Showing posts with label Oswald Spengler. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Oswald Spengler. Show all posts

Saturday, October 19, 2024

Esoteric Trumpism │ Constantin von Hoffmeister

For his supporters, Donald Trump is a bulwark of traditionalism and a champion of ‘America First’. For his detractors, he is a disruptive, deceitful agent of chaos. But a more philosophical approach frames him as a key figure in an eldritch struggle with deep-seated forces of decay. Esoteric Trumpism is a profound, almost mystical interpretation of Donald Trump’s political journey, situating him not merely within the framework of contemporary politics but as a figure of cosmic and world-historical significance. This interpretation posits that Trump’s rise and continued influence reflect deeper metaphysical catalysts at play in the twilight of Western civilization, as predicted by the historiographer Oswald Spengler in the 1920s and 1930s.

» Trump’s significance lies not in the man but in the archetype he embodies. « 

According to Spengler’s cyclical theory of history, every great culture passes through stages of growth, flowering, and decline, ultimately transforming into a civilization. A civilization, in Spengler’s view, is the final, ossified stage of a culture – marked by materialism, a dystopian government apparatus, and stagnation – where the original creative spirit has faded. In this phase, democratic institutions begin to decay, leading to the rise of autocratic leaders, or Caesars, who assert their will as the last defenders of the civilization’s final flickers of vitality. Trump, in this narrative, appears as a Caesar of the West, struggling against the forces of chaos and entropy that threaten to engulf the remnants of the culture’s achievements. 

The Swamp, in the context of Esoteric Trumpism, eclipses its conventional political metaphor as a term for entrenched, secretive, and subversive agencies. Instead, it takes on a life of its own, representing a primordial, chthonic entity whose tentacles have reached into the heart of American power. This is no mere political quagmire – it is an ancient force, predating the Republic itself, fueled by what can only be described as eldritch energies. Trump’s wrestle against this dark presence is painted in Lovecraftian tones, where the stakes are not just electoral victories or policy changes but the very soul of the nation. His presidency becomes a metaphysical battle, with Trump cast as a modern hero who, like Spengler’s envisioned Caesars, refuses to capitulate to the rot that envelops his civilization. Each executive order, every political maneuver, is understood as an audacious attempt to dismantle this machinery of the Great Old Ones that has operated unseen for centuries. Trump’s defiance is portrayed as a courageous, almost tragic stand against the inevitable. He fights not for personal gain but to stave off the encroaching darkness that looms over the West.


[...] Trump’s economic nationalism and policies aimed at restoring American autarky – through tariffs, immigration controls, and the reduction of global dependencies – are emblematic of a dying civilization’s last effort to preserve itself. Spengler wrote that as civilizations enter their final stages, the state becomes primarily an economic object, with the competition for resources and sovereignty taking precedence over other concerns. Trump’s trade wars with China and his efforts to revive American industry are therefore not merely political strategies but the actions of a Caesar seeking to preserve his people’s material and cultural autonomy in the face of an encroaching global order. These actions reflect the Spenglerian picture of a civilization striving to maintain its vitality, even as it approaches its unstoppable downfall.

[...] Trump’s significance lies not in the man but in the archetype he embodies. The rise of such Caesarian leaders does not promise material success; their triumph is symbolic, not in policies but in their rebellion against a senile and rabid world order. Trumpism, even as Trump’s personal influence fades, will persist as a movement that channels the existential fears of a civilization in freefall, longing for a return to integrity and self-expression. The power of the archetype lies in its resonance with a people alienated by the deep state – Trump articulates their despair, even as his achievements remain modest. His role is to act as the last expression of Western vitality, not to reverse the downward spiral but to embody the final brave spirit of a people grasping for survival in a world disintegrating into frenzied insanity. 
 
Quoted from:
 

Sunday, December 3, 2023

The Chariot And Its Significance In World History | Oswald Spengler

The purpose of historical research is to depict the fate of human beings in a pictorial form, as far as it is manifested in deeds and personalities. We would know nothing of the Germanic migration period with its figures and battles if we were solely reliant on ground finds. Among these, however, one group is always overlooked or underestimated in its true historical significance: the weapons. They are closer to history than fragments and ornaments. They have been treated much too superficially by only considering their ornamentation or manufacturing technique. There is a lack of a psychology of weapons. Every weapon also speaks of the style of fighting and thus of the worldview of its bearers. In the invention, dissemination, or rejection of certain weapons, there is an ethos.
 
 
The bow, for example, is the first distance weapon that was instinctively rejected as unchivalrous by a group of European tribes. This includes, among others, the Romans, the Greeks of the mainland, and most Germanic tribes. In the depictions of the Ionian Odyssey saga on Corinthian and Attic vases, therefore, the bow, which is necessary to characterise the scene, is placed to the side, and Odysseus is given a sword, the weapon of combat man to man. [...] A new kind of man belongs to this weapon [the chariot]. The joy of risk and adventure, of personal bravery and chivalric ethos, becomes apparent. Master races arise that view war as the content of life and look down with pride and contempt on peasant peoples and cattle-breeding tribes. Here, in the second millennium, is expressed a mankind that was not there before. A new kind of soul is born. From then on, there is conscious heroism.

Quoted from:
Oswald Spengler (February 06, 1934) - The Chariot and Its Significance in the Course of World History. 
Lecture delivered at the Society of Friends of Asian Art and Culture in Munich, German Reich.

Monday, March 6, 2023

The Fate of Empires | Lieutenant-General Sir John Bagot Glubb

Lieutenant-General Sir John Bagot Glubb (1897 – 1986), known as Glubb Pasha, was a British army officer, scholar, and author, who led the Transjordan's Arab Legion between 1939 and 1956 as its commanding general. Glubb was a man of his time and class, he wrote some 20 books about the Arab world and Islam, and in 1978 a short treatise titled “The Fate of Empires and Search for Survival”. In this he describes a rising civilization as a society where people have a sense of duty and service, practical attitudes, a strong merchant class, and a desire for conquest.  
 

The characteristics of a falling civilizations include frivolity, love of money instead of duty, excessive reverence for celebrities, and the rise of intellect over action. Despite an empire’s geographic, religious, cultural, and technological differences, they all follow the same pattern of expansion, development, decline, and collapse. Using this knowledge, Glubb hoped that through understanding how empires decline, the British Empire could stand a chance at avoiding the same fate. Although the rise and fall of civilization are as unstoppable as the change of seasons, countries can mitigate losses by preparing for the future. 
 

Glubb formulates a set of patterns that empires experience until their eventual collapse. His framework consists of six stages that are characteristic of superpowers and follows the idea of cyclical paradigms in the historical record. Glubb estimates that on average empires last 250 years or 10 generations:
 
1. The Age of Pioneers (The Outburst)
2. The Age of Conquest
3. The Age of Commerce
4. The Age of Affluence (The High Noon)
5. The Age of Intellect
6. The Age of Decadence (Midnight)

Glubb’s formulation of collapse is inherently controversial, but he understands this keenly. Those living in or around a “collapsing” empire could never truly observe it, at least not directly - after all no citizen easily perceives or admits that the empire is failing or has failed. The human spirit is adaptive, and embraces many harsh and diverse conditions with exceptional ease. It is not a “gradually, then suddenly” - but a perpetuity of gradual decline. A collapse is realized centuries later by future hopefuls far removed, or in Glubb’s grim case, barbarians. Glubb’s sense of collapse implies a steady and progressive softening and weakening of an empire, nation, or power. Empires do not usually begin or end on a certain date. There is normally a gradual period of expansion and then a period of decline. Human affairs are subject to many chances, and it is not to be expected that they could be calculated with mathematical accuracy. 
 
The only thing we learn from history, is that men never learn from history”. His central proposition on collapse stems from the questionable way empires pass down history. Glubb considered an accurate generational transfer of history a crucial guard against collapse. Powers that retained fairly objective histories would win out in the long run as a matter of historical record in Glubb’s view. “Our people are represented as patriotic heroes, their enemies as grasping imperialists, or subversive rebels. In other words, our national histories are propaganda, not well-balanced investigations.” Further, in the wider historical sense, Glubb argues that for world history to be useful - it must be an accurate and collective history of the human race. “Any useful lessons to be derived must be learned by the study of the whole flow of human development, not by the selection of short periods here and there in one country or another.
 

(1.) The Age of Pioneers
The age of pioneers is marked by a sense of freedom and boldness characteristic of new encounters with the unknown. Pioneers are not limited to conventions or traditions. The leaders of the pioneers are creative, set the stage, and are free to improvise unique solutions and compromises. The old virtues - diligence, courage, honor, and loyalty rule the day. “Uninhibited by textbooks or book learning, action is their solution to every problem.
 

(2.) The Age of Conquest
The age of conquest is a period of military action and land acquisition. Glubb marks this period by the simmering desire for commerce and wealth by the public. The military may be proud and honorable, but conquest is driven mainly by a merchant class who usher in the age of commerce. “During the military period, glory and honor were the principal objects of ambition. To the merchant, such ideas are but empty words, which add nothing to the bank balance.

 

(3.) The Age of Commerce
Glubb marks the age of commerce by the ease at which goods are transported. In this period, trade is simplified and the ease of doing business maximized. The empire controls all trade routes, resulting in little to no interdependence in the domains of commerce and travel. “The means of transport were slower, but, when a great empire was in control, commerce was freed from the innumerable shackles imposed upon it today by passports, import permits, customs, boycotts and political interference.


(4.) The Age of Affluence
The age of affluence is identified by a subtle distinction in the value and utility of education. In an empire’s high noon, knowledge is viewed only as a path to riches, with its practical and virtuous foundations taking an indefinite back seat. Glubb intuits that as with the Arab decline, there is a gradual loss of knowledge that would have bolstered the empire’s institutions. “The Arab moralist, Ghazali (1058-1111), complains in these very same words of the lowering of objectives in the declining Arab world of his time. Students, he says, no longer attend college to acquire learning and virtue, but to obtain those qualifications which will enable them to grow rich.


(5.) The Age of Intellect
The age of intellect is marked by the common idea that education will solve all the problems in the world. It is this idea that underscores what Glubb terms “the inadequacy of intellect”. Glubb’s banal observation is that problem solving and cohesion among people depend simply on the principles that encourage self–sacrifice, loyalty, courage, and trust. Intellect is a product of these old virtues, and not the primary ingredient. “In a wider national sphere, the survival of the nation depends basically on the loyalty and self–sacrifice of the citizens. The impression that the situation can be saved by mental cleverness, without unselfishness or human self–dedication, can only lead to collapse.


(6.) The Age of Decadence
The age of decadence is signaled by increased pessimism and cynicism among citizens as the empire marches towards midnight. Civil dissensions predominantly in matters of politics become more tribal and pronounced. The pervasive pessimism and cynicism is assuaged through various means and frivolity becomes the order of the day. Glubb writes: “Frivolity is the frequent companion of pessimism. Let us eat, drink and be merry, for tomorrow we die. The resemblance between various declining nations in this respect is truly surprising. The Roman mob, we have seen, demanded free meals and public games. Gladiatorial shows, chariot races and athletic events were their passion. In the Byzantine Empire the rivalries of the Greens and the Blues in the hippodrome attained the importance of a major crisis. Judging by the time and space allotted to them in the Press and television, football and baseball are the activities which today chiefly interest the public in Britain and the United States respectively. The heroes of declining nations are always the same - the athlete, the singer or the actor. The word ‘celebrity’ today is used to designate a comedian or a football player, not a statesman, a general, or a literary genius.” 
 

In 10th century Baghdad, contemporary historians lamented the decadence of the period, which was signified by who the citizens considered their heroes. [They] deeply deplored the degeneracy of the times in which they lived, emphasizing particularly the indifference to religion, the increasing materialism and the laxity of sexual morals. They lamented also the corruption of the officials of the government and the fact that politicians always seemed to amass large fortunes while they were in office. The historians commented bitterly on the extraordinary influence acquired by popular singers over young people, resulting in a decline in sexual morality. The ‘pop’ singers of Baghdad accompanied their erotic songs on the lute, an instrument resembling the modern guitar. In the second half of the tenth century, as a result, much obscene sexual language came increasingly into use, such as would not have been tolerated in an earlier age. Several khalifs issued orders banning ‘pop’ singers from the capital, but within a few years they always returned.


When the welfare state was first introduced in Britain, it was hailed as a new high-water mark in the history of human development. History, however, seems to suggest that the age of decline of a great nation is often a period which shows a tendency to philanthropy and to sympathy for other races. This phase may not be contradictory to the feeling described in the previous paragraph, that the dominant race has the right to rule the world. For the citizens of the great nation enjoy the role of Lady Bountiful. As long as it retains its status of leadership, the imperial people are glad to be generous, even if slightly condescending. The rights of citizenship are generously bestowed on every race, even those formerly subject, and the equality of mankind is proclaimed. The Roman Empire passed through this phase, when equal citizenship was thrown open to all peoples, such provincials even becoming senators and emperors. The Arab Empire of Baghdad was equally, perhaps even more, generous. During the Age of Conquests, pure-bred Arabs had constituted a ruling class, but in the ninth century the empire was completely cosmopolitan. State assistance to the young and the poor was equally generous. University students received government grants to cover their expenses while they were receiving higher education. The State likewise offered free medical treatment to the poor. The first free public hospital was opened in Baghdad in the reign of Harun al-Rashid (786-809), and under his son, Mamun, free public hospitals sprang up all over the Arab world from Spain to what is now Pakistan. The impression that it will always be automatically rich causes the declining empire to spend lavishly on its own benevolence, until such time as the economy collapses, the universities are closed and the hospitals fall into ruin. It may perhaps be incorrect to picture the welfare state as the high-water mark of human attainment. It may merely prove to be one more regular milestone in the life-story of an ageing and decrepit empire.
 
 
It is of interest to note that decadence is the disintegration of a system, not of its individual members. The habits of the members of the community have been corrupted by the enjoyment of too much money and too much power for too long a period. The result has been, in the framework of their national life, to make them selfish and idle. A community of selfish and idle people declines, internal quarrels develop in the division of its dwindling wealth, and pessimism follows, which some of them endeavor to drown in sensuality or frivolity. In their own surroundings, they are unable to redirect their thoughts and their energies into new channels.
 

But when individual members of such a society emigrate into entirely new surroundings, they do not remain conspicuously decadent, pessimistic or immoral among the inhabitants of their new homeland. Once enabled to break away from their old channels of thought, and after a short period of readjustment, they become normal citizens of their adopted countries. Some of them, in the second and third generations, may attain pre-eminence and leadership in their new communities. This seems to prove that the decline of any nation does not undermine the energies or the basic character of its members. Nor does the decadence of a number of such nations permanently impoverish the human race.

Decadence is both mental and moral deterioration, produced by the slow decline of the community from which its members cannot escape, as long as they remain in their old surroundings. But, transported elsewhere, they soon discard their decadent ways of thought, and prove themselves equal to the other citizens of their adopted country. Neither is decadence physical. The citizens of nations in decline are sometimes described as too physically emasculated to be able to bear hardship or make great efforts. This does not seem to be a true picture. Citizens of great nations in decadence are normally physically larger and stronger than those of their barbarian invaders [...] Decadence is a moral and spiritual disease, resulting from too long a period of wealth and power, producing cynicism, decline of religion, pessimism and frivolity. The citizens of such a nation will no longer make an effort to save themselves, because they are not convinced that anything in life is worth saving."

If superpowers inevitably break down around the 10th generation, then in Glubb’s framework the global empire of the United States would be superseded by another great power by the year 2026 at the very least.

Reference
 
See also:
 
» When the ordinary thought of a highly cultivated people begins
to regard 'having children' as a question of pro's and con's,
the great turning point has come
. « - Oswald Spengler, 1918

Wednesday, August 24, 2022

The Liberal Political Theology | Neema Parvini

Neema Parvini (2022) - From the realist perspective of [Carl] Schmitt, there is no structural difference between the liberal state, the communist state, and the fascist state — or indeed any other state. The only difference is the extent to which a regime may obscure the nature of its power or else genuinely buy into myths of neutrality. Viewed in this way, a state wedded to liberal democracy is as ‘totalitarian’ as any other since, by its very nature, it will be unable to tolerate any leaders who are not always already liberal democrats. 
 
"Liberalism is to freedom as anarchism is to anarchy." Ernst Jünger, 1977
 
Should such leaders rise, the stalwarts of liberal democracy will perceive them as ‘populists’, ‘fascists’, ‘threats to democracy’, and so on. The extent of free speech, free inquiry, free thought, and so on is a liberal delusion. In fact, the range of ‘allowable opinion’ is always exceedingly narrow and the liberal democratic state is marked by its intolerance and spectacular inability to imagine any worldview that is not its own. The dominance of liberal political theology is total. Schmitt would not have disagreed with Oswald Spengler who wrote in The Decline of the West:

"England, too, discovered the ideal of a Free Press, and discovered along with it that the press serves him who owns it. It does not spread ‘free’ opinion — it generates it. […] Without the reader’s observing it, the paper, and himself with it, changes masters. Here also money triumphs and forces the free spirits into its service. No tamer has his animals more under his power. Unleash the people as reader-mass and it will storm through the streets and hurl itself upon the target indicated, terrifying and breaking windows; a hint to the press-staff and it will become quiet and go home. The Press today is an army with carefully organized arms and branches, with journalists as officers, and readers as soldiers. But here, as in every army, the soldier obeys blindly, and war aims and operation-plans change without his knowledge. The reader neither knows, nor is allowed to know, the purposes for which he is used, nor even the role that he is to play. A more appalling caricature of freedom of thought cannot be imagined. Formerly a man did not dare to think freely. Now he dares, but cannot; his will to think is only a willingness to think to order, and this is what he feels as his liberty."

As Edward Bernays would go on to say these ‘are the invisible rulers who control the destinies of millions. […] In some department of our daily lives, in which we imagine ourselves as free agents, we are ruled by dictators exercising great power.’ The point is that viewed from the outside, liberal democracy looks just as ‘totalitarian’ as any other regime even if it relies more on subtle persuasion, nudge techniques, and other psychological tricks than coercion to obtain its results.