Since 2017, when Trump entered the White House, the balance of power has shifted in China’s favor, though the United States remains the world’s most powerful state. China is rapidly closing the gap, particularly in cutting-edge technologies, which Washington fears could tilt global economic and military power. As China converts its economic strength into military might, it builds not just regional forces but also blue-water naval power and global projection capabilities linked to its Belt and Road Initiative. This imitation of US strategy alarms Washington and drives a bipartisan policy of containment.
on international relations theory, offensive realism, the US Zionist lobby, US–China rivalry and great power politics.
Initially, Chinese leaders argued that economic interdependence would prevent conflict, since prosperity required cooperation. However, survival—not prosperity—is the primary goal of states in an anarchic international system with no higher authority. As China’s economic rise translated into growing military capacity, American fear replaced optimism, triggering security competition in East Asia. Prosperity enriched both sides, but balance-of-power politics and survival imperatives outweighed economic interdependence theory.
» Great powers are ruthless, exploiting weaker rivals to secure survival and expand influence. «
John J. Mearsheimer's complete discourse video.
China’s trajectory fits this pattern. As its power has grown since the 1990s, Beijing naturally seeks to dominate East Asia. Yet the US cannot tolerate another regional hegemon, making containment inevitable. From Washington’s perspective, preventing Chinese hegemony is about survival, not choice. From Beijing’s perspective, seeking hegemony is equally rational. The result is a structural clash: both sides are locked in an intensifying security competition driven by the anarchic nature of the international system.
» The United States lives in mortal fear that the Chinese are going to dominate. «
The Ukraine war
creates two major problems for the US: it prevents a full pivot to Asia
and deepens the Sino-Russian partnership. Trump recognized this dynamic
and sought rapprochement with Moscow to peel Russia away from China, but
his chances of success are slim. Russia deeply distrusts the US, and
Trump underestimated the difficulty of ending the Ukraine conflict. His
instincts—to improve ties with Russia and focus on China—align with
realist logic, but his reliance on instincts over experts undermines
effective execution.
» It's only recently that Putin has brought the Russians back
from the dead and we now consider Russia to be a great power. «
Since 2017, US policy has shifted decisively from engagement to containment of China, first under Trump and then reinforced, even hardened, under Biden. Yet American forces remain tied down in Ukraine and the Middle East. Deployments against the Houthis in the Red Sea and the prospect of war with Iran divert vital resources away from East Asia, just as China grows militarily stronger. Past US experiments in social engineering—in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya—ended in failure, raising doubts about new entanglements that sap the capacity to counter China.
Facing escalating global uncertainties, Chinese President Xi Jinping said the SCO is increasingly
responsible for regional peace, stability, and member-state development, August 31, 2025.
Ultimately, the US–China rivalry reflects structural realities of power politics. Both states seek survival through maximizing power, and both see regional hegemony as the path to security. The United States, the sole global hegemon since 1900, refuses to share that status, while China, closing the gap, sees dominance in East Asia as essential. The result is an enduring, intensifying contest that economic interdependence or diplomatic optimism cannot erase.
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