Mexican territory, seizing lands of 70 indigenous peoples and carrying out California Genocide.
 » An increase in gold production leads ultimately to a rise in prices. «
California Gold Rush (1848–1855): Over 300,000 settlers flooded newly conquered Mexican
territory, seizing lands of 70 indigenous peoples and carrying out the California Genocide.
 
This contention originates from the belief, first, that the discovery of gold mines and the perfection of the technique of gold production are accidental and, secondly, that every discovery of new gold mines and of technical inventions in the sphere of gold production brings about an increase in the latter. However great may be the creative element in these technical inventions and the significance of chance in these discoveries, yet they are not entirely accidental. Still less accidental—and this is the main point—are the fluctuations in gold production itself. 
 
These fluctuations are by no means simply a function of the activity of inventors and of the discoveries of new gold mines. On the contrary, the intensity of inventors’ and explorers’ activity and the application of technical improvement in the sphere of gold production, as well as the resulting increase of the latter, depend upon other, more general causes. The dependence of gold production upon technical inventions and discoveries of new gold mines is only secondary and derived.

Grasberg Mine, operated by PT Freeport Indonesia, is one of the largest global gold and copper reserves, producing 1.7M oz gold, 6M oz silver, and 1.5B lbs copper in 2023.
» 
Although gold is a generally recognized embodiment of value, it is only a commodity. «
Grasberg Mine, operated by PT Freeport Indonesia, is one of the largest global gold
and copper reserves, producing 1.7M oz gold, 6M oz silver, and 1.5B lbs copper in 2023.
 
Although gold is a generally recognized embodiment of value and, therefore, is generally desired, it is only a commodity. And like every commodity it has a cost of production. But if this be true, then gold production—even in newly discovered mines—can increase significantly only if it becomes more profitable, i.e., if the relation of the value of the gold itself to its cost of production (and this is ultimately the prices of other commodities) becomes more favorable. If this relation is unfavorable, even gold mines the richness of which is by no means yet exhausted may be shut down; if it is favorable, on the other hand, even relatively poor mines will be exploited.

When is the relation of the value of gold to that of other commodities most favorable for gold production? We know that commodity prices reach their lowest level toward the end of a long wave. This means that at this time gold has its highest purchasing power, and gold production becomes most favorable. This can be illustrated by the figures in Table 2.

Table 2.— Selected Statistics of Gold Mining in the Transvaal, 1890–1913.
Table 2.— Selected Statistics of Gold Mining in the Transvaal, 1890–1913.


Gold production, as can be seen from these figures, becomes more profitable as we approach a low point in the price level and a high point in the purchasing power of gold (1895 and the following years). It is clear, furthermore, that the stimulus to increased gold production necessarily becomes stronger the further a long wave declines. We, therefore, can suppose theoretically that gold production must in general increase most markedly when the wave falls most sharply, and vice versa.

Wangu Gold Deposit, 2024: China discovered one of the world’s largest gold deposit in Hunan, with over 1,000 tons valued at $83B, located 19 kilometers underground.
» Gold production must in general increase most markedly when the wave falls most sharply, and vice versa. «
Wangu Gold Deposit, 2024: China discovered one of the world’s largest gold deposit
in Hunan, with over 1,000 tons valued at $83B, located 19 kilometers underground.
 
In reality, however, the connection is not as simple as this but becomes more complicated, mainly just because of the effect of the changes in the technique of gold production and the discovery of new mines. It seems to us, indeed, that even improvements in technique and new gold discoveries obey the same fundamental law as does gold production itself, with more or less regularity in timing. Improvements in the technique of gold production and the discovery of new gold mines actually do bring about a lowering in the cost of production of gold; they influence the relation of these costs to the value of gold, and consequently the extent of gold production. 
 
Kumtor Gold Mine, Kyrgyzstan, 2025: Nationalized in 2021, Kumtor, one of Central Asia’s largest gold reserves,  begins underground mining, projected to add 147 metric tons of gold to state reserves over 17 years.
» Improvements in the technique of gold production actually do bring about a lowering in the cost of production of gold. «
Kumtor Gold Mine, Kyrgyzstan, 2025: Nationalized in 2021, one of Central Asia’s largest gold reserves, 
began underground mining, projected to add 147 metric tons of gold to state reserves over 17 years.
 
But then it is obvious that exactly at the time when the relation of the value of gold to its cost becomes more unfavorable than theretofore, the need for technical improvements in gold mining and for the discovery of new mines necessarily becomes more urgent and thus stimulates research in this field. 
 
Muruntau Gold Mine, Uzbekistan, 2025: Holds the world’s largest gold reserves, one of the largest open-pit gold mines, ranks second in global production, producing 2M+ oz annually, expected to operate for decades.
» Gold production is subordinate to the rhythm of the long waves. «
Muruntau Gold Mine, Uzbekistan, 2025: Holds the world’s largest gold reserves, one of the largest open-pit
gold mines, ranks second in global production, producing 2M+ oz annually, expected to operate for decades.
 
There is, of course, a time-lag, until this urgent necessity, though already recognized, leads to positive success. In reality, therefore, gold discoveries and technical improvements in gold mining will reach their peak only when the long wave has already passed its peak, i.e., perhaps in the middle of the downswing. The available facts confirm this supposition. In the period after the 1870’s, the following gold discoveries were made: 1881 in Alaska, 1884 in the Transvaal, 1887 in West Australia, 1890 in Colorado, 1894 in Mexico, 1896 in the Klondike. The inventions in the field of gold-mining technique, and especially the most important ones of this period (the inventions for the treatment of ore), were also made during the 1880’s, as is well known.

Lafigue Gold Mine, Ivory Coast, began production in August 2024,  targeting 200,000 oz gold annually ($800 million) over 13+ years.
» The increase in gold production takes place somewhat earlier than at the end of the downswing of the long wave. «
Lafigue Gold Mine, Ivory Coast, began production in August 2024, targeting 200,000 oz gold annually over 13+ years.
  
Gold discoveries and technical improvements, if they occur, will naturally influence gold production. They can have the effect that the increase in gold production takes place somewhat earlier than at the end of the downswing of the long wave. They also can assist the expansion of gold production, once that limit is reached. This is precisely what happens in reality. Especially after the decline in the 1870’s, a persistent, though admittedly slender, increase in gold production begins about the year 1883, whereas, in spite of the disturbing influences of discoveries and inventions, the upswing really begins only after gold has reached its greatest purchasing power; and the increased production is due not only to the newly discovered gold fields but in a considerable degree also to the old ones. This is illustrated by the figures in Table 3.

Table 3.— Gold Production, 1890–1900 (Unit: thousand ounces).
Table 3.— Gold Production, 1890–1900 (Unit: thousand ounces).

From the foregoing one may conclude, it seems to us, that gold production, even though its increase can be a condition for an advance in commodity prices and for a general upswing in economic activity, is yet subordinate to the rhythm of the long waves and consequently cannot be regarded as a causal and random factor that brings about these movements from the outside.
 
 
 
See also: 
 
 » Since the Kondratieff wave was not a transverse wave, meaning the wavelength varied, this tends to imply we may see the “real” high in commodity prices (adjusted for inflation) form in line with the ECM in 2032. This is by no means a straight, linear progression. There will be booms and busts along the way. Therefore, that is when we will see the final REAL high in gold, agriculturals, metals, etc. «   Martin Armstrong, March 16, 2013.

Tuesday, October 14, 2025

High Inflation: We are in Kondratieff's "Summer of Summer" | Ahmed Farghaly

Many people are wondering what has been happening to the prices of gold and silver recently. We were expecting developments similar to those that occurred after the 2020 bottom of the Kuznets wave [aka the 18-Year Cycle] in global markets. The first chart below presents our cyclical analysis of the Commodity Price Index.
 
» We are in the “summer of summer.” «  Commodity Price Index (quarterly bars, log scale) from 1750 to 2025: 162-Year, 54-Year, 18-Year, and 9-Year cycles.       [Note, there is ongoing debate regarding the precise starting points of the 162-year and 54-year cycles.     It can be argued that both should be anchored to the Great Depression low of 1932, rather than to 1949-50.]
 » We are in the “summer of summer.” «
 Commodity Price Index (quarterly bars, log scale) from 1750 to 2025162-Year, 54-Year, 18-Year, and 9-Year cycles. 
[Note, there is ongoing debate regarding the precise starting points of the 162-year and 54-year cycles.
It can be argued that both should be anchored to the Great Depression low of 1932, rather than to 1949-50.]
It is evident that the 54-Year Kondratieff wave, first identified by Nikolai Kondratieff, is clearly reflected in this historical chart. Even more intriguing is the apparent presence of a 162-Year larger-degree Kondratieff wave that maintains the same 3:1 harmonic relationship to the Kondratieff wave as the Kondratieff wave does to its smaller counterpart, the 18-Year Kuznets wave. In our cyclical model, the cycle spanning three Kondratieff Waves is called the Hegemony wave.
 
972-Year Methuselah Wave = three 324-Year Enoch Waves
Enoch Wave = two 162-Year Hegemony Waves 
Hegemony Wave (156.88 y) = three 54-Year Kondratieff Waves
Kondratieff Wave (52.72 y) = three 18-Year Kuznets Waves
Kuznets Wave 17.52 y) = two 9-Year Juglar Waves 
Juglar Wave (8.76 y) = two 54-Month Kitchin Cycles 
Kitchin Cycle = three 18-Month cycles = six 40-Week cycles

Many economists have described the “seasons” of the Kondratieff wave—spring (stable growth), summer (high inflation), autumn (low inflation and asset bubbles), and winter (deflationary recession). Typically, spring coincides with the first Kuznets cycle, summer with the second, and autumn and winter with the third. The highest inflation rates within a Kondratieff wave occur during the summer phase, corresponding to the second Kuznets cycle, which began in 2020.
 
» To every thing there is a season, and a time to every purpose under the heaven. « Ecclesiastes 3:1.
» To every thing there is a season, and a time to every purpose under the heaven. «
Ecclesiastes 3:1.

We are currently in the second Kuznets cycle (2020 to late 2030ies) of the second Kondratieff cycle (2000 to 2050) within the ongoing Hegemony wave (1950 to 2100)—a phase that can be described as the “summer of summer.” This phase suggests that we are likely to experience the highest inflation levels since the American Civil War (1861–1865).

» We are likely to experience the highest inflation levels since the American Civil War. « US Inflation: Annual Percentage Change from 1774 to 2007, with Outlook Extending to 2106.
» We are likely to experience the highest inflation levels since the American Civil War. «
US Inflation: Annual Percentage Change from 1774 to 2007, with Outlook Extending to 2106.
  
Our next chart above illustrates annual inflation in the United States since 1777. A distinct 162-Year Hegemony wave pattern emerges, with an inflation peak in 1813 marking the summer of the first Kondratieff cycle, a higher peak in 1865 corresponding to the summer of the second Kondratieff cycle, and a lower peak during World War I representing the summer of the third Kondratieff cycle. A comparable peak reappeared in 1980. According to our cyclical outlook, inflation in the current Kondratieff cycle is expected to surpass the levels of the 1970s, as this phase represents the second Kondratieff cycle within the broader Hegemony wave—the “summer season.”

The most advantageous assets to hold at this stage of the cycle—both from the standpoint of the Hegemony wave and the Kondratieff summer—are precious metals, real estate, and equities that tend to benefit from periods of high inflation.

 
 
» Yet, what experience and history teach us is this: that nations and governments have never learned anything from history, nor acted in accordance with the lessons to be derived from it. « Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Introduction to Lectures on the Philosophy of History, Berlin, 1822.
» Yet, what experience and history teach us is this: that nations and governments have never
learned anything from history, nor acted in accordance with the lessons to be derived from it. «
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Introduction to Lectures on the Philosophy of History, Berlin, 1822.
 
See also:

Sunday, October 12, 2025

Early Global Commodity Supercycle: Top Investment Picks | Andrew Hoese

Commodity Supercycles are long-term, decade-spanning periods of sustained above-average price surges, driven by major demand shocks—such as industrialization, energy transition, and urbanization—alongside supply constraints and geopolitical shifts. Notable past cycles include 1896–1920 (US industrialization), the 1970s (oil crises), and 2000–2014 (China’s rise). 
 
Gold-S&P 500 Ratio (monthly closes, 1925 to October 2025).
» There is an early breakout in Gold versus the S&P 500, a double bottom breaking higher. This signals a shift into a world unlike the past 40 years — a transition from an era of declining interest rates to one of rising rates. That creates different money flows. Money is no longer flowing mainly into bond and stock markets; instead, it is increasingly moving into precious metals, mining companies, and commodities. This marks the beginning of an outperformance of commodities and precious metals over traditional financial assets. «
Today, advancements in AI, digitization, electric vehicles, robotics, the emergence of thousands of new data centers, other technologies, and the relentless rise of BRICS+ are set to fuel an unprecedented surge in energy demand, including coal, oil, gas, hydrogen, nuclear, geothermal, solar, and more. Urgent grid overhauls and expansions will drive a massive increase in demand for key metals such as lithium, nickel, silver, and copper.
 
The current Commodity Supercycle (2022-2045) is driven by several financial key factors, with interest rates playing a central role. From 1980 to 2021, declining rates favored Bonds and Stocks, creating cup-and-handle patterns in Gold and Silver. Now, the shift to an increasing interest rate environment is disrupting this dynamic, as evidenced by a shoulder-head-shoulder topping pattern in bonds. 
 
When rates hit 4.5-5% on the 10-Year US Treasury Note Yield, stocks are likely to decouple, with rates rising while stocks stagnate or decline. The Dollar (DXY), currently in an uptrend channel, could accelerate commodity gains if it breaks downward. Inflation cycles further shape this landscape: disinflation boosts safe-haven assets like gold and silver, while accelerating inflation drives broader commodity markets. Money printing, such as the significant stimulus in April 2025 (Trump's One Big Beautiful Bill Act), fuels gold and silver in real-time, with other commodities responding as money flows through the system.
 
 
 Investment Potential Rankings: Commodities and Financial Instruments (October 2025):
TopLithium, Coal, Iron Ore. iShares MSCI Brazil ETF (EWZ: tracks large/mid-cap Brazilian equities for emerging market exposure), VanEck Steel ETF (SLX: tracks global steel sector companies (production, mining, fabrication). Highest potential due to recent bottoms, high historical leverage (50-150x for coal/iron ore, 20x for EWZ), strong breakout patterns, and inflation-sensitive demand (EV/BESS for Lithium, Steel +1.1%). Under-the-radar status maximizes asymmetry.
Mid: Copper, Nickel, Natural Gas, Silver, Platinum, Palladium: Strong performers with breakouts or bottoming patterns; Silver/Platinum have top performer potential but face consolidation or supply risks; Copper near highs but neutral Q4 2025; nickel oversupply concerns.
Low: Oil bearish short-term ($60/bbl YE2025); Gold strong but nearing consolidation, and less leverage than Silver.
Lowest: S&P 500, NASDAQ, Bonds. Financial assets face headwinds from rising rates (4.5-5% disconnect); bonds least attractive due to downtrend and rotation to commodities.
The ongoing and escalating worldwide commodity boom is unfolding in a clear sequence: It began in 2022 with a disinflation phase, where gold and silver led as safe-haven assets, potentially pushing silver prices toward $60-90. Over the next six to twelve months, a transition is expected where gold and silver may consolidate or experience choppy trading (point 7. in the historic long-term fractal).
 
 Platinum-Palladium Ratio (monthly bars, 1986 to October 2025).
 
 Platinum-Gold Ratio (monthly bars, 1986 to October 2025).
 
 Platinum-Silver Ratio (monthly bars, 1986 to October 2025).
 
 Copper-Gold Ratio (monthly bars, 1986 to October 2025).
 
  Oil-Gold Ratio (monthly bars, 1984 to October 2025)
 
Uranium (monthly bars, 2011 to October 2025): Bullish.
 
During this period, other commodities like Crude Oil and Base Metals, which bottomed in April-May 2025, will begin to gain traction. As the cycle shifts to accelerating inflation, oil and base metals are poised to surge, driven by money rotating out of bonds and stocks into hard assets. 


This mirrors historical patterns, such as the 2018-2020 period when gold rose during a slowdown, followed by oil's sharp rally in August 2020 after gold consolidated. The current cycle aligns with the 2001-2008 commodity bull market, characterized by a declining dollar and strong commodity outperformance against financial assets, as signaled by gold's breakout against the S&P 500.
 
In 2025, Precious Metals are surging, with gold and silver both up over 60% year-to-date and mining stocks nearly doubling in value. Technical indicators suggest short-term overbought conditions, but the long-term outlook remains bullish. Notably, spot silver has climbed above $50, showing backwardation against futures prices around $48.70, indicating strong physical demand and potential discrepancies between paper and physical markets.
 
Certain commodities are poised to lead in performance. Gold is a key leader but not the top performer; Silver and Platinum are expected to outshine it, with silver potentially reaching $300 based on historical fractals from the 1940s to 1980s. 
 
Platinum, currently at a 0.4 ratio to gold, could revert to its historical mean of 1.2-2x gold’s price, with potential to hit 5.5-6x as seen in the early 1900s. Crude Oil, Natural Gas, Copper (nearing all-time highs), Steel (breaking out), Iron Ore, Nickel, and Lithium (up 100-300% from bottoms) are also strong contenders. 
 
Platinum-Gold Ratio currently 0.41 (gold/platinum 2.44) as of October 2025, with platinum at $975/oz, gold $3975/oz. Historical: Platinum premium (up to 6.63:1 in 1968) until late 1990s due to industrial demand (catalysts, auto); low 0.05 in 1885. Fluctuations from supply disruptions (South Africa/Russia mines), financial crises, geopolitical tensions, inflation fears; gold safe-haven spikes ratio in downturns (e.g., 2.3x in 2020, 3.1x Feb 2025).
Coal and Iron Ore offer high leverage, with potential for 50-150x gains as seen in the 2000s bull market, making them prime investment targets. Emerging markets like Brazil, through ETFs like EWZ, present 20x potential driven by currency exchange rate unwinds, particularly as the dollar weakens.

Historical parallels provide further context. In the 1930s, gold’s revaluation with flat input costs led to massive mining gains. The inflationary 1970s and 2000s resemble today’s environment, while the 1940s-80s increasing rate cycle mirrors current conditions, with silver moving from consolidation to a boom. 
 
This is not solely a precious metals bull market but part of a broader commodity and hard assets cycle. To maximize returns in the current commodity cycle, one should have invested in under-the-radar commodities like oil, natural gas, iron ore, nickel, and copper between April and May 2025, when they formed quiet bottoms—evident in patterns like inverted head-and-shoulders and double bottoms—before gaining mainstream attention. 
 
These assets, now moving higher, offered significant asymmetry as smart money positioned early, capitalizing on low public interest. For those yet to invest, opportunities remain in inflation-sensitive commodities like steel, coal, and lithium, which are breaking out or showing early uptrends, particularly as the dollar weakens and money flows from bonds and stocks. 
 
 
Commodity Supercycles from 1805 to 2045.

A rotation from Gold back to the Dow might be most prudent if/when inflation-adjusted DJI retreats
back to its 2000 level, which could take many years.  For now, we are right at the upper rail.

The Great Rotation out of Paper Assets into Hard Assets: 
The biggest Bull Market of our Lifetimes is underway.

Gold entering the parabolic phase of the Debt/Fiat collapse.
Moves that took years to unfold now happen in Months/Weeks.
 
Copper: The new oil for this century.

Palladium: Now joining the party. Target $3,430.
 
Platinum: Bullish. First target above $3k. 
 
Silver: A chart pattern that has taken five decades to form.
A generational set-up unfolding. Go long and stay long. 
 
An epic Silver fractal is playing out. 
  
162-Year, 54-Year, and 18-Year cycles in Silver from 1802 to 2025 (quarterly closes, log scale). 
 
The global financial shift isn’t coming—it’s already here. Gold. Silver. BRICS. De-dollarization. Geopolitics and geoeconomics now underpin the unfolding of the next great global commodity supercycle: escalating US–China rivalries, supply-chain fractures, and rising WW3 risks accelerate the decline of the United States’ 250-year empire-life cycle while cementing China’s ascent. 
 
Collapsing US stock indices–to–gold ratios reveal deep monetary stress, aligning with inflationary, interest-rate, and commodity-cycle dynamics that signal dollar devaluation and the breakdown of the post–World War II global financial system. The Great Rotation out of paper assets—equities and bonds—into hard, tangible assets is igniting what the charts suggest will become the greatest commodity bull market of our lifetimes.
 
Wealth preservation now hinges on tangible inflation hedges—metals such as lithium, copper, and nickel; precious metals including gold, silver, platinum, and palladium; and energy assets spanning coal, oil, gas, hydrogen, nuclear, geothermal, and solar. Avoid rate-sensitive exposure in US stock indices, and bonds; instead, accumulate undervalued, cash-flow-rich commodity producers and physical holdings to capture asymmetric, real-asset returns into around 2040.
 
See also: