Suicide by a Thousand Cuts: EU Migrant Population Hits Record 64.2 Million

Immigration to the European Union has surged to historically high levels, reaching a total of 64.2 million foreign-born residents in 2025. According to the Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration, which utilizes Eurostat and UNHCR data, this represents a dramatic climb from the 40 million recorded in 2010 and a year-over-year increase of 2.1 million people. 

 

"Agents of Deveolpment," preparing for a crossing from the French coast toward the UK. 

To put this in perspective, approximately one in seven people residing in the European Union was born in a country other than the one where they currently live. The growth trend over the last 15 years highlights a significant shift in the bloc's composition.

 

 

Number of individuals born outside their country of residence
(including those with unknown birth country) in the EU, 2010-2025

 (excluding Portugal due to missing data).

 Number of immigrants in EU countries with the largest immigrant populations, 2010-2025.

 

Number of individuals born outside their country of residence in the EU, 2010-2025.

 

In 2010, the foreign-born population represented approximately 9% of the total EU population; by 2025, that share has risen to 14.25%. This presence is characterized by heavy geographic concentration, particularly in nations like Germany, where nearly 18 million foreign-born residents out of a total population of 83.6 million bring the local percentage to approximately 21.5%. 

"Replacement Migration: Is it A Solution to Declining and Ageing Populations?"

Population Division, UN DESA, New York, March 21, 2000.

 

Resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly on the "Global Compact for Safe, 

Orderly and Regular Migration," A/RES/73/195, Marrakesh, Morocco, December 19, 2018. 

 

» The 2030 Agenda recognizes... migrant women, men and children... as agents of development. « 

"Migration and the 2030 Agenda. A Guide for Practitioners." IOM, 2018.

 

This shift also carries a distinct demographic impact. While the median age of the broader EU population reached 44.9 years in early 2025, 72% of the foreign-born group in Germany is of working age, contrasting sharply with the aging domestic profile of the bloc. These figures demonstrate that migration is not just increasing in volume, but is fundamentally reshaping the labor and age structures of the Union's largest economies.

Immigrant Population in 2025 by EU country (% of total population).

 

The Geography of Concentration

A small number of countries handle the vast majority of arrivals and residency stocks. Germany continues to be the primary destination, hosting nearly 18 million foreign-born residents, of whom 72% are of working age. Meanwhile, Spain has emerged as the leader in recent growth, adding 700,000 residents in a single year—roughly one-third of the entire EU’s annual increase—bringing its total foreign-born population to 9.5 million (20%). While Germany and Spain account for nearly half of the total increase, smaller states like Luxembourg, Malta, and Cyprus are experiencing the most significant pressure relative to their population size.

 

Ranking of EU27 countries by total migrant inflows, 2024.

 

Ranking of EU27 countries by total migrant inflows per 1,000 inhabitants, 2024. 

 

Asylum applications follow a similarly concentrated pattern, with four nations receiving nearly three-quarters of all claims. Spain leads the applications with 141,000, drawing heavily from Latin America, followed by Italy with 127,000 and France with 116,000, both of which exhibit diverse source-country patterns. Germany received 113,000 applications, primarily from conflict-driven regions such as Syria and Afghanistan. While larger nations take the most applications in absolute terms, smaller countries often bear a greater burden relative to their population.

 

Countries of Origin of First-Instance Asylum Applicants, 2025.

 

Socio-Economic Strain and the Housing Crisis

As migration reaches these new peaks, official data points to a severe mounting strain on living conditions across the bloc. In 2024, 8.2% of EU residents were considered overburdened by housing costs, spending at least 40% of their disposable income on rent or mortgages. The crisis is particularly acute for the youth, with nearly one in ten people aged 15 to 29 facing a similar housing cost burden. Furthermore, 16.9% of the population now lives in overcrowded households, and 9.2% are unable to adequately heat their homes.

Refugees as a Share of Total Population, 2025: Germany hosts the most (≈2.7 million), more than double Poland (≈1 million), followed by France (≈751,000), Spain (≈471,000), and Czechia (≈381,000). Italy (≈314,000), Austria (≈281,000), and the Netherlands (≈263,000), while most others have fewer than 200,000. Totals include refugees, people in refugee-like situations, and displaced persons from Ukraine under temporary protection.

Recently, European Council President Antonio Costa has emphasized that housing affordability is now "at the core of people's disillusionment with democratic institutions." Spot on, Mr. Costa... these economic pressures, combined with concerns over public security, services, and the cost of living, have fueled the rise in anti-immigration sentiment across EU member states and the UK. While the EU allocates approximately 2% of its seven-year budget to migration and "border management," the bulk of the financial and social costs are currently borne by individual national governments. 

 

In 2014, the cost to support 2 million "refugees" over the next three years was at €900

billion—more than twice the German federal government's total annual budget.

 

Now just imagine—due to a prolonged general economic crisis and decline—what will happen once national administrations are no longer able to milk their native populations for hundreds of billions of euros and can no longer redistribute enough protection money to millions of formerly pampered, predominantly male, military-age "refugees" and "migrants" from dozens of Muslim countries destroyed by U$raHell, UK, NATO, and the very EU… they may suddenly start helping themselves otherwise.

 

Most urgent EU priority instead: Drone production and another €90 billion "loan" for Ukraine.

Geopolitical Tensions and 'Defense' Realities

The official EU migration narrative is now inextricably linked to Russia... Russia's support of Syrian "dictator" Assad, the Libyan "Gaddafi regime," and "Putin's unprovoked aggression" against Ukraine. The EU currently hosts approximately 4.35 million Ukrainian nationals, with Germany serving as the largest host at over one million people. However, the political climate is shifting as domestic hospitality begins to wane. Berlin and Kyiv are now coordinating efforts to facilitate the return of military-age Ukrainian men to their home country's meat grinder as losses mount at the front.

 

Though this be madness, yet there is method in’t.

Simultaneously, the EU—getting ready for "war with Russia by 2030"—is pivoting toward a more aggressive "defense" posture. Through the recently launched €800 billion EU “ReArm Europe / Readiness 2030” plan, member states are significantly increasing "defense spending" to counter perceived Russian aggression. 

 

 Militarism, war, deindustrialization, mass-migration, inflation, debt, impoverishment,

corruption, energy and food shortages: All ingredients in place for a perfect storm in the EU.

 

Moscow has dismissed these security concerns as "nonsense," suggesting that EU governments are using the "threat narrative" to distract their citizens from internal domestic failures and the growing complexities of their deliberately self-fabricated "Agenda 2030" replacement migration crisis. 

Reference:
Tommaso Frattini and Camilla Piovesan (April 20, 2026) - The Immigrant Population in the European Union:
Growth, Concentration and Dispersion. 

  

 See also:

Anthony Rubin (2026) - Replacing Europe: An Undercover Look at Mass Migration.

TPR (2016) - The US Weapon of Mass Migration and the Coerced Suicide of Europe.

TPR (March 30, 2026) - JPMorgan Maps and Times the Global Oil Supply Shockwave. Really? 
Stanislav Krapivnik (March 27, 2026) - No Energy, No Food: Global System Breakdown Begins.

Alexander L. Chizhevsky (2025) - Mass Excitability during Solar Cycle 25 (2019–2030).

David Betz (2025) - United Kingdom Configured for Civil War Within the Next 5 Years.

Markku Siira (2025) - The Sidonius Apollinaris Syndrome.

Replacing Europe: An Undercover Look at Mass Migration | Anthony Rubin

In a single generation, Europe has changed forever—more profoundly than in the last two thousand years. The globalist governments of Western Europe orchestrated this against their own peoples by design: they opened the borders, and a never-ending, multi-million-strong mass migration—in recent years primarily from Africa, the world's most violence-ridden continent—has been flowing into Europe. Mass immigration has fractured social unity and uprooted European cultures entirely, transforming once-majestic cities into no-go zones and slums. For every 'refugee boat' that arrives, institutionalized African mafias net between 50,000 and 60,000 euros directly in cash from the European Union, all while native Europeans are being replaced demographically, racially, spiritually, and culturally in their own homeland.

  

September 4, 2015: Germany's Merkel regime opens Europe's borders.

 

Who is facilitating all this? The 'king daddy' above everything is the United Nations (UN) and its migration wing, the International Organization for Migration (IOM). You find them at every key border crossing. Then, of course, there is the European Commission and its degenerate, omnipresent bureaucracy. At the lower levels, you find all sorts of other criminal organizations and enterprises; utterly corrupt, opportunist European governments using migration as blackmail for financial aid; and a myriad of publicly funded, so-called international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), such as the Red Cross, Catholic charities, the Norwegian Refugee Council, and the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS). Every one of them deserves investigation and prosecution, yet they continue to operate with total impunity.

"Replacement Migration: Is it A Solution to Declining and Ageing Populations?"

Population Division, UN DESA, New York, March 21, 2000.

 

Resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly on the "Global Compact for Safe, 

Orderly and Regular Migration," A/RES/73/195, Marrakesh, Morocco, December 19, 2018. 

 

» The 2030 Agenda recognizes... migrant women, men and children... as agents of development. « 

"Migration and the 2030 Agenda. A Guide for Practitioners." IOM, 2018.

 

Nowadays, starting mostly from Mauritania, an Islamic Republic in West Africa, via the nearby Spanish Canary Islands, the end point of this mass migration is continental Western Europe, where the benefits are highest. These were the richest countries in the world, but they no longer are. Of course, the immediate and direct results of this influx have been not only rampant crime and rape, but also the radical decline in public security, quality of life, stability of cities, and an insane deterioration and collapse of fiscal, legal, education, healthcare, and pension systems across the board. 

 

» Europe is not going to be the monolithic societies that they once were in the last century. 

Jews are going to be at the center of that. It’s a huge transformation for Europe to make. They are 
now moving into a multicultural mode, and Jews will be resented because of our leading role. 
But without that leading role and without that transformation, Europe will not survive. « 

Barbara Lerner Spectre, Founding Director, Paideia Stockholm, 2010.

 

» For every boat [full of migrants] that arrives [to the Canaries], the [Mauritanian] mafia gets between 50,000 to 60,000 euros  [from the Spanish government]. It’s all a game! And Spain wouldn't want this to stop. Every year Spain receives more than 3 billion euros from the European Union. Out of that 3 billion, Spain keeps 2 billion. Then the Spanish take the  other 1 billion in cartons, in boxes, or in suitcases, put it on a flight, and it goes to Mauritania. There they speak with, say, ten people from the very top. For those people, the money isn't sent by check or by bank transfer. It’s in cartons; it’s in luggage. They are paid in cash. « 
IOM representative to the Canaries, teaching basic economics of mass migration and 'refugee crisis,' 2025.

 

However, perpetually financed with billions of euros by the EU Commission in Brussels, European governments keep flying these people by the thousands from the Canaries to the mainland and putting them in camps all across Europe, where they just eat, sleep, and roam on the taxpayers' dime for years, waiting for their 'asylum papers.' Nobody seems to care that certain fish don't mix in the same aquarium, that the native populations don't want them, or that they haven't added anything to these countries. 

» The total cost to support 2 million 'refugees' over the next three years was estimated at 900

billion euros—more than twice the [German] federal government's annual budget for 2014. « 

Migrant 'camps' in Paris, January 23, 2026.

Paris 2026. Indistinguishable from Africa. 

 

Helsinki Cathedral 2025: Huge provocation. Won't end well.

 

Is it reversible? You could stop it tomorrow; these are still the most powerful countries on earth. This is collective self-extermination, and if more Europeans knew and understood the extent of all this, they'd be up in arms in the streets against their governments. But it’s getting to a point where it might be too late. In Germany, they can't even raise a national army because it would be majority Muslim, and they are afraid to give weapons to hundreds of thousands of young Muslim men. Every day that goes by, it gets worse. Reversing it now would involve serious civil conflict because these migrants are high-testosterone men who will fight back. In Calais, France, someone was beheaded in a parking lot not far from where we were. When I met with a UN/IOM worker, he sold me an Excel sheet for 600 bucks showing that the vast majority of arrivals—over 95%—are men. There are almost no women or children. This is the end of Europe, and the West in general.

 

Reference:

Anthony Rubin (January 23, 2026) - We Followed the World’s Deadliest Illegal Mass Migration Route. (video)

  

January 23, 2026: Spain is set to approve a decree legalizing more than 500,000 undocumented immigrants. 

This move provides full EU legal status, enabling them to live and work across Europe while accessing public benefits.

 

 » The result will be a mixed new population with an average IQ of 90

—too dumb to grasp anything, but intelligent enough to work. « 

TPR (June 10, 2016) - The US Weapon of Mass Migration and the Coerced Suicide of Europe.  

What goes around, comes around.

Anthony J. Rubin (29), is the Miami-based founder of Muckraker, a guerrilla media outlet specializing in high-threat undercover exposés on global migration and NGO/government involvement in border crises. A self-described Libertarian Nationalist and America First advocate, he embeds in danger zones to produce documentaries like "Inside the Darién Gap" and "Replacing Europe" alongside his brother, Joshua. Their work combines hidden-camera investigations with a focus on US sovereignty and the rejection of globalism and interventionism.

How America Became a Financialized Rentier Economy | Jiang Xueqin

From 1950 to 1980, America’s economy was mainly focused on manufacturing. Manufacturing made up 40% of GDP, generated 40% of profits, and employed 30% of the workforce. If you were a factory worker between 1950 and 1980, life was good. You worked 40 hours a week, had health insurance, could buy a home, and your wife didn’t have to work. Families raised three to four kids, owned two cars, took vacations every year, dined out weekly, and retired with solid pensions. 

» The US economy has shifted from production to speculation. «

 

After 1980 came the Reagan Revolution and the rise of neoliberalism, an economic philosophy centered on free markets and deregulation. Since then, the US economy has been financialized. Today, financial services account for 22% of GDP, while manufacturing has fallen from 40% to just 10%. Financial services now generate 40% of all corporate profits but employ only 5% of the workforce.

These numbers reflect a radical transformation of American society. From 1950 to 1980, workers had political power. As a confident middle class, they joined unions and participated in politics. Today, most of that power has shifted to Wall Street and to the professional-managerial elite—highly educated, coastal, Ivy-League graduates clustered in New York, Washington, Boston, and San Francisco. This elite, multicultural and financially dominant, has become the most powerful political bloc in America. As a result, government policy increasingly favors them at the expense of workers. That’s the first major shift: political influence moving from labor to finance.

Education reflects this change. In the 1950s and 1960s, graduates of top schools often aspired to be professors, scientists, entrepreneurs, or corporate executives. Today, nearly all want to go to one place: Wall Street. Why? Because that’s where the money is. The brightest PhDs in statistics and artificial intelligence—who might otherwise be developing breakthrough technologies at IBM—are instead running hedge-fund algorithms, speculating with other people’s money.

The US economy has shifted from production to speculation. Financial services don’t create goods; they move money around to make more money. It’s not productive—it’s speculative. And America’s smartest minds are devoted to it. This shift has made the economy far more unstable. In 2001 came the dot-com crash. In 2008, the subprime mortgage crisis. More recently, multiple banks collapsed in a single week.

Why? Bubbles. Housing, stocks, and other assets are all overpriced. People gamble on the assumption prices will always rise. When bubbles burst, the result is volatility, instability, and uncertainty. That’s bad for the economy. Inequality has also surged. The top 1% now capture a vastly greater share of wealth, and the gap keeps widening.

In short, financialization has been destructive. It has made politics more divisive, the economy more volatile, and redirected the nation’s best talent into speculation rather than innovation. Young people today struggle to own homes. Many rent indefinitely, with little hope of upward mobility. This is the rentier economy: when ownership is out of reach, people are locked out of building wealth. Instead of producing, many speculate—buying Bitcoin or chasing bubbles.

Reference:

Jiang Xueqin (September 24, 2025) - Why Young Americans Can’t Buy Homes Anymore. (video)

Global Demographic Crash and the Death of Growth | Anu Madgavkar

Falling fertility rates below replacement (2.1 children per woman) in two-thirds of humanity are driving global population shifts toward depopulation by 2100. UN projections show populations in major economies declining 20-50%, with age structures inverting from pyramids to obelisks: fewer youth, more seniors. 

 

Demographic shifts are transforming population pyramids into shallots or obelisks, with fewer youth and more seniors. The world’s countries are grouped into ten regions: Advanced Asia, Central/Eastern Europe, Emerging Asia, Greater China, India, Latin America/Caribbean, Middle East/North Africa, North America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Western Europe. In advanced economies, population structures are increasingly top-heavy, resembling obelisks, due to declining fertility and aging populations. 

First-wave regions (advanced economies and China) face immediate impacts, with working-age shares dropping from 67% to 59% by 2050. Later-wave regions (emerging Asia, India, Latin America, Middle East/North Africa) peak in the 2030s; Sub-Saharan Africa, the exception, peaks post-2080.

 

The story of collapsing demographics starts in Luxembourg, the first country the United Nations recorded as having a fertility rate below replacement in 1950, when it first started collecting data.

Luxembourg’s fertility rate rebounded in the 1950s, however, making Serbia and Croatia, both part of Yugoslavia at the time, the first countries where fertility permanently dropped below the replacement threshold, in 1963 and in 1968, respectively. Within a year, fertility rates in Denmark, Finland, and Luxembourg had followed suit. None of these countries has had a fertility rate equal to or above replacement since then.

Twenty years later, most countries in Advanced Asia, Europe, and North America had crossed the replacement fertility threshold.

Subsequently, fertility rates in countries at varying levels of economic development around the world have fallen below replacement—in Thailand in 1989, Mexico in 2015, and India in 2019.

Sub-Saharan Africa is the one region of the world today where fertility rates remain high and are likely to stay above the replacement rate beyond the next quarter century.

Economic consequences include slowed GDP per capita growth by 0.4% annually on average in first-wave regions through 2050, unless offset by levers: doubled-to-quadrupled productivity growth, 1-5 extra weekly work hours per person, or migration boosting working-age populations. Senior dependency rises, with support ratios (working-age per senior) falling from 6.5 globally to 3.9, widening the "senior gap" (consumption minus income) by 1.3-1.5 times. Public pensions, covering 40-80% of gaps, strain finances; asset appreciation (e.g., real estate) has supported seniors but may falter for future generations.

Global Fertility Rate and Annual Population Growth: Top and Bottom 20 Countries in 2025.

Consumption shifts: seniors drive 25% of global spending by 2050 (double 1997), favoring healthcare (up 5-29% per capita) over education (down 4-33%). Labor markets age, with 50+ workers comprising 37% of hours worked in first-wave regions by 2050.

 
Later-wave regions must "get rich before old," accelerating productivity (median $13/hour vs. $60 in high-income) via investment, human capital, and job creation to capture demographic dividends before they vanish. Two-thirds may not reach high-income thresholds before matching first-wave aging.

Responses: Boost productivity through AI/automation; adapt workforces for seniors via flexible hours, retraining; target senior consumers with tailored products (e.g., adaptive clothing, fall sensors); reform pensions by raising retirement ages; enhance female participation and migration integration. Societies must rethink norms on fertility, caregiving, and intergenerational equity to avert lower growth and eroded wealth flows. 

 

Reference:
Anu Madgavkar et al. (2025) - Dependency and Depopulation: Confronting Consequences of New Demographic Reality.

Youth Bulge Options - A Demographic Theory of War | Gunnar Heinsohn

Today approximately 44 percent of the world’s 7.2 billion people are under 24 years old - and 26 percent are under 14. A staggering 82 percent live in less developed regions of the world – primarily sub-Saharan Africa and Asia. Currently, the global median age is 29.2 years, a sharp contrast to Europe, for example, where the median age is 41. Of the 20 states with the lowest median ages worldwide, 18 are in sub-Saharan Africa. The UN predicts that the median age will rise to 42 years by the century’s end, and with it the world’s population will increase to 10.9 billion people. Developing and least developed countries have the highest fertility rates and many are expected to triple in population by 2100. The populations of Burkina Faso, Malawi, Niger, Mali, Somalia, Uganda, Tanzania and Zambia are predicted to increase by 500%. In these countries demographic pressure is already responsible for food scarcity, water scarcity, malnutrition, and disease. 

The Youth Bulge Theory attempts to explain and to predict social conflict, migration, conquest and war, and was first introduced by the CIA in 1995 (The Demographic Backdrop to Ethnic Conflict: A Geographic Overview). Youth bulge specifically refers to a disproportionate percentage of a state population being between the ages of 15 and 24 years old. But the main point of the Youth Bulge Theory is that an excess in especially young adult male population predictably leads to social unrest, war and terrorism, as the third and fourth sons that find no prestigious positions in their existing societies rationalize their impetus to compete by religion or political ideology. 

In his study Söhne und Weltmacht (Sons and World Power: Terror in the Rise and Fall of Nations; 2003) German genocide expert Gunnar Heinsohn investigated family size in various societies in relation to the frequency of violent conflict since 1500 A.D. He concluded, that the presence of large numbers of young men in nations that have experienced population explosions — all searching for respect, work, sex and meaning — tend to turn into violent countries and become involved in wars. Heinsohn’s demographic materialism is not concerned with the absolute size of populations, but rather with the share of teenagers and young men. If the population under the age of 20 becomes 40% or more compared to the total, society is facing a youth bulge. Serious problems start when families begin to produce three, four or more sons.  Faced with limited resources, the surplus sons' competition for power and prestige does only leave six options: #1 Violent Crime, #2 Civil War, #3 Revolution, #4 Emigration, #5 Genocide, and #6 War of Conquest or Colonization.  
  

This is a man's world:
Somali surplus sons warming up for option #2.

Youth bulge can be seen as one factor among many in explaining social unrest and uprisings in society. But Heinsohn essentially claims that most historical periods of social unrest are lacking external triggers (such as rapid climatic changes or other catastrophic changes of the environment). Even most genocides can be readily explained as a result of a built-up youth bulge, including European colonialism, 20th-century fascism, the rise of Communism during the Cold War, the Arab Spring, and ongoing conflicts such as in Somalia, South Sudan, Central African Republic or in Mali. Since more than a decade Heinsohn keeps warning Western politicians about the too many angry young men outside the Euro-American world today — above all, too many Muslim young men in the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa. He considers them one of the principal threats to the West in the first quarter of the 21st century, and illustrates this also in the recent examples of Afghanistan and Iraq: Since 1950, Iraqi fathers of all ethnic and religious groups have sired, on the average, three to four sons. They produced a youth bulge. Saddam Hussein canalized this youth bulge in the options #4 to #6 (genocide, war of conquest, numerous Iraqis went into exile). Following Saddam's removal from power the competition for positions of power was transformed into a civil war (option #2) that is being driven by a massive wave of sons. It may not be easy to recognize the current violence as a civil war, because the Americans and their allies are fighting on one of the sides. But the fact that this was a civil war would become clear through its continuation once the US at her allies withdraw. The same phenomenon could be seen — according to Heinsohn — in Afghanistan (see video clip HERE) where the enormous surplus of sons could never be absorbed, in spite of the recruitment of large numbers of police and military personnel. War would therefore inevitably continue in one way or another even after the withdrawal of Western troops.