Blowing in the Wind | Germany's Renewable Energy Devolution

After two decades of Green Craze, Global Warming Doom, and hundreds of billions of Euros of subsidies,
how much of Germany's energy consumption is actually supplied by its solar and wind parks?
Less than 3 percent (HERE + HERE)

Demographics as Destiny

Business Insider (Nov 30, 2015) - What the size of the world's workforce will be like in a decade is well predictable, since the future workers have already been born. Demographics have long been a key determinant of potential growth rates, but the change in the global population over the next few years is unprecedented. Japan's population started to shrink in the mid-1990s and Germany's started shrinking around the year 2000, but the world's most populous country, China, is now seeing its working-age population shrink for the first time. Though the overall global population will continue to grow for some time yet, the growth of the working-age population is slowing down pretty much everywhere. That's relevant for a bundle of reasons. Around the world there will be fewer workers to support a growing number of retirees. But it also has some economists expecting significant pressure on wages.

 The sea of red and pink across the advanced world means contraction, no growth,
or slow growth. Only in a belt of the developing world (in Africa particularly)
is there any substantial expansion coming by 2020. Credits: HSBC (Nov 2015)
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If employers have to fight for a group of workers that is growing more slowly, or even declining, they will need to encourage people to move, and their labour will be more valuable. Some countries, like Japan, Russia, and parts of Europe, have already entered the stage that the rest of the world is going into — and they've struggled with it. In Japan, slowing economic growth has made the county's ever-expanding pile of public debt more and more difficult to deal with, and the working-age population has already declined by 11.1% in the past 20 years. Smaller populations mean less demand and less potential output. More retirees relative to the number of working-age people means more fiscal pressure: greater expenditure on healthcare and less tax income. Globally, although working-age populations are still growing, HSBC expects global potential growth to be 0.6ppt lower per year over the next decade compared with the past decade given these demographic changes. Not great news for heavily indebted economies (see also HERE).

Martin Armstrong's Political Economy | 72 Year Cycle of Political Change

"Bretton Woods took place in 1944. Adding 72 years brings us to 2016. This model has been
uncanny in predicting political change." (recent interview HERE)

Martin Armstrong (Jan 8, 2013) - Where does the Political-Economy Model stand right now for the West? The answer to that question is the epic turn appears to be 2016. Bretton Woods took place in 1944. Adding 72 years brings us to 2016. This model has been uncanny in predicting political change incorporating the same frequency for volatility. The Russian Revolution of 1917 was right on target with the fall of the Berlin Wall 72 years later in 1989. This strongly warns that this wave in the Economic Confidence Model due to peak 2015.75, will be extremely important. This is the time frame we have been looking at for the past 30 years for the next Sovereign Debt Crisis. Certain trends simply cannot be sustained beyond 72 years without change. 

"High Treason" - Federal Republic of Germany established May 23, 1949 + 72 Years = 2021

This time that change is coming by dragging the politicians by the hair cave-man style. How intelligent people just cannot see the problem with borrowing perpetually and never having any intention of paying off the debt, it’s simply unimaginable. The previous cycle turning in 1872 and that led to what is known as the “long depression” of the 19th century everyone concedes lasted for 26 years. This is why the real estate model is 78 years. It too is closely aligned with political turmoil that always brings structural change [...] Consequently, we are looking at 2014 for the beginning of a rise in separatism and civil unrest around the West. Then we see 2016 and the start of a nasty economic decline. We could see things get real bad during the 2016-2020 phase. That may actually be the bottom in the European economic meltdown (see also HERE)

Martin Armstrong (Oct 17, 2015) - Each country has its own unique cycle. There was a very major turning point in France that nearly became a revolution [in May 1968]. Even Charles de Gaulle secretly left France for a few hours after fearing for his life and a revolution [...] The French socialist state is now collapsing under Hollande. Civil unrest will erupt moving into 2017 and then there is the risk of another major cultural revolution as the youth do not share the same values as the socialistic elites who are in control. We will see that risk erupt by 2020 or 51.6 years from the May 1968 cultural revolution (see also HERE)

The Demographic Crash of Civilizations

According to the latest United Nations World Population Report, the current global population of 7.3 billion is projected to rise to 8.5 billion by 2030, 9.7 billion by 2050, and 11.2 billion by 2100. Yet, perhaps the most significant development of the twenty-first century is not population growth, but the silent extinction of peoples, nations, cultures, and civilizations.

The so-called "developed world" is neglecting one of the most fundamental responsibilities of any enduring civilization: raising the next generation. Civilization, culture, social cohesion, and economic prosperity all depend on a basic prerequisite—continued human existence. Without reproduction, all other achievements ultimately become irrelevant.

 Prosperity, war, birth control, decadence, exploitation, austerity, abortion, and social decline are all mirrored in the changing age structure of the German population across the years 1910, 1970, 2009, and the projection for 2060. (HERE)

 

Take Germany as an example. The country has a population of approximately 82 million, with a fertility rate of 1.43—a figure that continues to decline. Of this population, around 17 million have a recent immigrant background, and roughly 22 million are retirees. Germany’s labor force still numbers about 40 million, but neoliberal reforms under the Schröder-Merkel governments have contributed to the marginalization of an estimated 11 to 18 million people, creating a socio-economic underclass.

Approximately 8 million working-age adults (18 to 65) are unable to sustain themselves—either unemployed or trapped in precarious, low-wage employment such as contract work, “One-Euro jobs,” part-time roles, mini-jobs, and other exploitative schemes tied to the Hartz labor market reforms. Around half a million Germans are homeless, many of them children, in a system where the remaining taxpayers finance what can only be described as institutionalized social neglect.

The average worker surrenders nearly two-thirds of their gross income to taxation, while the state has poured €400 billion into rescuing failing banks and continues to pay €100 million in daily interest on public debt. Within this socio-economic landscape, roughly 650,000 children are born each year—one-third to parents of immigrant backgrounds—compared to around 840,000 deaths annually, resulting in a net loss of nearly 200,000 people per year.

In essence, as it rapidly ages and grows poorer, Germany loses the equivalent of a mid-sized city every year. Official projections indicate the population will shrink to between 65 and 74 million by 2060, depending on annual net migration levels (ranging from 100,000 to 400,000). Meanwhile, demographic collapse among the native population continues, marked by a third of women remaining childless, over 200,000 abortions annually, and other structural factors contributing to a sustained decline in birth rates.

Combined with immigration policies perceived by critics as prioritizing replacement over integration, Germany faces the potential erasure of its historic national identity within this century. This trajectory is not unique; similar patterns can be observed across nearly all other European nations.
 

 The Pentagon’s all-season recipe for disaster—straight from the NATO playbook—consists of orchestrated regime changes and civil wars, which in turn trigger mass migration and the subsequent settlement of a globalized lumpenproletariat and refugee populations among 30 million unemployed and 120 million impoverished native Europeans. (HERE + HERE + HERE)

As of today, the global average fertility rate stands at 2.3, with 80% of the world’s population living in countries where women, on average, have fewer than three children. This means that global fertility is only marginally above the replacement level, and current population growth is primarily driven by increased life expectancy rather than high birth rates. In 1960, China’s fertility rate was 6.1; today it has fallen to 1.6. Iran’s fertility rate dropped from 6.3 in 1985 to 1.9 today. Thailand followed a similar trajectory: from 6.14 in 1955 to 3.92 in 1985, and down to 1.49 today.

The issue facing the developed world is not only economic stagnation but also demographic decline. Many nations are aging rapidly and experiencing fertility rates well below the replacement threshold—some have arguably passed the demographic point of no return. The lowest fertility rates globally are concentrated in the most industrialized regions of Asia: China (1.55), Japan (1.40), South Korea (1.25), Taiwan (1.11), Hong Kong (1.04), Macau (0.91), and Singapore (0.80). Similarly low, near-extinction fertility rates are seen in parts of Southern Europe and former Soviet states: Portugal (1.52), Spain (1.48), Italy (1.42), Greece (1.41), Poland (1.33), and Ukraine (1.30).

In contrast, Africa remains demographically youthful. In 2015, children under 15 made up 41% of its population, with another 19% aged 15 to 24. Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as much of Asia—regions that have seen substantial fertility declines—show smaller proportions of children (26% and 24%, respectively) and comparable shares of youth (17% and 16%). Together, these three regions were home to 1.7 billion children and 1.1 billion young people in 2015.

Source: UN DESA

 Source: CIA World Factbook.