Helioeconomics: Solar Cycles & World Economic Rhythms | Aleksander Valkov

In his June 2025 working paper, Russian economist Aleksander Valkov, Head of the Department of National and World Economy at Moscow State University, introduces "helioeconomic theory"—a bold interdisciplinary framework asserting that long-term solar activity, specifically the approximately 11-year Schwabe sunspot cycle (measured via Wolf sunspot numbers), serves as a primary exogenous driver synchronizing global economic cycles across centuries and countries. 

HelioEconomic Leading Index (HELI) and Economic Cycles (1750–1900). 

 

HelioEconomic Leading Index (HELI) and Economic Cycles (1900-2050): 

Blue line: HELI Index (normalized, 0–1 scale); Black dashed line: Solar Cycle (Wolf number, 11-year harmonic); Red vertical dashed lines: Economic Peaks (1749, 1801, 1859, 1917, 1968, 2024); Green vertical dashed lines: Economic Bottoms (1775, 1833, 1889, 1944, 1996, 2045); X-axis: Years 1750-1900 and Years 1900-2050, in strict chronological order.

 

HelioEconomic Leading Index (HELI) for USA, Russia, China, and Great Britain (1900-2024).

Blue line: USA; Red line: Rusia; Green line: China; Brown line: Great Britain; Red vertical dashed line: Economic Peak; Green vertical dashed line: Economic Bottom. 

 

Rather than viewing economic expansions and contractions as purely the result of credit, technology, policy, or random shocks, Valkov argues that solar magnetic activity provides the underlying rhythm. He posits that every fifth solar maximum plants the seed for a major economic peak approximately five to ten years later, while solar minima trigger the deepest troughs. 

 

This pattern establishes a dominant approximately 55-year supercycle (roughly five Schwabe cycles) that has governed global economic turning points from pre-industrial 1750 through the industrial and modern eras, spanning diverse economies including the USA, UK, Russia, China on a panel of 12 major countries.

 

 

» These findings have important implications for economic theory, forecasting, and policy. «

 Next solar minimum (Cycle 25/26 transition) anticipated around 2030–2031.

 

Valkov posits that solar activity influences economies through four interconnected channels: 

 

The first channel involves biophysical and health effects: geomagnetic storms and solar radiation variations are argued to affect human health, melatonin levels, mood, and cognitive function, citing medical literature on increased depression, suicides, and risk aversion during periods of high solar activity. 

Second, technological disruptions are a growing concern in the modern era, as space weather impacts infrastructure, satellites, and power grids. 

Third, Valkov includes agricultural and climate channels through subtle influences on weather patterns and crop yields, though he acknowledges this is a weaker driver for the regular 11-year solar cycle. 

Finally, the psychological and behavioral channel is considered crucial, suggesting that collective mood shifts drive investor sentiment, risk-taking, and economic decisions, a concept that builds on research by Krivelyova and Cesare Robotti (2003) and similar studies. 

 

The key innovation of Valkov's work, however, is the proposed 55-year rhythm: every fifth solar maximum (a period of 54–60 years) marks a "super-peak" corresponding to major economic booms and the subsequent crises that occur when the underlying expansion ultimately overshoots.

Valkov's theory builds on earlier ideas from Jevons (1875), Chizhevsky (1924), Garcia-Mata (1934), and the Foundation for the Study of Cycles, but he elevates them with rigorous modern statistical methods and an extraordinary historical dataset covering twelve major economies, including the United States, United Kingdom, Russia, and China—both before and after industrialization.

 » The HELI index outperforms traditional leading indicators in predicting major economic turning points, offering

policymakers and analysts a new interdisciplinary tool for risk assessment and macroeconomic planning. « 

At the heart of Valkov's paper is the HelioEconomic Leading Index (HELI), a composite indicator that combines smoothed Wolf sunspot numbers (inverted and appropriately lagged) with macroeconomic variables such as unemployment rates, GDP growth, and industrial production. Spectral analysis, Granger causality tests, and principal component methods show that the HELI index explains approximately 78% of the variance in global business-cycle turning points over nearly three centuries—a level of explanatory power rarely achieved by conventional leading indicators.

The alignment is striking: Major economic peaks repeatedly occur near every fifth solar maximum (for example, the Roaring Twenties, the mid-1960s–early-1970s boom, and the 2014–2020 expansion), while the deepest depressions and recessions cluster around prolonged solar minima (the 1930s Great Depression, the early 1980s double-dip, and the 2008–2009 Global Financial Crisis all fit the pattern with remarkable precision).

The 11-year solar cycle is historically segmented into four distinct periods based on psychological excitability: Minimum (3 years), Growth (2 years), Maximum (3 years), and Decline (3 years).

» In each century, the universal cycle of historical events is repeated exactly 9 times. Throughout the world history of Mankind, beginning with 500 B.C. and until the present time, in each century I have discovered 9 clearly outlined concentrations of the initial moments of historical events. Thus, it can be considered that each cycle of the general historical, military or social activity of humanity is equal, on average, to 11 years. « 

Alexander L. Chizhevsky, 1924.

Valkov's long-term charts overlaying sunspot numbers with unemployment or industrial production in the US, UK, Russia, and China reveal an almost eerie synchronization that persists through wars, pandemics, gold standards, fiat currencies, and radically different political systems. Given that Solar Cycle 25 reached a stronger-than-expected maximum around 2024–2025, the HELI index indicates that the current global expansion has already peaked or is in its final stage.

  

» On average, the difference between the peaks and troughs of solar activity and economic cycles does not exceed six months. «

88% of recessions since the 1800s and 100% of major financial crises occurred during the downturn of sunspot cycles. 

Leonty Miroshnichenko, 2023.

 

The model forecasts an accelerating contraction phase leading into a major multicycle trough centered on the early 2030s—precisely the period when the next solar minimum is expected. Mainstream macroeconomics remains deeply skeptical of any strong exogenous pacemaker for business cycles, and critics will rightly point to risks of overfitting and the indirect nature of causal mechanisms. 

 

Yet, the sheer scope of the evidence—280 years, twelve diverse economies, consistent performance across radically different institutional regimes—makes the paper impossible to dismiss lightly. Whether helioeconomics ultimately gains broad acceptance or remains a heterodox curiosity, the HELI index has already demonstrated superior long-range forecasting ability compared with traditional indicators. 

 

Reference:
Aleksander Valkov (June 2025) - Helioeconomics: Solar Cycles as the Hidden Pacemaker of Global Economic Fluctuations.

 

See also:

Leonty Miroshnichenko (2023) - Kondratiev Waves Aligned with Solar Cycles. 

 Lifang Peng, Ning Li, and Jingwen Pan (2019) - Effect of Ap Index of Geomagnetic Activity on S&P 500 Stock Market Return.

Alexander L. Chizhevsky (December 14, 2025) - Mass Excitability during Solar Cycle 25 (2019–2030).

2026 High in the Benner Cycle | "Time to Sell Stocks and Values of all Kinds"

Samuel Benner (1832–1913), a once-prosperous farmer in Lawrence County, Ohio, whose wealth was destroyed by a devastating hog cholera epidemic and the Panic of 1873, devoted the remainder of his life to identifying recurring patterns in economic booms and busts. Through exhaustive analysis of commodity prices—specifically provisions (pork products such as bacon, ham, mess pork, lard, and salted pork), live hogs, corn, cotton, and pig iron (later also wheat and railroad-stocks)—he published "Benner's Prophecies of Future Ups and Downs in Prices" in 1876, a work that formed the basis for his annual forecasts through 1907.

  

 » Periods When to Make Money. « The original 1872 business card of the George Tritch Hardware Co. in Denver, Colorado—which was copyrighted in 1883 and 1897—is the focus of an ongoing controversy: Was it genuinely created by Tritch, or was it simply plagiarized and popularized by Benner four years later in 1876?

 
Benner’s approach was empirical, grounded in price data from 1780 to 1872, and used to extend projections far into the future by emphasizing recurring cycles in commodity prices and business activity. He treated these cycles not merely as descriptive patterns but as prescriptive guidance, advising investors on when to buy during "hard times" and when to sell during "good times."

 

Benner's time-price model identified nested peaks and troughs in commodity prices, agricultural yields, and broader economic conditions. Central to his framework were the following patterns:

■ 27-Year Cycle in Pig Iron and Cotton Prices: Analyzing data from 1833 to 1899, Benner observed high prices following an ascending arithmetic progression of 8, 9, and 10 years, repeating every 27 years. Low prices, conversely, followed a descending series of 9 and 7 years. This cycle captured the volatility in industrial commodities like pig iron, which Benner viewed as a bellwether for economic health, given iron's role in manufacturing and infrastructure.
■ 11-Year Cycle in Corn and Hog Prices: Beginning in 1836, this cycle alternated between 5- and 6-year sub-periods, reflecting fluctuations in agricultural staples. Benner broke it into peaks and troughs that aligned with seasonal and weather-related disruptions.
■ Business Cycle with 16-18-20 Year Peaks: Extending his commodity analysis, Benner described a broader 11-year business rhythm, characterized by peaks spaced 16, 18, and 20 years apart. Lows coincided with pig iron troughs, while panics occurred at intervals averaging 9 years (7-11-9 pattern, akin to the Juglar cycle). Every third peak aligned roughly every 54 years, echoing longer waves like those later formalized by Nikolai Kondratieff.

 Benner's astronomical time-price cycles theory.

These cycles formed a hierarchical structure: shorter oscillations (5–11 years) drove immediate price swings, while longer ones (27 and 54 years) shaped multi-decade eras of prosperity or contraction. Benner integrated them into a single chart, forecasting "ups and downs" with directives such as "Years of Good Times: High Prices and the Time to Sell" for peaks and "Years of Hard Times: Low Prices and a Good Time to Buy" for troughs.

 

 

 » "B." [2026] Years of Good Times. High Prices and the Time to Sell Stocks and Values of All Kinds. « 

For 2025, Benner’s cycle predicted the US stock market driving higher; for 2026, it forecasts a major top: "High Prices and the Time to Sell Stocks and Values of All Kinds" into 2032 ("Years of Hard Times, Low Prices, and a Good Time to Buy Stocks"). 2026 is marked as a "B" phase year — a peak of high prices and euphoria, often the culmination of a bull market before a shift to downturns. Historical "B" peaks have aligned (often within 1-2 years) with major tops like: 1929 (Great Depression peak), 2000 (dot-com bubble), 2007 (pre-2008 crisis), and others. 

Benner attributed these periodicities to celestial mechanics, positing that solar system dynamics influenced earthly economies. He aligned his 11-year cycle with Jupiter's major equinox, which recurs every 11.86 years—a near-match to observed corn, hog, and business fluctuations from 1836, 1847, 1858, and 1869. Jupiter, in his view, served as the "ruling element" in natural product price cycles, potentially modulated by electromagnetic influences from Uranus and Neptune on Saturn and, in turn, Earth.

This astro-economic perspective echoed earlier hints by English economist William Stanley Jevons, who suggested in 1843 planetary configurations might underpin business cycles but abandoned the idea amid academic opposition. Modern interpretations extend this to lunar phases and solar activity (e.g., nodal precession, sunspot cycles), though Benner's original emphasis remained on observable price data rather than strict astronomy and astrology.

   

Benner's Cycle Forecast for the Period 2015–2035.

In 1948, Edward R. Dewey, director of the Foundation for the Study of Cycles, updated and reprinted Benner’s work as the Foundation’s "Reprint No. 24". He lauded Benner’s pig-iron forecasts over the 60-year period from 1875 to 1935 for achieving a gain-to-loss ratio of 45:1, deeming it one of the most reliable business charts despite numerous imitations by lesser-known authors. Proponents cite alignments with major events: the cycle's "B" peaks (high-price euphoria phases) approximated the 1929 stock market top preceding the Great Depression, the 2000 dot-com bust, and the 2007 pre-financial crisis summit—often within 1–2 years. 

 

Edward R. Dewey (1967) considered the true length of Benner’s pig iron price cycle to be 9.2 years and thus his "forecast got off the track by one year every five waves. By 1939 his projection was no longer usable."  In 1971 Dewey commented: "Were Benner still alive and issuing yearly supplements to his Prophecies, he probably would have learned all that was necessary to know about cycles of fractional length and would have adjusted later forecasts accordingly." 

However, scrutiny reveals nuances: Benner's original chart, rooted in agriculture (which comprised 53% of the US economy in the 1870s), projected a 1927 high and 1930 low, not the exact 1929–1932 Depression timeline. A sensational 1933 Wall Street Journal article, designed to attract attention, altered Benner’s original cycle dates for dramatic effect, thereby fueling persistent misconceptions (see chart below).

 

 

Martin Armstrong recently contended that Benner’s cycle was more a historical curiosity than a reliable predictive tool, noting that it has been both right and wrong many times: 

 

The claim that Benner’s Cycle predicted the Great Depression is false. The chart [above] that was published in the Wall Street Journal altered Samuel Benner’s cycle, which was based on agriculture. It predicted a high in 1927, not 1929, and the low in 1930, not 1932. Claims that Benner’s work calls for a crash in 2025 are flat-out wrong. His target years would be 2019 and 2035, based on his data, not the altered, fake news published by the Wall Street Journal in 1933.

 

Benner was a farmer. Applying his cycle to the economy today is no longer effective, any more than the Kondratieff Wave. Both were based on the economy, with agriculture being the #1 sector. As the Industrial Revolution unfolded, those cycles remain relevant for commodities, but not the economy. Agriculture, when Benner developed his model, accounted for 53% of the economy. Today it is 3%. If they were alive today, they would have used the services industry. Capital flows are still pointing to the dollar, given the prospect of war and sovereign defaults outside the USA.

Martin Armstrong, August 30, 2025.

 

See also: 

Samuel Benner (1876)  - Benner's prophecies of future ups and downs in prices. 

What years to make money on pig-iron, hogs, corn, and provisions.  

Samuel Benner (1907)  - Benner's prophecies of future ups and downs in prices. 

Edward R. Dewey and Edwin F. Dakin (1947) - Cycles: The Science of Prediction.

Edward R. Dewey (1967)  - The Case for Cycles.
Edward R. Dewey and Og Mandino (1971) - Cycles: The Mysterious Forces that Trigger Events.

LCdr. David Williams (1982) - Financial Astrology.  

TPR (2022) - "Periods When to Make Money": Benner Cycle Projection into 2023 Major Low.

Gold Production Mirrors the Long Wave, It Doesn’t Drive It | Nikolai Kondratieff

As regards the opening-up of new countries for the world economy, it seems to be quite obvious that this cannot be considered an outside factor which will satisfactorily explain the origin of long waves. The United States have been known for a relatively very long time; for some reason or other they begin to be entangled in the world economy on a major scale only from the middle of the nineteenth century. Likewise, the Argentine and Canada, Australia and New Zealand, were discovered long before the end of the nineteenth century, although they begin to be entwined in the world economy to a significant extent only with the coming of the 1890’s. 

 

» We know that commodity prices reach their lowest level toward the end of a long wave. This means

that at this time gold has its highest purchasing power, and gold production becomes most favorable. «
Second Transvaal Gold Rush: Miners of the Republic Gold Mining Company,

De Kaap Valley, Eastern Transvaal gold fields, South Africa, 1888.

 

It is perfectly clear historically that, in the capitalistic economic system, new regions are opened for commerce during those periods in which the desire of old countries for new markets and new sources of raw materials becomes more urgent than theretofore. It is equally apparent that the limits of this expansion of the world economy are determined by the degree of this urgency. If this be true, then the opening of new countries does not provoke the upswing of a long wave. On the contrary, a new upswing makes the exploitation of new countries, new markets, and new sources of raw materials necessary and possible, in that it accelerates the pace of capitalistic economic development.

There remains the question whether the discovery of new gold mines, the increase in gold production, and a consequent increase in the gold stock can be regarded as a casual, outside factor causing the long waves. An increase in gold production leads ultimately to a rise in prices and to a quickening in the tempo of economic life. But this does not mean that the changes in gold production are of a casual, outside character and that the waves in prices and in economic life are likewise caused by chance. We consider this to be not only unproved but positively wrong. 

 

 » An increase in gold production leads ultimately to a rise in prices. «

California Gold Rush (1848–1855): Over 300,000 settlers flooded newly conquered Mexican

territory, seizing lands of 70 indigenous peoples and carrying out the California Genocide.

 

This contention originates from the belief, first, that the discovery of gold mines and the perfection of the technique of gold production are accidental and, secondly, that every discovery of new gold mines and of technical inventions in the sphere of gold production brings about an increase in the latter. However great may be the creative element in these technical inventions and the significance of chance in these discoveries, yet they are not entirely accidental. Still less accidental—and this is the main point—are the fluctuations in gold production itself. 

 

These fluctuations are by no means simply a function of the activity of inventors and of the discoveries of new gold mines. On the contrary, the intensity of inventors’ and explorers’ activity and the application of technical improvement in the sphere of gold production, as well as the resulting increase of the latter, depend upon other, more general causes. The dependence of gold production upon technical inventions and discoveries of new gold mines is only secondary and derived.

» Although gold is a generally recognized embodiment of value, it is only a commodity. «
Grasberg Mine, operated by PT Freeport Indonesia, is one of the largest global gold

and copper reserves, producing 1.7M oz gold, 6M oz silver, and 1.5B lbs copper in 2023.

 

Although gold is a generally recognized embodiment of value and, therefore, is generally desired, it is only a commodity. And like every commodity it has a cost of production. But if this be true, then gold production—even in newly discovered mines—can increase significantly only if it becomes more profitable, i.e., if the relation of the value of the gold itself to its cost of production (and this is ultimately the prices of other commodities) becomes more favorable. If this relation is unfavorable, even gold mines the richness of which is by no means yet exhausted may be shut down; if it is favorable, on the other hand, even relatively poor mines will be exploited.

When is the relation of the value of gold to that of other commodities most favorable for gold production? We know that commodity prices reach their lowest level toward the end of a long wave. This means that at this time gold has its highest purchasing power, and gold production becomes most favorable. This can be illustrated by the figures in Table 2.

Table 2.— Selected Statistics of Gold Mining in the Transvaal, 1890–1913.

Gold production, as can be seen from these figures, becomes more profitable as we approach a low point in the price level and a high point in the purchasing power of gold (1895 and the following years). It is clear, furthermore, that the stimulus to increased gold production necessarily becomes stronger the further a long wave declines. We, therefore, can suppose theoretically that gold production must in general increase most markedly when the wave falls most sharply, and vice versa.

» Gold production must in general increase most markedly when the wave falls most sharply, and vice versa. «

Wangu Gold Deposit, 2024: China discovered one of the world’s largest gold deposit

in Hunan, with over 1,000 tons valued at $83B, located 19 kilometers underground.

 

In reality, however, the connection is not as simple as this but becomes more complicated, mainly just because of the effect of the changes in the technique of gold production and the discovery of new mines. It seems to us, indeed, that even improvements in technique and new gold discoveries obey the same fundamental law as does gold production itself, with more or less regularity in timing. Improvements in the technique of gold production and the discovery of new gold mines actually do bring about a lowering in the cost of production of gold; they influence the relation of these costs to the value of gold, and consequently the extent of gold production. 

 

» Improvements in the technique of gold production actually do bring about a lowering in the cost of production of gold. «

Kumtor Gold Mine, Kyrgyzstan, 2025: Nationalized in 2021, one of Central Asia’s largest gold reserves, 

began underground mining, projected to add 147 metric tons of gold to state reserves over 17 years.

 

But then it is obvious that exactly at the time when the relation of the value of gold to its cost becomes more unfavorable than theretofore, the need for technical improvements in gold mining and for the discovery of new mines necessarily becomes more urgent and thus stimulates research in this field. 

 

» Gold production is subordinate to the rhythm of the long waves. «

Muruntau Gold Mine, Uzbekistan, 2025: Holds the world’s largest gold reserves, one of the largest open-pit

gold mines, ranks second in global production, producing 2M+ oz annually, expected to operate for decades.

 

There is, of course, a time-lag, until this urgent necessity, though already recognized, leads to positive success. In reality, therefore, gold discoveries and technical improvements in gold mining will reach their peak only when the long wave has already passed its peak, i.e., perhaps in the middle of the downswing. The available facts confirm this supposition. In the period after the 1870’s, the following gold discoveries were made: 1881 in Alaska, 1884 in the Transvaal, 1887 in West Australia, 1890 in Colorado, 1894 in Mexico, 1896 in the Klondike. The inventions in the field of gold-mining technique, and especially the most important ones of this period (the inventions for the treatment of ore), were also made during the 1880’s, as is well known.

» The increase in gold production takes place somewhat earlier than at the end of the downswing of the long wave. «

Lafigue Gold Mine, Ivory Coast, began production in August 2024, targeting 200,000 oz gold annually over 13+ years.

  

Gold discoveries and technical improvements, if they occur, will naturally influence gold production. They can have the effect that the increase in gold production takes place somewhat earlier than at the end of the downswing of the long wave. They also can assist the expansion of gold production, once that limit is reached. This is precisely what happens in reality. Especially after the decline in the 1870’s, a persistent, though admittedly slender, increase in gold production begins about the year 1883, whereas, in spite of the disturbing influences of discoveries and inventions, the upswing really begins only after gold has reached its greatest purchasing power; and the increased production is due not only to the newly discovered gold fields but in a considerable degree also to the old ones. This is illustrated by the figures in Table 3.

Table 3.— Gold Production, 1890–1900 (Unit: thousand ounces).

From the foregoing one may conclude, it seems to us, that gold production, even though its increase can be a condition for an advance in commodity prices and for a general upswing in economic activity, is yet subordinate to the rhythm of the long waves and consequently cannot be regarded as a causal and random factor that brings about these movements from the outside.

 

Quoted from:
Nikolai Kondratieff (1926)  - The Long Waves in Economic Life.

 

 

See also: 

Ahmed Farghaly (October 6, 2025) - High Inflation: We are in Kondratieff's "Summer of Summer". 

 

 » Since the Kondratieff wave was not a transverse wave, meaning the wavelength varied, this tends to imply we may see the “real” high in commodity prices (adjusted for inflation) form in line with the ECM in 2032. This is by no means a straight, linear progression. There will be booms and busts along the way. Therefore, that is when we will see the final REAL high in gold, agriculturals, metals, etc. «   Martin Armstrong, March 16, 2013.

  There is NO STORE OF VALUE because everything rises and falls.