The Slow Demise of France’s Enduring Colonial Currency System in Africa?

There is a currency circulating across 14 African nations. Designed in Paris, printed in France, it required for decades that its users deposit up to half their foreign reserves in the French Treasury. Called the CFA franc (officially Communauté Financière Africaine, i.e. African Financial Community), it has operated continuously since 1945. The same instrument created to control and manage France's colonial possessions in sub-Saharan Africa still functions in many ways today. More than 155 million people use it; 14 formally sovereign nations depend on it. And the debate over whether it represents stability or subjugation has never been louder.

UEMOA + CEMAC + Comoros = CFA franc zone.

 

A country that controls another country's currency controls that economy. France understood this better than almost anyone. While the British pound zone dissolved France held on and the invisible scaffolding linking Paris to Dakar, Abidjan, Yaoundé and Libreville has never been dismantled.

Return to 1945. Europe lies in ruins. France, liberated from Nazi Germany, struggles to feed itself. Inflation spirals; the metropolitan franc loses value weekly. Across the Atlantic the Bretton Woods agreements establish the postwar financial order: the gold-backed dollar as global anchor, every nation required to declare its currency's value to the new IMF. France's shattered economy forces a sharp devaluation of the metropolitan franc against the dollar.

 

West African CFA franc—fiat bills with zero intrinsic value, backed

only by an ECB-mandated fixed exchange rate to the euro.

 

De Gaulle's finance minister Pleven applies different rates to the metropole and the colonies. In France the franc falls hard. In French West Africa, French Equatorial Africa, and the Comoros a new currency is born at a stronger rate: one CFA franc equals 1.7 metropolitan francs. By 1948 the ratio is two to one. The colonies suddenly possess a currency stronger than France's own.

Presented as generosity, the mechanics tell another story. A strong currency in a raw-material exporter that imports finished goods acts as an import subsidy and export tax. It cheapens French manufactures for the colony and makes the colony’s own goods less competitive abroad. From day one the CFA franc's pricing structure channeled African purchasing power toward French industry and quietly strangled the development of competitive local export sectors. Solid Rothschild architecture designed to endure.

A fixed exchange rate set below equilibrium creates excess demand for foreign currency

(Qd > Qs), which the central bank must cover by selling reserves to maintain the peg.

 

And its original name said everything: Colonies Françaises d’Afrique—French Colonies of Africa. No euphemism. Notes were printed then, and still are, in Chamalières by the Banque de France. Four pillars underpinned the system and proved remarkably durable: a fixed exchange rate with the French franc (later the euro) guaranteeing unlimited convertibility by the French Treasury; free capital movement between the CFA zone and France; and the operations account requiring the zone's central banks to deposit a large share of foreign-exchange reserves in the French Treasury.

At founding that share was 100 percent. By 1973 it fell to 65 percent; by 2005 to a 50 percent ceiling. Even at half, 'sovereign nations' handed over half their foreign exchange wealth to a former colonial power in exchange for a guarantee against currency collapse. Defenders cite stability: relatively low inflation compared with much of Africa, insulation from crises that wrecked Zimbabwe or Venezuela. Outside one massive 1994 devaluation the CFA franc has tracked the French franc and then the euro almost lockstep for nearly eighty years. But stability for whom, and at what cost?

Viral 2019 Italian TV clip of Giorgia Meloni (then opposition leader, now Prime Minister) holding a CFA franc note and calling it France's "colonial currency" to exploit resources via seigniorage and export controls.  

Pegged at 655.957 CFA francs to the euro, member states cannot adjust the exchange rate to their own conditions. They cannot devalue to boost exports, expand the money supply in a downturn, or set independent interest rates. Monetary policy—the core tool of any sovereign country—is outsourced to the European Central Bank, which sets policy for Germany, France and the Netherlands, not Senegal, Cameroon or Chad. In 2008 and again during the COVID-19 plandemic, countries with sovereign currencies printed money and cut rates; CFA countries could not.

Economists have long argued the franc is chronically overvalued relative to the productive capacity of its users. Overvaluation makes imports cheap and exports expensive—fine for comprador elites buying luxury goods in Paris, devastating for farmers selling cocoa or cotton against competitors with weaker, flexible currencies. The structural result is a permanent tilt toward importing rather than producing and deep dependence on foreign capital. This is a design feature, not an accident.

 

Olympio, murdered—like Kennedy—by the small hat money printers in 1963.

 

Sylvanus Olympio, first president of Togo, was elected in 1961 and immediately pushed to leave the CFA system and establish a national central bank. He saw monetary and political sovereignty as inseparable. On January 13, 1963, less than three years after independence, he was assassinated in a coup led by a French-trained sergeant. The new government proved far more amenable to French interests; Togo remained in the CFA zone. Leaders who challenge French economic control tend to meet violent ends or removal; those who cooperate enjoy long, French-supported tenures.

Sankara—radical anti-imperialist, pan-Africanist and austere leader

—prioritized self-reliance, massive social reforms, and integrity.

Murdered by the small hat money printers in 1987. 

The most iconic case is Thomas Sankara. In 1983, aged 33, he seized power in Upper Volta and renamed it Burkina Faso—"land of upright people." He ran mass vaccination campaigns, planted over ten million trees against desertification, banned female genital mutilation, appointed women to high office, refused air-conditioning, drove a modest Renault 5 and cut official salaries including his own. His greatest offense in Paris's eyes was open challenge to the CFA franc and Françafrique—the web of political, military and economic ties binding former colonies to France. On October 15, 1987 he was assassinated in a coup led by his deputy Blaise Compaoré, who then ruled the country for 27 years and reversed the anti-French course. In April 2022 a Burkinabe military tribunal convicted Compaoré and associates in absentia; Compaoré, living in exile in Ivory Coast, received a life sentence. The tribunal confirmed French agents were in Ouagadougou the day after the coup. Sankara's family formally accused France of masterminding the killing. Macron pledged in 2017 to declassify related documents; they have not been fully released.

Françafrique operates on a larger scale still: French bases, advisers inside ministries, preferential access for French firms to African resources, and the CFA franc as monetary backbone. Comprador elites enjoyed convertibility that let them move wealth to Paris, an overvalued currency that made luxury imports affordable, and French political and military protection. Ordinary citizens faced scarce credit, interest rates dictated by European conditions, import competition that crushed local firms, and capital mobility that functioned largely as a one-way valve outward.

France confronts rising anti-French sentiment in West Africa—Bamako,

Mali, 2020: "France get out" demonstration against French, EU and UN forces. 

By the late 1980s the franc was severely overvalued. Commodity prices—cocoa, coffee, cotton, oil—were falling while the French franc appreciated, dragging the CFA with it. On January 12, 1994 the CFA franc was devalued 50 percent overnight. The decision was taken in Paris, not in any African capital. French Prime Minister Édouard Balladur later confirmed it was done at France's instigation "to help these countries in their development." Overnight the purchasing power of roughly 150 million people was halved. Prices of imported food, medicine and fuel doubled; urban poverty surged; foreign-currency public debt effectively doubled. The cost fell entirely on African citizens who had no vote and no veto. The event laid bare the system's reality: sovereign in name, monetary dependencies in fact.

When France joined the euro in 1999 the CFA franc was pegged at 655.957 to the euro—a rate that still holds. The anchor changed; the dynamics did not. Monetary policy is now set by the European Central Bank for a union of wealthy European states with zero representation or accountability to the African economies bound to it. Notes continue to be printed in Chamalières; until recent reforms the operations accounts still funneled reserves to the French Treasury; French representatives sat on the boards of the BCEAO in Dakar and the BEAC in Yaoundé.

 

Rothschild stooge Macron arrives in Ivory Coast—for Christmas with his troops.

 

By the 2010s a new generation of African intellectuals and leaders challenged the system with growing force. Senegalese economist Ndongo Samba Sylla called the CFA franc "an anachronism requiring orderly elimination." In 2015 Chadian President Idriss Déby declared that a "cord preventing development in Africa" must be severed—everyone knew which cord. In 2019 Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni held up a CFA note on television and accused France of exploitation, an accusation that resonated widely.

 

In December 2019, under pressure, Macron and Ivory Coast's Alassane Ouattara announced reforms in Abidjan: the West African CFA franc would become the Eco; the 50 percent reserve deposit requirement would end; French board seats at the BCEAO would disappear; the operations account would close and reserves return to Dakar. Headlines called it historic. The fine print was more cautious: the fixed euro peg remained, French convertibility guarantee continued, and France retained a backup credit line. The most symbolically offensive features were removed; the macro-economically decisive peg stayed.

Muammar Gaddafi's African gold dinar was a 2009-2011 pan-African initiative to introduce a single, gold-backed currency aimed to replace the US dollar and the French-backed CFA franc across Africa, allowing nations to sell oil and resources for gold to achieve complete financial independence from Western systems. Murdered by the small hat money printers in 2011.

Critics call it rebranding. The name Eco had already been chosen for a broader ECOWAS common currency that would have included Nigeria; a francophone-only Eco complicated that project. The reforms covered only the eight West African states. The six Central African users of the BEAC franc—Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon—still deposit 50 percent of reserves in Paris and still have French board representation. As of today, the Eco has not launched; the latest ECOWAS target of 2027 is viewed with widespread skepticism.

Meanwhile the Sahel transformed. Coups between 2020 and 2023 toppled governments in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Guinea, each fueled in part by anti-French sentiment over military presence, European and US sponsored Jihadist terrorism, economic extraction and the CFA franc. In 2024 Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger left ECOWAS and formed the landlocked Alliance of Sahel States, explicitly rejecting French influence and discussing exit from the CFA franc toward national or shared Sahelian currencies. Chad and Senegal demanded withdrawal of French troops, Niger the retreat of the French and Americans. 

 

» The slave that cannot carry out his own revolt deserves no pity. «
Ibrahim Traoré, President of Burkina Faso.

 

Senegal's president Bassirou Diomaye Faye and his prime minister Ousmane Sonko campaigned in 2023 on economic sovereignty; Sonko declared in 2025 that the CFA franc is "both a symbolic and an economic problem." The cry "La France dégage" (France, get out!) has echoed from Niamey to Bamako to Ouagadougou to Dakar, encompassing French military bases, mining concessions and, above all, monetary sovereignty. The CFA franc had become the most visible symbol of unfinished decolonization.

» Jub, Jubal, Jubanti. «
(Be upright, act with integrity, and rectify what is crooked.)

Faye, elected president of Senegal in 2024, had expelled French troops by March 2025 and was

elected Chairman of ECOWAS in July 2026; however, Senegal has not left the CFA franc. Hello Eco...

What replaces it remains complicated. Exit without credible alternatives requires building central-bank capacity, reserve management, monetary-policy frameworks and market confidence from scratch. Countries that left earlier—Guinea in 1960, Madagascar and Mauritania in 1973—faced significant turbulence. Yet defenders must confront the system's record: the 14 CFA countries include some of the world's poorest; Niger, Chad, the Central African Republic and Burkina Faso rank near the bottom of the UN Human Development Index; per-capita GDP remains a fraction of the global average. Eighty years of promised stability have not delivered development, poverty reduction or structural transformation. The question is no longer only whether these countries can afford to leave, but whether they can afford to stay.

 

Why would-should-could all these countries remain in the CFA franc zone? 

A monetary system whose notes are printed in France, whose reserves have historically been held in the French Treasury, whose exchange rate is set by a European institution, and in which the actual users long had no meaningful say, was designed under colonialism, preserved through co-optation, coercion and violence, and maintained by institutional inertia and the complicity of local comprador elites who benefit. 

 

At no point in history has the CFA franc been closer to its demise, just coinciding with the scheduled 2027 rollout of the

Eco—the proposed new ECOWAS common currency, directly pegged to the Euro. Again. One couldn't make this up.

And it just sounds, looks, and smells as fantastic and promising as the Euro...

 

The CFA franc is a monument to the idea that independence can be granted with one hand while economic sovereignty is withheld with the other. The most effective control is not always exercised with guns and borders; sometimes it is exercised with exchange rates, reserve requirements and banknotes printed thousands of kilometers from the pockets that carry them.

 

Whether or when the CFA franc system collapses, adapts once more as the Eco, national sovereign currencies, or something else remains open. What is clear is that a reckoning is already under way across the Sahel and beyond. A new generation asks the question Sankara asked four decades ago: "If a nation does not control its own money, can it truly call itself free?"

 

Reference: 
Enrico Creta (2026) - The CFA Franc and the Mechanics of Monetary Servitude in Francophone Africa.
Alassane Dialloa Dego & Adama Bac (2024) - From French franc to euro: An economic impact for CFA franc zone countries?
Fanny Pigeaud & Ndongo Samba Sylla (2021) - Africa's Last Colonial Currency: The CFA Franc Story.

Marco Rubio and the Narco-Terrorist Elite | Maureen Tkacik

If you’re a little too online, you likely know that Marco Rubio as a teenager made extra cash working for his late brother-in-law Orlando Cicilia. The business imported and sold exotic animals as a front for moving nearly a half million pounds of cocaine and marijuana.

 

» What politician doesn't have a felon relative? «

Marco Rubio, south of the US border commonly known as "El Gusano" and "Narco Rubio." 

[...] Rubio has sworn he knew nothing about the drugs. He was only 16. (Admittedly, one of Cicilia's co-defendants had been only 16 when Tabraue had allegedly ordered him to murder his estranged wife to stop her from telling the feds what they'd done with the body of another guy they'd murdered the year earlier.) Not that it matters, of course: What politician doesn't have a felon relative? But for Rubio in particular, the connection seems too incongruous with his long-cultivated squeaky-cleanness. 

 

» Too incongruous with his long-cultivated squeaky-cleanness. «

[...] Today, Marco Rubio is the Trump administration's most formidable liar. When Pam Bondi or Pete Hegseth or Karoline Leavitt or Stephen Miller refers to an anti-genocide protester or a day laborer or a sandwich hurler or a fisherman clinging to the wreckage of a fishing boat that has just been struck by a Hellfire missile as a "terrorist," they come off as pathological. 

 

But Rubio's approval ratings are the highest in the Republican Party, even as he is the architect of what is arguably Trump’s single most cynical policy: the scheme to appoint drug cartel bosses and their cronies atop the governments of every Latin American country, in the name of fighting drug cartels.

In September, Rubio hailed Ecuadoran President Daniel Noboa, who leads a country whose homicide rate has risen eightfold since 2016, as an "incredibly willing partner" who "has done more just in the last couple years to take the fight to these narco-terrorists and these threats to the security and stability of Ecuador than any previous administration." Just five months earlier, a damning investigation revealed that Noboa’s family fruit business had trafficked 700 kilos of cocaine to Europe in banana crates between 2020 and 2022. 

 

Rubio has tirelessly promoted the cause of convicted (alas, just-pardoned) drug trafficker Juan Orlando Hernández. In 2018, Rubio personally and publicly commended Hernández, then president of Honduras, for combating drug traffickers (and supporting Israel), just seven months before his brother was indicted for trafficking 158 tons of cocaine in containers stamped "TH," for Tony Hernández.

 » Marco Rubio is the Trump administration's most formidable liar. «

 

Rubio has raved about the crime-fighting efforts of Salvadoran and Argentine junior strongmen Nayib Bukele and Javier Milei, in spite of the former’s documented alliance with MS-13 and the various Miami cocaine trafficking scandals that enveloped his libertarian political party last fall, as well as both leaders’ slavish devotion to the drug cartels' single favorite mode of money laundering.

 

Rubio has been one of the Beltway’s biggest backers of newly elected Chilean president José Antonio Kast, the son of a literal Nazi war criminal who has spent his entire political career lionizing, whitewashing, and promising a restoration of the brutal reign of Augusto Pinochet, who personally ordered the Chilean army to build a cocaine laboratory, consolidated the narcotics trade inside his terrifying secret police, and then allegedly "disappeared" key conspirators like his secret police chemist Eugenio Berríos.

And for at least a decade, Rubio has lauded, strategized with, and viciously condemned the multitude of criminal investigations into former Colombian President Álvaro Uribe, whom some describe as a kind of Kissingerian figure to the former Florida senator. 

 

A 1991 Pentagon analysis described Uribe, whom Rubio depicts as a kind of paradigmatic drug warrior, as one of the 100 most important Colombian narco-terrorists, a close personal friend of Pablo Escobar and a political figure "dedicated to collaboration with the Medellín [drug] cartel at high government levels."

» Álvaro Uribe [on the left, next to Pablo Escobar], whom some describe

as a kind of Kissingerian figure to the former Florida senator. «

That brings us to Rubio’s current campaign of state-sponsored terrorism against Venezuela and fisherman emanating from there, on the pretense that Nicolás Maduro runs something called the "Cartel of the Suns," which has flooded the United States with cheap cocaine. The case that this is anything but a fairy tale is laid out in a 2020 indictment whose insanity I hope to explore soon, but its flimsiness is also underscored by the puny vessels SOCOM has chosen to drone-strike into oblivion.
 

Last week, Berkeley professor emeritus Peter Dale Scott wrote a letter to The New York Times disputing the newspaper's characterization of "a remarkable dissonance" between Trump's simultaneous massacres of subsistence traffickers and pardoning of a convicted trafficker of more than 400 tons of cocaine. Actually, he pointed out, the "contradiction" was markedly unremarkable: "The ill-conceived and deliberately misnamed 'War on Drugs' has been a cover for contradictory CIA involvement with drug​-traffickers for decades." 

 

This is especially true in Venezuela, Scott noted. Customs Service investigators probing a 998-pound cocaine seizure in the country in 1990 discovered the Agency had been operating a joint venture with top military generals to traffic cocaine as a purported means of "infiltrating" Colombian cartels. The venture had been nicknamed "Cartel de los Soles," and the Times itself reported that it had successfully smuggled tons of cocaine into the United States with virtually no accountability until Hugo Chávez imprisoned the general who had spearheaded the cartel and expelled the DEA from Venezuela, at which point it became fashionable to finance industrial sabotage, military coups, and ultimately terror attack projects, under the premise that it was a "narco-state."

 

On December 1, 2025, Trump has officially pardoned former Honduran President, Juan Orlando Hernández, who 

US officials said was at the center of one of the largest and most violent drug-trafficking conspiracies in the world.

 

[...] Rubio returned to Miami and never left, any misgivings about his ties to a scary narcotics gang apparently negated by his conspicuous political talent. By the time he ran for city commissioner in the late '90s, Jeb Bush was donating to his campaign, as were a number of executives of the Fanjul sugar empire and a collection of eye doctors including (and likely corralled by) the ophthalmologist and onetime political fixer Alan Mendelsohn, who would later host the first fundraiser for Rubio's first presidential campaign exploratory committee. 

 

In one of the more "only in Miami" episodes of recent history, a midsized ship seized by the Coast Guard in the Pacific Ocean in 2001 turned out to have 12 tons of cocaine concealed inside its fuel tank, along with a cursory paper trail that led investigators to a Miami-based Ponzi scheme that was laundering drug cartel proceeds, whose ringleader had in turn funneled millions into Mendelsohn's various foundations and political action committees in a vain attempt to "fix" his legal problems.  

 

But where that scandal took down Rubio's close friend and sometime roommate David Rivera, who was elected to Congress in the 2010 election that sent Liddle Marco to the Senate, he emerged untainted. As one local political consultant told Rubio's biographer, "He was the anointed golden child, even then."

 

Quoted from:
Maureen Tkacik (December 23, 2025) - The Narco-Terrorist Elite: Why is Marco Rubio so hell-bent on making Iran-Contra again?

 

» The cartels are running Mexico. We have to do something. «

  » Colombia is run by a sick man. He's not going to be doing it for very long, it will be an operation by the US. «

» Now I hear that Iran is trying to build up again, and if they are, we're going to have
 to knock them down. We'll knock them down. We'll knock the hell out of them. « 
» We need Greenland. For defence reasons. «

Genocide Ziocon MIGA Don, January 3-4, 2026.

 

 See also:

Maureen Tkacik (August 27, 2025) - Foot Soldiers of the Trump Mafiacracy.
Maureen Tkacik (August 1, 2025) - Making America Epstein Again.

Helena Glass (January 4, 2025) - President Trump's End Game? South America. 

 Lu QiYuan (December 8, 2024) - Scott Bessent's Covert MAGA Strategy for Trump 2.0.

US Decapitation Operation "Absolute Resolve" in Venezuela | Ron Aledo

The operation in Venezuela is a multi-agency effort aimed at regime change, intended to install a pro-US, easily controlled government and eventually take indirect control of the country's oil. This is designed to maintain the US dollar's status as the world standard for global oil transactions. 

 

 

Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro kidnapped in US military strike,

Caracas, January 3, 2026, 4:30 AM local time.

 

In recent years, China, Russia, and other BRICS nations have attempted—with some success—to shift global oil transactions away from the US dollar toward the Chinese Yuan. Trump views this as a threat to the strength of the dollar and US global hegemony. This operation against Venezuela makes such a move away from the dollar more difficult.

» Trump knows who butters his bread. «

 

Operation "Absolute Resolve" was a multi-agency effort involving US intelligence agencies, the military, law enforcement, and the Department of Justice. The steps of the operation were likely as follows:
 

1. CIA and DIA Intelligence Covert Actions: The intelligence agencies recruited dozens of Venezuelan military personnel, primarily Generals and Colonels in charge of Nicolás Maduro’s security and the air defenses of Caracas. Additionally, the CIA, DIA, and NSA provided real-time intelligence for the military operation, including the locations of air defenses, military leaders loyal to Maduro, and the movement of bodyguards and security systems. 

 

The US war machine struck Venezuela just hours after President Maduro met

Chinese envoy Qiu Xiaoqi on January 2 to renew 600 bilateral trade deals.

 

2. Military Action: The US military destroyed multiple targets, likely air defense systems and command-and-control centers manned by military and political elements loyal to Maduro. This was a massive attack that neutralized all air defenses in the area and disabled military units that could have protected Maduro. US Delta Force arrived via helicopter at Maduro's location; facing neither bodyguards nor defenses, Maduro and his wife surrendered. They were then transported via helicopter to the USS Iwo Jima, a US Navy amphibious assault ship. As of 17:30 ET, Maduro arrived in New York escorted by civilian officers from the Department of Justice (DEA, US Marshals, and FBI). This is significant for Trump, as it depicts the mission as a "police/law enforcement" and "counternarcotics" operation.

 

» For Venezuela, we are prepared to give even our own blood! «

Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel, La Habana, January 3, 2026. 

 

3. Transfer to the Department of Justice: The US military transferred custody of Nicolás Maduro to law enforcement officers to maintain the appearance of a legal operation against an indicted narcotics trafficker. This provides legal authority to the mission and protects the Trump administration from future court challenges or potential impeachment attempts by a Democratic-controlled Congress following the November 2026 elections. This phase mirrors the actions taken against the former ruler of Panama, General Noriega.

 

» We are going to run the country. «

 Genocide Ziocon MIGA Don, unhinged 'like never seen before', Mar-a-Lago, January 3, 2026.

 

4. Transition Inside Venezuela: The Trump administration will likely negotiate with the Vice President—now President—Delcy Rodríguez to complete a transition to a new pro-US government. While María Corina Machado is a potential candidate for the presidency, Trump may appoint someone more widely accepted by the Venezuelan military to reduce the risk of a counter-coup in the immediate future.

 

Large pro-Maduro rally in Caracas, January 4, 2026.

 

Armed citizen militias were deployed in Aragua state and 

other areas, including the center of the capital Caracas.

 

As the Maduro government remains in charge—at least in appearance—via Delcy Rodríguez, the possibility of escalation remains high. If Trump negotiates a peaceful transition with Rodríguez, the crisis may be resolved without violence. However, if Rodríguez resists due to pressure from pro-Maduro military elements or Cuban intelligence officers in Caracas, violence is likely. Trump may then push for a military coup against Rodríguez using CIA-recruited officers, supported by US airstrikes on the command posts of pro-Maduro generals.

» An attack of this nature undoubtedly has a Zionist tinge. «

Vice President Delcy Rodríguez got straight to the point, Caracas, January 3, 2026.

 

Alternatively, Trump may leave Rodríguez as the nominal President if she agrees to follow all directives from the administration. However, the potential for unrest and armed resistance from segments of the population remains possible under all options.

 

» Trump's Plan A is the less bloody one. The people change 

hats very easily. The king is dead, long live the king. «

Ron Aledo on US Plans A and B for Venezuela, January 4, 2026.

 

Real Reason for the Operation: The primary motivation is likely an attempt to slow the efforts by Russia and China to replace the US dollar as the universal currency for oil transactions. Global oil trade is conducted in US dollars, which bolsters the dollar's strength and US global trade dominance. Recently, Russia, China, India, and other BRICS nations have challenged this by moving toward the Chinese Yuan. Trump views this as a threat to US dominance. By executing regime change, the US aims to install a friendly, manageable government in Venezuela and secure indirect control over its massive oil reserves, thereby reinforcing the dollar's position.
 

» Relationship between Venezuela, Russia, and China  is one of

the most significant geopolitical realignments of the 21st century. «

» Vassalize Mexico, to complete a North American internal

economic circulation, replacing China in its supply chain. «

Secondary Objectives: A secondary goal is the defeat of the Cuban regime. By cutting the flow of Venezuelan oil and funding to Cuba, the regime will likely collapse within a year, potentially leading to a negotiated transition and a new pro-US government on the island.

» Happy New Year to every Mossad agent walking beside them... «

 

It is important to note that Tulsi Gabbard and Vice President J.D. Vance were likely not active participants in this operation. The primary driver was Marco Rubio, who has long promised the fall of the Venezuelan and Cuban governments. Rubio views this as a "victory card" for a 2028 vice-presidential or presidential bid, potentially replacing J.D. Vance on the ticket.

 

Ron Aledo, Former CIA Analyst (ctr), US Army Veteran, Joint Staff Ops, January 3, 2026.