Long-Term Commodity Cycles: Unraveling the Big Picture | Ahmed Farghaly

Cycle analysis, based on J.M. Hurst's framework, streamlines financial market navigation. Synchronized cycles—from long-term Methuselah, Enoch, Hegemony, and Kondratieff waves to short-term fluctuations—reveal historical patterns shaping current and future commodity market trends.

 

Methuselah Wave = 972-Year Cycle = three 324-Year Enoch Waves

Enoch Wave = two 162-Year Hegemony Waves 

Hegemony Wave = three 54-Year Kondratieff Waves

Kondratieff Wave = three 18-Year Kuznets Waves

Kuznets Wave = two 9-Year Juglar Waves 

Juglar Wave = two 54-Month Kitchin Cycles 

Kitchin Cycle = three 18-Month Cycles = six 40-Week Cycles

 

Long-Term Cycle Foundations

In July 1949, the 972-year Methuselah Wave, the 324-year Enoch Wave (starting 1673), the 162-year Hegemony Wave, the 54-year Kondratieff Wave, and all shorter cycles converged at their lows (see list above). The current Enoch Wave is projected to trough again around 2263, the Hegemony Wave around 2107, and the Kondratieff Wave, which last bottomed in March 2003, around 2055. These synchronized cycles frame long-term commodity and market trends, with the Enoch and Kondratieff waves signaling sustained commodity appreciation through 2100 and 2032, respectively, while the Hegemony Wave suggests a future correction.

Commodity Price Index (yearly bars) from 1250 to 2025:

 324-Year Enoch Waves, 162-Year Hegemony Waves, 54-Year Kondratieff Waves, 18-Year Kuznets Waves.

Kuznets Cycle and Historical Parallels

The current Kuznets cycle, an 18-year wave, began with a trough between March and June 2020, mirroring the 1720 cycle that drove a 61-year commodity rise peaking in 1781. Now 5.33 years into this phase, the cycle aligns with late 2008, following the 2003 post-SARS trough. Since 2020, sharp advances in equities and commodities, alongside rising inflation, reflect historical post-trough patterns. Extended cycles indicate the current commodity uptrend may peak near 2100, with sustained inflationary pressures and geopolitical tensions persisting, punctuated by seasonal corrections within the Hegemony and Kondratieff waves.

 

Commodity Price Index (quarterly bars) from 1750 to 2025: 

 972-Year Methuselah Wave, 162-Year Hegemony Waves, 54-Year Kondratieff Waves, 18-Year Kuznets Waves, 9-Year Juglar Waves.

Kondratieff Seasons and Projections

The last Kondratieff Summer peak occurred in 1980, seven years after the 1973 energy price shock, with the current summer peak projected around 2032, coinciding with the Kuznets peak in the second cycle of the 9-year Juglar wave. A 5–6-year correction is anticipated into around 2037, followed by a commodity recovery marking the Kondratieff Fall Season, characterized by disinflation and equity bubbles. Winter deflation is expected to follow, driving declines in commodities and equities.

 

Commodity Price Index (monthly bars) from 1900 to 2025: 

54-Year Kondratieff Waves, 18-Year Kuznets Waves, 9-Year Juglar Waves.

 

Short-Term Cycle Dynamics

Within the Kuznets cycle, commodities and equities align with nested 9-year Juglar and 54-month Kitchin cycles. The current Kitchin cycle post-2024 is expected to drive a 26-month commodity rally, peaking around 2028 in its third 18-month subcycle, mirroring 2008–2011 patterns. Six 18-month subcycles and twelve 40-week cycles provide granular short-term projections. The commodity index is projected to rise through Q1 2026 and into 2028 before the first Juglar-wave correction.

Commodity Price Index (weekly bars) from 1995 to 2025:

 18-Year Kuznets Waves, 9-Year Juglar Waves, 54-Month Kitchin Cycles, 18-Month Cycles, 40-Week Cycles.

 

S&P 500 (quarterly bars) from 1800 to 2025: 
162-Year Hegemony Waves, 54-Year Kondratieff Waves, 18-Year Kuznets Waves, 9-Year Juglar Waves.

 

» The principle of confirmation [20-week VTL] on display. «

 Dow Jones, S&P 500, and NASDAQ 100 (daily bars) from July 2024 to October 2025. 

18-Month Cycles, 40-Week Cycles, 20-Week Cycles, 80-Day Cycles, 40-Day Cycles, 20-Day Cycles.

 

» Assuming the S&P 500 is in the first bullish half of the third and last 18-month cycle within the current 54-month cycle (which allegedly began in October 2022), and there is no uplifting and dominant influence of the 9-year, 18-year, or 54-year cycles, the upcoming 40-week cycle peak, anticipated around late September to early October, would be a long-term market top. «  

 

Implications and Geopolitical Context

All cycles except the Hegemony Wave signal continued commodity price rises, with the Kuznets cycle supporting a 26-month rally, the Kondratieff wave projecting growth through 2032, and the Enoch wave indicating strength toward 2100. Current trends diverge from historical analogues, suggesting higher peaks. Inflation is expected to persist through 2032, with a commodity correction into 2037. The final Kuznets swing within the Hegemony Wave may trigger significant disruption, potentially signaling the decline of an old world order and the rise of a new one. Rising commodity prices continue to reflect heightened geopolitical tensions.

 

Reference:
Ahmed Farghaly (October 17, 2025) - Long-Term Commodity Cycles: Unraveling the Big Picture.

 

 WWII's effect on commodity prices counteracted the expected post-1919 bear market, 

resulting in a higher-than-expected 1949 low which J.M. Hurst termed a "straddled trough."

» Inflation will persist until century's end due to a long-term cycle. «

 

See also: 

Ahmed Farghaly (October 6, 2025) - High Inflation: We are in Kondratieff's "Summer of Summer". 

Ahmed Farghaly (2016) - The 162-Year Cycle in Stocks and Commodities Since 1509.

Ron William (2022) - Is the Big Cycle Turning? 

Nikolai Kondratieff (1926) - Gold Production Mirrors the Long Wave, It Doesn’t Drive It.

Due to 'Mega Forces': No More Bust, Only Boom | BlackRock Outlook 2025

In its 2025 Global Outlook, BlackRock states that the global economy has moved beyond the cycle of 'boom and bust,' driven by a fundamental shift fueled by the rise of "mega forces." BlackRock argues that the world economy is currently undergoing a transformation shaped by five new "mega forces:" (1.) the transition to net-zero carbon emissions, (2.) geopolitical fragmentation, (3.) demographic changes, (4.) the digitization of finance, and (5.) AI.

 Finally, a world forever rosy: No more bust, only boom.

BlackRock, which oversees $11.5 trillion in assets, believes that this "economic transformation" has broken the global economy free from "historical trends" that have seen markets cycle through boom and bust for centuries. "Mega forces are reshaping economies and their long-term trajectories—it's no longer about short-term fluctuations in activity leading to expansion or recession. [...] 2024 has reinforced our view that we are not in a business cycle: AI has been a major market driver, inflation fell without a growth slowdown, and typical recession signals failed." BlackRock anticipates that stocks will benefit from this ongoing global transformation, which will require massive investments from capital markets, potentially rivaling the investments seen during the Industrial Revolution of the 19th and 20th centuries.

If Schumpeter knew: Economy now free of cycles.

 

As a result, BlackRock suggests investors should rethink their strategies, focusing on long-term opportunities, such as capitalizing on the infrastructure needed for this emerging future. "We think investors should focus more on themes and less on broad asset classes as mega forces reshape whole economies. [...] Infrastructure is at the intersection of mega forces—like AI. The AI buildout is creating a huge and immediate need for data centers. Demand for new-build green infrastructure is skyrocketing as countries and tech companies race to reduce emissions."

In the short term, BlackRock expects US stocks to continue their rally in 2025, in line with trends showing US companies outpacing global competitors over the last decade. "We see the US still standing out versus other developed markets due to stronger growth and its ability to better capitalize on mega forces. We’re increasing our overweight position in US equities and expect the AI theme to broaden." A positive US economic growth outlook for 2025, combined with Donald Trump’s tax cuts and deregulatory initiatives, could further boost the prospects for US stocks.

Meanwhile, US-China tensions are expected to intensify competition for resources, such as "copper," as both nations vie for a competitive edge in AI. New import tariffs imposed by Trump could exacerbate the situation. BlackRock also points to aging global populations, which are likely to push up labor costs and keep inflation high, a trend that could be worsened by potential new limits on immigration introduced by Trump.

Reference:
BlackRock Investment Institute (December 4, 2024) - 2025 Global Outlook. Building the transformation.

Decennial Cycle and Presidential Cycle in 2013

Michael Riesner and Marc Müller: Technical Outlook 2013 - Since 1900 the US market has marked an important long-term bottom in the first 4 years of EACH decade, without exception (see table of Lance Roberts at left) ... The last major low in the S&P 500 we saw in March 2009, which obviously belongs to the last decade. So either we see in the current decade the first failure of this pattern in more than 100 years or we will see another bear market and subsequent bottom in the next 2 years, which would then fit to both, the presidential and the decennial cycle. In this context it is very interesting that if we combine both cycles and look into the past, we are getting again a consistent picture of having a high probability for seeing a new bear market in the next 24 months. Since 1941 we had 7 presidential election cycles where the post-election and mid-term year fell into the first 4 years of a decade. In 5 out of 7 cycles (72% probability) we saw significant bear markets and more importantly, they were among the most painful bear markets of the last century! 
Conclusion: Our preferred scenario for 2013 is that we see an important March top in equities, followed by a distributive summer top building phase before seeing significant weakness from a potential August top developing into Q4. ... From a potential top of around 1550 to 1570 we could see the market correcting to 1180/1100. From a secular perspective this potential new bear market could bring us a very important long-term low for equities in 2014.

 

The K-Wave: Heretical Thoughts & Practical Understandings | Tony Plummer

 Credits: MARKET TECHNICIAN - Issue 59 – July 2007.

The Static and the Dynamic Views of Economics | Nikolai Kondratieff

The Sixth Kondratiev Long Wave Cycle

 

The Long Waves in Economic Life | Nikolai Kondratieff

XII. THE NATURE OF LONG WAVES  

Is it possible to maintain that the existence of long cycles in the dynamics of the capitalist economy is proved on the basis of the preceding statements? The relevant data which we were able to quote cover about 140 years. This period comprises two and one-half cycles only. Although the period embraced by the data is sufficient to decide the question of the existence of long waves, it is not enough to enable us to assert beyond doubt the cyclical character of those waves. Nevertheless we believe that the available data are sufficient to declare this cyclical character to be very probable.

We are led to this conclusion not only by the consideration of the factual material, but also because the objections to the assumption of long cyclical waves are very weak.

It has been objected that long waves lack the regularity which business cycles display. But this is wrong. If one defines “regularity” as repetition in regular time-intervals, then long waves possess this characteristic as much as the intermediate ones. A strict periodicity in social and economic phenomena does not exist at all — neither in the long nor in the intermediate waves. The length of the latter fluctuates at least between 7 and 11 years, i.e., 57 per cent. The length of the long cycles fluctuates between 48 and 60 years, i.e., 25 per cent only.

If regularity is understood to be the similarity and simultaneity of the fluctuations of different series, then it is present to the same degree in the long as in the intermediate waves.

If, finally, regularity is understood to consist in the fact that the intermediate waves are an international phenomenon, then the long waves do not differ from the latter in this respect either.

Consequently, there is no less regularity in the long waves than in the intermediate ones, and if we want to designate the latter as cyclical, we are bound not to deny this characterization to the former.

It has been pointed out [by other critics] that the long waves — as distinct from the intermediate ones which come from causes within the capitalistic system — are conditioned by casual, extra-economic circumstances and events, such as (1) changes in technique, (2) wars and revolutions, (3) the assimilation of new countries into the world economy, and (4) fluctuations in gold production.

These considerations are important. But they, too, are not valid. Their weakness lies in the fact that they reverse the causal connections and take the consequence to be the cause, or see an accident where we have really to deal with a law governing the events. In the preceding paragraphs, we have deliberately, though briefly, considered the establishment of some empirical rules for the movement of long waves. These regularities help us now to evaluate correctly the objections just mentioned.

1. Changes in technique have without doubt a very potent influence on the course of capitalistic development. But nobody has proved them to be the cause of long waves. On the contrary, the great importance of technical inventions and of the investment of new capital is most clearly evident during the upswing of the long cycle and during the first years after its highest point. During the downswing, on the other hand, the number of important inventions and new installations put into operation decreases noticeably. This is perfectly natural, for during the downswing the conditions for new investments are relatively unfavourable. Consequently, changes in technique cannot be considered as primary causes of the long waves; they are themselves only a function of their course.

2. Wars and revolutions also influence the course of economic development very strongly. But wars and revolutions do not come out of a clear sky, and they are not caused by arbitrary acts of individual personalities. They originate from real, especially economic, circumstances. The assumption that wars and revolutions acting from the outside cause long waves evokes the question as to why they themselves follow each other with regularity and solely during the upswing of long waves. Much more probable is the assumption that wars originate in the acceleration of the pace and the increased tension of economic life, in the heightened economic struggle for markets and raw materials, and that social shocks happen most easily under the pressure of new economic forces.

Wars and revolutions, therefore, can also be fitted into the rhythm of the long waves and do not prove to be the forces from which these movements originate, but rather to be one of their symptoms. But once they have occurred, they naturally exercise a potent influence on the pace and direction of economic dynamics.

3. As regards the opening-up of new countries for the world economy, it seems to be quite obvious that this cannot be considered an outside factor which will satisfactorily explain the origin of long waves. The United States have been known for a relatively very long time; for some reason or other they begin to be entangled in the world economy on a major scale only from the middle of the nineteenth century. Likewise, the Argentine and Canada, Australia and New Zealand, were discovered long before the end of the nineteenth century, although they begin to be entwined in the world economy to a significant extent only with the coming of the 1890’s. It is perfectly clear historically that, in the capitalistic economic system, new regions are opened for commerce during those periods in which the desire of old countries for new markets and new sources of raw materials becomes more urgent than theretofore. It is equally apparent that the limits of this expansion of the world economy are determined by the degree of this urgency. If this be true, then the opening of new countries does not provoke the upswing of a long wave. On the contrary, a new upswing makes the exploitation of new countries, new markets, and new sources of raw materials necessary and possible, in that it accelerates the pace of capitalistic economic development.

4. There remains the question whether the discovery of new gold mines, the increase in gold production, and a consequent increase in the gold stock can be regarded as a casual, outside factor causing the long waves.

An increase in gold production leads ultimately to a rise in prices and to a quickening in the tempo of economic life. But this does not mean that the changes in gold production are of a casual, outside character and that the waves in prices and in economic life are likewise caused by chance. We consider this to be not only unproved but positively wrong. This contention originates from the belief, first, that the discovery of gold mines and the perfection of the technique of gold production are accidental and, secondly, that every discovery of new gold mines and of technical inventions in the sphere of gold production brings about an increase in the latter. However great may be the creative element in these technical inventions and the significance of chance in these discoveries, yet they are not entirely accidental. Still less accidental — and this is the main point — are the fluctuations in gold production itself. These fluctuations are by no means simply a function of the activity of inventors and of the discoveries of new gold mines. On the contrary, the intensity of inventors’ and explorers’ activity and the application of technical improvement in the sphere of gold production, as well as the resulting increase of the latter, depend upon other, more general causes. The dependence of gold production upon technical inventions and discoveries of new gold mines is only secondary and derived.

Although gold is a generally recognized embodiment of value and, therefore, is generally desired, it is only a commodity. And like every commodity it has a cost of production. But if this be true, then gold production — even in newly discovered mines — can increase significantly only if it becomes more profitable, i.e., if the relation of the value of the gold itself to its cost of production (and this is ultimately the prices of other commodities) becomes more favorable. If this relation is unfavorable, even gold mines the richness of which is by no means yet exhausted may be shut down; if it is favorable, on the other hand, even relatively poor mines will be exploited.

When is the relation of the value of gold to that of other commodities most favorable for gold production? We know that commodity prices reach their lowest level toward the end of a long wave. This means that at this time gold has its highest purchasing power, and gold production becomes most favorable. This can be illustrated by the figures in Table 2.

At the same time, we believe ourselves justified in saying that the long waves, if existent at all, are a very important and essential factor in economic development, a factor the effects of which can be found in all the principal fields of social and economic life.

Even granting the existence of long waves, one is, of course, not justified in believing that economic dynamics consists only in fluctuations around a certain level. The course of economic activity represents beyond doubt a process of development, but this development obviously proceeds not only through intermediate waves but also through long ones. The problem of economic development in toto cannot be discussed here.

In asserting the existence of long waves and in denying that they arise out of random causes, we are also of the opinion that the long waves arise out of causes which are inherent in the essence of the capitalistic economy. This naturally leads to the question as to the nature of these causes. We are fully aware of the difficulty and great importance of this question; but in the preceding sketch we had no intention of laying the foundations for an appropriate theory of long waves.¹Gold production, as can be seen from these figures, becomes more profitable as we approach a low point in the price level and a high point in the purchasing power of gold (1895 and the following years).

It is clear, furthermore, that the stimulus to increased gold production necessarily becomes stronger the further a long wave declines. We, therefore, can suppose theoretically that gold production must in general increase most markedly when the wave falls most sharply, and vice versa.

In reality, however, the connection is not as simple as this but becomes more complicated, mainly just because of the effect of the changes in the technique of gold production and the discovery of new mines. It seems to us, indeed, that even improvements in technique and new gold discoveries obey the same fundamental law as does gold production itself, with more or less regularity in timing. Improvements in the technique of gold production and the discovery of new gold mines actually do bring about a lowering in the cost of production of gold; they influence the relation of these costs to the value of gold, and consequently the extent of gold production. But then it is obvious that exactly at the time when the relation of the value of gold to its cost becomes more unfavorable than theretofore, the need for technical improvements in gold mining and for the discovery of new mines necessarily becomes more urgent and this stimulates research in this field. There is, of course, a time-lag, until this urgent necessity, though already recognized, leads to positive success. In reality, therefore, gold discoveries and technical improvements in gold mining will reach their peak only when the long wave has already passed its peak, i.e., perhaps in the middle of the downswing. The available facts confirm this supposition.¹ In the period after the 1870’s, the following gold discoveries were made: 1881 in Alaska, 1884 in the Transvaal, 1887 in West Australia, 1890 in Colorado, 1894 in Mexico, 1896 in the Klondike. The inventions in the field of gold-mining technique, and especially the most important ones of this period (the inventions for the treatment of ore), were also made during the 1880’s, as is well known.

Gold discoveries and technical improvements, if they occur, will naturally influence gold production. They can have the effect that the increase in gold production takes place somewhat earlier than at the end of the downswing of the long wave. They also can assist the expansion of gold production, once that limit is reached. This is precisely what happens in reality. Especially after the decline in the 1870’s, a persistent, though admittedly slender, increase in gold production begins about the year 1883,² whereas, in spite of the disturbing influences of discoveries and inventions, the upswing really begins only after gold has reached its greatest purchasing power; and the increased production is due not only to the newly discovered gold fields but in a considerable degree also to the old ones. This is illustrated by the figures in Table 3.

From the foregoing one may conclude, it seems to us, that gold production, even though its increase can be a condition for an advance in commodity prices and for a general upswing in economic activity, is yet subordinate to the rhythm of the long waves and consequently cannot be regarded as a causal and random factor that brings about these movements from the outside.

XIII. CONCLUSIONS  

The objections to the regular cyclical character of the long waves, therefore, seem to us to be unconvincing. In view of this circumstance and considering also the positive reasons developed above, we think that, on the basis of the available data, the existence of long waves of cyclical character is very probable.

At the same time, we believe ourselves justified in saying that the long waves, if existent at all, are a very important and essential factor in economic development, a factor the effects of which can be found in all the principal fields of social and economic life.

Even granting the existence of long waves, one is, of course, not justified in believing that economic dynamics consists only in fluctuations around a certain level. The course of economic activity represents beyond doubt a process of development, but this development obviously proceeds not only through intermediate waves but also through long ones. The problem of economic development in toto cannot be discussed here.

In asserting the existence of long waves and in denying that they arise out of random causes, we are also of the opinion that the long waves arise out of causes which are inherent in the essence of the capitalistic economy. This naturally leads to the question as to the nature of these causes. We are fully aware of the difficulty and great importance of this question; but in the preceding sketch we had no intention of laying the foundations for an appropriate theory of long waves.

 

Long Wave Theory - Kondratieff Wave Already Bottomed? | Martin Armstrong

The Kondratieff Cycle and Its Subdivisions | David Knox Barker

The economic long wave is a boom-and-bust cycle that drives the global economy, first discovered by Russian economist Nikolai Kondratieff in the 1920s. Kondratieff was researching debt, interest rates, production, and prices when he uncovered the economic long wave. The ideal Kondratieff Long Wave Cycle (K-Wave) is 56 years in length, though it can vary, running longer or shorter in Fibonacci ratios relative to the ideal duration (between five 11-year sunspot cycles and three 22-year Hale cycles).

 

 56 year cycle in commodities, bonds, wages, and foreign trade.

 

The current long wave is of the extended variety and began in 1949. Current analysis suggests that this K-Wave will end in 2013, running eight years, or 14.5%, longer than the ideal 56-year duration. 

 

 The Long Wave, the Long Wave Seasons, and 16 Kitchin Cycles.

Harvard economist Joseph A. Schumpeter, author of 'Business Cycles: A Theoretical, Historical, and Statistical Analysis of the Capitalist Process', believed that the economic long wave is the single most important tool for economic prognostication.

  Long Wave (ideal length of 56 years).
Long Wave Seasons (ideal length of 14 years).
Kitchin Cycles (ideal length of 42 months).

Kitchin Third Cycles (ideal length of 14 months)
Wall Cycles (ideal length of 141.9 Day cycle).
Quarter Wall Cycles (ideally 35.475 days).

 

The ideal K-Wave spans 56 years and is divided into four 14-Year Seasons, each consisting of four Kitchin Cycles (approximately 42 months each). Each Kitchin Cycle is further broken down into three Kitchin Thirds (about 14 months each). Within the Kitchin Third Cycle, there are three Wall Cycles (each lasting 20 weeks or 142 calendar days). The Wall Cycle is further subdivided into four Quarter Wall Cycles (approximately 35 calendar days each). These cycles give rise to recurring patterns in financial markets and business trends.

 

The current long wave began in 1949 and is now in the Kondratieff Winter season. Most investors wish they had access to this long wave season chart in 2007. Every long wave has four seasons, just like a year. The approximate length of a long wave season is 14 years, though they can be shorter or longer. Each season typically contains four Kitchin cycles, with an ideal length of 42 months. However, long wave seasons can have fewer or more Kitchin cycles than the usual four.

 

Kitchin Cycles: Joseph Schumpeter concluded that every long wave was made up of 18 smaller business cycles, or Kitchin cycles. In more recent years, with more sophisticated charting technology and market analysis, the research conclusions of market analyst P.Q. Wall—that the long wave is made up of only 16 Kitchin cycles—have been validated. This is an essential distinction in cycle research. 

Schumpeter’s model of how all the cycles worked together to produce long waves included Kitchin cycles (the regular business cycle of 3-5 years) and Juglar cycles (7-11 years), with three Kitchins in each Juglar. Schumpeter also wrote about the Kuznets cycles (15-25 years), but didn’t include them in the charts above. The charts depict the flow of the Kitchin and Juglar cycles integrated into 56-year long wave cycles. Note that Schumpeter’s model presented 18 business cycles in a regular long wave.

 

Market Cycles differ from Business Cycles in that they are identified on an index chart, rather than necessarily in the economic data as a business cycle. However, they often correlate with the regular business or trade cycle. Every long wave appears to be made up of 16 market "Kitchin" cycles. The 16 Kitchin cycles that make up a long wave are ideally 42 months in length, though they are rarely ideal and fluctuate in length, both shorter and longer. In each Kitchin cycle, there are ideally 36 dips or 36 Hurst "5-week" lows.

Kitchin Third: The ideal Kitchin cycle is 42 months, or 1,277.5 days, in length, while the ideal Kitchin Third is 14 months, or 425.83 days. A Kitchin cycle is made up of 9 Wall Cycles, so each Kitchin Third consists of three Wall Cycles. P.Q. Wall had a general rule: the third is often the last and weakest. This applies to the final Kitchin Third in a Kitchin Cycle, as well as to Wall Cycles #3, #6, and #9—the final Wall Cycle in each Kitchin Third. The Kitchin Cycle often unfolds in three Kitchin Third sections, but the Kitchin Third is not typically as distinct as the other cycles.

 

 

Wall Cycle (aka 20-Week Cycle): The Wall cycle is the ideal trader’s cycle. Accurate technical analysis of the Wall cycle is essential for traders. Dividing the ideal 56-year long wave by 144, one obtains the ideal Wall cycle. The mathematical relationship of these cycles indicates that the Wall cycle is a miniature long wave. The approximate 20-week cycle (141.9 days) fluctuates shorter and longer by Fibonacci ratios to the ideal length. 

 

 
Quarter Wall Cycle (aka Trader’s Cycle): As the name implies, the Quarter Wall cycle reflects that the Wall cycle tends to unfold in four sections, or Quarter Wall cycles. The Quarter Wall cycle is a mini version of the long wave season. The ideal Quarter Wall cycle fluctuates in Fibonacci ratios relative to its ideal length of 35.475 days. The Quarter Wall is the critical cycle for traders. Just like the other cycles, the Quarter Wall will run shorter and longer relative to the “ideal”. The forecasting power of the Quarter Wall forecasting tool is often startling.

 

 

"There is a tide in the affairs of men.

Which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune;

Omitted, all the voyage of their life

Is bound in shallows and in miseries.

On such a full sea are we now afloat,

And we must take the current when it serves,

Or lose our ventures."

  Julius Caesar, Act 4, Scene 3 — William Shakespeare, 1599.

"By the Law of Periodical Repetition, everything which has happened once must happen again,

and again, and again - and not capriciously, but at regular periods, and each thing in its own period,

not another’s, and each obeying its own law [...] The same Nature which delights in periodical 

repetition in the sky is the Nature which orders the affairs of the earth. 

Let us not underrate the value of that hint."
The Mysterious Stranger — Mark Twain, 1898.

 

Reference:

David Knox Barker (2012) - Market Cycle Dynamics.

David Knox Barker (2010) - Fibonacci in Time and Price.

David Knox Barker (2010) - P.Q. Wall Of Waves: Fibonacci In Time And Price. 

Forbes (July 17, 2002) - P.Q. Wall Is Full Of Worry.
P.Q. Wall (July 23, 2001) - Fire or Ice.  

David Knox Barker (1996) - The K-Wave: Profiting from the Cyclical Booms and Busts in the Global Economy.