Why Time Is on Iran, Russia and China's Side | Michael Hudson

Time is on the side of Iran, Russia, and China and increasingly works against the US and its allies. The longer the confrontation persists, the greater the pressure on highly indebted Western economies. As in Russia's past wars against Napoleon and Germany, the decisive advantage need not come from military strength alone, but from an external force that steadily erodes the enemy's capacity to sustain the conflict. Today, that force is the global financial and economic system.

"General Winter"—Russia's eternal ally against her enemies.

The US has contained the oil price shock by releasing oil from its strategic petroleum reserves and encouraging other countries to do the same, despite the major disruption to Persian Gulf exports. But this buys time, and only by depleting reserves and leaving less room for further intervention. The stakes are high because higher energy prices quickly feed into diesel, aviation fuel, fertilizer, transportation, and food costs. With the US midterm elections approaching, Washington is therefore racing the clock to contain prices as its economic buffers diminish.

Weaponizing Survival: Energy, Food, and Sovereign Debt Pressure

Iran's strategic advantage is to avoid escalation while letting economic pressure accumulate. A similar dynamic is developing around Russia and Ukraine, where disruptions to grain exports risk compounding the energy shock. About 27% of global grain trade moves through the Black Sea; Ukraine's harvest is coming in while warehouses are full, and Russian attacks on shipping and ports threaten both incoming supplies and outgoing grain. Much of Ukraine's grain normally goes to Europe, leaving Europe vulnerable to simultaneous fertilizer, food, and energy-price shocks.

 

Asymmetric warfare against Western full-spectrum aggression:

wrecking the enemy through food, energy, and debt.

The crisis need not involve major military escalation because the US and Europe are already too financially stretched to absorb a sustained increase in energy costs without wider economic damage. Higher fuel prices raise transportation, food distribution, and production costs; industries operating on thin margins can become unprofitable; and higher inflation puts upward pressure on interest rates. The resulting pressure spreads to agriculture, trucking, and the movement of crops, with particularly severe effects in the West, among US allies, and across developing economies in Asia and the Global South.

Base, Apex, and Anchor of Primakov's RIC Triangle 2.0.

 

Higher inflation and interest rates also raise the cost of servicing already-heavy debt burdens. Rising bond yields compound the problem in the US, Japan, and other highly indebted economies, while vulnerabilities associated with Japan's currency and carry trade expose the limits of available policy responses. The fundamental vulnerability is therefore debt: governments must increasingly choose between supporting households and industry and servicing accumulated debt.

Sanctions Threaten America's Financial Power 

This pressure also threatens the financial system that has enabled the US to exercise global power for decades. Washington has relied not only on military force, but also on its control of the dollar, international payments, global banking, and the oil trade. By weaponizing sanctions against Iran and threatening Chinese, Asian, and other banks involved in Iranian oil transactions, the US is encouraging those same countries and institutions to reduce their dependence on the dollar. Financial coercion could therefore undermine one of America's principal instruments of power.

 

» We lie, we cheat, we steal. «

murder, slaughter, genocide: children, women, heads of state; weapon, drug, organ, child

trafficking; well poisoning; pedophilia; hijacking; torturing; counterfeiting; looting; piracy; bribery...

 

The oil trade is particularly important because Persian Gulf and OPEC oil have long been key channels of US financial influence. Oil revenues recycled through US banks, dollar assets, and the American financial system have reinforced the dollar's central position. Driving oil producers, buyers, and financial institutions away from that system therefore risks undermining the very mechanism Washington has used as a global economic choke point.  

 

Trump offered billions to Iran's military. 
Iran: "Leave before it's too late!"

Iran's strategy exploits this contradiction. If its own oil exports are blocked by sanctions and trade restrictions, the implicit threat is that broader oil exports may also be disrupted, forcing other countries to choose between accepting higher energy costs and resisting the sanctions regime. Iran cannot defeat the US militarily, even though it can attack US bases in the Middle East; its leverage instead lies in imposing costs on the wider system and forcing other countries to decide how they will respond.

China and the Emerging Alternative

China is relatively well-positioned to withstand such pressure because of its large oil reserves, coal resources, and extensive investment in solar power and other energy alternatives. The broader question is how China, Russia, Iran, Asia, and the Global South will respond if continued US sanctions keep driving up energy and commodity prices. Their incentive will be to develop mechanisms that insulate their trade from unilateral US financial coercion. 

Zhou Xiaochuan, Governor of the People's Bank of China, presenting his
landmark 2009 proposal, "Reform the International Monetary System," 
to the Bank for International Settlements (BIS).

Gold provides one possible reserve asset outside the dollar system. Countries have increasingly added to their gold reserves while maintaining relatively stable dollar holdings; the European Union now holds more reserves in gold than in dollars. China and Russia have also developed alternatives to Western payment infrastructure. China's and Russia's independent clearing systems reduce their reliance on SWIFT, while Iran has experimented with cryptocurrency payments despite the US seizure of Iranian cryptocurrency assets.  

 

The issue therefore goes beyond creating a BRICS currency. What is required is an alternative international architecture for payments, reserves, and lending, capable of financing trade without depending on the dollar, SWIFT, the IMF, or other Western institutions. China, because of its enormous financial reserves, is uniquely positioned to provide the financial capacity that such a system would require. Russia and Iran could contribute oil, with Russia also contributing grain.

The Cost of Dedollarization

Such a system could fundamentally reshape the post-1945 financial order. Countries facing rising energy, food, fertilizer, and chemical costs would increasingly face a choice between supporting domestic industry and households and servicing dollar-denominated debt. As balance-of-payments pressures intensify, governments would have to decide whether scarce resources should go toward subsidizing industry, protecting families from higher heating and food costs, or continuing to pay foreign creditors. The incentive to prioritize domestic stability would accelerate dedollarization and weaken the financial mechanisms through which Washington has historically exercised global influence.

More sanctions, guns, butter, servicing debt, or collapse?

 

China, Russia, and Iran could therefore form the foundation of an alternative monetary system: Iran contributing oil, Russia oil and grain, and China financial reserves. Such a system could remove or weaken several of the instruments of influence established after World War II to structure global trade and finance in America's interest, including control over the dollar, oil, food, and seaborne trade. 

Keynes's Alternative to the Dollar System

The alternative need not be another dominant national currency at all. The argument instead returns to John Maynard Keynes's 1944 proposal for an international clearing institution based on a supranational unit of account called the bancor. Keynes proposed a system designed to manage persistent international surpluses and deficits rather than forcing debtor countries into destructive austerity. The institution would manage intergovernmental debts, allowing countries with temporary imbalances to obtain temporary liquidity while preserving their capacity to become economically self-sufficient.

 

Keynes maybe wasn't all wrong.

The critical difference is that surplus countries would also share responsibility for global imbalances. Keynes argued that the persistent accumulation of surpluses and claims by creditor countries necessarily creates corresponding deficits elsewhere. If debts become so large that repayment requires destroying a debtor’s economy, those debts should be written down—and the corresponding creditor claims written down as well. The US rejected this approach in 1944 because it was then the dominant creditor and had little incentive to accept a system that could reduce its accumulated claims.

 

Keynes's proposal was shaped by the German reparations and transfer debates of the 1920s. His central argument was that a debtor cannot repay indefinitely by suppressing wages, transferring resources abroad, and selling its assets without destroying its own productive economy. A loan made without regard to the borrower’s ability to repay ultimately becomes a bad loan. The same logic, he argued, applies internationally: forcing debtors into permanent austerity can produce depression rather than repayment.

 

The proposed international institution would create an accounting unit based on a combination of gold and member currencies rather than a conventional national currency. It would manage international surpluses and deficits and provide liquidity for temporary imbalances. When accumulated claims became impossible to service without undermining a country’s productive capacity, the system would permit debt reduction rather than compel economic destruction.

China's Potential Role

China could potentially build such an international payments system around productive investment rather than creditor extraction. Its investments in ports, railways, infrastructure, and the Belt and Road Initiative could increase borrowers' productive capacity and ability to earn foreign exchange, enabling them to repay principal and interest rather than forcing them into austerity and privatization. The argument is that, unlike Western financial systems, China has the capacity to structure such financing primarily on geopolitical and developmental grounds rather than purely for financial returns or capital gains.

 

The central question is whether China itself could avoid becoming another creditor power with the capacity to weaponize its currency. The historical lesson, however, is that other countries did not necessarily expect the US to weaponize the dollar in the 1950s and 1960s, yet it eventually did. The same concern could apply to the yuan. The proposed solution, however, is not simply to substitute one national currency for another, but to create an international clearing mechanism that limits any single country's ability to accumulate unlimited financial power.

The End of the Post-1945 Order

The broader conclusion is that the post-1945 financial order may be approaching a structural break. The present conflict is no longer simply a military conflict; it is increasingly a contest between competing economic systems: a creditor-driven and highly financialized model and an industrial, state-directed model represented by China and parts of Asia. The existing system may not contain mechanisms capable of managing this transition. Instead, the world could fracture into parallel financial and economic systems, with the struggle over the future economic order ultimately displacing the narrower conception of a military or civilizational conflict.

Reference:

Michael Hudson (August 20, 2026) - Why Time Is on Iran, Russia and China's Side.

The Imminent Fall of the Eurodollar System | Alex Krainer

During a meeting with technology, crypto, and finance leaders held at the White House yesterday, President Trump brought up the GENIUS Act (Guiding and Establishing National Innovation for US Stablecoins Act) again.

» I know, I know… The idea that the Trump administration is doing anything "legitimate"

may defy imagination by now, but the current arrangement is anything but legitimate. «

 

Trump framed the Act as part of his administration's broader crypto and digital-asset agenda (ending what he called the "war on crypto," launching "Project Crypto," establishing a US Strategic Bitcoin Reserve, and creating a Digital Asset Stockpile):

"One year ago this summer, I signed landmark legislation known as the GENIUS Act. … paving the way for widespread adoption of dollar-backed stablecoins, and that's worked out very well."

Indeed, the Act was already passed last summer, and Trump signed it into law on July 18, 2025, so why all the commotion about it now, more than a year later?

Could be earth-shattering…

Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent tweeted that the GENIUS Act established a landmark framework and clear rules of the road for payment stablecoins, and that the Treasury is moving quickly to implement that framework, asking for "input from stakeholders" in order to "cement the role of the US dollar as the world's reserve currency, and keep America the crypto capital of the world."

The US, via regulated dollar stablecoins and Treasury authority under the GENIUS Act, aims to shut down the unregulated eurodollar market, reclaim control of the dollar's global role, and defund the "rules-based order" and shadow networks, triggering market tremors, surging demand for legitimate dollars, and pressure on non-favored countries such as Britain, the EU, and Canada.

The Act establishes new US federal laws creating a comprehensive regulatory framework for payment stablecoins redeemable for a fixed monetary value (typically $1) and intended to maintain a stable value relative to the "legal tender" currency. It also restricts the issuance of stablecoins to "permitted payment stablecoin issuers," and this is where the GENIUS Act gets extremely interesting.

What GENIUS Is All About…

Speaking at the SALT Conference in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, the former Wall Street executive and prominent advocate for monetary reform Caitlin Long pointed out that the GENIUS Act enables the Treasury Department to define "what is allowed to be a so-called euro-dollar, euro-yen, euro-euro. Or yuan, right?" She continued:

"… the term ‘euro' doesn't mean European. It means a dollar issued offshore outside of the United States … These are tokenized fiat currencies issued outside of their home country, and the US Treasury is taking charge of the recognition of the validity of these. That is massive.

The fact that there are institutions outside of the United States that can issue US currency should be regarded as an illegal aberration. Effectively, they're counterfeiting US dollars, but in spite of that, for some reason, it has been taken as normal for decades now. That's in spite of the fact that counterfeiting US dollars abroad effectively robs the purchasing power of American taxpayers to fund any manner of nefarious activities."

Most likely, that's why this system was allowed to grow to such massive proportions. Caitlin Long again:

"… If you're a student of the financial markets, you know that the eurodollar market is as large as the domestic financial market. That's the offshore dollar market. When the US Treasury is taking control of what is recognized as valid, that is taken from the Fed. … The Treasury is taking power back over the US dollar, over the eurodollar markets, and, frankly, over the US role in the financial system globally from the Fed."

Long made these comments after discussing the GENIUS Act with "someone who just walked out" of a Treasury Department meeting, and if she is right (I believe she certainly is), the implications could be truly earth-shattering. To begin with, disenfranchising the Fed and taking control over the currency from it is the stuff of civil wars.

"To put that into context, when we were talking earlier about how antiquated the traditional system is and that the Fed's systems are themselves behind… If you've been watching, all of the other agencies have issued rules [in accordance with the GENIUS Act]. One glaring exception: the Fed has not issued its rules yet, and according to the GENIUS Act, all of the agencies' rules were supposed to be final a couple of weeks ago. The Fed hasn't even issued theirs yet, so there's this dynamic going on between the Treasury Department and the Fed."

"The dynamic" going on between the Treasury Department and the Fed is a political collision course in which the Treasury is trying to wrest control over the monetary system from the unelected private bankers and return it to the democratically elected government and its legitimate institutions.

I know, I know… The idea that the Trump administration is doing anything "legitimate" may defy imagination by now, but the current arrangement is anything but legitimate. It is also patently unconstitutional: the Constitution of the US explicitly authorizes Congress with the power "To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof…" (Article I, Section 8, Clause 5). The Constitution also gives Congress the power "to provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the United States."

 

Contrary to its name, the eurodollar has nothing to do with the European currency. The eurodollar market is an offshore fractional-reserve banking system in which dollar deposits held at banks outside the US are multiplied through interbank lending and book-entry creation, largely free of Fed reserve requirements, to form a vast parallel dollar funding market that ultimately settles via US payment systems.

Eurodollar, Fed, and the Shadow Governments

The counterfeit US dollars circulating abroad are the glue that holds the global "rules-based" order together: they enable the funding needed to bribe foreign officials, pay for and arm the sundry jihadi terror groups and separatist militias. The colossal network of NGOs, charitable organizations, and other groups and activities of shadow governments around the world can't be fully funded through legitimate legal means. These activities often require illegal activities and trillions in embezzled funds.

For example, according to recent reports, billions of dollars have been offered to Iranian officials to sell out and turn Iran over to a government more friendly to the Trump team. In the past, we know that hundreds of millions in US bank notes are routinely smuggled from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, past the US Comptroller of the Currency, to provide funding for coups, assassinations, regime-change operations, and similar "special assignments" by the shadow government.

That is why it should be essential for the US government to regain control of the dollars circulating abroad (or to render those dollars illegitimate and worthless), defunding the "rules-based global order" and reasserting US economic and financial sovereignty. While it would be too optimistic to expect that the Trump administration has pushed the GENIUS Act to achieve any such elevated goals, we should hope that it might leave behind the means needed for American democracy to reassert its economic and financial sovereignty and turn its currency into a tool to recover its prosperity and economic edge.

In the Meantime, Tremors

Given that half or more of all US dollars in circulation around the world are outside the United States, the administration's intended actions (there'll be ambushes; we'll find out) will cause major tremors in world markets, driving demand for "legitimate" dollars and rendering the "illegitimate" ones worthless. This will enable Trump and his team to exert pressure on governments around the world and dictate the terms at which their dollar balances may be converted into new stablecoins needed for trade settlement and reserve requirements.

I expect that Great Britain, the EU, and Canada won't be among the "most favored nations" in the near future, which will further worsen their fiscal positions, make it difficult for them to access global markets and procure commodities like oil, natural gas, wheat, and others. This will lead to shortages and exacerbate inflationary pressures at home.

Reference:

Alex Krainer (August 20, 2026) - The imminent fall of the Eurodollar system.

See also:
Alex Krainer (August 17, 2026) - Japan's Yen Collapse Threatens to Drag the US Down With It.
Martin Armstrong (July 17, 2025) - Trump's GENIUS Act Sets the Stage for US CBDC.

De-Dollarized Payment Rails For African Continental Free Trade Area

On July 20, 2026, the governors of the Central Bank of Egypt and the Central Bank of Eswatini met in Cairo to discuss expanding banking cooperation, Egypt's experience with the Pan-African Payment and Settlement System (PAPSS), and the Pan-African Gold Bank initiative already underway with African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank, Cairo, Egypt).

PAPSS enables instant cross-border payments in local currencies through three core processes: instant payment, pre-funding and net settlement. Instant payments eliminate the need to convert into hard currencies and route funds outside Africa, while performing compliance, legal and sanctions checks in real time. This will save African nations an estimated $5 billion annually in Western bank transaction fees.

PAPSS, operated by Afreximbank together with the African Union (AU) and the AfCFTA Secretariat, had by then linked banks across a growing network. The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which entered into force on May 30, 2019, and by mid-2026 had been ratified by 49 of 54 signatory states, is the continent-wide free-trade area covering a market of more than 1.4 billion people; PAPSS was developed specifically to support payments and settlement under it. 

The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) is the flagship project of the African Union's Agenda 2063. It creates a single market of more than 1.4 billion people across the 55 AU member states by liberalizing trade in goods and services, investment, intellectual property, competition, digital trade, and women and youth participation.

In July 2026 the Bank of Central African States joined PAPSS, bringing in the six CEMAC CFA-franc countries and raising the total to 28 nations served by more than 190 commercial banks and fintechs through 16 switches. 

Customer  payments move in local currencies: a payer instructs a bank,  PAPSS performs real-time validation, compliance, and sanctions checks,  and the beneficiary’s bank credits the recipient, typically in about  seven seconds against a 120-second design maximum. Because the credits  are irrevocable, direct participants pre-fund clearing accounts through  their national Real-Time Gross Settlement Systems (RTGS) while indirect  participants obtain liquidity through sponsorship. At 11:00 UTC each  day, PAPSS calculates the multilateral net position of every  participating central bank, settles the local-currency leg through the  central banks' RTGS systems, and sends any residual imbalance as a  hard-currency instruction to Afreximbank, which acts as settlement  agent. The residual step still uses dollars or other convertible  currencies, yet the front end largely bypasses external correspondent  chains and sharply reduces the volume of hard-currency settlement  required.

Separately, on December 29–30, 2025, the Central Bank of Egypt and Afreximbank signed a memorandum of understanding to establish a pan-African gold-bank program intended to formalize gold value chains, strengthen central-bank reserves, and reduce reliance on foreign refining and trading hubs. 

 

A feasibility study for an internationally accredited gold refinery, secure vaulting, and related financial services—potentially located in an Egyptian free-trade zone—was commissioned with McKinsey; by mid-2026 Afreximbank had signaled a $50–100 million commitment toward the refinery, with construction targeted for the end of 2026 and operations in 2027–28. The project remains at the planning stage.

 

From 2012–2022, industrial and semi-industrial gold mining operated in 26+ African countries, with output rising in most. Production nearly doubled in Mali and Burkina Faso and increased fivefold in Côte d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast), while declining elsewhere—most notably in South Africa (180 tons in 2011 to 84 tons in 2022). In 2022, Ghana led with 95.8 tons, followed by South Africa (84), Mali (66.2), and Burkina Faso (57.7).

Parallel developments are linking Africa more closely to Chinese and Hong Kong infrastructure. Afreximbank became a direct participant of China's Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) and Standard Bank the first African commercial bank to join the system; in June 2026, Standard Bank and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) were authorized as the Renminbi Clearing Bank of Africa, covering 19 countries. 

 

Hong Kong's Christopher Hui advanced gold-market memoranda with Laos and exploratory discussions with Ghana, while the Hong Kong Gold Exchange partnered with Alibaba-backed AGTech on a digital trading and clearing platform. Chinese gold imports reached roughly 163 tons in May and 173 tons in June 2026, against official People's Bank of China (PBOC) purchases of about 10 and 15 tons respectively; the difference is absorbed by commercial banks and private demand.

See also:

TPR (August 8, 2026) - The Slow Demise of France’s Enduring Colonial Currency System in Africa?

MFA of PRC (2023) - The US' Economic Hegemony: Looting and Exploitation.

The Slow Demise of France’s Enduring Colonial Currency System in Africa

There is a currency circulating across 14 African nations. Designed in Paris, printed in France, it required for decades that its users deposit up to half their foreign reserves in the French Treasury. Called the CFA franc (officially Communauté Financière Africaine, i.e. African Financial Community), it has operated continuously since 1945. The same instrument created to control and manage France's colonial possessions in sub-Saharan Africa still functions in many ways today. More than 155 million people use it; 14 formally sovereign nations depend on it. And the debate over whether it represents stability or subjugation has never been louder.

UEMOA + CEMAC + Comoros = CFA franc zone.

 

A country that controls another country's currency controls that economy. France understood this better than almost anyone. While the British pound zone dissolved France held on and the invisible scaffolding linking Paris to Dakar, Abidjan, Yaoundé and Libreville has never been dismantled.

Return to 1945. Europe lies in ruins. France, liberated from Nazi Germany, struggles to feed itself. Inflation spirals; the metropolitan franc loses value weekly. Across the Atlantic the Bretton Woods agreements establish the postwar financial order: the gold-backed dollar as global anchor, every nation required to declare its currency's value to the new IMF. France's shattered economy forces a sharp devaluation of the metropolitan franc against the dollar.

 

West African CFA franc—fiat bills with zero intrinsic value, backed

only by an ECB-mandated fixed exchange rate to the euro.

 

De Gaulle's finance minister Pleven applies different rates to the metropole and the colonies. In France the franc falls hard. In French West Africa, French Equatorial Africa, and the Comoros a new currency is born at a stronger rate: one CFA franc equals 1.7 metropolitan francs. By 1948 the ratio is two to one. The colonies suddenly possess a currency stronger than France's own.

Presented as generosity, the mechanics tell another story. A strong currency in a raw-material exporter that imports finished goods acts as an import subsidy and export tax. It cheapens French manufactures for the colony and makes the colony’s own goods less competitive abroad. From day one the CFA franc's pricing structure channeled African purchasing power toward French industry and quietly strangled the development of competitive local export sectors. Solid Rothschild architecture designed to endure.

A fixed exchange rate set below equilibrium creates excess demand for foreign currency

(Qd > Qs), which the central bank must cover by selling reserves to maintain the peg.

 

And its original name said everything: Colonies Françaises d’Afrique—French Colonies of Africa. No euphemism. Notes were printed then, and still are, in Chamalières by the Banque de France. Four pillars underpinned the system and proved remarkably durable: a fixed exchange rate with the French franc (later the euro) guaranteeing unlimited convertibility by the French Treasury; free capital movement between the CFA zone and France; and the operations account requiring the zone's central banks to deposit a large share of foreign-exchange reserves in the French Treasury.

At founding that share was 100 percent. By 1973 it fell to 65 percent; by 2005 to a 50 percent ceiling. Even at half, 'sovereign nations' handed over half their foreign exchange wealth to a former colonial power in exchange for a guarantee against currency collapse. Defenders cite stability: relatively low inflation compared with much of Africa, insulation from crises that wrecked Zimbabwe or Venezuela. Outside one massive 1994 devaluation the CFA franc has tracked the French franc and then the euro almost lockstep for nearly eighty years. But stability for whom, and at what cost?

Viral 2019 Italian TV clip of Giorgia Meloni (then opposition leader, now Prime Minister) holding a CFA franc note and calling it France's "colonial currency" to exploit resources via seigniorage and export controls.  

Pegged at 655.957 CFA francs to the euro, member states cannot adjust the exchange rate to their own conditions. They cannot devalue to boost exports, expand the money supply in a downturn, or set independent interest rates. Monetary policy—the core tool of any sovereign country—is outsourced to the European Central Bank, which sets policy for Germany, France and the Netherlands, not Senegal, Cameroon or Chad. In 2008 and again during the COVID-19 plandemic, countries with sovereign currencies printed money and cut rates; CFA countries could not.

Economists have long argued the franc is chronically overvalued relative to the productive capacity of its users. Overvaluation makes imports cheap and exports expensive—fine for comprador elites buying luxury goods in Paris, devastating for farmers selling cocoa or cotton against competitors with weaker, flexible currencies. The structural result is a permanent tilt toward importing rather than producing and deep dependence on foreign capital. This is a design feature, not an accident.

 

Olympio, murdered—like Kennedy—by the small hat money printers in 1963.

 

Sylvanus Olympio, first president of Togo, was elected in 1961 and immediately pushed to leave the CFA system and establish a national central bank. He saw monetary and political sovereignty as inseparable. On January 13, 1963, less than three years after independence, he was assassinated in a coup led by a French-trained sergeant. The new government proved far more amenable to French interests; Togo remained in the CFA zone. Leaders who challenge French economic control tend to meet violent ends or removal; those who cooperate enjoy long, French-supported tenures.

Sankara—radical anti-imperialist, pan-Africanist and austere leader

—prioritized self-reliance, massive social reforms, and integrity.

Murdered by the small hat money printers in 1987. 

The most iconic case is Thomas Sankara. In 1983, aged 33, he seized power in Upper Volta and renamed it Burkina Faso—"land of upright people." He ran mass vaccination campaigns, planted over ten million trees against desertification, banned female genital mutilation, appointed women to high office, refused air-conditioning, drove a modest Renault 5 and cut official salaries including his own. His greatest offense in Paris's eyes was open challenge to the CFA franc and Françafrique—the web of political, military and economic ties binding former colonies to France. On October 15, 1987 he was assassinated in a coup led by his deputy Blaise Compaoré, who then ruled the country for 27 years and reversed the anti-French course. In April 2022 a Burkinabe military tribunal convicted Compaoré and associates in absentia; Compaoré, living in exile in Ivory Coast, received a life sentence. The tribunal confirmed French agents were in Ouagadougou the day after the coup. Sankara's family formally accused France of masterminding the killing. Macron pledged in 2017 to declassify related documents; they have not been fully released.

Françafrique operates on a larger scale still: French bases, advisers inside ministries, preferential access for French firms to African resources, and the CFA franc as monetary backbone. Comprador elites enjoyed convertibility that let them move wealth to Paris, an overvalued currency that made luxury imports affordable, and French political and military protection. Ordinary citizens faced scarce credit, interest rates dictated by European conditions, import competition that crushed local firms, and capital mobility that functioned largely as a one-way valve outward.

France confronts rising anti-French sentiment in West Africa—Bamako,

Mali, 2020: "France get out" demonstration against French, EU and UN forces. 

By the late 1980s the franc was severely overvalued. Commodity prices—cocoa, coffee, cotton, oil—were falling while the French franc appreciated, dragging the CFA with it. On January 12, 1994 the CFA franc was devalued 50 percent overnight. The decision was taken in Paris, not in any African capital. French Prime Minister Édouard Balladur later confirmed it was done at France's instigation "to help these countries in their development." Overnight the purchasing power of roughly 150 million people was halved. Prices of imported food, medicine and fuel doubled; urban poverty surged; foreign-currency public debt effectively doubled. The cost fell entirely on African citizens who had no vote and no veto. The event laid bare the system's reality: sovereign in name, monetary dependencies in fact.

When France joined the euro in 1999 the CFA franc was pegged at 655.957 to the euro—a rate that still holds. The anchor changed; the dynamics did not. Monetary policy is now set by the European Central Bank for a union of wealthy European states with zero representation or accountability to the African economies bound to it. Notes continue to be printed in Chamalières; until recent reforms the operations accounts still funneled reserves to the French Treasury; French representatives sat on the boards of the BCEAO in Dakar and the BEAC in Yaoundé.

 

Rothschild stooge Macron arrives in Ivory Coast—for Christmas with his troops.

 

By the 2010s a new generation of African intellectuals and leaders challenged the system with growing force. Senegalese economist Ndongo Samba Sylla called the CFA franc "an anachronism requiring orderly elimination." In 2015 Chadian President Idriss Déby declared that a "cord preventing development in Africa" must be severed—everyone knew which cord. In 2019 Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni held up a CFA note on television and accused France of exploitation, an accusation that resonated widely.

 

In December 2019, under pressure, Macron and Ivory Coast's Alassane Ouattara announced reforms in Abidjan: the West African CFA franc would become the Eco; the 50 percent reserve deposit requirement would end; French board seats at the BCEAO would disappear; the operations account would close and reserves return to Dakar. Headlines called it historic. The fine print was more cautious: the fixed euro peg remained, French convertibility guarantee continued, and France retained a backup credit line. The most symbolically offensive features were removed; the macro-economically decisive peg stayed.

Muammar Gaddafi's African gold dinar was a 2009-2011 pan-African initiative to introduce a single, gold-backed currency aimed to replace the US dollar and the French-backed CFA franc across Africa, allowing nations to sell oil and resources for gold to achieve complete financial independence from Western systems. Murdered by the small hat money printers in 2011.

Critics call it rebranding. The name Eco had already been chosen for a broader ECOWAS common currency that would have included Nigeria; a francophone-only Eco complicated that project. The reforms covered only the eight West African states. The six Central African users of the BEAC franc—Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon—still deposit 50 percent of reserves in Paris and still have French board representation. As of today, the Eco has not launched; the latest ECOWAS target of 2027 is viewed with widespread skepticism.

Meanwhile the Sahel transformed. Coups between 2020 and 2023 toppled governments in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Guinea, each fueled in part by anti-French sentiment over military presence, European and US sponsored Jihadist terrorism, economic extraction and the CFA franc. In 2024 Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger left ECOWAS and formed the landlocked Alliance of Sahel States, explicitly rejecting French influence and discussing exit from the CFA franc toward national or shared Sahelian currencies. Chad and Senegal demanded withdrawal of French troops, Niger the retreat of the French and Americans. 

 

» The slave that cannot carry out his own revolt deserves no pity. «
Ibrahim Traoré, President of Burkina Faso.

 

Senegal's president Bassirou Diomaye Faye and his prime minister Ousmane Sonko campaigned in 2023 on economic sovereignty; Sonko declared in 2025 that the CFA franc is "both a symbolic and an economic problem." The cry "La France dégage" (France, get out!) has echoed from Niamey to Bamako to Ouagadougou to Dakar, encompassing French military bases, mining concessions and, above all, monetary sovereignty. The CFA franc had become the most visible symbol of unfinished decolonization.

» Jub, Jubal, Jubanti. «
(Be upright, act with integrity, and rectify what is crooked.)

Faye, elected president of Senegal in 2024, had expelled French troops by March 2025 and was

elected Chairman of ECOWAS in July 2026; however, Senegal has not left the CFA franc. Hello Eco...

What replaces it remains complicated. Exit without credible alternatives requires building central-bank capacity, reserve management, monetary-policy frameworks and market confidence from scratch. Countries that left earlier—Guinea in 1960, Madagascar and Mauritania in 1973—faced significant turbulence. Yet defenders must confront the system's record: the 14 CFA countries include some of the world's poorest; Niger, Chad, the Central African Republic and Burkina Faso rank near the bottom of the UN Human Development Index; per-capita GDP remains a fraction of the global average. Eighty years of promised stability have not delivered development, poverty reduction or structural transformation. The question is no longer only whether these countries can afford to leave, but whether they can afford to stay.

 

Why would-should-could all these countries remain in the CFA franc zone? 

A monetary system whose notes are printed in France, whose reserves have historically been held in the French Treasury, whose exchange rate is set by a European institution, and in which the actual users long had no meaningful say, was designed under colonialism, preserved through co-optation, coercion and violence, and maintained by institutional inertia and the complicity of local comprador elites who benefit. 

 

At no point in history has the CFA franc been closer to its demise, just coinciding with the scheduled 2027 rollout of the

Eco—the proposed new ECOWAS common currency, directly pegged to the Euro. Again. One couldn't make this up.

And it just sounds, looks, and smells as fantastic and promising as the Euro...

 

The CFA franc is a monument to the idea that independence can be granted with one hand while economic sovereignty is withheld with the other. The most effective control is not always exercised with guns and borders; sometimes it is exercised with exchange rates, reserve requirements and banknotes printed thousands of kilometers from the pockets that carry them.

 

Whether or when the CFA franc system collapses, adapts once more as the Eco, national sovereign currencies, or something else remains open. What is clear is that a reckoning is already under way across the Sahel and beyond. A new generation asks the question Sankara asked four decades ago: "If a nation does not control its own money, can it truly call itself free?"

 

Reference: 
Enrico Creta (2026) - The CFA Franc and the Mechanics of Monetary Servitude in Francophone Africa.
Alassane Dialloa Dego & Adama Bac (2024) - From French franc to euro: An economic impact for CFA franc zone countries?
Fanny Pigeaud & Ndongo Samba Sylla (2021) - Africa's Last Colonial Currency: The CFA Franc Story.