Showing posts with label Grand Strategy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Grand Strategy. Show all posts

Wednesday, September 3, 2025

The End of Western Dominance—US Lives in Mortal Fear | John Mearsheimer

Since 2017, when Trump entered the White House, the balance of power has shifted in China’s favor, though the United States remains the world’s most powerful state. China is rapidly closing the gap, particularly in cutting-edge technologies, which Washington fears could tilt global economic and military power. As China converts its economic strength into military might, it builds not just regional forces but also blue-water naval power and global projection capabilities linked to its Belt and Road Initiative. This imitation of US strategy alarms Washington and drives a bipartisan policy of containment.

John J. Mearsheimer, American political scientist and professor at the University of Chicago, best known for his work
on international relations theory, offensive realism, the US Zionist lobby, US–China rivalry and great power politics.

Initially, Chinese leaders argued that economic interdependence would prevent conflict, since prosperity required cooperation. However, survival—not prosperity—is the primary goal of states in an anarchic international system with no higher authority. As China’s economic rise translated into growing military capacity, American fear replaced optimism, triggering security competition in East Asia. Prosperity enriched both sides, but balance-of-power politics and survival imperatives outweighed economic interdependence theory.

» Great powers are ruthless, exploiting weaker rivals to secure survival and expand influence. «
John J. Mearsheimer's complete discourse video. 

Historical lessons reinforce this logic. Weak states like China during its “century of humiliation” (1840s–1940s) and Russia during NATO expansion in the 1990s suffered because they lacked power. Great powers are ruthless, exploiting weaker rivals to secure survival and expand influence. In this system, the optimal strategy is regional hegemony, dominating one’s neighborhood while preventing rivals from doing the same. The US has long acted this way, blocking Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union from achieving dominance in Europe or Asia, while securing its own supremacy in the Western Hemisphere.

China’s trajectory fits this pattern. As its power has grown since the 1990s, Beijing naturally seeks to dominate East Asia. Yet the US cannot tolerate another regional hegemon, making containment inevitable. From Washington’s perspective, preventing Chinese hegemony is about survival, not choice. From Beijing’s perspective, seeking hegemony is equally rational. The result is a structural clash: both sides are locked in an intensifying security competition driven by the anarchic nature of the international system.

» The United States lives in mortal fear that the Chinese are going to dominate. «

China’s path to hegemony is more difficult than America’s was because regional powers like Japan, Australia, South Korea, and the Philippines—backed by the US—resist Chinese dominance. India participates in the Quad but is geographically and strategically less central to East Asian balance. Russia, meanwhile, has been pushed into China’s camp by the Ukraine war, eliminating a potential counterweight. This complicates US strategy: instead of balancing China together, Washington and Moscow are now aligned against each other.
 
The Ukraine war creates two major problems for the US: it prevents a full pivot to Asia and deepens the Sino-Russian partnership. Trump recognized this dynamic and sought rapprochement with Moscow to peel Russia away from China, but his chances of success are slim. Russia deeply distrusts the US, and Trump underestimated the difficulty of ending the Ukraine conflict. His instincts—to improve ties with Russia and focus on China—align with realist logic, but his reliance on instincts over experts undermines effective execution.

» It's only recently that Putin has brought the Russians back 
from the dead and we now consider Russia to be a great power. «

Since 2017, US policy has shifted decisively from engagement to containment of China, first under Trump and then reinforced, even hardened, under Biden. Yet American forces remain tied down in Ukraine and the Middle East. Deployments against the Houthis in the Red Sea and the prospect of war with Iran divert vital resources away from East Asia, just as China grows militarily stronger. Past US experiments in social engineering—in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya—ended in failure, raising doubts about new entanglements that sap the capacity to counter China.

Facing escalating global uncertainties, Chinese President Xi Jinping said the SCO is increasingly
responsible for regional peace, stability, and member-state development, August 31, 2025.
 
Ultimately, the US–China rivalry reflects structural realities of power politics. Both states seek survival through maximizing power, and both see regional hegemony as the path to security. The United States, the sole global hegemon since 1900, refuses to share that status, while China, closing the gap, sees dominance in East Asia as essential. The result is an enduring, intensifying contest that economic interdependence or diplomatic optimism cannot erase.

 

See also:

Tuesday, March 5, 2024

On Realism and War with China | John Mearsheimer

Lex Fridman: The communication gap between China and the United States seems to be much greater than that of what was the former Soviet Union and the United States.
 
Mearchiavelli,
Machiavelli's revenant.
 
John Mearsheimer: It’s an interesting question. A lot of people describe the Cold War as an ideological competition above all else.
Communism versus liberal democracy or communism versus liberal capitalism, whatever. I actually don’t believe that. The Soviets were realists to the core. Stalin was a realist par excellence, and ideology did not matter much in Stalin’s foreign policy. And if you look at Soviet foreign policy after World War II, throughout the Cold War, they were realists to the core. And in those days the Americans were realists. Sure, a lot of liberal ideology floating around out there, but the Americans were realists. One of the reasons we avoided a shooting match between the United States and the Soviet Union from 1947 to 1989 was because both sides understood the basic balance of power logic.
 
The US-China competition is somewhat different. But first of all, the Chinese are realists to the core. I’ve spent a lot of time in China. I am basically a rock star in China. The Chinese are my kind of people. They are realists. They speak my language. It’s the United States that is no longer very realist. American leaders have a very powerful liberal bent and tend not to see the world in realist terms.
 
That’s fascinating. So the Chinese are pragmatic realists and think of the world as a competition of military powers?
 
Yeah, you are actually right. And I think we will avoid war. The problem with the Americans is, it’s not just their liberalism. It’s the possibility that we will pursue a rollback policy. During the Cold War the American grand strategy towards the Soviet Union was: containment, containment, containment. We now know from the historical record that the United States was not only pursuing containment. We were trying to rollback Soviet power to put it bluntly. We were trying to wreck the Soviet Union. And I would not be surprised moving forward with regard to China if the United States pursues a serious rollback policy.
 
So you’re saying throughout history the United States was always pursuing rollback policies? 

Look, you don’t respect the power of other nations. You fear the power of other nations.
 
Will there be a war with China in the 21st century?
 
I don’t know. But my argument is yes, there will be war with China
 

Thursday, October 26, 2023

The US War On China | Edward N. Luttwak

Xi’s incessant calls for “combat readiness” may mean that he actually doubts that Chinese military forces are ready for real combat. Its navy, after all, is brand new and inexperienced, while the air force is greatly inferior in its technology, mostly relying on Soviet jet engines, radar-evading “stealth” that is not really stealthy, and inferior missiles. But more importantly, Xi’s intense bellicosity and intense calls for “the rejuvenation of the Chinese people” suggests motives that we cannot even imagine. No, not Taiwan, which China could have had for the asking by merely treating Hong Kong’s freedoms with demonstrative respect, making “one country, two systems” very attractive to the Taiwanese.
 
» There is no China. There is only Xi. He is a dictator. He is isolated. He is obsessed. Kill the bastard ! 
Wang Yi is but a lackey. China is corrupt and weak. Dump Ukraine and destroy China ! «
 
» Know your enemy. He will win who knows why to fight how to fight when to fight and when not to fight. «
  Sun Tzu, The Art of War.
 
Much more likely is his personal sense of shame that China’s history is a long sequence of defeats at the hands of badly outnumbered invaders — the Turkic, Mongol and Manchurian Jurchen tribes-people, and then the Japanese who might still be there if they had not attacked the US. As with Mussolini, then, Xi’s real aim may well be to turn his unwarlike people into warriors.