Showing posts sorted by date for query Belt and Road. Sort by relevance Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by date for query Belt and Road. Sort by relevance Show all posts

Friday, August 21, 2026

Why Time Is on Iran, Russia and China's Side | Michael Hudson

Time is on the side of Iran, Russia, and China and increasingly works against the US and its allies. The longer the confrontation persists, the greater the pressure on highly indebted Western economies. As in Russia's past wars against Napoleon and Germany, the decisive advantage need not come from military strength alone, but from an external force that steadily erodes the enemy's capacity to sustain the conflict. Today, that force is the global financial and economic system.

Tsar Nicholas I famously boasted that Russia possessed two unbeatable generals—"General January and General February." However, while the severe winter of 1854–1855 did inflict catastrophic casualties on British and French forces during the Siege of Sevastopol, "General Winter" failed to save Russia from defeat in the Crimean War (1853–1856). World War I illustration of 'General Winter' on the Eastern Front, featured on the front page of the French periodical Le Petit Journal (1916).
"General Winter"—Russia's eternal ally against her enemies.

The US has contained the oil price shock by releasing oil from its strategic petroleum reserves and encouraging other countries to do the same, despite the major disruption to Persian Gulf exports. But this buys time, and only by depleting reserves and leaving less room for further intervention. The stakes are high because higher energy prices quickly feed into diesel, aviation fuel, fertilizer, transportation, and food costs. With the US midterm elections approaching, Washington is therefore racing the clock to contain prices as its economic buffers diminish.

Weaponizing Survival: Energy, Food, and Sovereign Debt Pressure
Iran's strategic advantage is to avoid escalation while letting economic pressure accumulate. A similar dynamic is developing around Russia and Ukraine, where disruptions to grain exports risk compounding the energy shock. About 27% of global grain trade moves through the Black Sea; Ukraine's harvest is coming in while warehouses are full, and Russian attacks on shipping and ports threaten both incoming supplies and outgoing grain. Much of Ukraine's grain normally goes to Europe, leaving Europe vulnerable to simultaneous fertilizer, food, and energy-price shocks.
 
Asymmetric warfare against Western full-spectrum aggression:
wrecking the enemy through food, energy, and debt.

The crisis need not involve major military escalation because the US and Europe are already too financially stretched to absorb a sustained increase in energy costs without wider economic damage. Higher fuel prices raise transportation, food distribution, and production costs; industries operating on thin margins can become unprofitable; and higher inflation puts upward pressure on interest rates. The resulting pressure spreads to agriculture, trucking, and the movement of crops, with particularly severe effects in the West, among US allies, and across developing economies in Asia and the Global South.

 
Higher inflation and interest rates also raise the cost of servicing already-heavy debt burdens. Rising bond yields compound the problem in the US, Japan, and other highly indebted economies, while vulnerabilities associated with Japan's currency and carry trade expose the limits of available policy responses. The fundamental vulnerability is therefore debt: governments must increasingly choose between supporting households and industry and servicing accumulated debt.

Sanctions Threaten America's Financial Power 
This pressure also threatens the financial system that has enabled the US to exercise global power for decades. Washington has relied not only on military force, but also on its control of the dollar, international payments, global banking, and the oil trade. By weaponizing sanctions against Iran and threatening Chinese, Asian, and other banks involved in Iranian oil transactions, the US is encouraging those same countries and institutions to reduce their dependence on the dollar. Financial coercion could therefore undermine one of America's principal instruments of power.

murder, slaughter, genocide: children, women, heads of state; weapon, drug, organ, child
trafficking; well poisoning; pedophilia; hijacking; torturing; counterfeiting; looting; piracy; bribery...
 
The oil trade is particularly important because Persian Gulf and OPEC oil have long been key channels of US financial influence. Oil revenues recycled through US banks, dollar assets, and the American financial system have reinforced the dollar's central position. Driving oil producers, buyers, and financial institutions away from that system therefore risks undermining the very mechanism Washington has used as a global economic choke point.  
 
Tru
mp offered billions to Iran's military
. 

Iran: "Leave before it's too late!"

Iran's strategy exploits this contradiction. If its own oil exports are blocked by sanctions and trade restrictions, the implicit threat is that broader oil exports may also be disrupted, forcing other countries to choose between accepting higher energy costs and resisting the sanctions regime. Iran cannot defeat the US militarily, even though it can attack US bases in the Middle East; its leverage instead lies in imposing costs on the wider system and forcing other countries to decide how they will respond.

China and the Emerging Alternative
China is relatively well-positioned to withstand such pressure because of its large oil reserves, coal resources, and extensive investment in solar power and other energy alternatives. The broader question is how China, Russia, Iran, Asia, and the Global South will respond if continued US sanctions keep driving up energy and commodity prices. Their incentive will be to develop mechanisms that insulate their trade from unilateral US financial coercion. 

Zhou Xiaochuan, Governor of the People's Bank of China, presenting his
landmark 2009 proposal, "Reform the International Monetary System," 
to the Bank for International Settlements (BIS).

Gold provides one possible reserve asset outside the dollar system. Countries have increasingly added to their gold reserves while maintaining relatively stable dollar holdings; the European Union now holds more reserves in gold than in dollars. China and Russia have also developed alternatives to Western payment infrastructure. China's and Russia's independent clearing systems reduce their reliance on SWIFT, while Iran has experimented with cryptocurrency payments despite the US seizure of Iranian cryptocurrency assets.  
 
The issue therefore goes beyond creating a BRICS currency. What is required is an alternative international architecture for payments, reserves, and lending, capable of financing trade without depending on the dollar, SWIFT, the IMF, or other Western institutions. China, because of its enormous financial reserves, is uniquely positioned to provide the financial capacity that such a system would require. Russia and Iran could contribute oil, with Russia also contributing grain.

The Cost of Dedollarization
Such a system could fundamentally reshape the post-1945 financial order. Countries facing rising energy, food, fertilizer, and chemical costs would increasingly face a choice between supporting domestic industry and households and servicing dollar-denominated debt. As balance-of-payments pressures intensify, governments would have to decide whether scarce resources should go toward subsidizing industry, protecting families from higher heating and food costs, or continuing to pay foreign creditors. The incentive to prioritize domestic stability would accelerate dedollarization and weaken the financial mechanisms through which Washington has historically exercised global influence.

More sanctions, guns, butter, servicing debt, or collapse?
 
China, Russia, and Iran could therefore form the foundation of an alternative monetary system: Iran contributing oil, Russia oil and grain, and China financial reserves. Such a system could remove or weaken several of the instruments of influence established after World War II to structure global trade and finance in America's interest, including control over the dollar, oil, food, and seaborne trade. 

Keynes's Alternative to the Dollar System
The alternative need not be another dominant national currency at all. The argument instead returns to John Maynard Keynes's 1944 proposal for an international clearing institution based on a supranational unit of account called the bancor. Keynes proposed a system designed to manage persistent international surpluses and deficits rather than forcing debtor countries into destructive austerity. The institution would manage intergovernmental debts, allowing countries with temporary imbalances to obtain temporary liquidity while preserving their capacity to become economically self-sufficient.
 
Keynes maybe wasn't all wrong.

The critical difference is that surplus countries would also share responsibility for global imbalances. Keynes argued that the persistent accumulation of surpluses and claims by creditor countries necessarily creates corresponding deficits elsewhere. If debts become so large that repayment requires destroying a debtor’s economy, those debts should be written down—and the corresponding creditor claims written down as well. The US rejected this approach in 1944 because it was then the dominant creditor and had little incentive to accept a system that could reduce its accumulated claims.
 
Keynes's proposal was shaped by the German reparations and transfer debates of the 1920s. His central argument was that a debtor cannot repay indefinitely by suppressing wages, transferring resources abroad, and selling its assets without destroying its own productive economy. A loan made without regard to the borrower’s ability to repay ultimately becomes a bad loan. The same logic, he argued, applies internationally: forcing debtors into permanent austerity can produce depression rather than repayment.
 
The proposed international institution would create an accounting unit based on a combination of gold and member currencies rather than a conventional national currency. It would manage international surpluses and deficits and provide liquidity for temporary imbalances. When accumulated claims became impossible to service without undermining a country’s productive capacity, the system would permit debt reduction rather than compel economic destruction.

China's Potential Role
China could potentially build such an international payments system around productive investment rather than creditor extraction. Its investments in ports, railways, infrastructure, and the Belt and Road Initiative could increase borrowers' productive capacity and ability to earn foreign exchange, enabling them to repay principal and interest rather than forcing them into austerity and privatization. The argument is that, unlike Western financial systems, China has the capacity to structure such financing primarily on geopolitical and developmental grounds rather than purely for financial returns or capital gains.
 
The central question is whether China itself could avoid becoming another creditor power with the capacity to weaponize its currency. The historical lesson, however, is that other countries did not necessarily expect the US to weaponize the dollar in the 1950s and 1960s, yet it eventually did. The same concern could apply to the yuan. The proposed solution, however, is not simply to substitute one national currency for another, but to create an international clearing mechanism that limits any single country's ability to accumulate unlimited financial power.

The End of the Post-1945 Order
The broader conclusion is that the post-1945 financial order may be approaching a structural break. The present conflict is no longer simply a military conflict; it is increasingly a contest between competing economic systems: a creditor-driven and highly financialized model and an industrial, state-directed model represented by China and parts of Asia. The existing system may not contain mechanisms capable of managing this transition. Instead, the world could fracture into parallel financial and economic systems, with the struggle over the future economic order ultimately displacing the narrower conception of a military or civilizational conflict.

Reference:

Wednesday, September 3, 2025

The End of Western Dominance—US Lives in Mortal Fear | John Mearsheimer

Since 2017, when Trump entered the White House, the balance of power has shifted in China’s favor, though the United States remains the world’s most powerful state. China is rapidly closing the gap, particularly in cutting-edge technologies, which Washington fears could tilt global economic and military power. As China converts its economic strength into military might, it builds not just regional forces but also blue-water naval power and global projection capabilities linked to its Belt and Road Initiative. This imitation of US strategy alarms Washington and drives a bipartisan policy of containment.

John J. Mearsheimer, American political scientist and professor at the University of Chicago, best known for his work
on international relations theory, offensive realism, the US Zionist lobby, US–China rivalry and great power politics.

Initially, Chinese leaders argued that economic interdependence would prevent conflict, since prosperity required cooperation. However, survival—not prosperity—is the primary goal of states in an anarchic international system with no higher authority. As China’s economic rise translated into growing military capacity, American fear replaced optimism, triggering security competition in East Asia. Prosperity enriched both sides, but balance-of-power politics and survival imperatives outweighed economic interdependence theory.

» Great powers are ruthless, exploiting weaker rivals to secure survival and expand influence. «
John J. Mearsheimer's complete discourse video. 

Historical lessons reinforce this logic. Weak states like China during its “century of humiliation” (1840s–1940s) and Russia during NATO expansion in the 1990s suffered because they lacked power. Great powers are ruthless, exploiting weaker rivals to secure survival and expand influence. In this system, the optimal strategy is regional hegemony, dominating one’s neighborhood while preventing rivals from doing the same. The US has long acted this way, blocking Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union from achieving dominance in Europe or Asia, while securing its own supremacy in the Western Hemisphere.

China’s trajectory fits this pattern. As its power has grown since the 1990s, Beijing naturally seeks to dominate East Asia. Yet the US cannot tolerate another regional hegemon, making containment inevitable. From Washington’s perspective, preventing Chinese hegemony is about survival, not choice. From Beijing’s perspective, seeking hegemony is equally rational. The result is a structural clash: both sides are locked in an intensifying security competition driven by the anarchic nature of the international system.

» The United States lives in mortal fear that the Chinese are going to dominate. «

China’s path to hegemony is more difficult than America’s was because regional powers like Japan, Australia, South Korea, and the Philippines—backed by the US—resist Chinese dominance. India participates in the Quad but is geographically and strategically less central to East Asian balance. Russia, meanwhile, has been pushed into China’s camp by the Ukraine war, eliminating a potential counterweight. This complicates US strategy: instead of balancing China together, Washington and Moscow are now aligned against each other.
 
The Ukraine war creates two major problems for the US: it prevents a full pivot to Asia and deepens the Sino-Russian partnership. Trump recognized this dynamic and sought rapprochement with Moscow to peel Russia away from China, but his chances of success are slim. Russia deeply distrusts the US, and Trump underestimated the difficulty of ending the Ukraine conflict. His instincts—to improve ties with Russia and focus on China—align with realist logic, but his reliance on instincts over experts undermines effective execution.

» It's only recently that Putin has brought the Russians back 
from the dead and we now consider Russia to be a great power. «

Since 2017, US policy has shifted decisively from engagement to containment of China, first under Trump and then reinforced, even hardened, under Biden. Yet American forces remain tied down in Ukraine and the Middle East. Deployments against the Houthis in the Red Sea and the prospect of war with Iran divert vital resources away from East Asia, just as China grows militarily stronger. Past US experiments in social engineering—in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya—ended in failure, raising doubts about new entanglements that sap the capacity to counter China.

Facing escalating global uncertainties, Chinese President Xi Jinping said the SCO is increasingly
responsible for regional peace, stability, and member-state development, August 31, 2025.
 
Ultimately, the US–China rivalry reflects structural realities of power politics. Both states seek survival through maximizing power, and both see regional hegemony as the path to security. The United States, the sole global hegemon since 1900, refuses to share that status, while China, closing the gap, sees dominance in East Asia as essential. The result is an enduring, intensifying contest that economic interdependence or diplomatic optimism cannot erase.

 

See also:

China's Preparations for Reunification With Taiwan Around 2027 | Jin Canrong

The Chinese government has consistently avoided setting a timetable for resolving the Taiwan question, emphasizing instead President Xi’s call for peaceful reunification with patience, sincerity, and effort. Despite this, American analysts frequently forecast 2027 as the likely point of resolution. Their view is shaped by China’s large strategic reserves, new industrial measures, and visible military procurement, all of which they interpret as signs of preparation for decisive conflict.

Jin Canrong (金灿荣), leading scholar of China–US relations, American politics, and foreign policy;
CCP strategist; Professor and Associate Dean at the School of International Studies, Renmin University of China.

From a military perspective, China faces few obstacles. A Taiwan operation could be carried out through blockade or direct combat, and success would likely come quickly. US intervention is not considered probable, making the true challenges economic and political rather than military or diplomatic. China’s main vulnerabilities are its dependence on imported resources, its lack of a fully unified domestic market, and the influence of elites with assets or family ties abroad. By contrast, Russia’s economy, though smaller, is buffered by its abundant resources, allowing it to withstand sanctions more effectively.

Among many other heads of states, Putin, Kim Jong Un, 
Park Geun-hye, ex-President of South Korea, and Masoud
Pezeshkian, President of Iran, joined Beijing’s historic victory parade on September 3, marking 80 years since
Japan’s WWII surrender, where China showcased its hypersonic missiles and nuclear triad. 
 
The government is taking steps to address these weaknesses. Grain reserves now exceed two years thanks to improved storage and expanded farmland. By 2027, new oil and gas discoveries together with Central Asian pipelines are expected to reduce import dependence. Coal-to-oil conversion and the spread of new energy vehicles will further narrow the energy gap. The more difficult issue lies in market access, as domestic circulation remains weak due to provincial barriers. Efforts to expand the Belt and Road initiative continue, though China lacks the military and cultural instruments historically used by the West to protect overseas investments.

»
US intervention is not considered probable. «
Jin Canrong's complete discourse video.
 
Diplomatically, a resolution of the Taiwan issue would have far-reaching effects. ASEAN countries, seeing the United States as unreliable for security, would likely align with China, turning the South China Sea into an inland sea. Japan and South Korea, highly dependent on maritime trade and external resources, would also face strong pressure to yield. Once the Taiwan Strait and the South and East China Seas are secured, Shanghai and the eastern seaboard would be protected, creating what could be the safest period in Chinese history.

Welcome to the Eurasian Century.
 
Historically, China’s threats came from the north, but industrialization eliminated that danger. Today, the principal threats come from the sea, the heartland of Western industrial power. Once Taiwan is reclaimed and the maritime approaches are secure, China can focus entirely on internal development and raising living standards. The most serious obstacles to this outcome are economic fragility and political complications, not military or diplomatic resistance. The year 2027 therefore stands out as the most likely turning point, a moment that could bring short-term hardship but ultimately mark the beginning of a new and safer era for China.

 
See also:

Monday, September 1, 2025

Hybrid Warfare & Strategic Stalemate in China–US Competition | Jin Canrong

Structurally speaking, China–US relations are certainly not good. The logic is quite simple: the world is changing significantly, and China is the variable, while the US is the leader of the original order. Naturally, the US is not pleased. [...] Whether it's Biden or Trump, both consider China their only opponent. This is very critical. America’s power is still greater than ours.

Jin Canrong (金灿荣), leading scholar of China-US relations, American politics, and foreign policy;
CCP strategist; Professor and Associate Dean, School of International Studies, Renmin University of China.

[...] China–US relations entered full competition in late 2017, when the US began to wage a hybrid war against China. It is called a hybrid war because multiple tactics are employed: trade war; industrial war (denying chips and pushing Chinese companies to relocate industries); financial war (aggressive interest rate hikes to extract Chinese capital); legal battles; media campaigns (such as accusations of genocide in Xinjiang); and biological warfare allegations, including SARS and COVID-19 claims.

» Siding with the EU to split the West. «
The China-US Competition, Jin Canrong, August 19, 2025.

[...] There are also sovereignty issues concerning Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the East and South China Seas, as well as opposition to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) through new alliances, like AUKUS (US, UK, Australia) and the Quad (US, India, Australia, Japan).

[...] The first phase involved US offensives and China’s strategic defense; now, we have entered a strategic stalemate. The key to strategic alignment is domestic management. The US faces high debt, declining manufacturing, and internal challenges, while China confronts economic performance issues, social conflicts, and a rapidly falling birth rate. Addressing domestic challenges strengthens both nations’ positions abroad.

[...] The US strategy toward China involves territorial ambitions (Canada, Greenland, Panama Canal), aligning Russia, reorganizing allies (Europe, Japan, Canada), and increasing defense spending to ensure allies can act independently. China, meanwhile, has abandoned its low-profile policy, focusing on active defense and strategic deterrence.

[...] Since last year, China’s defense policy has changed. China has moved from passive strategy to assertive action. Strategic stalemate depends on addressing domestic issues first, then external threats. For external alignment, China should coordinate with the EU to balance the West, manage neighboring relations, and continue Belt and Road and BRICS initiatives. This roughly represents the current positions of both parties.
 

Friday, July 25, 2025

89 Seconds to Midnight on the Doomsday Clock | Jeffrey Sachs

There are nine countries known to possess nuclear weapons. Perhaps more do, but nine are confirmed. Most of these countries are in geopolitical or diplomatic conflict with at least one other nuclear power. In the case of the United States and Russia, they are in open conflict—specifically in Ukraine—which is in fact a war between the US and Russia, and an extremely dangerous one. 

The world is sick of the US, Zionism, and I$raHell.


We must understand the global scene clearly in order to avoid terrible, potentially catastrophic mistakes. The US seems unable to accept a world in which it is no longer the sole superpower. But that era is over. The future is multipolar. The sooner Washington accepts this, the safer we will all be.
 
I often refer to the Doomsday Clock created by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists—a US publication founded in 1947 after the US atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. [...] When the clock was first introduced, it was set at 7 minutes to midnight. [...] Today, the clock stands at just 89 seconds to midnight.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio described Gaza’s residents as "vicious animals." 
When asked whether he would call for a ceasefire, Rubio replied, "I will not do that."
21st-century Nazism or plain and simple Zionism?
 
The US sees every conflict as a zero-sum game—one side must win, and the other must lose. There is no room for compromise, coexistence, or mutual respect. But the world doesn’t work that way. In our deeply interconnected and nuclear-armed world, we must find ways to cooperate—even with rivals.

The US needs to abandon its imperial mindset and embrace a new paradigm: one based on multipolarity, mutual respect, and the rule of international law. That is the only path to peace—not just in Ukraine or the Middle East, but globally. And I believe China has an important role to play in this transformation.
 
China has consistently advocated for a multipolar world, a peaceful international order, and respect for sovereignty. These are not just slogans; they are the foundation for a workable global system in the 21st century. China’s own development since 1980 has shown that economic progress does not require military aggression. Instead, China has focused on infrastructure, education, trade, technology, and long-term planning.


The Belt and Road Initiative, launched over a decade ago, has helped dozens of countries—especially in the Global South—gain access to much-needed infrastructure. Rather than exporting war, China is exporting railways, highways, ports, and power grids. That is a model the world needs. But unfortunately, the United States sees China’s rise not as a positive development, but as a threat.

Washington policymakers talk about “decoupling,” “containment,” and even “strategic rivalry.” They send warships through the Taiwan Strait and arms to Taipei. They push military alliances in the Pacific and increase military budgets, all in the name of “competition.” But what does that competition really mean? If it’s about innovation, education, clean energy, and development—then fine. Let’s compete to build a better world. But if it’s about military encirclement, economic warfare, and ideological confrontation—then we are heading toward disaster. 

Monday, April 14, 2025

Digital Yuan Reshaping Global Trade And Power | G. Valiachi & S. Murugan

The global financial order is witnessing a seismic shift, and at its epicenter is China’s digital yuan. The recent launch of the Digital RMB Cross-Border Settlement System (CIPS) by the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) is more than just a technological breakthrough—it is a geopolitical maneuver with far-reaching implications for global trade, financial sovereignty, and the dominance of the US dollar.

The
Digital Yuan’s rise is not merely a financial evolution
 
Will the rest of the world, particularly the West, adapt to this new reality, or will they be left navigating a financial ecosystem where China dictates the rules? One thing is certain: the era of uncontested dollar dominance is coming to an end. The world must prepare for a future where digital currencies, led by China's digital yuan, reshape global finance in ways we are only beginning to comprehend.

A Disruptive Technological Edge: For decades, international transactions have relied on the SWIFT system, where dollar-dominated settlements often take 3-5 days to clear, involving multiple intermediary banks and high transaction costs. China's digital RMB, powered by blockchain technology, has completely upended this model. With settlement times reduced to just seven seconds and handling fees slashed by 98 per cent, the efficiency gains alone are compelling enough for emerging markets and strategic trade partners to make the switch. The first successful real-time settlement between Hong Kong and Abu Dhabi using digital RMB has already demonstrated its disruptive potential. By bypassing SWIFT and eliminating reliance on correspondent banks, China has effectively engineered an alternative financial network—one that reduces the influence of US-dominated monetary systems and reshapes the global trade paradigm.

» Settlement times reduced to just seven seconds and handling fees slashed by 98 per cent. «
Digital RMB vs SWIFT.

Redefining Financial Sovereignty: The ramifications of this development extend beyond mere efficiency. For years, the US has wielded its control over the SWIFT system as an instrument of economic coercion, particularly through sanctions. The digital RMB offers an alternative, allowing countries under Western financial pressure—such as Iran and Russia—to conduct transactions without US oversight. This is already materializing: six ASEAN nations, including Malaysia and Singapore, have incorporated the RMB into their foreign exchange reserves, and Thailand has completed its first oil trade settled in digital yuan.

The Global De-dollarization Trend: The cross-border RMB settlement volume in ASEAN exceeded 5.8 trillion yuan in 2024, a staggering 120 per cent increase from 2021. As China strengthens its digital payment network, the US dollar’s role as the world’s reserve currency faces an existential challenge.

» Over 87 per cent of the world’s countries are now digitally integrated with the RMB settlement system. «

Strategic Integration: The digital yuan’s role extends beyond financial transactions; it is a foundational pillar of China’s broader economic expansion strategy. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), already a monumental undertaking spanning over 140 countries, now has a digital counterpart in the “Digital Silk Road.” By integrating the digital RMB with Beidou satellite navigation and quantum communication, China is creating a seamless trade infrastructure that enhances efficiency by 400 per cent. This convergence of digital currency and physical trade infrastructure fundamentally alters the balance of economic power. European car manufacturers are already settling Arctic route freight costs in digital RMB, and Middle Eastern energy traders have reduced settlement costs by 75 per cent. If this momentum continues, the dollar-based financial order could soon become a relic of the past.

The Future of Global Finance: With over 87 per cent of the world’s countries now digitally integrated with the RMB settlement system, China has successfully built a financial architecture that challenges traditional banking norms. The total volume of cross-border digital RMB transactions has already surpassed $1.2 trillion, and this figure is set to grow exponentially as more nations join the digital currency bridge test. Meanwhile, the US and Europe remain embroiled in regulatory debates over digital currency frameworks. The Federal Reserve’s hesitancy on Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs) and the European Central Bank’s slow progress on the digital euro underscore the West’s lack of preparedness for this revolution. While Washington deliberates, Beijing executes.


» China is no longer playing by the old rules. It’s a war for the future of global finance. «
Former Greek Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis, April 14, 2025.

Saturday, April 12, 2025

The Last Tariff: China Ended the US’s Trade War With a Whisper | Gerry Nolan

It happened with no fanfare. No saber-rattling. No choreographed press conference. Just one quiet statement from Beijing’s Customs Tariff Commission: "Tariffs on US goods will rise to 125% — and this will be our final adjustment. Regardless of future US actions, China will no longer respond." In Washington, they saw a concession. In reality? Beijing walked away from the last imperial leverage DC had left.

 » Tariffs on US goods will rise to 125% — and this will be our final adjustment.
Regardless of future US actions, China will no longer respond. «
China's Customs Tariff Commission, April 11, 2025.

In Trump's chaotic circus, tariffs are sold as economic patriotism, blunt-force trauma marketed as “tough negotiation.” But tariffs are the last resort of a hollowed-out empire that no longer produces, competes, or innovates, only thinks it can still dictate.

Trump’s latest move, slapping a 125% tariff on Chinese goods, was meant to flex dominance. Beijing waited, matched it perfectly, then froze the board. "There is no possibility of market acceptance of US goods in China." Translation: “We don’t need you anymore.” No further hikes are necessary. The US is de facto cut off from the colossal Chinese market. That's not de-escalation. That's de-dollarization in practice. Geoeconomic Aikido, using the empire’s aggression to accelerate the break from it.

Chinese Embassy in the US, April 10, 2025.

Washington still believes in a world that no longer exists. It thinks it can dictate trade terms while running trillion-dollar deficits, threaten its way into solvency while its factories rust, and that China will forever tolerate economic warfare just to retain access to Walmart shelves and US Treasury bonds, bonds that are a ticking time bomb for the hollowed empire.

But that world is gone. China has reoriented trade through Belt & Road. It’s fortified currency alliances with BRICS+, hardened internal markets, and invested across the Global South. Most importantly, it has shifted away from Western export dependency.


So when Beijing says, “we will ignore further US tariff moves,” it’s not a concession. It's sovereignty. The US has already been priced out, there’s no need for more theaters. This is the reckoning of a rentier empire built on financial parasitism, not production.

The definition of narcissism.

America doesn't have the tools to win a trade war, it doesn't make the tools anymore. Wall Street eviscerated its industrial base. Labor was deskilled by decades of outsourcing. Infrastructure crumbled while $10 trillion burned in forever wars. Trump’s 125% tariff isn’t policy, it’s a symptom. An empire in late stage declined. The power of Beijing’s response isn’t the tariff, it’s the refusal to respond again. No escalation. No panic. Just a clean break from a failing system.

A message to the Global South: “We won’t be dragged into Washington’s chaos. We won’t fight over a burning house. We’ll build new ones.” It's multipolar maturity. Let the US isolate itself, tariff its own supply chains, and raise rates until its middle class fractures. Beijing will trade in yuan with the Global Majority, while America tariffs itself into irrelevance.

 » The reckoning of a rentier empire built on financial parasitism, not production. « 

Markets have lost nearly $6 trillion net since February, despite brief rebounds. Wall Street knows: this isn’t 2001. China isn’t cowering. It now holds the keys to rare earths, battery tech, and semiconductors. Trump framed the tariffs as punishment for “ripping off the USA.” 
 
But who really gutted America’s industries? China? Or Goldman Sachs? Who looted pensions, turned homes into hedge fund fodder, and spent trillions on wars that only enriched Raytheon and BlackRock? The real theft wasn’t done in Beijing. It was done in boardrooms, think tanks, and Senate halls under the banner of “free markets” and “security.”

 » There is no possibility of market acceptance of US goods in China. «
The US is de facto cut off from the colossal Chinese market.

This moment isn’t the climax of a trade war. It’s the end of illusion, that the US can sanction, tariff, and bully its way to eternal dominance. Beijing just called time. 125% is the ceiling. From here forward, they won’t play the empire’s game. They're building a new one, with bricks, not bombs. With real trade, not tribute. With allies who don’t need threats to stay loyal.

 
 
Trump economic counselor Peter Navarro accuses China of killing "1 million Americans with fentanyl" and "destroying over 60,000 American factories and 5 million manufacturing jobs". Who prescribes opioids to millions of Americans, leading to addiction? Did China choose to ship these factories offshore and deindustrialize for tax evasion and cheap labor?


See also:

And, of course, no one understands tariffs—only Trump does.