Helioeconomics: Solar Cycles & World Economic Rhythms | Aleksander Valkov

In his June 2025 working paper, Russian economist Aleksander Valkov, Head of the Department of National and World Economy at Moscow State University, introduces "helioeconomic theory"—a bold interdisciplinary framework asserting that long-term solar activity, specifically the approximately 11-year Schwabe sunspot cycle (measured via Wolf sunspot numbers), serves as a primary exogenous driver synchronizing global economic cycles across centuries and countries. 

HelioEconomic Leading Index (HELI) and Economic Cycles (1750–1900). 

 

HelioEconomic Leading Index (HELI) and Economic Cycles (1900-2050): 

Blue line: HELI Index (normalized, 0–1 scale); Black dashed line: Solar Cycle (Wolf number, 11-year harmonic); Red vertical dashed lines: Economic Peaks (1749, 1801, 1859, 1917, 1968, 2024); Green vertical dashed lines: Economic Bottoms (1775, 1833, 1889, 1944, 1996, 2045); X-axis: Years 1750-1900 and Years 1900-2050, in strict chronological order.

 

HelioEconomic Leading Index (HELI) for USA, Russia, China, and Great Britain (1900-2024).

Blue line: USA; Red line: Rusia; Green line: China; Brown line: Great Britain; Red vertical dashed line: Economic Peak; Green vertical dashed line: Economic Bottom. 

 

Rather than viewing economic expansions and contractions as purely the result of credit, technology, policy, or random shocks, Valkov argues that solar magnetic activity provides the underlying rhythm. He posits that every fifth solar maximum plants the seed for a major economic peak approximately five to ten years later, while solar minima trigger the deepest troughs. 

 

This pattern establishes a dominant approximately 55-year supercycle (roughly five Schwabe cycles) that has governed global economic turning points from pre-industrial 1750 through the industrial and modern eras, spanning diverse economies including the USA, UK, Russia, China on a panel of 12 major countries.

 

 

» These findings have important implications for economic theory, forecasting, and policy. «

 Next solar minimum (Cycle 25/26 transition) anticipated around 2030–2031.

 

Valkov posits that solar activity influences economies through four interconnected channels: 

 

The first channel involves biophysical and health effects: geomagnetic storms and solar radiation variations are argued to affect human health, melatonin levels, mood, and cognitive function, citing medical literature on increased depression, suicides, and risk aversion during periods of high solar activity. 

Second, technological disruptions are a growing concern in the modern era, as space weather impacts infrastructure, satellites, and power grids. 

Third, Valkov includes agricultural and climate channels through subtle influences on weather patterns and crop yields, though he acknowledges this is a weaker driver for the regular 11-year solar cycle. 

Finally, the psychological and behavioral channel is considered crucial, suggesting that collective mood shifts drive investor sentiment, risk-taking, and economic decisions, a concept that builds on research by Krivelyova and Cesare Robotti (2003) and similar studies. 

 

The key innovation of Valkov's work, however, is the proposed 55-year rhythm: every fifth solar maximum (a period of 54–60 years) marks a "super-peak" corresponding to major economic booms and the subsequent crises that occur when the underlying expansion ultimately overshoots.

Valkov's theory builds on earlier ideas from Jevons (1875), Chizhevsky (1924), Garcia-Mata (1934), and the Foundation for the Study of Cycles, but he elevates them with rigorous modern statistical methods and an extraordinary historical dataset covering twelve major economies, including the United States, United Kingdom, Russia, and China—both before and after industrialization.

 » The HELI index outperforms traditional leading indicators in predicting major economic turning points, offering

policymakers and analysts a new interdisciplinary tool for risk assessment and macroeconomic planning. « 

At the heart of Valkov's paper is the HelioEconomic Leading Index (HELI), a composite indicator that combines smoothed Wolf sunspot numbers (inverted and appropriately lagged) with macroeconomic variables such as unemployment rates, GDP growth, and industrial production. Spectral analysis, Granger causality tests, and principal component methods show that the HELI index explains approximately 78% of the variance in global business-cycle turning points over nearly three centuries—a level of explanatory power rarely achieved by conventional leading indicators.

The alignment is striking: Major economic peaks repeatedly occur near every fifth solar maximum (for example, the Roaring Twenties, the mid-1960s–early-1970s boom, and the 2014–2020 expansion), while the deepest depressions and recessions cluster around prolonged solar minima (the 1930s Great Depression, the early 1980s double-dip, and the 2008–2009 Global Financial Crisis all fit the pattern with remarkable precision).

The 11-year solar cycle is historically segmented into four distinct periods based on psychological excitability: Minimum (3 years), Growth (2 years), Maximum (3 years), and Decline (3 years).

» In each century, the universal cycle of historical events is repeated exactly 9 times. Throughout the world history of Mankind, beginning with 500 B.C. and until the present time, in each century I have discovered 9 clearly outlined concentrations of the initial moments of historical events. Thus, it can be considered that each cycle of the general historical, military or social activity of humanity is equal, on average, to 11 years. « 

Alexander L. Chizhevsky, 1924.

Valkov's long-term charts overlaying sunspot numbers with unemployment or industrial production in the US, UK, Russia, and China reveal an almost eerie synchronization that persists through wars, pandemics, gold standards, fiat currencies, and radically different political systems. Given that Solar Cycle 25 reached a stronger-than-expected maximum around 2024–2025, the HELI index indicates that the current global expansion has already peaked or is in its final stage.

  

» On average, the difference between the peaks and troughs of solar activity and economic cycles does not exceed six months. «

88% of recessions since the 1800s and 100% of major financial crises occurred during the downturn of sunspot cycles. 

Leonty Miroshnichenko, 2023.

 

The model forecasts an accelerating contraction phase leading into a major multicycle trough centered on the early 2030s—precisely the period when the next solar minimum is expected. Mainstream macroeconomics remains deeply skeptical of any strong exogenous pacemaker for business cycles, and critics will rightly point to risks of overfitting and the indirect nature of causal mechanisms. 

 

Yet, the sheer scope of the evidence—280 years, twelve diverse economies, consistent performance across radically different institutional regimes—makes the paper impossible to dismiss lightly. Whether helioeconomics ultimately gains broad acceptance or remains a heterodox curiosity, the HELI index has already demonstrated superior long-range forecasting ability compared with traditional indicators. 

 

Reference:
Aleksander Valkov (June 2025) - Helioeconomics: Solar Cycles as the Hidden Pacemaker of Global Economic Fluctuations.

 

See also:

Leonty Miroshnichenko (2023) - Kondratiev Waves Aligned with Solar Cycles. 

 Lifang Peng, Ning Li, and Jingwen Pan (2019) - Effect of Ap Index of Geomagnetic Activity on S&P 500 Stock Market Return.

Alexander L. Chizhevsky (December 14, 2025) - Mass Excitability during Solar Cycle 25 (2019–2030).

Long-Term Commodity Cycles: Unraveling the Big Picture | Ahmed Farghaly

Cycle analysis, based on J.M. Hurst's framework, streamlines financial market navigation. Synchronized cycles—from long-term Methuselah, Enoch, Hegemony, and Kondratieff waves to short-term fluctuations—reveal historical patterns shaping current and future commodity market trends.

 

Methuselah Wave = 972-Year Cycle = three 324-Year Enoch Waves

Enoch Wave = two 162-Year Hegemony Waves 

Hegemony Wave = three 54-Year Kondratieff Waves

Kondratieff Wave = three 18-Year Kuznets Waves

Kuznets Wave = two 9-Year Juglar Waves 

Juglar Wave = two 54-Month Kitchin Cycles 

Kitchin Cycle = three 18-Month Cycles = six 40-Week Cycles

 

Long-Term Cycle Foundations

In July 1949, the 972-year Methuselah Wave, the 324-year Enoch Wave (starting 1673), the 162-year Hegemony Wave, the 54-year Kondratieff Wave, and all shorter cycles converged at their lows (see list above). The current Enoch Wave is projected to trough again around 2263, the Hegemony Wave around 2107, and the Kondratieff Wave, which last bottomed in March 2003, around 2055. These synchronized cycles frame long-term commodity and market trends, with the Enoch and Kondratieff waves signaling sustained commodity appreciation through 2100 and 2032, respectively, while the Hegemony Wave suggests a future correction.

Commodity Price Index (yearly bars) from 1250 to 2025:

 324-Year Enoch Waves, 162-Year Hegemony Waves, 54-Year Kondratieff Waves, 18-Year Kuznets Waves.

Kuznets Cycle and Historical Parallels

The current Kuznets cycle, an 18-year wave, began with a trough between March and June 2020, mirroring the 1720 cycle that drove a 61-year commodity rise peaking in 1781. Now 5.33 years into this phase, the cycle aligns with late 2008, following the 2003 post-SARS trough. Since 2020, sharp advances in equities and commodities, alongside rising inflation, reflect historical post-trough patterns. Extended cycles indicate the current commodity uptrend may peak near 2100, with sustained inflationary pressures and geopolitical tensions persisting, punctuated by seasonal corrections within the Hegemony and Kondratieff waves.

 

Commodity Price Index (quarterly bars) from 1750 to 2025: 

 972-Year Methuselah Wave, 162-Year Hegemony Waves, 54-Year Kondratieff Waves, 18-Year Kuznets Waves, 9-Year Juglar Waves.

Kondratieff Seasons and Projections

The last Kondratieff Summer peak occurred in 1980, seven years after the 1973 energy price shock, with the current summer peak projected around 2032, coinciding with the Kuznets peak in the second cycle of the 9-year Juglar wave. A 5–6-year correction is anticipated into around 2037, followed by a commodity recovery marking the Kondratieff Fall Season, characterized by disinflation and equity bubbles. Winter deflation is expected to follow, driving declines in commodities and equities.

 

Commodity Price Index (monthly bars) from 1900 to 2025: 

54-Year Kondratieff Waves, 18-Year Kuznets Waves, 9-Year Juglar Waves.

 

Short-Term Cycle Dynamics

Within the Kuznets cycle, commodities and equities align with nested 9-year Juglar and 54-month Kitchin cycles. The current Kitchin cycle post-2024 is expected to drive a 26-month commodity rally, peaking around 2028 in its third 18-month subcycle, mirroring 2008–2011 patterns. Six 18-month subcycles and twelve 40-week cycles provide granular short-term projections. The commodity index is projected to rise through Q1 2026 and into 2028 before the first Juglar-wave correction.

Commodity Price Index (weekly bars) from 1995 to 2025:

 18-Year Kuznets Waves, 9-Year Juglar Waves, 54-Month Kitchin Cycles, 18-Month Cycles, 40-Week Cycles.

 

S&P 500 (quarterly bars) from 1800 to 2025: 
162-Year Hegemony Waves, 54-Year Kondratieff Waves, 18-Year Kuznets Waves, 9-Year Juglar Waves.

 

» The principle of confirmation [20-week VTL] on display. «

 Dow Jones, S&P 500, and NASDAQ 100 (daily bars) from July 2024 to October 2025. 

18-Month Cycles, 40-Week Cycles, 20-Week Cycles, 80-Day Cycles, 40-Day Cycles, 20-Day Cycles.

 

» Assuming the S&P 500 is in the first bullish half of the third and last 18-month cycle within the current 54-month cycle (which allegedly began in October 2022), and there is no uplifting and dominant influence of the 9-year, 18-year, or 54-year cycles, the upcoming 40-week cycle peak, anticipated around late September to early October, would be a long-term market top. «  

 

Implications and Geopolitical Context

All cycles except the Hegemony Wave signal continued commodity price rises, with the Kuznets cycle supporting a 26-month rally, the Kondratieff wave projecting growth through 2032, and the Enoch wave indicating strength toward 2100. Current trends diverge from historical analogues, suggesting higher peaks. Inflation is expected to persist through 2032, with a commodity correction into 2037. The final Kuznets swing within the Hegemony Wave may trigger significant disruption, potentially signaling the decline of an old world order and the rise of a new one. Rising commodity prices continue to reflect heightened geopolitical tensions.

 

Reference:
Ahmed Farghaly (October 17, 2025) - Long-Term Commodity Cycles: Unraveling the Big Picture.

 

 WWII's effect on commodity prices counteracted the expected post-1919 bear market, 

resulting in a higher-than-expected 1949 low which J.M. Hurst termed a "straddled trough."

» Inflation will persist until century's end due to a long-term cycle. «

 

See also: 

Ahmed Farghaly (October 6, 2025) - High Inflation: We are in Kondratieff's "Summer of Summer". 

Ahmed Farghaly (2016) - The 162-Year Cycle in Stocks and Commodities Since 1509.

Ron William (2022) - Is the Big Cycle Turning? 

Nikolai Kondratieff (1926) - Gold Production Mirrors the Long Wave, It Doesn’t Drive It.

The Long Waves in Economic Life | Nikolai Kondratieff

XII. THE NATURE OF LONG WAVES  

Is it possible to maintain that the existence of long cycles in the dynamics of the capitalist economy is proved on the basis of the preceding statements? The relevant data which we were able to quote cover about 140 years. This period comprises two and one-half cycles only. Although the period embraced by the data is sufficient to decide the question of the existence of long waves, it is not enough to enable us to assert beyond doubt the cyclical character of those waves. Nevertheless we believe that the available data are sufficient to declare this cyclical character to be very probable.

We are led to this conclusion not only by the consideration of the factual material, but also because the objections to the assumption of long cyclical waves are very weak.

It has been objected that long waves lack the regularity which business cycles display. But this is wrong. If one defines “regularity” as repetition in regular time-intervals, then long waves possess this characteristic as much as the intermediate ones. A strict periodicity in social and economic phenomena does not exist at all — neither in the long nor in the intermediate waves. The length of the latter fluctuates at least between 7 and 11 years, i.e., 57 per cent. The length of the long cycles fluctuates between 48 and 60 years, i.e., 25 per cent only.

If regularity is understood to be the similarity and simultaneity of the fluctuations of different series, then it is present to the same degree in the long as in the intermediate waves.

If, finally, regularity is understood to consist in the fact that the intermediate waves are an international phenomenon, then the long waves do not differ from the latter in this respect either.

Consequently, there is no less regularity in the long waves than in the intermediate ones, and if we want to designate the latter as cyclical, we are bound not to deny this characterization to the former.

It has been pointed out [by other critics] that the long waves — as distinct from the intermediate ones which come from causes within the capitalistic system — are conditioned by casual, extra-economic circumstances and events, such as (1) changes in technique, (2) wars and revolutions, (3) the assimilation of new countries into the world economy, and (4) fluctuations in gold production.

These considerations are important. But they, too, are not valid. Their weakness lies in the fact that they reverse the causal connections and take the consequence to be the cause, or see an accident where we have really to deal with a law governing the events. In the preceding paragraphs, we have deliberately, though briefly, considered the establishment of some empirical rules for the movement of long waves. These regularities help us now to evaluate correctly the objections just mentioned.

1. Changes in technique have without doubt a very potent influence on the course of capitalistic development. But nobody has proved them to be the cause of long waves. On the contrary, the great importance of technical inventions and of the investment of new capital is most clearly evident during the upswing of the long cycle and during the first years after its highest point. During the downswing, on the other hand, the number of important inventions and new installations put into operation decreases noticeably. This is perfectly natural, for during the downswing the conditions for new investments are relatively unfavourable. Consequently, changes in technique cannot be considered as primary causes of the long waves; they are themselves only a function of their course.

2. Wars and revolutions also influence the course of economic development very strongly. But wars and revolutions do not come out of a clear sky, and they are not caused by arbitrary acts of individual personalities. They originate from real, especially economic, circumstances. The assumption that wars and revolutions acting from the outside cause long waves evokes the question as to why they themselves follow each other with regularity and solely during the upswing of long waves. Much more probable is the assumption that wars originate in the acceleration of the pace and the increased tension of economic life, in the heightened economic struggle for markets and raw materials, and that social shocks happen most easily under the pressure of new economic forces.

Wars and revolutions, therefore, can also be fitted into the rhythm of the long waves and do not prove to be the forces from which these movements originate, but rather to be one of their symptoms. But once they have occurred, they naturally exercise a potent influence on the pace and direction of economic dynamics.

3. As regards the opening-up of new countries for the world economy, it seems to be quite obvious that this cannot be considered an outside factor which will satisfactorily explain the origin of long waves. The United States have been known for a relatively very long time; for some reason or other they begin to be entangled in the world economy on a major scale only from the middle of the nineteenth century. Likewise, the Argentine and Canada, Australia and New Zealand, were discovered long before the end of the nineteenth century, although they begin to be entwined in the world economy to a significant extent only with the coming of the 1890’s. It is perfectly clear historically that, in the capitalistic economic system, new regions are opened for commerce during those periods in which the desire of old countries for new markets and new sources of raw materials becomes more urgent than theretofore. It is equally apparent that the limits of this expansion of the world economy are determined by the degree of this urgency. If this be true, then the opening of new countries does not provoke the upswing of a long wave. On the contrary, a new upswing makes the exploitation of new countries, new markets, and new sources of raw materials necessary and possible, in that it accelerates the pace of capitalistic economic development.

4. There remains the question whether the discovery of new gold mines, the increase in gold production, and a consequent increase in the gold stock can be regarded as a casual, outside factor causing the long waves.

An increase in gold production leads ultimately to a rise in prices and to a quickening in the tempo of economic life. But this does not mean that the changes in gold production are of a casual, outside character and that the waves in prices and in economic life are likewise caused by chance. We consider this to be not only unproved but positively wrong. This contention originates from the belief, first, that the discovery of gold mines and the perfection of the technique of gold production are accidental and, secondly, that every discovery of new gold mines and of technical inventions in the sphere of gold production brings about an increase in the latter. However great may be the creative element in these technical inventions and the significance of chance in these discoveries, yet they are not entirely accidental. Still less accidental — and this is the main point — are the fluctuations in gold production itself. These fluctuations are by no means simply a function of the activity of inventors and of the discoveries of new gold mines. On the contrary, the intensity of inventors’ and explorers’ activity and the application of technical improvement in the sphere of gold production, as well as the resulting increase of the latter, depend upon other, more general causes. The dependence of gold production upon technical inventions and discoveries of new gold mines is only secondary and derived.

Although gold is a generally recognized embodiment of value and, therefore, is generally desired, it is only a commodity. And like every commodity it has a cost of production. But if this be true, then gold production — even in newly discovered mines — can increase significantly only if it becomes more profitable, i.e., if the relation of the value of the gold itself to its cost of production (and this is ultimately the prices of other commodities) becomes more favorable. If this relation is unfavorable, even gold mines the richness of which is by no means yet exhausted may be shut down; if it is favorable, on the other hand, even relatively poor mines will be exploited.

When is the relation of the value of gold to that of other commodities most favorable for gold production? We know that commodity prices reach their lowest level toward the end of a long wave. This means that at this time gold has its highest purchasing power, and gold production becomes most favorable. This can be illustrated by the figures in Table 2.

At the same time, we believe ourselves justified in saying that the long waves, if existent at all, are a very important and essential factor in economic development, a factor the effects of which can be found in all the principal fields of social and economic life.

Even granting the existence of long waves, one is, of course, not justified in believing that economic dynamics consists only in fluctuations around a certain level. The course of economic activity represents beyond doubt a process of development, but this development obviously proceeds not only through intermediate waves but also through long ones. The problem of economic development in toto cannot be discussed here.

In asserting the existence of long waves and in denying that they arise out of random causes, we are also of the opinion that the long waves arise out of causes which are inherent in the essence of the capitalistic economy. This naturally leads to the question as to the nature of these causes. We are fully aware of the difficulty and great importance of this question; but in the preceding sketch we had no intention of laying the foundations for an appropriate theory of long waves.¹Gold production, as can be seen from these figures, becomes more profitable as we approach a low point in the price level and a high point in the purchasing power of gold (1895 and the following years).

It is clear, furthermore, that the stimulus to increased gold production necessarily becomes stronger the further a long wave declines. We, therefore, can suppose theoretically that gold production must in general increase most markedly when the wave falls most sharply, and vice versa.

In reality, however, the connection is not as simple as this but becomes more complicated, mainly just because of the effect of the changes in the technique of gold production and the discovery of new mines. It seems to us, indeed, that even improvements in technique and new gold discoveries obey the same fundamental law as does gold production itself, with more or less regularity in timing. Improvements in the technique of gold production and the discovery of new gold mines actually do bring about a lowering in the cost of production of gold; they influence the relation of these costs to the value of gold, and consequently the extent of gold production. But then it is obvious that exactly at the time when the relation of the value of gold to its cost becomes more unfavorable than theretofore, the need for technical improvements in gold mining and for the discovery of new mines necessarily becomes more urgent and this stimulates research in this field. There is, of course, a time-lag, until this urgent necessity, though already recognized, leads to positive success. In reality, therefore, gold discoveries and technical improvements in gold mining will reach their peak only when the long wave has already passed its peak, i.e., perhaps in the middle of the downswing. The available facts confirm this supposition.¹ In the period after the 1870’s, the following gold discoveries were made: 1881 in Alaska, 1884 in the Transvaal, 1887 in West Australia, 1890 in Colorado, 1894 in Mexico, 1896 in the Klondike. The inventions in the field of gold-mining technique, and especially the most important ones of this period (the inventions for the treatment of ore), were also made during the 1880’s, as is well known.

Gold discoveries and technical improvements, if they occur, will naturally influence gold production. They can have the effect that the increase in gold production takes place somewhat earlier than at the end of the downswing of the long wave. They also can assist the expansion of gold production, once that limit is reached. This is precisely what happens in reality. Especially after the decline in the 1870’s, a persistent, though admittedly slender, increase in gold production begins about the year 1883,² whereas, in spite of the disturbing influences of discoveries and inventions, the upswing really begins only after gold has reached its greatest purchasing power; and the increased production is due not only to the newly discovered gold fields but in a considerable degree also to the old ones. This is illustrated by the figures in Table 3.

From the foregoing one may conclude, it seems to us, that gold production, even though its increase can be a condition for an advance in commodity prices and for a general upswing in economic activity, is yet subordinate to the rhythm of the long waves and consequently cannot be regarded as a causal and random factor that brings about these movements from the outside.

XIII. CONCLUSIONS  

The objections to the regular cyclical character of the long waves, therefore, seem to us to be unconvincing. In view of this circumstance and considering also the positive reasons developed above, we think that, on the basis of the available data, the existence of long waves of cyclical character is very probable.

At the same time, we believe ourselves justified in saying that the long waves, if existent at all, are a very important and essential factor in economic development, a factor the effects of which can be found in all the principal fields of social and economic life.

Even granting the existence of long waves, one is, of course, not justified in believing that economic dynamics consists only in fluctuations around a certain level. The course of economic activity represents beyond doubt a process of development, but this development obviously proceeds not only through intermediate waves but also through long ones. The problem of economic development in toto cannot be discussed here.

In asserting the existence of long waves and in denying that they arise out of random causes, we are also of the opinion that the long waves arise out of causes which are inherent in the essence of the capitalistic economy. This naturally leads to the question as to the nature of these causes. We are fully aware of the difficulty and great importance of this question; but in the preceding sketch we had no intention of laying the foundations for an appropriate theory of long waves.